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Globalization and Capitalist Geopolitics
Globalization and Capitalist Geopolitics is concerned with the growth of
transnational corporate power against the backdrop of the decline of the West
and the struggle by non-Western states to challenge and overcome domina-
tion of the rest of the world by the West. At the centre of the study is the
problematic status of the US as guarantor of global security and imperial
nation in decline. The declining power of America in a multipolar world
places a question mark under the future of Western leadership of globalization.
Woodley interrogates the structure of contemporary world order and
examines competing approaches to globalization and global capitalism in
international relations and international political economy. He engages with
key scholars in the ﬁeld, and provides an authoritative yet accessible com-
mentary on debates on globalization and geopolitics in the wake of the global
ﬁnancial crisis.
In a period of increasing geopolitical insecurity and geoeconomic transi-
tion, this book is a major contribution to the debate on globalization. It is a
key resource for students and scholars seeking a deeper understanding of the
historical and economic determinants of neoliberal capitalism, the impact of
global economic convergence for Western economies, and the implications of
globalization for the reconstruction of contemporary world order.
Daniel Woodley teaches politics at DLD College in London. He is the author
of numerous articles and textbooks on ideology and political theory, including
Fascism and Political Theory (2010), also published by Routledge.
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Preface
In an age of increasing uncertainty and risk, students of international rela-
tions are struggling to describe and explain the dissonance between global
politics as the study of globalization and transnational governance, and geo-
politics as the study of conﬂict between competing regional blocs or ‘great
spaces’. This has led many commentators to theorize a new multipolar order,
as US leadership falters and emerging powers challenge Western hegemony. It
has also led some commentators to retreat from theories of cosmopolitanism
and complex interdependence back to classical theories of geopolitics which
resituate international conﬂict in the immutable logic of geographical deter-
minism as if the internationalization of capitalist relations of power instan-
tiated by corporate globalization – which has integrated former communist
states and developing economies into the structures of neoliberal global
capitalism – had not taken place.
To explain the material determinants of contemporary geopolitics a new
approach is required based on insights drawn from critical political economy.
Although the US continues to preside over a quasi-imperial system of power
based on global military preponderance and ﬁnancial statecraft, and is reluc-
tant to recognize the realities of global economic convergence, the age of
imperial state hegemony is giving way to a new international economic order
characterized by capitalist sovereignty and the competition between regional/
transnational concentrations of power for geopolitical security. From this
perspective, contemporary geopolitics should be understood as a transna-
tional strategic practice employed by powerful industrialized economies which
mirrors predatory corporate rivalry for control over global markets, reprodu-
cing the structural conditions for corporate power through the transnational
state form of capital. The emerging conﬂict between the West and ‘Hobbesian
contenders’ such as Russia and China is less a geopolitical struggle between
‘great spaces’ or a ‘clash of civilizations’, as some commentators have sug-
gested, than a competition between alternative models of capitalist develop-
ment and capitalist ﬁnance in a multipolar world order in which transnational
corporate power is the deﬁning feature of human social organization.
The text outlines a Marxian approach to international political economy,
examining the debate on globalization and geopolitics from the perspective of
capitalist sovereignty. Capitalist sovereignty resolves at a transnational level
the tension between equal juridical sovereignty and material inequality in
an international political economy mediated by the oligarchic power of
ﬁnance. Neoliberal global capitalism is deﬁned by a transition from imperial
state hegemony to transnational corporatism in a decentred world-system
where the determining logic of capital is organized and diﬀused through
structures of economic integration, securitization and ﬁnancial surveillance
necessitated by the growing internationalization of production, trade and
investment. This geoeconomic order has its origins in European imperialism,
yet the logic of globalization lies not in empire but in the directionless
expansion of capital as a mode of power. The transnationally constituted
power of ﬁnancial capital is valorized politically through the global state form
of capital which transcends the Hobbesian antinomy of disorder and terri-
torial sovereignty in an attempt to escape traditional categories of territorial
political authority. But while the liberal international order founded by the
West has irreversibly transformed international political economy, the insti-
tutional and ideological form of globalization is now evolving beyond the
geopolitical control of the West as new concentrations of ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic power are established in Asia and beyond, challenging the transna-
tionally constituted geopolitical power of the Anglosphere for the ﬁrst time in
modern history.
Chapter 1 examines the changing structure of the world-system in an age of
transnational corporate power – a transformation which is redeﬁning the
international political economy of world order. Chapter 2 then elaborates a
theory of capital as the ‘objective subject’ of a new global sociality founded
upon the directionless self-expansion and valorization of value. As a self-
expanding mode of power, capital is structured through the corporate social
organization of commodity-producing societies (Chapter 3) and mediated
through the transnational state form of ﬁnancial capital (Chapter 4). Follow-
ing this, Chapter 5 assesses the extent to which the accumulation crisis of
western capitalism is undermining the leadership of the US in the global
economy. It suggests that the failure of the Anglo-Saxon nations to accept
their declining power in the international system and restructure their
indebted economies is leading the West towards ﬁnancial and monetary col-
lapse as rising powers in Eurasia prepare to move towards a post-US-centric
international monetary system.
Chapter 6 then investigates the new economic regionalism in international
relations, focusing on the growth of emerging markets in Asia and Latin
America as regional economies seek greater autonomy from the constraints of
western international ﬁnancial institutions. Finally, Chapter 7 examines the
counterhegemonic challenge to the global monetary power of the West
represented by the rise of China and resurgence of Russia as two principal
revisionist states in the world-system. While China has thus far refused to
aggressively balance the US, restricting itself to the formation of commercial
structures and ﬁnancial institutions to accommodate its expanding economic
xiv Preface
footprint, Russia has made clear it seeks to replace the petrodollar with a new
global energy trading system and to promote greater interregionalism in the
greater Eurasian space. This lies at the heart of the present confrontation
between the US and Russia in Ukraine, a conﬂict designed to force European
powers to choose between a transatlantic past and a Eurasian future as the
US pivots towards East Asia and turns to address its approaching domestic
political crises.
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1 Globalization and world order
Introduction
The following study is concerned with the tension between globalization and
geopolitics in a multipolar world order where the balance of global economic
power is shifting as emerging capitalist states challenge the established ﬁnan-
cial and political domination of the West in international politics. The aim of
the text is to reconnect the twin logics of capital and territoriality separated in
Marxist and neorealist international political economy (IPE) through the idea
of capitalist sovereignty, and to assess the implications of corporate globali-
zation for the economic security and future prosperity of the West as that
region of the world where rationalization traditionally has been most
advanced (Stiegler 2010). Globalization is proceeding in a world characterized
by cooperative and antagonistic relations between states and regional organi-
zations of states which, despite growing pressure to comply with the norms of
global governance, continue to compete for resources and regional dom-
inance. However, while geoeconomic rivalry remains an essential feature of
international relations – exempliﬁed by the conﬂict between the West and the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies over the
future of the international monetary system – imperialist geopolitics as tra-
ditionally practised by hegemonic states is increasingly inconsistent with the
transnational organization of trade, investment and production in a post-US-
centric global economy in which the balance of economic power is shifting
towards Asia. International relations between states and regional economic
formations are determined less by territorial ﬁxity and interimperial rivalry
than by the overarching logic of accumulation organized through transna-
tional commodity chains, not merely between advanced economies in the
‘Lockean heartland’, but between advanced economies and ‘Hobbesian con-
tenders’ seeking to challenge the prerogative right of the West to determine
the geopolitical and ideological form of global capitalism in a posthegemonic
international system.
The thesis of capitalist sovereignty places the value form-determined rela-
tion of power at the centre of theoretical analysis. It is necessary to move
beyond well-meaning critiques of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank or World Trade Organization (WTO) as agencies of the ‘collec-
tive imperialism of the Triad’ (Amin 2011) to understand the transnationali-
zation of corporate power and foreign direct investment (FDI) outside the
core capitalist economies where accumulation has traditionally been con-
centrated. While capital is supported by state actors which sustain conditions
of accumulation, and while rivalry between a ‘plurality of centres of accu-
mulation remains a constitutive dimension of contemporary capitalism’
(Callinicos 2002: 262) – and is often organized directly by states through
sovereign wealth funds (Woolridge 2012) – it is power over global markets
which endows ﬁnancial capital with the capacity to determine frameworks of
global extraction and accumulation, and to consolidate and extend the structural
asymmetries of power that sustain transnational corporatism.
As Marx argued in Grundrisse, the ‘tendency to create the world market is
directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit is a barrier to be
overcome’ (Marx 1973: 408). In the political economy of globalization capital
assumes the role of the objective subject: the sole aim capital is capable of
realizing is self-augmentation through the valorization of value – not simply
the blind accumulation of surplus-value through the direct exploitation of
commodiﬁed labour-power in spatially bounded production sites, but the
exponential growth of synthetic market values through the growth of capital-
ist ﬁnance as an end in itself rather than an instrument for the development of
production and commerce. Financial capital is managed for the beneﬁt of
transnational investors – an interlocking network of corporate-state elites
centred in North America, Europe and Asia whose class proﬁle is fragmented
but whose structural power is articulated through a transnationally con-
stituted geopolitics that transcends the territorially embedded interests of
national capitals. As transnationally constituted power, global ﬁnance struc-
tures capital ﬂows, patterns of cross-border investment and commodity pro-
duction, aligning foreign and security policy between economies in the
capitalist core in a hierarchical system of cooperation and competition with
peripheral economies.
This process of transnationalization and world modernization – always
partial, uneven and incomplete, has implications for the structural logic of
anarchy in international relations (IR) by creating incentives for multi-
lateralism, yet globalization simultaneously creates new sources of conﬂict
between transnational capital and regional power centres along the arc of
geopolitical insecurity from Central Asia to the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), as advanced capitalist economies try to exploit, yet struggle
to contain the legacies of, weak state formation in the periphery
(Dannreuther 2013), to limit the rise of an independent Eurasian alliance
system resistant to Western geopolitical intervention, to constrain China’s
diplomatic and economic penetration of pro-Western client states in Asia,
Latin America and the Middle East, and to suppress counterhegemonic nation-
alist and religious movements by direct force.1 Despite liberal-cosmopolitan
dreams of a ‘global commonwealth of citizens’ (Archibugi 2008), the
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willingness of Western corporate-state elites to manage globalization through
transnational institutions is diminished by their refusal to recognize at an
institutional level the changing balance of power in the world economy and
the structural imbalances created by the ﬁscal and monetary crisis of the
American state.
To make sense of capitalist sovereignty in a world structured by nation-
states, it is necessary to theorize transnational corporatism against the back-
drop of debates in IR and the ‘relative decline’ of the West. As Robinson
argues, the dynamic force of global capital and the relative economic power
of capitalist nations are increasingly determined by forces and institutions
‘grounded in the global system rather than the interstate system’ (Robinson
2004a: 56). Yet despite belated recognition of the impact of global capitalism
on international politics, IR remains not only epistemologically conﬁned in
state-centric theory (methodological nationalism), but fails to deal adequately
with three themes in the political economy of world order, namely the con-
solidation of corporate power in the transition from liberal to postliberal
capitalism, the rise of a transnational security system consistent with the
defence of corporate property, and the challenge posed by the economic
geography of regionalism to the ﬁnancial and geopolitical power of the West.
Contrary to the claims of cosmopolitan theorists, a world federation foun-
ded on shared commitment to liberal universalism is implausible, not merely
because revisionist states such as Russia and China favour mercantilism and
question Anglo-American leadership of the global economy, but because
transnational corporatism itself is incompatible with democratic authority
and legal accountability. The pressure to comply with rules-based trade com-
pels all states to adapt to ‘complex interdependence’ in their own interests, as
neoliberal institutionalists correctly argue; yet corporate ﬁnancial capital (a
private mode of power engineered for the pecuniary gain of investors) and
democracy (a public mode of decision making for resolving distribution issues
in sovereign polities) are essentially antithetical: far from empowering states
to establish a rational basis for multilateral co-governance (synarchy), inter-
national legal agreements such as the proposed Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) threaten to restrict market
competition and limit the capacity of states to enact legislation to regulate
corporations, thereby consolidating the economic and political power of the
transnational investor class – while potentially also excluding Russian ﬁrms
from EU markets.
Dominated by Anglo-American scholarship, mainstream IR has been rela-
tively slow to explore these themes, for while globalization promotes trade
and investment and advances ‘synarchic’ properties in the world-system (co-
governance between states and open interregionalism), the uneven and combined
development of global capitalism has produced a ‘coexistence of multiplicity’
in the international system in which no single economy or economic model is
triumphant. In addition, while the rapid development of capitalist forms in
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emerging economies is challenging Western economic leadership, the insertion
of core and peripheral economies into structures of global governance – whose
agendas are co-determined by corporate power – is problematizing the historic
status of the uniﬁed state actor as the epistemological ground of IR.
Although globalization requires the national state form of capital to
reproduce non-capitalist social structures of accumulation (Kotz 1994, 2007),
it simultaneously creates unstable dynamics between economies at diﬀerent
stages of development in a ‘heterogeneous interstate system that yields an
endless proliferation of transnational actors and identities’ (Wilson 2009: 35).
This entails not simply the intrusion of ‘irrational’ identities and practices in
an otherwise ‘rational’ world system formed during ﬁve centuries of Western
hegemony, but a rupture in the linear modernizing dynamic of liberal uni-
versalism characterized by a jettisoning of the growth paradigm of indus-
trialism and progress and a reversion to non-capitalist informal economy/
decommodiﬁed labour-power across disaggregated and spatially distributed
supply chains in emerging market economies where local ﬁrms employing
billions of low-paid workers in ‘special production zones’ compete for contracts
to supply global brands (cf. Sanyal 2007).
The securitization necessary to sustain this global accumulation regime has
also contributed to the development of ‘parapolitics’, namely the nexus of
transnational power interests that ﬂourishes along the interstices between
formal government, the ‘deep state’ and organized crime which is dyadic to
corporate power as a form of globalized predatory entrepreneurialism (Wilson
2009; cf. Deneault 2010; Napoleoni 2009; Blakely 2009). Wilson (2012)
derives the deep state from the structure of the liberal ‘dual state’ which
represses and conceals political conﬂict and which sustains the bourgeois
illusion of a rational ‘risk-free’ business civilization but which cannot over-
come its genesis in the originary violence of state formation. In the post-9/11
era the deep state is ﬁnally revealed for what it is: the crimogenic dimension
of liberal order. Parapolitics, in this sense, is also the ‘study of criminal
sovereignty, of criminals behaving as sovereigns and sovereigns behaving as
criminals in a systematic way’ (Cribb 2009: 8).
A second theme of the text is the present contradictory status of the US as
self-appointed guarantor of global security and superpower in decline – the
‘indispensible nation’ whose control over international ﬁnance and global
security have been severely tested by the failure of the Iraq war and the
impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis (Xinbo 2010). To understand the condi-
tion of the last superpower, it is necessary to consider the academic con-
troversy between unipolar optimists – apologists for Pax Americana under a
‘liberal Leviathan’ (Ikenberry 2011; Kindleberger 1981) – and unipolar pessi-
mists – neorealist and neo-Marxist critics of US foreign policy who reject
hegemonic stability theory and/or emphasize the inherently conﬂictual char-
acter of attempts to establish an enduring global hegemony (Kennedy 1987;
Mearsheimer 2001; Layne 2012; Monteiro 2014; Waltz 1993; Zakaria 2011;
Arrighi 1994, 2007). The thesis of unipolar pessimists is hardly new, for as
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Gilpin argued in the 1980s, while the normative role of a hegemon is to act as
the cement binding the international system (providing collective private
goods like security where no state can be denied access to a good or where
consumption of a good by one actor does not preclude its enjoyment by
others), the rapid expansion and ﬁnancialization of the global economy under
American leadership has unleashed centrifugal forces that will ultimately
overwhelm the US. Anticipating Arrighi (1994), Gilpin (1987) stressed that
corporations in a global capitalist economy must continually restructure and
relocate economic activities to remain competitive and expand market share,
with major implications for the geoeconomic balance of power: unleashing
the global market, he argues, creates a ‘new political environment […] With
the inevitable shift in the international distribution of economic and military
power from the core to rising nations in the periphery and elsewhere, the
capacity of the hegemon to maintain the system decreases’ (Gilpin 1987: 77–8).
Unprecedented in the present epoch are: (i) the gap between US military
and economic capabilities; (ii) the rapidity of America’s decline from unipolar
ascendency in the ‘permissive environment’ of the early post-Cold War period
to defensive retrenchment and reluctant multilateralism in the present decade
as the geopolitical foundations of the US-centric order are eroded; and (iii)
the growing gulf between the wealth of transnational ﬁnancial corporations
headquartered in the US and the collapse of America’s economy since 2007.
Yet mainstream IR continues to be framed in terms acceptable to US foreign
policymakers. The only issues separating neorealists and neoliberals are their
respective views on the possibility of multilateral cooperation: both elide not
only the precedents for America’s intervention in Iraq (Sarai 2008; Burman
2007; Hartnet & Stengrim 2006; Konings 2010; Stokes 2004), or the manip-
ulation of the international monetary system by the Federal Reserve (Hudson
2003; Wheatley 2013a), but also the illiberal character of neoliberalism as an
economic ideology which has destroyed embedded liberalism in favour of
corporate ownership and privatized citizenship, leading to a general ‘regres-
sion in thought and social organization that has been detrimental to the vast
majority of individual lives and societies as a whole’ (Bone 2010: 725;
O’Flynn 2012; Wallerstein 1995).
Despite the deep malaise of US society (Hedges 2009; Berman 2011), as
apologists for Western hegemony, neorealists and neoliberals both contend
that the US must remain active in the ﬁeld of global security by countering
regional hegemons and binding rising powers within the existing structure of
global governance. Yet the shifting nature of world order is reﬂected in a trend
towards ‘soft balancing’ as proto-peers and regional powers seek to counter
US leadership in global institutions without challenging the US directly (Pape
2005; Bobrow 2008). This has caught the Anglosphere by surprise, no less than
Russia’s willingness to use ‘hard balancing’ to limit the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) encroachment into the post-Soviet space of Eurasia,
which has led the US in turn to retaliate with economic sanctions and pres-
sure on Saudi Arabia to depress the market price of Russia’s primary export
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and source of hard currency. These developments presage the end of a distinct
period in the evolution of the international system:
The post-Cold War era was quite literally deﬁned by endings: of bipolarity,
and of the threat of total nuclear annihilation. That ending has, at last,
ended. Post-post-Cold War politics are deﬁned by an increasingly chaotic
diversity of ideas and practices. That the Chinese, Indian and Russian
models of capitalism diverge systematically from the erstwhile simplicity
of market fundamentalism is hardly surprising. The same holds in the
security realm where these and other rising states seek their own roles,
channels of inﬂuence, and representation in regional and global govern-
ance structures, which the old American-made Cold War and post-Cold
War order by its very nature could not accommodate.
(Abdelal & Krotz 2014: 132)
The US has attempted to impose a rehierarchization of world order, arrogat-
ing ‘special governance rights’ to Western economies while denying equivalent
categorial rights to self-determination and non-intervention to emerging
economies (Reus-Smit 2005b: 72). Yet the era when international relations
could be guided and balanced by a ‘superpower’ is ending and those obser-
vers who still see ‘no credible alternative to the American role as lynchpin and
guarantor of the global system grossly overestimate the current US capacity’
(Cohen 2008: 3; Layne 2012).
What remains to be determined is whether peaceful transition to multi-
polarity is possible – facilitating the ascent of China, India, Russia and Iran
as emerging powers (Zakaria 2011; Hiro 2010; Tselichtchev 2012), or whether
the US will attempt to delay global convergence by embroiling contenders in
low-intensity regional conﬂicts (as in Ukraine) or fostering internal unrest (as
in Iran). The power of the Anglosphere derives from the transnational orga-
nization of capitalist ﬁnance, which has accelerated the de-democratization and
deterritorialization of political decision making, yet the uncontrolled growth
of neoliberal globalization has also accelerated the rapid and uneven growth
of capital markets and investment outside the Lockean heartland. The para-
dox of world order is that having created the institutional basis for multi-
lateral trade and governance, the West is unwilling to sanction a minimum
level of geopolitical rebalancing necessary to allow contenders a propor-
tionate voice in international politics or to enable the global market to func-
tion as neoclassical theory claims it ought – that is, by yielding positive-sum
welfare gains through free trade. This subversion of rationality by Western
ﬁnancial capital lies at the heart of recurring crises in the Western-led global
economy which emerging economies blame on the ‘domestic needs of the
country issuing the primary reserve currency [clashing] with international
ﬁscal requirements’ (Hiro 2010: 287).
This leads to a third major theme in the text, namely the origins of Amer-
ica’s economic decline and the problem of overaccumulation in ﬁnancialized
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economies. Much has been written on the origins of the global ﬁnancial crisis
and the ﬁnancialization of Western economies, and as we shall see in Chapter
5, the decline of the US economy has been determined less by cyclical than
structural economic factors – an historically speciﬁc conﬂuence of contingent
processes including weakness of demand formation (Cynamon 2013; Foster &
Magdoﬀ 2009; Stiegler 2011), ﬁscal and monetary instability, misallocation of
capital and mass employment (Nasser 2013), constraints to growth posed by
declining access to cheap energy (Heinberg 2005; Ruppert 2004), and the
reappropriation of developmental sovereignty by non-Western states acting
through regional organizations as competitors to the Washington consensus
(Nicolas 2012; Telò 2007; Ambrosio 2005; Chance 2010). However, the origins
of the crisis lie in the nature of capital itself, and in the attempt by corporate-
state elites to overcome the contradiction between accumulation and declining
proﬁtability in deindustrialized societies.
In liberal economic theory, overaccumulation is typically deﬁned as capital
superabundance, a self-generating process stimulated by ﬁnancial innovation
and securitization, through which investors leverage positions and maximize
yields at the expense of long-term investments. In critical IPE, on the other
hand, overaccumulation is linked to a decline in the rate of return on capital
investment and the failure of the rate of proﬁt to recover from recessions,
leading to a structural crisis of valorization where ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial
corporations seek higher returns through the accumulation of ‘ﬁctitious
value’. Deﬁned in orthodox or Marxian terms, however, the assumption is the
same: that the value of ‘ﬁctitious capital’ has expanded so far out of propor-
tion to the ‘real’ economy of production and consumption that the latter risks
being overwhelmed by a glut of idle capital that cannot be usefully or proﬁt-
ably invested. The beneﬁciaries of this system are assumed to be predatory
(and interchangeable) corporate-state elites that have depended on ﬁat money
creation to sustain their power over local economies based on consumption
and savings for the last four decades.
However, while it is accepted that revenues generated through ﬁnancialized
capitalism dwarf the level of value generated in commodity production,
and while devaluation and deleveraging are sources of instability in ﬁnancialized
economies, the argument that capital accumulation has reached its historic
limits must be placed in question, not merely because new potential sources
of value augmentation exist beyond the US, EU and Japan, but because the
assumption that value is derived exclusively from direct exploitation of
labour-power as a commodity is unsustainable. As we shall see in more detail
in Chapter 2, capital constitutes an abstract ordering force which anticipates
new forms of spatial organization to sustain the subsumption of new
geographical regions, populations and resources beneath the category of value.
Yet we cannot proceed with an analysis of dominant capital unless we are
prepared (i) to rethink the classical Marxian notion of value as a precise
‘crystallization’ of abstract labour, and (ii) to question the false dichotomiza-
tion of real and ﬁctitious value in historical materialism. In recent years,
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energetic attempts have been made to save Marx’s labour theory of value
from revisionist critique by focusing on its purely symbolic function as a cri-
tical discourse on capital enabling individuals to comprehend the hidden
nature of capitalist exploitation (Harvey 1982; Hardt & Negri 1994). How-
ever, attempts to disconnect the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the
labour theory of value are extremely problematic, for, as Nitzan and Bichler
(2009: 124) argue, studying the ‘rationalist order of capitalism without quan-
tities is like studying feudalism without religion, or physics without mathe-
matics’. By deﬁnition, the authors observe, capital ‘seeks to turn quality into
quantity, to objectify and reify social relations as if they were natural and
unassailable’ (ibid.). Marxian IPE should be concerned less with the produc-
tion of value through material exploitation of human labour-power than the
architecture of global ﬁnancial capital as a transnational mode of power rea-
lized through the organization and manipulation of markets and prices by
ﬁnancialized corporations.
Commodity production remains central to the generation of value in all
capitalist formations, yet continuous realization of above-average proﬁt by
ﬁnancialized corporations has less to do with transforming units of abstract
labour into surplus-value and more to do with capitalization, namely the
capacity of investment managers to speculate on ﬁnancial outcomes and esti-
mate the precise quantity of money capital to invest in the present in order to
realize future gains, a practice that has accelerated as a consequence of the
continual innovation of new ﬁnancial instruments. That is to say, the scale
and scope of capitalization have increased through the continual creation of
more complex ﬁnancial instruments to leverage value from investments in
equities and securities at higher rates than is possible through the exploitation
of labour-power in simple commodity-producing societies or long-term
investments in infrastructure and manufacturing industries.
As Mann argues in his critique of McNally (2009), the crisis has con-
solidated rather than destroyed the ‘rule of value’, for the economic reality of
the crisis ‘lies not in the destruction of value, the end of “ﬁctitious” capitals
and “artiﬁcial” assets, but in the movement (or otherwise) of the category of
value itself to higher levels of abstraction and opacity’ (Mann 2010: 174). The
power of capital
lies to a signiﬁcant extent in the expropriation of labour’s surplus pro-
duct, but the exercise of that power resides more fundamentally in the
hegemonic-categorial logic of value: the territorial and historical impera-
tive of equivalence and substitutability. Abstract labour remains a crucial
manifestation of this relation, but our current condition demonstrates
that value itself is not beholden to labour. The present hegemony of the
category of value is buttressed by capital’s own accumulatory dynamic,
but also by larger transformations in the way that the state exercises its
capacity to govern. These include changing ideas of how the state in
capitalism should exercise authority and those particular shifts in
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regulatory arrangements that liberate capital, via accelerated ﬁnancializa-
tion, from a dependence on labour’s productive capacity, without hindering
its mandate for self-expansion.
(Mann 2010: 177–78)
Financialization is usually explained as an intensive mode of value augmen-
tation and self-synthesis characterized by overaccumulation – the production
of excess capital in proportion to opportunities for its proﬁtable use where
‘individual capitalists driven by competition and striving to maximize their
proﬁts through the exploitation of labour power adopt technologies which
drive the economy away from a balanced accumulation path’ (Harvey 1982:
308). On this view, capital is gradually withdrawn from productive circulation
and immobilized in the money form as corporate actors diversify away from
productive to speculative investments yielding above-normal returns from
market trades in derivatives and other securitized assets unconnected to their
core business. Yet it is diﬃcult to distinguish categorially between ‘real’ and
‘ﬁctitious’ value, for as Mann (2010: 180) notes, the ‘astounding power of the
category of value in capitalism lies precisely in the fact that it “really” renders
these distinctions meaningless’. What deﬁnes capitalist value are the equiva-
lence and substitutability that erase qualitative distinctions between
exchangeable commodities: ‘Surely,’ queries Mann, a ‘theory of value that
relegates a substantial part of value in circulation to the realm of the ﬁctitious
can do little but distract our attention from the fact that the capitalist
dynamics which fundamentally determine our lives depend not on artiﬁcial
variations of value but on value per se?’ (ibid.: 181).
Securitized asset values are simply paper claims to future value, and to
fetishize the category of real value over its ﬁctitious form is to fall into the
trap of reformism which seeks to salvage and relegitimize the productive
accumulation of value in state-democratic formations as a benign mode of
economic reproduction immune from the pathologies of ‘ﬁnancial gambling’
(Mann 2010: 179). Hypothecated values do not negate the pecuniary reality
of synthetic paper investments as derivative forms of money capital in ﬁnan-
cialized economies. What is clear, however, is the discrepancy between the
weak ﬁnancial power of emerging markets and the concentration of capital in
G7 ﬁnancial centres that export inﬂation and low growth via monetary
expansion and ﬁnancial statecraft to developing societies – treating emerging
market economies as ‘disposable adjustment mechanisms’ (Raghuram Rajan,
cited in McKillop 2014).
This reﬂects the comparative advantage enjoyed by the West of a stable
‘trust architecture’, namely ‘property rights protections, reliable legal systems
and institutional depth that owners of capital value’ (Bain & Company 2012:
15). Yet despite this comparative advantage, the West is locked into a spiral of
decline as corporate-state elites jettison the growth paradigm of the 1950s for
a post-growth economy – a ‘socialism for the 1 per cent’ where the corporate
interests of system-relevant ﬁnancial institutions prevail over an eﬃcient
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allocation of resources (Luce 2014). This has increased rather than diminished
the role of the state in the political economy of corporate power and, as
McKillop (2014) argues, the larger the revenue obtained through this rentier
system the more elites can ignore the economic performance of any activity.
Although supported by a sophisticated national security state (Marshall 2010;
Pease 2010), this ‘economy’ is unsustainable because oligarchy ‘seals its own
demise by and through dependence on the rent-takers and seekers who are
inevitably corrupt’ (McKillop 2014), ﬂouting economic rationality and the
ﬁscal stability of states through a restriction of competition and transferral of
private corporate debt to taxpayers (cf. Lynn 2010).
The political economy of world order
At the end of the millennium realists hypothesized three models of world
order in the twenty-ﬁrst century: ‘geoeconomic realism’ – the assertion that
military conﬂict is giving way to non-violent economic rivalry between states;
multipolarity – the view that America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is likely to be short-
lived, leading to conﬂict between the hegemon and revisionist contenders; and
a US-centric order where the US refuses to retrench and unipolarity prevails
(Mastanduno 1999).
Liberals, on the other hand, have been more concerned with the juridiﬁca-
tion of international relations and the increasing interdependence between
states in a globally integrated economy: however paradoxical, ‘the measure of
a state’s capacity to act as an independent unit within the international
system – the condition that “sovereignty” purports both to grant and
describe – depends on the breadth and depth of its links to other states’
(Slaughter 2005: 63; cf. Chayes & Chayes 1995; Boyle 2010). Liberals of all
schools insist that the world is entering a period of greater transnational
institutional innovation and constitutional pluralism in which exclusive
sovereignty – a ‘political entity’s externally recognized right to exercise ﬁnal
authority over its own aﬀairs’ (Biersteker & Weber 1996) – is made redundant
by interdependence, where states continue to pursue self-interested coopera-
tion but no longer exercise or claim exclusive prerogative right in the conduct
of interstate relations (Keohane 2002; Teubner 1997; Rosenau 2007; Gallarotti
2010). Liberals concede that only national states can claim the ‘political impri-
matur that is bestowed by political accountability’ (Slaughter 2005: 35), yet wel-
come the transition towards disaggregated sovereignty and the diﬀusion of power
in supranational institutions (Guzzini 2012). From a liberal-institutionalist per-
spective, international order is no longer contingent on ‘separation, autonomy,
and deﬁned territorial or jurisdictional boundaries, but rather entails connection,
interaction, and interpenetrating networks and institutions […] “Sovereignty as
autonomy” makes no sense today’ (Slaughter 2004: 7; cf. Willke & Willke 2012:
74; Bjola & Kornprobst 2011).
This is complicated by a parallel debate within Marxist IR on the political
economy of world order, where discussion centres on the geopolitical and
10 Globalization and world order
sociomaterial conditions of ‘empire’. On one side of this debate sit ‘tradi-
tional’ Marxists, who link globalization in a conventional sense to imperial-
ism – an economic system based on the subordination of international
political economy to the ‘forms of accumulation in the core capitalist states of
the world market’ (Hanieh 2013: 46; cf. Poulantzas 1975; Petras & Veltmeyer
2001; Berberoglu 2005; Harvey 2003; Callinicos 2009; Panitch & Gindin
2004; Bromley 2003). Here the explicit assumption is that US global hege-
mony after 1945 led to a restructuring of the advanced economies in the
‘capitalist chain’ in the interests of multinational corporations headquartered
in the US and owned primarily by US investors. On the other side of the
debate, neo-Gramscian scholars have focused on the conditions of reproduci-
bility of US international hegemony (Cox 1983; Arrighi 1994), rejecting the
explanatory emphasis of neorealist scholars who emphasize the cyclical
mechanisms of economic change that determine the secular rise and decline
of sectors of production and changing patterns of investment in new sectors
of economic activity in the evolving hierarchy of capitalist economies. For
Gramscians, the rise and fall of empire is linked to ﬁnancialization and the
declining capacity of the hegemon to sustain the material and ideological
conditions for military preponderance.
Wallerstein oﬀers a highly sophisticated version of neo-Marxism based on
his reconceptualization of Kondratieﬀ long-wave cycles in history. He argues
that the capitalist world system that emerged in the sixteenth century has now
reached an impasse as a result of the declining proﬁtability of capitalist forms:
over coming decades, he predicts, the world system will be characterized by
conﬂict between those committed to sustaining the system (transnational
investors and their political allies) and those groups seeking a just alternative
(the rest of humanity). On this view, the world system maintains itself via
‘mechanisms that restore equilibrium every time its processes move away from
it. The equilibrium is never restored immediately, but only after a suﬃcient
deviation from the norm occurs, and of course, it is never restored perfectly’
(Wallerstein 2006a: 75). One of these mechanisms is the state form of capital,
deﬁned as the ‘facilitator of the value-form determined processes of valorisation
and accumulation, and reproducer of the right to levels and forms of use-
value consumption adequate to realise the right to existence’ (Reuten & Wil-
liams 1989: 264), which stabilizes markets by socializing losses to mitigate the
destabilizing eﬀects of ﬁnancialization. Systemic crises are becoming increas-
ingly serious, but while neoliberals depict the crisis of 2007–09 as a ‘normal
accident’ – the ‘temporary breakdown of a high-risk system’ that can be
managed (if not fully resolved) through governance reforms under Western
leadership (Willke & Willke 2012) – neo-Marxists insist that disruptions of
this magnitude are likely to trigger irreversible change in the structural para-
meters of the world system, exposing the limited range of options available to
corporate-state elites acting transnationally (Angeloni 2012). As Wallerstein
notes, secular trends ‘cannot go on forever because they are hot asymptotes’
(leading to diminishing returns as cyclical patterns reach their upper limits).
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As systems approach their asymptotic limits, it is more diﬃcult to reproduce
conditions of equilibrium. As a result the system approaches terminal crisis
and ‘bifurcates – that is, ﬁnds itself before two (or more) alternative routes to
a new structure, with a new equilibrium, new cyclical rhythms and new secular
trends’ (Wallerstein 2006b: 75).
Thus while liberals view capitalism as a global force ‘sustained within a
network of economic ﬁnancial, technological and regulatory inter-
dependencies’ necessary to compensate for systemic risk (Willke & Willke
2012), critical international theorists focus on the material logic of corporate
power in the global economy, emphasizing the limits of globalization and
the potential for counterhegemonic struggles (Worth 2009; Bedirhanog˘lu
2008; Cutler 2005; Robinson 2006). However, while critical theory is right to
identity the illiberal face of corporate globalization and its dependence on
coercive force to remove barriers to capital – rejecting liberal normative
justiﬁcations which state that globalization displaces premodern normative
hierarchies with polyarchy and secularism (Willke 2009) – the epistemological
substance of their critique is tied to a nineteenth-century model of economic
development based on historical materialism. Neo-Marxists are eﬀectively
tied to a theory of historical capitalism, failing to notice that the authentic
object of Marx’s historical science is not history but capital: ‘The epistemo-
logical warrant for Marx’s procedure of inquiry’, argues Westra, ‘derives from
the ontological peculiarity of the object: the tendency of capital towards
self-abstraction and self-synthesis, enabling theory to trace the unfolding of
all the categories of capital in a dialectical thought experiment’ (Westra 2010:
61).
In a global capitalist order deﬁned by disaggregated sovereignty, in which
territorial state power is reframed through cross-cutting vertical/horizontal
institutions of global governance linking state and non-state actors, the
transnational organization of global capital is no longer coterminous with the
‘sovereign’ interests of nation-states, as realists argue, or national capitals, as
Marxists claim. Rather than assume that national interests are derived exclu-
sively from the priority of survival in an anarchic international system,
national interests should be seen as ‘political constructs serving a particular
social purpose’ (Apeldoorn 2014: 16). That social purpose is the valorization
of value, and in a posthegemonic capitalist order no single state can act as the
indispensable lynchpin of the global economy (Robinson 2004b). While it is
useful to examine the state-speciﬁc coherence of capital accumulation and
while states show preference to corporations that advance their own geopoli-
tical interests, it is necessary to move away from state-centric approaches to
globalization and imperialism towards a conception of world order based on
open regions because the national/international distinction is no longer an
‘immutable structural feature’ of world politics (Robinson 2004a). From this
perspective, to describe the international system in the traditional language of
‘imperialism’ is simplistic because US corporations are ‘no longer subservient
to any imperial centre or purpose but multiply their private money sequences
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on the back of monopolies of force and money-issue paid for by increasingly
impoverished citizens’ (McMurtry 2014: 8). It is perhaps more accurate to
argue, as Wilson observes, that the extent to which international relations is
‘subordinated to the paradigm of “securitization” and the technocratic com-
putations of anticipatory self-defense, true politics becomes the exclusive
domain of parapolitical entities who are continuously deciding the emergency
within an eternal (and historically suspended) present’ (Wilson 2012: 27).
In the global capitalist economy, ﬁnance is the dominant form of capital
and if globalization were nothing more than a cipher for American imperial-
ism, as Panitch and Gindin believe, then ‘ﬁnance capital would have to be
dominated by US institutions’, which is not the case, for only 20 per cent of
the 495 leading global corporations classiﬁed as ‘banking and diversiﬁed
ﬁnancials’ are from the US (Fuchs 2010: 239). The political economy of
world order is based less on the prerogative right of the US as a hegemon
acting as the executor of Western imperial interests, than on the shift from a
US-centred economy to a decentred global corporate system increasingly
organized around growth poles in emerging market economies where the
global ﬁnancial crisis is viewed more accurately as a crisis of the Western
ﬁnancial system. The expansion of capitalism in the present epoch reﬂects the
globalizing logic of corporate capital rather than imperial power, such that
the ‘universality of capitalism – its social relations, rules of movement and
contradictions – and the logics of commodity economy, capital accumulation
and pursuit of maximum proﬁt have permeated each and every corner of our
lives’ (Daping 2012: 23). Although US military power is deployed for the
destruction of regional and local sovereignties, the radical ‘decentring’ of world
order is determined in an objective economic sense by movements of capital
that are beyond the capacity of any state to organize or control. As globali-
zation exceeds the geopolitical logic of liberal internationalism we are wit-
nessing an authoritarian intensiﬁcation of valorization necessary to structure
the global totality through the continual expansion of the value form across
globalized and regionalized circuits of power (Liodakis 2010).
After hegemony
Traditionally understood, hegemony indicates the existence of a single state
with the capacity to impose a stable hierarchical organization in the distribu-
tion of power which other states support in their own interests, implying an
absence of military struggle between states and extended periods of accumu-
lation. The concept has been qualiﬁed by neo-Gramscians such as Cox, who
argues that hegemony is founded ‘not only upon the regulation of interstate
conﬂict but also upon a globally conceived civil society, i.e. a mode of pro-
duction of global extent which brings about links among social classes of the
countries encompassed by it’ (Cox 1996: 136). It has also been criticized by
Gill, who notes that traditional geopolitical deﬁnitions are limited since they
link ‘social forces with a territorial entity, whereas the global system needs to
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be conceived as a totality, and the social forces that operate within that
system are not territorially bounded or determined’ (Gill 2008: 36).
The question for critical theory, however, is not whether unipolarity is con-
ducive to global security by providing incentives for strategic restraint, as
Ikenberry (2001) and others once argued – overlooking the point that states
with an ‘elevated position to maintain’ possess a ‘heightened and exaggerated
perception of the importance of threats in a global context, and a tendency to
pacify or police “turbulent boundaries”’ (Jervis 2011: 266; cf. Monteiro
2014) – but whether the notion of ‘imperial prerogative’ remains a meaningful
notion in a posthegemonic world order. As Russia’s opposition to US uni-
lateralism has shown, history always returns to remind us of the plurality of
the world, and revisionist states will continue to matter in the twenty-ﬁrst
century and will continue to defend their interests by force if necessary.
However, while states facilitate the political organization of capital in capi-
talist societies (including Russia and China whose own elites are adaptive to
the opportunities aﬀorded by global capitalism), the dynamic subject of
capitalism is not a political force as such: the new nomos of the earth is no
longer consistent with the interests of the leading state in the imperialist
chain, as Poulantzas (1975) argued, nor does it enact a self-regulating legal
balance between competing equal sovereignties, as Schmitt (1950) argued.
Rather it reﬂects the power of capital to incorporate the political in a
transnationally constituted structure of private economic power.
Neo-Marxist theories of global capitalism as an historical social system
move beyond the conﬁnes of realist geopolitics as the spatial organization of
human activity. In contrast with Kindleberger (1973), Modelski (1987) and
Ikenberry (2008), Marxists stress the economic logic of capitalist forms
expressed in cycles of accumulation and ﬁnancialization in which capital is
diverted from trade and production towards more risky investments. An
aspiring hegemon creates new frameworks of control at particular stages in its
evolution, and must resolve contradictions in the world system or lose supre-
macy to a competitor better positioned to take advantage of new economic
and technological conditions forged under the ‘carapace of imperial organi-
zation’ (Arrighi et al. 1999: 37). The US is in decline, argues Arrighi (2007),
because it is ﬁxed on a ‘path-dependent’ course of ﬁnancialization that it is
powerless to change, and it is only a matter of time before the baton of
hegemony is passed (peacefully or otherwise) to China as the latter gains
ascendancy as the major growth pole in the global economy.
Yet it is unclear whether and to what extent the historical-sociological
model identiﬁed by Wallerstein or Arrighi ﬁts with the present world system,
for while it is instructive to theorize patterns of hegemonic transition, capi-
talist sovereignty suggests something broader and more diﬀuse than state
hegemony. In addition, there are too few historical cases of hegemonic tran-
sition from which to draw positive law-like hypotheses linking the develop-
ment of capitalist cycles to empire, and predictions of Chinese hegemony in
the twenty-ﬁrst century must be tempered by the fact that the term
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‘superpower’ is an historically contingent phenomenon reﬂecting the huge
asymmetries of power between the West and the non-Western world during
the Cold War. While comparative analyses of historical ﬁnancializations
under the Dutch or the British are instructive, there is no real precedent for
the unique conditions that facilitated the spectacular rise of the US after
1945, in particular the role of the US dollar as a global reserve currency, the
weakness of competing economies destroyed by US air power during the
Second World War, the existence of a common ideological enemy to sustain
the transatlantic alliance, and the availability of abundant cheap energy to
sustain the permanent warfare state.
More seriously, however, the premises of generic theories of ﬁnancializa-
tion, which see it as a ‘deviation’ from the normal course of productive
capitalism, are highly questionable. While ﬁnancialization is linked to over-
accumulation, characterized by the non-reinvestment of proﬁts in directly
productive processes, the tendency of historical sociology to rely on the idea
of ‘deviant ﬁnance’ suggests a theoretical blind spot – one that is responsible
for the sterile distinction between manufacturing and non-material economic
activity. As Marazzi argues, the ‘abnormal development’ of ﬁnance in the
global economy of production and consumption may be alarming, but vague
notions of reindustrialization are characterized by a lack of realism (Marazzi
2010: 48–9). The violence of ﬁnancial capitalism may distort local economies
and undermine stability, but it is linked to new processes of value production
which are increasingly opaque; and, while it is common for writers on the
Left to celebrate the class compromise of Fordism, it is futile to glorify
‘golden era’ capitalism in a global accumulation regime dependent as much
on complex ﬁnancial instruments as production of tangible commodities with
use value. In contrast with simple commodity capitalism, value is no longer
captured wholly or directly through production (where deriving value from
labour-power is increasingly problematic), but through apparatuses for cap-
turing value outside directly productive processes in the sphere of circulation
and exchange (ibid.: 55).
Financialization further indicates the speciﬁc historic function of biocapit-
alism, namely the production of value ‘by extracting it not only from the
body functioning as the material instrument of work, but also from the body
understood in its globality’ (Marazzi 2010: 50). Using a transhistorical
approach, deﬁning capitalism ‘with reference to the state becomes a con-
ceptual straitjacket when [Arrighi] attempts to analyse the contemporary
world’ (Postone 2007: 15). In addition, his conceptualization of capital lacks
speciﬁcity as he links the rise and fall of successive capitalist episodes to the
actions of hegemonic powers rather than attempt to explain the material logic
of capitalist sovereignty in the present period. Rather than dovetail geopo-
litics and world history, ‘the large-scale historical pattern that structured
much of the twentieth century suggests the existence of overarching structural
imperatives and constraints that cannot adequately be explained in local and
contingent terms’ (ibid.: 8).
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Critics like Agnew argue that globalization correlates with the economic/
cultural power of the US as a business civilization that posited itself as a
universal telos for mankind, and with a ‘quickening and geographical
reformulation of the progressive universalization of capitalist commodiﬁca-
tion and accumulation’ (Agnew 2005: 2; cf. Boggs 2011a). Yet his additional
claim – that globalization is a ‘hegemonic project intimately connected to the
geopolitical calculus of the US government and economic interests’ (ibid.) –
raises more questions than it solves, because not only does it assume America
planned globalization, but that the future of the international system is
dependent on US leadership. In fact, Agnew’s argument is better expressed in
reverse, for the ﬁnancial and military power of the US in the international
system is no longer the determining factor of globalization but the other way
around: globalization follows the logic of a corporate business culture that
emerged in the US in the nineteenth century, and which required US leader-
ship to arrive at its present state, but this model of economic growth is no
longer unique and is no longer organized in the exclusive interests of the US
as the ‘indispensable’ nation because the direction of transnational corporate
investment has long been detached from the interests of America as a society.
Financialization has not worked for the US, and ‘despite the alleged omni-
potence of its Wall Street-Washington Complex, despite its control over key
international organizations […] the bottom line is that the net proﬁt share of
US-listed corporations has kept falling’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2012: 60). Con-
fronted by weak domestic growth, US ﬁnancial capital prioritized its external
economy, adapting to changing patterns of trade as emerging markets
attracted greater shares of FDI. The changing geoeconomic balance of power
is indicated by the sharp decline of America’s share of global output, which
on a purchasing power parity basis has fallen below 20 per cent (Davidson
2014). Statistics published by the World Bank show that the contribution of
developing economies to global trade ﬂows rose from 26 per cent to 42 per
cent between 1995 and 2010, due to increasing trade between emerging markets.
By 2025, the study concludes, growth
will predominantly be generated in emerging economies. Although many
high-income countries are only gradually recovering from the ﬁnancial
crisis, most developing economies have swiftly returned to their fast pre-
crisis growth trend [… S]ix major emerging economies – Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation –
will collectively account for more than half of all global growth.
(World Bank 2011: 2–3)2
While higher added value has historically been generated in the advanced
industrialized economies (Scott 1997; Phelps 2008; Henderson et al. 2002),
preserving the comparative technological advantage of the West, all sovereign
territorial units are now measured equally on their relative merits by investors
as spaces for accumulation, to be integrated into or detached from global
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value chains in pursuit of higher levels of proﬁtability (Milberg & Winkler
2013; Wallace & Brady 2010). Furthermore, while US hegemony has been an
embedded feature of corporate globalization, establishing relations of pro-
duction typical of US capital in both core and peripheral economies (Pou-
lantzas 1975), transnational corporate power is no longer coterminous with
the economic interests of the US itself. More than 70 per cent of the Amer-
ican economy is based on consumption while internal investment constitutes
only 12 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) – not because there is little
to invest in but because US corporations keep proﬁts oﬀshore and direct their
investment towards oﬀshore markets which do not beneﬁt the US (Rickards
2011; Standing 2007; Deneault 2010). The gains of oﬀshoring have not been
realized in America because it has handed production to foreign subsidiaries,
and ‘despite the corporate sector’s contribution to national savings over the
past decade, the oﬀshoring-ﬁnancialization linkage creates a structural limit
on the capacity of non-ﬁnancial corporations to act as engines of growth and
innovation’ (Milberg & Winkler 2013: 211). To explain this contradiction, we
have no option but to decouple the transnational power of capital from the
future of the US as an ‘imperial’ nation.
The tendency to deﬁne geopolitics in the language of empire is hardly
restricted to neo-Marxism. For Schmitt (1950), the historical evolution of
world order is always determined by successive secularized theologies of
power which derive their force and meaning from the political rationality of a
proto-hegemon, which he located (after 1945) in the unrestricted extension of
US sovereign power beyond the logic of its geographical territorialization
(Ortung). The imperial narrative of American militarism is not diﬃcult to
ﬁnd, for in the US geopolitical imaginary the earth is divided in a ‘carto-
graphy of separation’ between zones of civilized peace and zones of unavoid-
able conﬂict which compel the US to adopt a ‘warrior ethos’ to manage the
ebb and ﬂow of violence and pacify the ‘remote periphery’ (Lipschutz 2009;
Kaplan 2002). Although the ideology of benign intervention prevents the US
from understanding that its prior actions may have caused the problem ‘to
which subsequent “interventions” are deemed the appropriate policy
response’ (Dalby 2013: 38–9), in Schmittian terms it assumes the form of the
katechon – that is, the mythic image of imperial authority which ‘keeps chaos
at bay’ (Vaughan-Williams 2011).
Yet, far from standing above the ‘ebb and ﬂow’ of a rising tide of political
violence, this mythic ﬁgure stands on closer inspection for the power of a
sovereign who strives to withhold and delay a necessary transition in world
order – a declining hegemon with its eyes ﬁxed on the ruins of empire that lie
before it (Hell 2009). This has led the US to normalize a state of exception
(Agamben 2005), engulﬁng the West in a potentially unending ‘global war on
terror’ to sustain a transnationally constituted system of monetary power
threatened by global economic convergence and the evolution of counter-
hegemonic regionalism. Unable to relinquish its ‘geopolitical imaginary’, the
US remains conﬁned in the fantasy of its ‘unipolar moment’, seeking to delay
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its inevitable ruin by conﬂating the universalizing global imperative of capital
with the particular interests of the West. Confronted by the spectre of global
economic convergence instantiated by the internationalization of capitalist
social relations, the US is emerging as a geopolitical barrier to ‘reasonable
change’ in a paradoxical attempt to forestall the overdue end time of empire
(Hell 2009). It thus ﬁnds itself in a dialectically contradictory position, on
the one hand acting as a katechon to delay the inevitable course of history
(Verzöger der Weltgeschichte), and on the other acting as an ‘accelerator [of
world history] despite itself ’ (Beschleuniger wider Willen) (ibid.).
To explain neoliberal global capitalism as an historically speciﬁc form of
social life, therefore, we must explain capitalist sovereignty as a transnation-
ally constituted mode of power that transcends national politics but which
orders political and cultural forms through the corporate reorganization of
advanced and peripheral economies. This reﬂects the unidimensional ration-
ality of a ‘business civilization’ (Laski 1936), and the unrestricted economic
logic of corporate power as the social embodiment of the law of value which
operates with ‘ever more force vis-à-vis the states and national economies
subsumed under this law’ (Smith 2003: 30).
In the new global economy territorial states are being transformed into
administrative instruments for restructuring spatial units in response to
investment priorities of transnational corporations: corporatism constitutes
an objective form of domination based on the diﬀerential capacity of domi-
nant capital to gain access to and control markets, to restrict competition and
to steer the political decision making of national economies. As the twilight
of the Euro-Atlantic age nears, however, there is increasing tension between
the plurality and spatiality of capitalism and the imperial self-identity of the
West which is unsustainable in a world dominated by the rising power of Asia
(cf. Mahbubani 2013). The decline of the West is not simply a result of its
ageing population (Sönmezler et al. 2010), but of wage disparities between the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
emerging market economies, declining intellectual and physical capital, low
investment, rising energy costs and the corruption of democracy by corporate
oligarchy (Winters 2011). This is leading to global restructuring as ﬁnancial
capital ﬂees stagnant geographic regions and corporations seek proﬁtable
investment in growth poles beyond OECD states. Only if globalization is
understood in its totality – as a transition from imperial state authority to
transnational corporate power based on the spatialization of labour processes
where ‘work tasks can be done in diﬀerent locations with no loss in proﬁt-
ability or control’ (Wallace & Brady 2010: 133) – is it possible to understand
capital as the objective subject of modernity. Globalization has altered the
connection between territoriality and power, and the global ﬁnancial crisis
has created the momentum for a further transfer of decision making to
institutions of global governance.
Corporate power is the political-organizational logic that drives global capital,
and the intensiﬁcation of corporate political and ideological power ultimately
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derives from its capacity to develop a legitimizing rationality comparable
in force to that of the medieval Church or the absolutist state. The corpora-
tion has evolved as the prevailing form of human social organization for two
main reasons: ‘First, there was a shift in institutional and organizational
structure of lead polities, and second, there was a shift in the relative impor-
tance of the groups […] that held power and produced rationalities, away from
political elites and toward corporate elites’ (Harrod 2006: 29).
As we shall see in Chapter 3, it is easier for transnational elites to inter-
nationalize this legitimizing rationality through globalization than it is for
individual states to internationalize the legitimizing rationality of speciﬁc
political cultures, even as oligopoly undermines the integrity and eﬃciency of
‘free’ markets as means for allocating resources (Harrod 2006: 45). As we
shall see in Chapter 4, class formation is determined to a greater extent at a
transnational level through formal (public) and informal (public/private) net-
works that insulate absentee corporate actors from the territorial complexity
of business operations (Robinson & Harris 2000; Carroll & Carson 2006;
Carroll 2010; Everling 2010), though such networks are too diﬀuse to create a
uniﬁed global class in the orthodox Marxist sense. Lacking class conscious-
ness as such, transnational capitalist elites represent a personiﬁcation of eco-
nomic categories of ﬁnancial capital whose power is reﬂected in their
mobility, their insertion within global and regional networks of power, and
their capacity to leverage the mobility and power of ﬁnance to consolidate
their domestic bargaining power within national polities (Talani 2012: 160).
The rise of a transnational capitalist elite forces us to abandon hierarchical
conceptions of order based on interstate rivalry where ‘the (national) state is
the point of backward linkage to society and forward linkage to the international
order’ (Robinson 2006: 168). Instead, we must understand how ‘capitalists and
allied dominant strata integrate horizontally and in the process move “up”
cross-nationally, penetrating and utilising numerous national and transnational
state apparatuses to forge their rule’ (ibid.).
To understand global corporatism, therefore, it is important to note that
capital is power. Carroll identiﬁes three forms of economic power based on
control over capital: the operational power of corporate management over the
labour process; the strategic control of investment decisions based on majority
holdings of interlocking corporate institutional shareholders; and the alloca-
tive power derived from control over credit (Carroll 2004: 5; Scott 1997).
Following Veblen (1923), Nitzan and Bichler assess the diﬀerential power of
dominant capital, whose capacity to marshal resources and control human
activity through the organization of markets suggests a parallel with Mum-
ford’s (1967) model of the ‘social machine’, the goal of which is to structure
the totality through the imposition of labour on society. Accumulation, they
suggest, represents the capacity of dominant capital to accumulate faster than
the average (Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 17–18).
On this basis, it is necessary to diﬀerentiate business (corporate rivalry)
from industry (the creative productivity of society), and the tendency of big
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business to exploit preferential access to ﬁnancial capital to acquire and/or
asset-strip proﬁtable concerns (cf. Froud et al. 2006). Corporations maximize
neither competition nor productivity; rather, they seek to limit competition and
productivity through asymmetric market power. Dominant capital subverts
competition, exposing the liberal myth of ordered risk taking in preference for
rent seeking. At stake here is the utility of the idea that competitive risk
taking carries a positive value, suggesting the extinction of a moral-political
order founded on entrepreneurship as competition becomes less relevant to
pricing decisions and as prices reﬂect not value but market power – that is,
the capacity of dominant capital to control the productivity of society for its
own pecuniary gain (Picciotto 2011: 108–16), exploiting asymmetries within
and between states. Capital thus becomes accumulated power, while politics
(as Dewey observed) is the ‘shadow cast by big business on society’. In this
sense, the diﬀerential power of dominant (global) capital is the underlying
condition for predatory globalization: accumulation through oligopoly,
enhancing the control of transnational investors over markets while limiting
the capacity of local communities to resist the privations of corporate power.
Conclusion
In contrast with the late nineteenth century, when the world economy was
governed by clearly demarcated territorial empires, in the new global order
states remain ‘ontological givens’, though global economic integration is
increasingly determined by transnational corporations acting through state,
regional and transnational structures of power to sustain and expand oppor-
tunities for diﬀerential accumulation. As Van der Pijl (2001) argues, the pre-
sent capitalist system is characterized by a combination of the ‘discipline of
capital’ and the interests of elites in powerful states, sustained by the expan-
sion of consumerism and debt, creating an ecologically destructive system
which threatens the integrity of human life. Since the 1980s global capitalism
has been reorganized spatially within and between regional blocs in accor-
dance with the security, investment and trade priorities of transnational cor-
porations rather than free trade or liberal cosmopolitanism, which not only
raises issues of democratic accountability, but places in question the liberal
ideal of a ‘global civil society’. In the absence of formally democratic institu-
tions of transnational governance, corporate actors combine with state and
interstate actors to facilitate the valorization of capital in globalized and
regionalized circuits of power at the expense of long-term investment in their
own economies. On the one hand, the directionless logic of transnational
ﬁnance indicates a trend towards nihilism, collapsing distinctions between
culture, law and territory; on the other hand, globalization raises the spectre
of neo-medievalism, which Bull (1977) juxtaposed to the ‘universal compe-
tence’ of legal-rational authority, subjecting states to centrifugal pressures
while fuelling the growth of supranational regimes that constitute the state
form of global capital (Friedrichs 2004).
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Marx stressed the tendency of capital to ‘purge or purify its environment of
non-economic, non-capitalist encumbrances’, although it was already clear by
the 1890s that capitalism ‘no longer embodied the asymptotic tendency of
capital to gravitate towards pure capitalism but rather entailed the main-
tenance of extra-capitalist excrescences’ (Westra 2010: 18, emphasis added).
This much, observes Callinicos (2005), is accepted by most serious students of
international political economy, and it is inconceivable that ﬁnancialized
capitalism – particularly after the global crisis – could function without the
intervention of state, regional and transnational authorities to mediate the
growing power of corporate capital. In this global order states are themselves
being ﬁnancialized, as the intensiﬁcation of derivatives trading forces govern-
ments to augment traditional forms of public ﬁnance by investing national
assets in ﬁnancial markets via sovereign wealth funds, which ‘realign the
value component of those asymmetries across global production networks by
providing a disadvantaged country with some ownership over the advantaged
country’s domestic assets and the proﬁts that arise’, and which defend
national sovereignty, ‘protecting fragile political mandates while also limiting
external interference’ (Dixon & Monk 2010: 11–12). Yet, while capital recog-
nizes multiple jurisdictions, it falls under none; and while great powers may
attempt to subsume the directionless logic of capital to the territorial logic of
the state, the diﬀerential power of transnational capital over national capitals
is an inescapable feature of the international economy in the transition from
imperial state hegemony to global corporate power.
Notes
1 Writing before the dramatic yet ultimately retrogressive events of the ‘Arab Spring’,
Simpfendorfer (2011) suggests that states such as Syria and Egypt were heading
towards a period of sustained economic growth in partnership with China, opening up
a new ‘Silk Road’ in Eurasia. Although this project has been undermined by con-
ﬂicts in Mesopotamia and North Africa – fuelled by the external interference of
Western and Sunni Arab states – the eventual re-emergence of a new Silk Road
connecting China and Russia to Europe and the Middle East is seen by many
observers as an inevitable development with major geopolitical implications for the
West.
2 In April 2014, the World Bank estimated that China’s economy would overtake the
US for the ﬁrst time (measured in terms of purchasing power parity) (see Giles
2014). The World Bank also estimated that the six largest middle-income econo-
mies – China, India, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico – now account for
32.3 per cent of global GDP, while the six largest high-income economies – the US,
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy – account for 32.9 per cent.
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2 Capitalist sovereignty
Introduction
To make sense of neoliberal global capitalism in the interstate system, it is
necessary to examine the contradictory relation between capital as a self-
valorizing value prone to crises of overaccumulation, and the multilevel
regulatory and disciplinary structures that transcend territorial states yet
simultaneously articulate/augment the particular interests of the West – a
hegemonic transnational entity that achieved unrivalled global power in the
interimperial wars of the twentieth century. The notion of ‘capitalist sover-
eignty’ seems to imply the decline of the nation-state, yet the enduring pre-
sence of the state in capitalist society suggests that capital is dependent on its
state form to reproduce the conditions necessary for the production of value.
The modern state evolved as a solution to the ontological contradiction
between: (i) the universal and the particular, to allow for plurality and diver-
sity within a universal state system; (ii) space and time, to organize and con-
tain time within domesticated spatial contexts; and (iii) the self and other –
the need to distinguish friends and enemies based on a spatial demarcation of
identities (Walker 1993).1 From a Marxian perspective, on the other hand, the
state is also understood as an epiphenomenal expression of bourgeois class
power – although Marxists recognize that all historical formations leave an
enduring imprint on future societies and that the territorial unit remains a
vital instrument of social control.
Although the geopolitical logic of accumulation in the age of absolutism
(acquisition of territory to enhance the prestige of aristocratic/religious elites)
is distinct from accumulation in a global economy – where transnational
capital is relatively independent of the territorial logic of state power – as
Callinicos (2007) argues, the global capitalist system is nevertheless deter-
mined by a dialectical interaction between capitalist and territorial logics of
power. For this reason there is necessarily a ‘realist moment in any Marxist
analysis of international relations […] such analysis must take into account
the strategies, calculations and interactions of rival political elites in the state
system’ (ibid.). Yet contemporary geopolitics is determined less by pursuit of
power for its own sake than by the speciﬁc form of intercapitalist competition
in the world system (Pozo-Martin 2007) – that is, by the competition between
capitals whose capacity to dominate markets is positively or negatively aﬀected
by their alignment and relative proximity to the nexus of ﬁnancial and military
power controlled by states. Geopolitics is not a ‘means to its own end’, a ‘pure
power politics aimed at power for power’s sake [because] in geopolitical
actions and concerns there always have prevailed mostly economic interests’
(Adamo 2001: 490).
What, therefore, does it mean to speak of ‘capitalist sovereignty’? As we
saw in Chapter 1, this issue is inextricably tied to the core problematic of
globalization, namely the transition from imperial state hegemony to global
corporatism in a posthegemonic order where sovereign power is diﬀused
through new structures of global capitalist integration and control necessi-
tated by the transnationalization of production, trade and investment.
Although this economic order has its political origins in colonial relations of
domination established by Europe, the logic of corporate globalization lies
not in empire building but in the diﬀuse articulation of capitalist sovereignty
through a pluralistic structure of global governance which attempts to trans-
cend the Hobbesian antinomy of disorder and sovereignty through the logic
of synarchy, and thus to escape the ‘classical categories of political authority,
resting instead on the dialectical fusion of segmental autonomy and collective
policy formation’ (Chryssochoou 2009: 131). As a response to the exhaustion
of state-democratic capitalism, globalization points towards new forms of
coordinated social management which originate in, yet potentially override,
the prerogative power of sovereign states which collectively deﬁned the spatial
and legal order of international law and politics in the early modern period.
On the one hand, capitalist sovereignty resolves at a global level a tension
between equal sovereignty and material inequality in a world system mediated
by ﬁnance: sovereign equality is ‘interdependent with the historical develop-
ment and universalization of capitalist social relations by which the formal
separation of the purely “political” states system and the “economic” sphere
(the world market) was eﬀected’ (Spronk 2004: 1). On the other hand, it
‘deterritorializes social forms and liberates ﬂows of desires from restrictive
codes. As it deterritorializes and decodes, it creates artiﬁcial neo-territorialities
that reconcile the liberated ﬂows from the requisites of surplus accumulation’
(Gammon 2010: 368).
This problematic was examined by Hardt and Negri (2000) in a ground-
breaking yet ultimately ﬂawed study in which the authors posited an abstract
conceptualization of empire as a global network of ‘biopower’, which dom-
inates life in its entirety leading to a ‘perpetual and universal peace outside of
history’. Brilliant as their intervention was, however, the authors not only
prematurely announced the death of the state (failing to anticipate the
enduring relevance of spatial and legal boundaries for globalization in the
absence of a single binding juridical value beyond the capitalist logic of
equivalence), but failed to specify how capitalist sovereignty – as an immanent
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and deterritorializing constitutive force expressed through the homogenizing,
centralizing force of striation (patterning/rendering/homogenizing) – is recon-
ciled with the transnationally constituted geopolitical power of the Anglo-
sphere as it struggles to delay the inevitable transition to a multipolar global
growth system presupposed by corporate globalization. Whether advanced by
cheerleaders or critics of the Washington consensus, however, accounts of
global order as a seamless totality without an exterior governed by a single
disciplinary logic must be rejected if we are to explain the interrelationship
between state territoriality and corporate power, and the persistence of space
for the valorization of ﬁnancial capital (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013).
To explain the emerging institutional form of transnational corporate
power it is necessary to go beyond the sweeping generalities of post-Marxism
to investigate how capitalist sovereignty is instantiated at a regional and
transnational level, colliding with older articulations of legal and political
regulation embedded in the nation form as a fetishistically constituted terri-
torial unit. As Robinson argues, states are ‘social relations that have histori-
cally been territorialized but those relations are not by deﬁnition territorial’
(Robinson 2007: 15), yet states fulﬁl an indispensible function in the repro-
duction of capitalist power. Contra Hardt and Negri, the theory of capitalist
sovereignty must be grounded in a more comprehensive theory of global cor-
porate power supported by state actors, rather than a ‘plane of immanence’
juxtaposed to the transcendental sovereignty of states: as the most advanced
form of human social organization, transnational corporate power constitutes
an agent of globalizing capital which transgresses historic territorial sover-
eignties yet cannot exist in unstriated space – that is, cannot overcome bar-
riers to accumulation in unsecured space at risk from a potential ‘deviation
from the dominant that enables the generation of new subjectivities and forms
of community’ (Gonzaga 2009: 34).
While non-capitalist social forms provide fertile soil for the global violence
of capital accumulation, as Luxemburg (1913) argues, capital does not
expand without the infrastructural support of non-capitalist structures which
it then assimilates and degrades. In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari’s
(1977) work on deterritorialization remains a key resource for explaining
the non-linear transition from a ‘primitive socius’ (the despotic machine)
which resists decoding/striation to a ‘deterritorialized socius’ (the capitalist
machine) characterized by a ‘general axiomatic of decoded ﬂows’. The con-
temporary form through which the latter is realized is capitalist globalization,
yet the world system ‘includes among its elements the various nation-states
which play a crucial role in the regulation of capital movements and in the
realization of surplus value’ (Patton 2000: 95). Deleuze and Guattari recog-
nized that deterritorialization is ultimately ‘inseparable from correlative
reterritorializations’, a geoeconomic process discernible in the spatial ﬁxity,
embedding and rescaling which structure capital ﬂows as state space and
world space incorporate ‘precapitalist landscapes with speciﬁcally capitalist
sociospatial conﬁgurations’, and where frameworks of capitalist organization
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are ‘intertwined with historically speciﬁc patterns of uneven development
insofar as [this] entails the systematic privileging of some locations, places,
territories, and scales, and the marginalization and exclusion of others’
(Brenner 2011: 106).
Before proceeding to an evaluation of corporate power (Chapter 3) and its
global state form (Chapter 4), our ﬁrst task is to deﬁne the ‘objective sub-
jectivity’ of capital. Capital is a complex category – a dynamic and self-
perpetuating value which constitutes the directionless, nihilistic subject of
modernity as value-augmentation for its own sake. In Marxist scholarship
capital exists in the process of exchange as a value that expands through cir-
culation, but capital also possesses a relational dimension reﬂecting the social
relations of power which facilitate the production of value through the labour
process and through ﬁnancialization.
Van der Pijl disaggregates the self-perpetuating logic of capital into three
phases: (i) original accumulation – the ‘stamping of the commodity form on
social relations’; (ii) production – the subordination of labour-power and
creativity to the process of expanding value (valorization of capital); and (iii)
social reproduction – the subsumption of the biosphere to the requirements of
capital (Van der Pijl 2001: 2). Marx theorized capital as a structuring force
that subsumes economic and cultural processes to its own determinate logic
yet possesses no ﬁxed directionality or rationality beyond the incessant drive
to accumulate. Capital is not a static entity or quantity in the everyday sense
that an individual may be said to ‘hold’ commodities, equities or securities
with deﬁnite values; it is, rather, a ‘mode of power’ driven by a logic of
accumulation derived from the legal right to exclude – that is to say, from the
capacity of capitalists as agents of capital combined in joint-stock ventures
protected by the principle of limited liability to remove valued resources from
general societal use. ‘Objective subjectivity’ implies volition and cognition,
and it is admittedly diﬃcult to attribute volition or cognition to an abstract
mode of power, no matter how dynamic or constitutive. Yet capital does indeed
have the quality of subjecthood: a form of subjectivity that is simultaneously
dynamic yet involuntary and unconscious.
In philosophy, subjectivity is typically deﬁned and determined by the lim-
ited range of free actions open to actors, and debates on free will/determinism
are concerned primarily with those actions for which we hold individual
agents morally accountable. Marx, on the other hand, was interested in the
preconstituted structure and constitutive dynamics of commodity-determined
societies, and outlined a systematic account of the social and economic pro-
cesses in history that are determined independently of human moral agency
while indicating those aspects of collective existence that might be changed
through praxis – although this concept was left for philosophers such as
Bloch (1959), Feenberg (2014) and Markovic´ (1974) to develop more fully.
Marx’s conception of subjectivity is revealed in The Poverty of Philosophy,
where he criticizes Proudhon for romanticizing the artisan as the ‘master of
the means of production’:
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The producer, the moment he produces in a society founded on the divi-
sion of labour and on exchange (and that is M. Proudhon’s hypothesis), is
forced to sell. M. Proudhon makes the producer master of the means of
production; but he will agree with us that his means of production do not
depend on free will. Moreover, many of these means of production are
products which he gets from the outside, and in modern production he is
not even free to produce the amount he wants. The actual degree of
development of the productive forces compels him to produce on such or
such a scale.
(Marx 1936: 36–37, emphasis added)
However, not only is the producer’s will restricted by the constraints posed by
the historical evolution of productive forces in actual historical societies. In
addition, the subject-consumers of capitalism are only ‘free’ to choose to the
extent that they occupy a speciﬁc location in the division of labour, and their
predispositions are framed by the practices of society:
The consumer is no freer than the producer. His judgment depends on his
means and his needs. Both of these are determined by his social position,
which itself depends on the whole social organization. True, the worker
who buys potatoes and the kept woman who buys lace both follow their
respective judgments. But the diﬀerence in their judgements is explained
by the diﬀerence in the positions which they occupy in the world, and
which themselves are the product of social organization.
(Marx 1936: 36–37)
Thus, Marx inquires, do social needs ‘arise directly from production or from a
state of aﬀairs based on production […] to choose another example, does not
the need for lawyers suppose a given civil law which is but the expression of a
certain development of property, that is to say, of production?’ (Marx 1936:
37). A similar conclusion is reached by Wilson (1996), who observes the
contradictions between bourgeois freedom and human sociality exposed in
the myth of liberal individualism. Developing Marx’s position in Grundrisse,
Wilson notes that regardless of how particular individuals view their own life
situations and choices, the private interest of individuals in commodity societies
is ‘bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest
of private persons; but its content, as well as the form and means of its rea-
lisation, is given by social conditions independent of all’ (Marx, quoted in
Wilson 1996: 7; cf. Macpherson 1962). The commodity, argues Wilson,
represents the ‘freedom of the isolated individual and this a freedom to
choose within the rules but not the rules themselves […] Rather than
“combination-for-itself”, the commodity-form consists in “combination-in-
itself”, an association “subservient to and led by an alien will and intelli-
gence”’ (Wilson 1996: 7). In Roemer’s (1988) formulation, the subject in
capitalist society is always free to lose.
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Yet Marx was not a philosophical incompatibilist who rejected social
mediation between free will and determination. He observed that objective
historical development has a logic if and only if human subjectivity is also
asserted, which is to say, progress is possible only to the extent that socio-
economic development is mediated by self-directed historical actors possessed
of a given synthetic and creative quality of mind able to recognize and
negotiate objectively determined constraints. Progress derives not simply from
objective facts such as the ‘law’ of the declining rate of proﬁt or the tendency
towards a concentration and centralization of capital; structures may be
determinate to the extent they mark the boundaries within which eﬀective
human agency is possible, yet as Bloch warned, the socioeconomic conditions
for progress are ‘never completely ripe or so perfect that they are in no need
of a will to action and an anticipatory dream in the subjective fact of this will’
(Bloch 1959: 580). For Marx, praxis is an essential productive component of
human life and he employs the term to signify free, productive self-activity
through which mankind reﬂexively shapes society and nature, and therefore
also itself.
As Feenberg comments, Marx ‘represented the practical meaning of his-
torical materialism in the form of a plausible truth: men can only change their
life if they alter their mode of living, that is, the actual-concrete activities
which constitute their speciﬁc existence, and from which they can only sepa-
rate themselves in their imagination’ (Feenberg 2014: 12). Unlike Arendt
(1958), Marx rejects the Aristotelian dualism of poeisis (productive action)
and praxis (critical diagnosis) which had been transformed through German
Idealism into the binary of Arbeit and Ethik. In its place he substitutes self-
alienated labour and authentic self-activity, stressing the historical necessity
for the emancipation of alienated labour as a reﬂexive mode of domination
(Postone 1993). It is ultimately because the ‘historically determined relations
of production and exchange are in their estranged form also themselves pro-
ducts of social labour,’ argues Schmied-Kowarzik (1981: 116), ‘that the pos-
sibility of their overcoming is given in the overthrow of alienated relations
through the consciously revolutionary praxis of associated producers’.
Yet while critical Marxists since Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch and Ernst
Bloch have rejected economistic readings of Capital as a ‘scientiﬁc’ study of
the laws of value in capitalism (denouncing the ‘scientization’ of Marxism as
an administrative resource in favour of praxis as an epistemological category
while stressing the possibility of an autonomous subjectivity for labour in an
idealized discursive space where counterhegemonic consciousness can ﬂourish),
whether capital reproducing or capital transcending, human agency in capit-
alism occurs under conditions determined by the alienated movement of
capital, just as ‘ﬁctitious capital’ is still derived from value produced under
capitalist conditions rather than surplus-value generated in the labour process.
As Althusser (1969) observed, Marx provided an explanation for the systemic
logic of commodity-determined society: in its developed form the systemic
logic of capital lies in the determinate relation between its parts, and the ways
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in which these interrelations are regulated by the structuring principle of the
system itself (value augmentation). Subjectivity, therefore, is always already
an expression of the ‘qualitatively determinate material forms of productive
subjectivity developed in the course of history by the movement of the real
subsumption of labour to capital’ (Westra 2010: 49). The dynamic subject in
capitalism is not a proletariat or global multitude, but an immanent process
of abstraction through which value is realized as the adequate social subject
bearing the relation of capital. To make sense of this, it is necessary to
reconsider Marx’s theory of abstract labour as ‘empty self-equivalence’,
namely the production of a subjectivity inseparable from its relation to value.
Capital as subject
The tension between capital-logic and historicist approaches hinges on
disagreement between those who see the law of value as the structuring principle
of capitalist society, a theory of the necessary inner connections between the
essential social forms assumed by capital, and those who posit the subjective-
objective act of class struggle as the main factor in historical change – and
hence the appropriate focus of academic inquiry. For the former, the attempt
to understand capitalism systematically means to approach it in an abstract
logical fashion to reveal the ‘inner laws’ of capital that underlie commodity-
determined societies. For the latter, understanding capital in a concrete his-
torical sense means to abandon the reiﬁed straightjacket of Marx’s critique of
political economy as a ‘scientiﬁc’ analysis of the law of value and to pay
attention to the subjective role of historical actors whose agency extends
beyond the act of reproducing the commodity-determined structure of class
society through abstract labour as a socially mediating activity.
As one critic of capital-logic approaches argues, acceptance of a logic cre-
ated ‘prior to what people do in history generates a problematic trade-oﬀ
since theory is “explanatory” only to the extent that people do not alter sub-
stantially what was deﬁned abstractly’ (Knafo 2002: 148). Defenders of capital-
logic approaches, on the other hand, argue that what is being explained is the
agency of people whose social relations are reiﬁed by the logic of capital,
irrespective of whether their actions ‘interfere’ with that logic – which, if his-
tory is to change, presumably they must. For the purposes of the present dis-
cussion, it is unnecessary to unravel all the complex issues in this debate,
which would inevitably require a separate book. Yet we must ﬁrst deﬁne in
non-opaque terms the material logic of capitalist sovereignty as a precondi-
tion for global corporate power, in order to identify a materialist geopolitics
consistent with globalization. It is necessary, therefore, to consider capital in
its pure form as a sovereignty unconstrained by spatial or natural limits, before
interrogating the changing structure of global ﬁnance and the implications of
decentred globalism for Western hegemony.
In contrast with poststructuralism, which stresses the absence of any origi-
nating source of action, the purpose of our investigation is the totalizing
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power of capital as the subject of modernity. While writers associated with the
‘new’ global political sociology (Urry 2003; Nash 2010; Taylor 2010) oﬀer
illuminating insights into the fragmentation and individualization of agency
in global capitalism, the cultural turn in social science is rejected, for neither
pluralism nor poststructuralism is adequate to a systematic critique of the
corporatization of political power and the alienated form of commodity
relations in the corporate economy. On the one hand, pluralists remain tied to
a polyarchic model of liberal capitalism that has been refuted by critical elite
theorists and neo-Marxists (Domhoﬀ 2014; Lukes 2005). As Rueschemeyer et
al. (1992: 297) argue, in Western democracies the ‘economically powerful are
able to exert suﬃcient control over the political process that political decisions
rarely challenge their interests’. Neopluralism quickly collapses into an eclectic
mix of neo-Marxist and functionalist propositions, conceding the structural
determination of action while retaining a neo-Parsonian general theoretical
scheme. On the other hand, postmodernists highlight weaknesses in evolu-
tionary and progressivist approaches, yet their focus on identity leads to a
dramatic underestimation of the continued relevance of state power in the
reproduction of capitalist hegemony in the advanced economies, where
despite the appearance of diversity a genuine plurality of power sources is in
decline, weakening the ability of social movements to challenge concentra-
tions of power organized through the state. As Nash (2010) concedes, in the
academic stampede to establish how the site of political action has shifted
from ﬁxed institutions to non-state actors there has been a tendency to place
excessive emphasis on symbolic resources and ‘alternative repertoires of con-
tention’. This extreme decentring, suggests Taylor (2010: 21), means the cul-
tural turn has ‘little to say about the complex ambiguities generated by the
insertion of these political forms into a context of complex and globalized
hypermodernity’.
While the cultural turn is rejected as unsuitable for explaining the social
logic of corporate power in neoliberal capitalism, so is traditional Marxism.
For while the grand modernizing project of liberal modernity has proven
ultimately self-limiting – if not self-annihilating (Wagner 1994) – the revolu-
tionary expectations of Marxism anticipated in the polemical works of Lenin,
Trotsky and Luxemburg have been refuted by history:
on the one hand the world is more overwhelmingly capitalistic than ever,
and so to that extent […] the fundamental categories of Marx’s critique,
as the thinking of capital, remain indispensable; on the other, politically
the world looks more like neo-Realism than it does anything envisaged in
the Communist Manifesto. World-spanning capital does not generate its own
supersession from within itself but produces an ungoverned international
political space comprising a multitude of sharply delimited nation-states,
identical ‘units’ iterated across the globe.
(Davenport 2011: 6–7)
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The historical trajectory of capitalism, argues Davenport, has ‘superseded the
kind of theory intended to transform it […] The theorising that it was once
thought would lead beyond the condition of unfreedom that Realism is a part
of has failed’ (Davenport 2011: 46). However, he observes, although history
has ‘passed by’ the revolutionary Marxist vision of international class struggle, it
also reveals a ‘mute Marx’:
the negative, critical element of Marx’s thinking, more clearly; a Marx
whose themes – critique of ideality [sic], of capital, of domination, and of
society as second nature – have a depth and resonance beyond his own
subjective understanding of them. It is this element that thinks the
objectivity of society and history most deeply, and that still demands
interpretation. After Marxism, Marx becomes more, not less, radical.
(Davenport 2011: 8)
The early Marxist assumption that crisis would yield appropriate economic
conditions for a transition to global socialism is clearly erroneous, for in cor-
porate globalization political reaction is omnipresent: private economic power
and cultural nationalism have emerged as two self-reinforcing narratives in
the discursive organization of postliberal capitalist society, and as the pre-
carization and casualization of employment confronts manual and intellectual
workers, the working class as a ‘class for itself ’ is collapsing as atomized
workers are reduced to petty commodity sellers – ‘squabbling wage-slaves
ﬁghting over the table scraps of capital. Each is compelled, under penalty of
starvation, to employ every advantage – race, nationality, language, religion,
gender – for survival’ (Eaves 2011: 3). The middle-class ‘precariat’, on the
other hand, which reproduces the system of value and value hierarchy as a
‘referent point’ of commodity capitalism, is no longer capable of instigating
or advancing progressive social change because the sociological category
‘middle class’ denotes a ‘stratiﬁed ﬁeld of subjectivity disciplined to a large
degree to the norms of a modern society in which capital has a fundamental
role in organizing social production through disciplinary markets, enclosures,
governance and its proﬁt-seeking enterprises’ (De Angelis 2010: 960; cf. Buck
2008; Lazonick 2013).
Postone (2003: 95) theorizes capital as a totalizing subject that ‘generates
ceaselessly what is “new,” while regenerating what is the “same”’, namely
value. Although the epiphenomenal axioms of capital (trade unions, welfare,
ﬁnancial regulation, etc.) produced by successive capitalist cycles appear or
disappear following each new crisis, capital continually reproduces value
through the augmentation of new spatiotemporal conditions for the valoriza-
tion of capital. Once a new limit is posited, argues Patton (2000: 96), capital
‘approaches this limit only to displace it further ahead by reconstituting its
own immanent relative limits’.
Moving beyond narratives of class which proceed from the transhistorical
standpoint of labour (labour as a generic social category in the production of
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use values), Postone argues that neither class exploitation nor private property
constitute the ‘fundamental’ features of capitalism. In contrast with Lukács
(1923), who developed an otherwise penetrating critique of modernity in his
study of reiﬁcation, Marx categorized the subject with ‘reference to social
relations constituted by the forms of objectifying practice grasped by the
category of capital’. Marx’s theory of the Subject with reference to the cate-
gory of capital, argues Postone, ‘indicates that the social relations at his
critique’s centre should not be understood essentially in terms of class rela-
tions but rather in terms of the social mediation expressed by categories such
as value and capital’ (Postone 2003: 86, emphasis added). Lukács recognized
that Marx’s goal in Grundrisse was to explain how qualitatively distinct
products of an historically speciﬁc form of labour become quantitatively
equivalent to all other products. Yet, despite the brilliance of his materialist
appropriation of Hegel, Lukács reads the commodity form in traditional
Marxist terms as a general framework based on a theory of class exploitation
in which he identiﬁes Hegel’s Geist with the proletariat as the identical
subject/object of history. Lukács imputes to the proletariat an objectively
possible class consciousness unimpaired by reiﬁed relations, an approach
informed by Weber’s ideal types, yet posits the rationality of action beyond
the immediacy of the individual to the ‘action of a class as a totality’ (Frisby
1992: 93).
For Postone, labour and the extended process of reproduction it requires
and instantiates are not simply detached from capital in a workers’ state
because socialism is possible only through the abolition of abstract labour as
a socially mediating activity which creates an objective form of domination.
‘Really existing socialism’ in the Soviet Union failed to eradicate or transcend
the capital relation, attempting instead to mediate it through the state and
impose centralized state control over all areas of social, political and cultural
organization. The result was ‘socialist rationalization’, complicated by the
eﬀorts of ‘socialist labour science’ to design new forms of labour organization
to compensate workers for the elimination of labour tasks with a conceptional
dimension that would otherwise limit the authority of management over
production (Oﬀe 1976).
Traditional Marxism is inadequate for four reasons: ﬁrst, it falsely reduces
emancipation to overcoming unjust distributions of resources (to be corrected
through patterned redistribution); second, it proceeds from the transhistorical
standpoint of labour as a timeless activity mediating metabolic exchange
between society/nature; third, it ignores the complex determination of socio-
political and ideological phenomena through the commodity form; and
fourth, it misses the point that there is no need to posit a uniﬁed global
capitalist class because corporate power constitutes itself as a radically
decentred subject – as an organized system of transnational proﬁt-making
capacities indiﬀerent to the determination of use value. An adequate account
of capital as subject must therefore explain the objectiﬁcation of institutions
and practices in global capitalism through a formal analysis of the
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marketization of global exchange, and the rescaling of capital ﬂows and pro-
duction. With the rescaling of production and the intensiﬁcation of ﬂows in
the global economy, hegemony is no longer consistent with the ‘imperial’
authority of states, but with the determinate logic of capital ﬂows expressed in
the reiﬁed form of capitalist commodity relations. Capitalism is ontologically
unique, ‘inasmuch as it is constituted by a qualitatively homogeneous social
“substance” [… Preceding] social formations are not so totalized; their fun-
damental social relations are not qualitatively homogeneous’ (Postone 2003:
87). These relations cannot be ‘grasped by the concept of a “substance”,
cannot be unfolded from a single structuring principle, and do not display an
immanent, necessary historical logic’ (ibid.).
Attempts to explain capital as a totalizing subject require a closer appre-
ciation of the philosophical and methodological parallel between Hegel and
Marx as two of the most important theorists of modernity (Murray 1988;
Habermas 1987; Schmidt 1971). Central to the lineage of Marx and Hegel are
the structures of reason appropriated by the former in his reading of the Sci-
ence of Logic, a systematic study in non-formal logic in which the third term
of each successive categorial triad in the development of thought concludes
by integrating (or ‘sublating’) the ﬁrst two terms via the continual resolution
and re-emergence of contradiction (thesis/antithesis/synthesis). This dialectical
method was applied by Marx in Grundrisse to elucidate the ‘organic unity’ of
capital, and Hegel’s ordering of categories is reﬂected in Marx’s ordering of
economic categories in his mature critique of political economy (Meaney
2002). Marx substitutes movement of exchange for movement of thought,
leading to the development of value in and for itself as capital (Arthur 2002:
89). The contradiction resolved by the mode of exchange in commodity-
determined society is that which exists between sociation (the immediate
social contextualization of production) and dissociation (atomization of
commodity-determined society which separates historical actors from the use
values necessary to satisfy general social needs). The immediate function of
exchange is qualitative: the acquisition of socially useful goods, yet this is
disrupted by the fetish character of the commodity form which connects the
‘materiality of the capitalist social relation to the way this relation is cogni-
tively apprehended’ (De Angelis 1996: 12). As a consequence of the com-
modity fetish this qualitative and localized reciprocal act gives rise under the
capital relation to a more powerful self-augmenting value, namely exchange
value: the quantitative value of acquiring a commodity not for its utility or
intrinsic value but its value to be realized through future exchange (i.e. through
a process of capitalization), as a result of which ‘all its natural properties are
extinguished’ (Marx 1973: 141).
To progress from a simple aggregation of isolated acts of exchange to a
self-reproducing market, exchange value necessitates the emergence of money
as a universal equivalent posited as a value in and for itself. It is here that the
conditions of possibility for the emergence of money (and ultimately global
money) take shape – that is, for the emergence of capital as a self-valorizing
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value distinct from the contingency of simple commodity circulation based on
the medium of money (expressed as C-M-C’):2
Starting from money [on the other hand] gives rise to the movement
(M-C-M’), and therewith a systematic advance is made possible in the
interweaving of money and commodities, namely that the M-C-M’ circuit
has built into it greater possibilities of continuity and self-reproduction
than the C-M-C’ circuit. Value is now immanent in the activity of
exchange; it is itself the object, not the eﬀect and medium of other
motives. With the form of capital, value becomes its own end rather than
mediator of other relations; that is to say with capital we have before us
an individual subject.
(Arthur 2002: 102)
Marx’s mature social theory developed from Hegel thus reveals what capital
would be if it functioned unconstrained in accordance with its own immanent
principles. For, since value is nothing more than pure quantitative form, the
telos of capitalist production is the limitless augmentation of value irrespec-
tive of its social and environmental costs. The money form facilitates the
intensiﬁcation of capital through the inversion of simple commodity produc-
tion (C-M-C’) into the more complex capital relation (M-C-M’), as a result of
which abstract socially necessary labour subordinates concrete labour, leading
to the separation of needs and capacities, while eliminating all other possible
rationale for exchange except one: quantitative gain (Kay & Mott 1982: 56–7;
cf. Foley 1986).
The restlessness of capital is thus a function of its continual need to expand,
for the single goal capital is capable of realizing is value augmentation, ‘a one-
dimensional purely quantitative measure of its achievement which negates all
content’ (Arthur 2002: 141). The ‘true inﬁnite’ of capital derives from its self-
movement: as self-valorizing substance and subject, capital proceeds from
itself and, to continue being itself, must become continually larger. As Marx
put it, the ‘only utility whatsoever which an object can have for capital can be
to preserve or increase it’ (Marx 1973: 270), and for this to occur, the complex
circuit of capital must diﬀerentiate itself from a simple circulation of com-
modities. Marx distinguishes capital from simple circulation because in
capitalism exchange value ‘preserves and perpetuates itself in and through
circulation’, which, argues Arthur, ‘entails a form of exchange-value-creating
production which presupposes circulation as a developed moment. In this
“self-movement” of the creation of exchange values, there is a “return to the
point of departure”, i.e. production’ (Arthur 2002: 49). By means of this pro-
cess, production posits circulation and ‘presupposes it in its “constant return
to itself in order to posit it anew”. This new mode of production arises from,
and is imposed on, an older mode, from sources external to it’ (ibid.: 49–50).
Although as a mode of power capital may ﬂourish on the basis of bonded
labour, the self-expansion of capital is typically dependent on the
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commodiﬁcation of labour-power as a condition of possibility for future
value-positing activity, a capacity appropriated by capital in its drive to self-
expansion and self-supersession through the generation of surplus-value. It is
also contingent on the economic socialization of human agents as mutually
suspicious rivals who continually strategize and monitor each other’s beha-
viour, creating a society of privatized corporate agents incentivized by mate-
rial gain. Unlike previous forms of political organization, however, the object
of capital is not territory as such, but ‘value, the commodity form of private
property where this has become a type of convertible abstract right, an enti-
tlement to proﬁt share, a futures contract or a ﬁnancial derivative’ (Patton
2000: 102). As the objective subject of modernity, capital rationalizes inchoate
social and cultural forms to appropriate the results of human industriousness
and creativity, although this appropriation is unstable in the absence of cor-
porate social organization and incoherent and defenceless in the absence of its
state form.
The tyranny of abstraction
Commodities are bought for their qualitative speciﬁcity but exchanged as
social means, generalized at a societal level as a social mediation not com-
prising multiple forms of abstract labour but as socially total abstract labour
(gesamtgesellschaftliche Arbeit). For the purposes of the present discussion,
the self-movement of capital as the structuring principle of modernity (and
hence its objective subjectivity) is based on the emergence of the commodity
which contains in its own structure an accretion of use values that are con-
tinually superseded to create a higher form of use value which is simulta-
neously a speciﬁc quantity of exchange value. Marx is clearly indebted to
Hegel for his analysis of the self-valorization of capital as a self-causing agent
which, through its own self-positing and self-expansion, is actualized as a
totality which in turn imposes an objective structure of social domination
over human existence. However, in contrast with Marx’s own initial syn-
chronic presentation of capitalism as a ‘fully formed’ system based on the law
of value, historical capitalism as a mode of production speciﬁc to the
advanced societies has only come into existence in a gradual and contingent
form, and has only developed fully where labour-power is able to evolve
properly into a self-mediating commodity and thus where the commodity
form becomes ‘totalizing’. Yet Marx’s enduring achievement was to apply
Hegel’s method in a radically inverted form to reveal the ‘tyranny of
abstraction’ in commodity-determined society:
[T]o the degree that Hegel’s notion of the Subject does have historical and
social validity, according to Marx, that Subject is not a concrete human
social agent, collective or individual. Rather, the historical Subject ana-
lyzed by Marx consists of objectiﬁed relations, the subjective-objective
categorial forms characteristic of capitalism, whose ‘substance’ is abstract
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labor, that is the speciﬁc character of labor as a socially mediating activ-
ity in capitalism. Marx’s Subject, like Hegel’s, then, is abstract and
cannot be identiﬁed with any social actors. Moreover both unfold in time
in a way that is independent of human will.
(Postone 1993: 76)
This point is articulated by Marx in Grundrisse, where he considers the
geoeconomic consequences of capital accumulation as a process of self-
realization:
while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to
intercourse […] and conquer the whole world for its market, it strives on
the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a mini-
mum the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more
developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over
which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, [and]
the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the
market and for greater annihilation of space by time […] There appears
here the universalizing tendency of capital, which extinguishes from it all
previous stages of production.
(Marx 1973: 539–40)
This insight has been developed by theorists of globalization like Harvey, who
notes that a ‘reduction in the cost and time of movement has proven a com-
pelling necessity of a capitalist mode of production’ (Harvey 2003: 98). To this
end, he adds, ‘the evolution of the geographical landscape of capitalist activity
is driven remorselessly by round after round of time-space compression’ (ibid.).
Capital therefore becomes a force independent of living labour and pos-
sesses the ‘objectivity of a subject distinct from living labour capacity and
standing independently over against it’ (Marx 1973: 462). Through abstrac-
tion, capital as ‘dead labour’ operates as a social mediation – a homogenous
substance derived from alienated social relations ‘constituted by structured
forms of practice [that] acquire a quasi-independent existence and subject
people to determinate quasi-objective constraints’ (Postone 1993: 80). With
the concentration of capital, all aspects of society and culture become
embedded in this mode of power. Despite the gross iniquity of global capit-
alism, this is not the traditional authority of a minority over the majority, but
the impersonal, self-reﬂexive domination of individuals by their own position
in the division of labour. Domination in capitalism is grounded not simply in
class relations, but in the ‘pervasive structuring social forms of capitalist
society that are constituted by determinate forms of social practice’ (ibid.:
159), that is, the capitalist form of alienated labour which brings into being a
social system deﬁned by the ‘quasi-independent, abstract, universal Other that
stands opposed to the individuals and exerts an impersonal compulsion on
them’ (ibid.).
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Yet this abstract domination is concealed through a process of naturaliza-
tion that presents labour as transhistorical, as a natural rather than histori-
cally determinate necessity. This insight into the objectivity of capitalist
domination highlights the constitutive power of capital as a causal force that
arrests consciousness in societies governed by the power of spectacle, which
Agamben (1993) deﬁnes as ‘capital to such a degree of accumulation that it
becomes an image’ (in Barkan 2009: 249). In the society of spectacle, capi-
talist relations develop to the point that human life is ‘governed by exchange
value; even use value itself has become indistinguishable from its representa-
tion as exchange value’, where the ‘economy expands to a dominant position
over all other spheres of social life’ (Barkan 2009: 249; cf. Gorz 2011). Capi-
tal directs culture towards a monolithic telos of value augmentation – towards
a one-dimensional rationality that incorporates workers who relate to them-
selves as ‘object[s] opposed to and enabling capital to exist for-itself as subject
and as subject[s] opposed to and enabling capital’s internal diﬀerentiation as
object – as capital’s constitutive outside and vanishing mediation throughout the
entire process’ (Gawel 2012: 4). Through capitalist subjectiﬁcation – through
the performance of abstract labour as a lived process of reiﬁcation – the
worker
relates to himself as the very abstraction by which capital relates to itself,
and this is the ground of both his speciﬁcity in the original exchange as
naked object and free subject relating only to itself in its independence,
and also his negative auto-relationality as a pure generality without
identical sameness, the literal undoing of the ideological self-equivalence
entailed by the contract. His individuality thus is both poverty and gen-
erality, in each case the negative image of capital as the subject of its own
process of valorization.
(Gawel 2012: 4, emphasis added)
The process of valorization is thus both equally disempowering and totalizing,
for the ‘abstract individual – a processual relationship of domination that negates
its relational origins by propagating itself as its own formal equivalence – has
been capital’s form throughout’ (Gawel 2012: 4).
Arthur accepts with qualiﬁcation the assertion that capital can be con-
sidered a ‘self-constituting Subject’ based on a single structuring principle:
‘Whereas a simple inversion of Hegel produces a materialist philosophy of
history founded on some a priori dialectical schema’, he notes, Marx’s cri-
tique of political economy denotes the forms that Hegel’s concepts absolutize
and idealize. ‘In these forms a historical “logic” can indeed be seen; but it is
one restricted to the parameters of capitalist development, because its social
forms are uniquely constituted through material abstraction in a way that
grounds a dialectic’ (Arthur 2004: 94). As the objective subject of modernity,
capital is thus a material abstraction of the value form which unfolds inde-
pendently of human will – that is to say, unfolds in ways that are less
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responsive to human agency during periods when the system achieves a state
of ‘normal functioning’, but which may become more susceptible to human
agency as the system begins to fail (cf. Wallerstein 2010, 2011a).
Yet Arthur is critical of the indeterminacy of the notion of capital as an
unself-conscious quasi-Subject without cognition. This raises questions about
the nature of agency, for what kind of subject has no self-consciousness or
self-knowing? Such agency might be attributed ‘to animals whose activity
secures their subsistence, just as capital bent on self-valorisation preserves and
increases its “substance” through reﬂexively incorporating its increment. But
is this tendency to self-preservation enough to constitute a subject?’ (Arthur
2004: 94). Arthur is also critical of Postone’s interpretation of the term sub-
stance, which has more than one meaning. In particular, we should distin-
guish between substance as material form and substance as self-constitutive
force – something that exists on its own account – and he questions Postone’s
failure to specify whether labour or value is fundamental to the totality. If
capital is a subject, he argues, ‘and only its totalising activity posits value as
an actuality and abstract labour as a practical truth, then it seems plausible to
argue that labour is not the self-mediating social ground, but rather a moment
in the self-mediation of capital, with value as both origin and product of this
subject’ (ibid.: 98). Marx posits the self-constitutive power of capital: abstract
labour is understood as the substance of value, and Postone may be in danger
of placing the cart before the horse, so that capital posits itself as its own
product. Finally, Arthur is critical of Postone’s failure to emphasize class
struggle as if labour were fully integrated into the logic of capital. Against this
view, he insists, we must recognize labour is at once ‘in and against capital;
bearers of its forms to be sure, but always incipiently in revolt against such
“interpellation”’ (Arthur 2004: 101). Labour is not identical to a ‘class of
labourers’, and although Postone is correct to emphasize the integrality of
labour as a category for the totality, this does not disqualify the ‘proletariat
from forming itself as a counter-subject to capital […] no one is more aware
of this than capital itself which certainly does not rely only on “dull economic
compulsion” to secure labour services’ (ibid.: 101). This is echoed by Albritton,
who argues that Postone fails to consider the condition of labour in his tota-
lizing narrative of self-valorizing value: ‘If we follow through with his claim
that “Marx characterizes capital as a self-moving substance which is Sub-
ject”’, he contends, ‘the result will be a theory which represents the self-
unfolding of capital, or, in other words, capital’s theory of itself ’ (Albritton
2004: 81).
These criticisms are apposite and must be considered before proceeding
with our analysis, yet do they not substantially weaken Postone’s critique of
traditional Marxism or his theoretical conceptualization of capitalist sub-
jectivity as a form of non-intentional causality which produces outcomes
consistent with the self-expanding logic of capital as a mode of power rather
than simply class actors.3 Both Arthur and Albritton are right to question the
apparent functional automaticity of Postone’s approach, which seems to rule
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out all political opposition to capital by reaﬃrming the absolute causality of
value. Furthermore, as Feenberg argues, Postone’s depiction of ‘traditional
Marxism’ contains elements of caricature: far from being idealistic, Lukács’s
intention was to demonstrate how, ‘starting out from the speciﬁc degradation
of its life and work under the reign of the law of value, the proletariat can
break with capitalist forms of thought and action and realize the potentialities
for a very diﬀerent type of society contained and repressed in capitalist
industrialism’ (Feenberg 1996: 609). In addition, few activists could feel
inspired by Postone’s gloomy professorial exegesis of Marx’s social theory –
even if he is correct to argue that capitalist temporality pushes the rate of
technical and ﬁnancial innovation to the point where labour becomes less
important for the generation of surplus-value (cf. Marazzi 2010). Yet, as
Starosta argues, the essential importance of Postone’s intellectual contribution
lies in his argument that, if
concretely and consistently developed, the mature Marxian notion of
alienation amounts to the social constitution of capital as the (alienated)
concrete subject of the historical movement of modern society. The essen-
tial determination of social reproduction in its capitalist form is to
become totally subsumed under […] the autonomized movement of self-
valorizing value, thereby determining human beings as ‘personiﬁcations
of economic categories’, that is, objectiﬁed social relations.
(Starosta 2004: 45)
Furthermore, he adds, ‘this personiﬁcation does not derive from an uncritical
relapse into the abstract principles of structural-functionalist methodology’.
On the contrary, it ‘necessarily follows from a consistently materialist under-
standing of the speciﬁcally capitalist inverted constitution of practice under-
lying both the forms of objectivity and subjectivity of present-day social life’
(Starosta 2004: 45). The error of traditional Marxism is that it only ‘provides
an objective context which is seen as spurring, accelerating or facilitating the
self-determining movement of the subjective factor […] there is no real med-
iation between the materiality of the production process of human life and the
political consciousness of the emancipatory subject’ (ibid.: 49). On the con-
trary, even if radical political practice is not diverted by nationalism, religious
sectarianism or consumerism, anti-capitalism in its fundamentalist and prag-
matic varieties is typically founded on progressive forms of misrecognition
where ‘movements are blind to the larger context of which they are a part
[and thus] generate consequences that are undesirable for them as well’
(Postone, in interview with Blumberg & Nogales 2008).
Capital is a value that is self-activating, ‘both substance and subject’
(Murray 1988: 216). In addition, the circuit of capital should be seen as per-
formative: capital is a constantly mutating substance and subject which is
‘always engaged in experiment, as the project is perpetually unﬁnished’ (Thrift
2005: 3). The singular monolithic telos of capital can be better appreciated by
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considering the structural limits placed on value augmentation not simply by
the barriers to production of a given value but by the eﬀects of a separation of
wealth from the circuit of capital (hoarding/demand for liquidity), which
leads in turn to disinvestment and recession. Capital must continually repro-
duce itself anew by producing commodities drawing on the stimulated
demand of consumers, for the ‘particularity of the commodity has to be con-
verted into the universality of money which is much more problematic than
going from money […] to commodities. Somebody must need, want or desire
the particular commodity’ (Harvey 2010: 106). The constraints imposed by
competition on the expansion of value are insuﬃcient to deter capitalists from
introducing new commodities by creating new needs to overcome the barriers
of existing markets (Clarke 1989: 13). Idle capital is dysfunctional, for as
McNally observes, ‘every ﬁnite form of capital as a sum of money stands as a
barrier to capital’s drive towards inﬁnity, its telos as absolute wealth. Inherent
in capital’, he argues, ‘is an unending process of self-negation; capital drives
beyond its previous limit only to ﬁnd itself separated from its goal: absolute
wealth’ (McNally 2003: 6). Capital cannot capitalistically produce its own
‘vital presupposition’, and its sovereignty is therefore constrained by given
structural variables reﬂecting the cultural and political organization of market
economies. The ‘solution’ developed by capital is to
strive endlessly to negate all the limits imposed upon it by actual use-
values, to try to overcome its own ﬁxity (ﬁnite determination) by reducing
the time spent in the sphere of production […] If it were possible – which
it is not – capital would take leave entirely of the sphere of production of
use values in order to assume a ‘pure’ form of money breeding money; it
would utterly annihilate space in favour of time.
(McNally 2003: 8)
One response to this conundrum is the creation of credit markets which, by
selling (or creating ex nihilo) the universal commodity form of money, allow
capitalists access to capital to ﬁnance innovation and further reduce depen-
dency on living labour. Another is globalization which accelerates the ‘socia-
lization and global integration of capitalist production, whilst constituting a
powerful means of economic and social restructuring’ (Liodakis 2010: 46).
Neoliberal ﬁnancialization has led to an economic transformation of
advanced economies based on the expanded role of ﬁnance relative to other
spheres of activity, where: (i) non-ﬁnancial corporations reduce reliance on
bank capital to acquire ﬁnancial capacity for themselves; (ii) banks extend
their mediating activities in ﬁnancial markets; and (iii) households are integrated
more intensively into the debt/credit nexus of capitalist ﬁnance (Lapavitsas
2011; Brown 2010).
Debt is not in itself an impediment to economic growth, but the debt-
creation system that compels the process of ﬁnancialization constitutes a
relation of power: ‘a “capture”, “predation”, and “extraction” machine for
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macroeconomic prescription and management’, and hence a ‘mechanism for
the production and “government” of individual subjectivities’ (Lazzarato
2012: 29). Developing Nietzsche’s genealogical investigation into the origins
of the dual phenomena debt/guilt (in German both concepts are signiﬁed by
the word Schuld), Lazzarato argues perceptively that debt not only facilitates
the purchasing power necessary to sustain capital, but socializes consumers
into ‘correct’ forms of subjectivity necessary to sustain the debt (power) rela-
tion itself – to remain ‘free’ (despite the guilt/burden of being in debt), and
able to ‘act in such a way that you are able to honour your debts even if, like
the IMF, it has a tendency to devour “debtors” by imposing economic policies
that promote “recession”’ (ibid.: 31).
Financialization announces the moment when capital becomes potentially
self-constitutive (M-M’), although this moment may be short lived, for as
McNally argues, in spite of the appearance of limitless self-valorization,
speculative capital can no more escape the dynamic of bad inﬁnity
[movement towards an inﬁnite destination that is never actually fulﬁlled]
than can any other form. Every ﬁnancial crisis and stock market crash
represents a revenge of the ﬁnite as interest-bearing money discovers its
inﬁnite ties to the ﬁnite world of use-values. After all, ﬁxed capital and
ﬁctitious capital are two interconnected extremes within the contradictory
unity of capital as a whole.
(McNally 2003: 12)
‘Revenge of the ﬁnite’ notwithstanding, however, the expanding systemic role
of ﬁnance in the transformation of global capitalism reveals the objective
subjectivity of capital as a constitutive mode of power: in an era deﬁned by
accelerated global ﬂows, extraction and speculation, and the increasing role of
language and mnemotechnics4 in the sphere of exchange (Marazzi 2011;
Stiegler 2010), we are witnessing the emergence of a purely quantitative logic –
a logic of valorization that requires the ‘plundering of all other potential
values of the earth’ (Elsner 2012: 133). On the one hand this leads to a sub-
jugation and subsumption of autonomous forms under the value relation,
substituting a one-dimensional rationality for autonomously grounded values/
codes that underpin communities. On the other hand, this increases the potential
for geopolitical conﬂict as corporate-state interests maximize opportunities
for new sources of accumulation as rates of proﬁtability decline.
The quantitative logic of ﬁnancialization is typically justiﬁed in ﬁnancial
economics through a synthesis of ‘eﬃcient market theory’ and ‘portfolio
optimization theory’, neither of which reﬂect the imperfect function of capital
markets which periodically defeat themselves by diverting excess surplus
capital (the accumulated surplus corporations cannot invest productively) into
overinvestment in credit markets and the innovation of complex ﬁnancial
instruments which assume ‘all products of human economic activity’ and risk
can be eﬃciently priced (Nesvetailova 2013: 70). However, the realities of
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leveraged ﬁnance and the unstoppable growth of shadow banking (where
asset deals and loans are conducted oﬀ-balance sheet to maximize returns
and avoid the intended eﬀects of intensiﬁed regulation) indicate the de facto
limits of transnationally constituted public authorities (the IMF/Bank of
International Settlements, etc.), to reduce risk and control ‘ﬁnancial innova-
tion’ which is increasingly a ‘front for borderline practices and outright fraud,
the sole purpose of which [is] self-enrichment of ﬁnancial institutions and
banks’ (ibid.: 71).
As Haiven notes in an insightful essay, if the purely quantitative logic of
value seeks to co-opt the ‘dense world of qualitative social values under its
cyclopean logic of quantiﬁed economic value’, then the modern structure of
ﬁnance should be understood as the ‘redoubling of the complexities and
abstractions of money [which] creates a world-embracing matrix of signals
that allows for a form of synthetic comprehension of social totality and
futurity’ (Haiven 2010: 93). Financial capital is a destabilizing force, yet also
functions as capital’s ‘imagination’ – a more complex moment of the capital-
ist abstraction of value (ibid.: 94). Anxious not to anthropomorphize a cate-
gory without self-consciousness, Haiven argues that capital has ‘no agency of
its own but is a durable pattern that profoundly inﬂuences people’s agency,
subjectivity, expectations, and dispositions toward actions that reproduce and
expand capitalist social relations’ (ibid.: 98–99, emphasis added). He notes
furthermore that the logical function of global ﬁnance is to resolve a contra-
diction between capitals through combination, eﬀectively ‘pooling the surplus
value they have extracted from labor and putting it toward geographically or
temporally distant projects that no single capitalist agent can aﬀord to risk’.
While it appears ﬁnance has a ‘will of its own’, however, it is a ‘complex
means by which the abstract system of capital – which is, after all, an ima-
gined presence given real-world power by its inﬂuence on human actions –
subtly mobilizes, disciplines and coordinates the agency of social actors
towards its perpetuation and expansion’ (ibid.: 107). In the global economy
ﬁnance has shed its older mercantilist form as money transcends its tradi-
tional functions as medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account.
To achieve ever-increasing rates of return in a world characterized by declin-
ing rates of proﬁt, ﬁnance must colonize new areas of human life constructing
‘what is liquid (saleable/convertible) in all “assets” and in the process giving
once non-ﬁnancial things a liquid, ﬁnancial dimension to which a rate of
return attaches’ (Bryan 2012: 172).
This analysis bears comparison with Habermas’s (1984) juxtaposition of
system and lifeworld, where vital sociocultural forms are recombined through
rationalization into diﬀerentiated, complex and self-suﬃcient systems. For
Habermas, this leads to a ‘colonization of the lifeworld’ by an overarching
structure of power driven by narrow criteria of rationality which drastically
limit the capacity of agents to engage in free communication. Rationalization
sustains the lifeworld within an atomized and rigidiﬁed structure, initiating a
form of cultural and ecological decay which can only be reversed through the
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constitution of ideal speech scenarios where alternative technologies for life
develop free from the distortion eﬀect of unequal power.
For Marazzi, who emphasizes the centrality of language in late capitalism,
linguistic-discursive mediation establishes the condition for a substantive
rationality which ‘allows us to justify and legitimize the governance of society
by referring to collective interests and needs’ (Marazzi 2011: 36). Yet, for
Haiven, the instability of ﬁnance derives from its tendency to (mis)calculate
value by focusing exclusively on exchange value, which explains its incapacity
to articulate and measure the ‘social totality of value’ – a deﬁciency he deﬁnes
as capital’s ‘imaginative gap’ (Haiven 2010: 112). Unlike Thrift (2005), who
naïvely applauds the elevated status of information workers under what he
terms ‘soft capitalism’ (i.e. the collective brain of knowledge economies), or
Hardt and Negri, who misconstrue the category ‘immaterial labour’ – a
questionable idea which falsely accords autonomy to emancipated workers
who control information ﬂows and ideas (reminiscent of knowledge economy
discourse in liberal management theory) (Sherman 2011), Haivan (2010: 115)
observes that by appropriating and transforming use values into metrics of
risk, ﬁnancialized capitalism ‘functions as a weapon of social discipline’.
Imagination can only serve as a metaphor, for capital is ‘inhuman and pos-
sesses no agency of its own nor any unique intelligence’ (ibid.). Rather, we
might say, ‘capital amassed through the credit system has the potential to
ﬁne-tune the engine of accumulation through sophisticated coordination of
investment decisions across an economy’ (Harvey 1982: 284), and while this
may lead to ‘irrational forms of overproduction and overspeculation’ (ibid.:
288), it constitutes the central nervous system of a complex and inter-
dependent global ﬁnancial structure that exists objectively and independently
of the transitory agency of really existing historical individuals and most
sovereign governments.
Liodakis acknowledges the signiﬁcance of the ‘general intellect’ in capital-
ism which he grounds in the ‘transformation of the mode of socialization and
the social division of labour, which tend to upset formerly private commodity
production and partly supersede the operation of the law of value’ (Liodakis
2010: 17). Yet labour is never actually immaterial, for it is not the ‘content of
labour but its commodity form that gives “weight” to an object or idea in a
market economy. Its physicality or otherwise is wholly irrelevant. […] trans-
formation of knowledge or intellect into saleable commodities relies precisely
on separating knowledge from the knower’ (Thompson 2005: 41). This point
is critical: individual subjectivity is an ‘abstraction of the social relations that
produce it, which as such concretely reproduces these social relations’ (Gawel
2012: 1). This mystiﬁcation becomes possible because value
constitutes this ground of sociality precisely as an independent subject.
Nor is this an innocent fact as value achieves this independence as the
subject of its own valorization process only insofar as the individual
worker […] forms its constitutive outside and mediation, and as such can
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never partake in the form of independent subjectivity it casts upon her as
its empty shadow […] Labor is initially posed by capital in exchange as a
propertyless object whose necessary opposition to capital is realized via its
appearance as free subject, and subsequently posed in production as pure
subjectivity excluded from the objective value that it produces. In being
posited by capital as separate and independent from it only as object, and
as originating agency as subject only insofar as it cannot take part in its
own objective product, labor in each instance is formed as the reverse
image of value.
(Gawel 2012: 1)
This process is vital to the separation and perpetuation of the value form as
abstraction in action. For, once the process of exchange between value and
labour takes place, the appearance of equality disappears, uncovering the
capital relation as the ‘assertion of capital’s necessity to valorize itself by
incorporating yet maintaining itself as opposed to what must exist outside of
it as its use, namely labor’ (Gawel 2012: 2). The worker, argues Gawel, is
‘always ejected from the general wealth of capital through the act of accepting
(and thus using) a portion of it, and in this way ﬁnds himself in need of
renewing the contract’ (ibid.: 2). In the same sense, the debtor – especially the
sovereign debtor who defaults – is ostracized from the capital markets to ﬁnd
herself at the mercy of the IMF. Regardless of the materiality of speciﬁc eco-
nomic processes, intellectual and manual workers are both separated from the
product of their labour as capital is reproduced in new ways through the value
form as a tyranny of abstraction which accelerates the universal development
of the forces of production (industrial or ﬁnancial) in its drive for self-expansion,
but which exhibits no substantive rationality of its own and posits no logical
telos beyond its own continuous self-valorization. In this sense, the tyranny of
abstraction (capitalist tyranny) is distinct from earlier forms of political tota-
litarianism, yet is ‘more subtle, more insidious, more hidden from general
view’ (Wood 2004: 64). As Wood concludes: ‘What could be more seductive
and disarming than the insinuation of the new tyranny into every facet of
human reality and thought under the beguiling cover of democracy, legal and
juridical equality, individual freedom, equality of opportunity, classlessness
and progress?’ (Wood 2004: 64).
Conclusion
If capital has no self-conscious agency, it nevertheless abstracts from the
activities and mentalities of the multitude, constituting durable patterns and
structures that inﬂuence subjects’ dispositions, which in turn reproduce and
extend capitalist relations of power. It is the logical function of ﬁnance to
resolve the contradiction and competition between capitals by aggregating
value and orchestrating investments that would otherwise be beyond the
scope of individual ventures even to conceptualize. As we shall see, this is a
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basic organizing principle of dominant capital as the driving force of trans-
national corporate power in the international political economy of neoliberal
globalization. Yet the constitutive power of capital is incomplete in the
absence of its state form as the sphere of juridical organization that stands
outside and above social reproduction yet remains integral to it. The capitalist
state form is a political technology to manage: (i) contradictions between
deterritorialized capitals and embedded regimes of accumulation; (ii) the ten-
dency towards overaccumulation, where despite increasing productivity,
conversion of surplus-value into capital is periodically blocked, leading to
declining proﬁtability; and (iii) geopolitical tensions created between state
actors in the organization of transnational corporate power.
Developing Hobbes’s characterization of the legal exemptions granted by
charter to corporations to pursue the public welfare, Barkan argues that cor-
porate power reﬂects the ‘doubling’ of sovereignty in modernity, which forces
us to rethink corporate agency as a mode of political sovereignty:
corporations are legal creations – ﬁctitious persons formed when states
recognize the power of individuals to organize collectively. Corporations
are ﬁctions, created by states, but given such social power that they
threaten to undermine the political sovereignty that created them. In
other words, corporations are an ‘imaginary relationship of individuals to
the real conditions of their existence’, produced by the state and law and
thus, strictly speaking, ideological. They are also the means by which
states attempt to marshal the collective power of individuals towards
public ends by granting them a special legal status. This paradoxical
relation, in which corporations emerge from law but continue to threaten
the existence and legitimacy of the state, suggests something more com-
plex than the declining power of states in the face of a global corporate
economy.
(Barkan 2013: 4)
Indeed, one of the signiﬁcant features of the global ﬁnancial crisis is not the
support of Western governments for the banking system, but the spectacle of
the Lehman Brothers collapse and its presentation in corporate media dis-
course as a threat to national security. The global crisis that followed revealed
the fusion of corporate-state power in postliberal capitalism – which Barkan
redeﬁnes through the parallel logics of state sovereignty and corporate hege-
mony. Following Agamben (1998), he posits an aﬃnity between formal poli-
tical sovereignty as exceptional power (where rule of law is legitimately
suspended to defend democracy against itself), and corporate sovereignty as
legally sanctioned immunity from law (where rule of law is suspended as
value augmentation reaches high levels of intensity). These dual logics –
which coincided in September 2008 as the US Congress passed the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act – should not be juxtaposed but seen as two
dimensions of prerogative right expressing the constitutive power of capital as a
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self-valorizing value in neoliberal capitalism. This formulation oﬀers a more
reliable basis from which to comprehend the evolution of capitalist sover-
eignty as a mode of power – as a precondition for generating value through
ﬁnancial instruments that have ‘little direct connection to the material econ-
omy of countries’ (Sassen 2011: 43). Capitalist sovereignty augments and dis-
places rather than destroys the political sovereignty of states, and by
exploiting legal distinctions between territorial accumulation regimes, capi-
talist sovereignty provides a basis for the expansion of the commodity market
system at the level of the global economy.
In the next chapter, we shall examine the logic of corporate power and the
development of the modern corporation as a vehicle for extending capitalist
sovereignty through the legal construction of ‘limited liability’ and ‘corporate
personhood’. If, as we have argued, capital has no actual conscious agency,
the same is not true with regard to the modern corporation, which constitutes
a reﬂexive intentional system. As Gupta argues:
The agency which is contained in the manifest form of the capitalist
corporation not only explains and predicts its own behaviour with a view
to achieving its predetermined end, it acts upon its self-explanations and
self-predictions to direct itself towards that predetermined end. This
means that the agency within the corporation can eﬀect suitable changes
and modiﬁcations within its own constitution, can impinge upon its own
behaviour, can moderate itself according to its own projections. One may
think of the capitalist corporation as some sort of collective organic
entity: self-contained, self-determining, self-projecting, self-modifying.
(Gupta 2002: 58)
Once we have examined the legal basis and political rationale of capitalist
sovereignty, expressed in terms of the prerogative right of capitalist corpora-
tions to accumulate at a diﬀerential rate, we can proceed towards a more
concrete analysis of the state form of transnational capital as a precondition
for the expansion and consolidation of corporate power in the global econ-
omy. Global economic governance can be understood as an attempt to
impose regulatory structures on capital ﬂows, yet as the regulatory experi-
ments that followed the global ﬁnancial crisis clearly demonstrate, capital will
quickly and perhaps inevitably overcome all political attempts at regulation in
order to exploit unequal terms of trade and achieve above-average returns.
Notes
1 Walker (1993: 159) is critical of rigid ontological distinctions in neorealism which,
he suggests, reveal the ‘limits of modern political discourse in an era perplexed by
temporal accelerations and historical/structural transformations. These limits are
especially apparent in the categories and debates of international relations theory as
the discipline most explicitly constituted as a limit of authentically political life
within the territorial container of the sovereign state’.
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2 Where C = commodity, C’ = new commodity, M = money, and M’ = new quantity
of money.
3 As we shall see in Chapter 4, IR scholars like Wendt (2003) have attempted to
combine intentional and non-intentional causality to explain the inevitable emer-
gence of a ‘world state’, a form of teleological reasoning that explains the development
of global economic and political integration without reference to the self-movement
of capital as the real subject of corporate globalization.
4 Mnemotechnics is concerned with the ‘art of memory’. Stiegler (2010: 29) deﬁnes
the term as ‘writing which functions as a fabricator of illusion and technique for the
manipulation of the mind’, contraposing dead memory to living memory. Van
Camp (2012: 3) observes that for Stiegler, ‘audio-visual media have become indis-
pensable for the creation of the large scale markets required for the return on
investment in research and development and industrial production. They provide
access to a meta-market of millions of minds whose attention can be captured and
conditioned to adopt new consumption goods’. However, he adds, while this is not
a new phenomenon, it certainly is the case that ‘the industrial exploitation of the
mnemotechnical system which we are currently experiencing tends toward the
destruction of both psychic and collective individuation processes’ (ibid.).
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3 Corporate globalization
Introduction
In Chapter 2 it was shown that while possessing no autonomous agency as
such, as self-valorizing value capital acquires an ‘objective subjectivity’ as a
dynamic structuring force – the constitutive mode of power in commodity-
determined societies whose social function is obscured by the formal separa-
tion of property ownership and political supremacy in classical theories of
sovereignty. Rejecting Marxism from the standpoint of labour, it was shown
that an adequate account of capitalist sovereignty must explain not simply the
global relevance of corporate capital as a causal variable in international
politics but the tendency of capital to develop new economic forms and social
structures while continuously regenerating the ‘same’ – that is, continually
reproducing contingent yet functionally identical commodity-determined
relations rooted in the value form. In this contingent sense, capital creates the
social conditions for historical change and the juridical evolution of the
national and transnational state, yet adapts its sociopolitical form to reincor-
porate and neutralize this modernization eﬀect. It is for this reason that
capitalist formations structured in accordance with the value relation char-
acterized by equivalence and substitutability cannot be superseded (Mann
2010).
This is not to refute the possibility of progress, only to assert that funda-
mental political change cannot take place in commodity-determined societies
of self-alienated labour. From this perspective, the global ﬁnancial crisis pro-
mises not the end of capitalism but its reconstitution in a totalizing postliberal
form (cf. Liodakis 2010; Crouch 2011; Stockhammer 2011; Hart-Landsberg
2013). Despite limited reform, the value relation has not been superseded; on
the contrary, it is running at near full capacity, and critical observers who
fetishize a normative distinction between real and ﬁctitious capital ‘overstate
the extent and depth of the crisis for capital, and underestimate the virtually
uninterrupted consolidation of the rule of the value, i.e. the territorial and
historical imperative of equivalence and substitutability’ (Mann 2010: 172).
Corporate globalization encompasses two manifestations of sovereignty.
The ﬁrst is articulated in the timeless anarchy of international relations as a
neo-Darwinian struggle between identity-based communities of fate, articulated
most forcefully in the ‘friend-enemy distinction’ (Schmitt 1927), where mere
potential for conﬂict is adequate to activate war between rivals. The state-
centric model of international politics is by no means redundant: the national
state form of capital matters for the political organization of class power and
the cultural mediation of globalizing capital (Hobsbawm 1992). The global
hegemony of capital is possible precisely because capitalism is a world system
that incorporates and reproduces in itself a plurality of political forms. As
Wallerstein argues, ‘capitalism as an economic mode is based on the fact that
the economic factors operate within an arena larger than that which any
political entity can totally control. This gives capitalists a freedom of manoeuvre
that is structurally based’ (Wallerstein 1974: 230).
The second manifestation of sovereignty is entailed in the geocentric logic
of corporate globalization and the intensiﬁcation of capitalist power through
its transnational state form: corporations possess non-legitimate power yet
their power is articulated through complex structures of global economic
governance which confer legitimacy on capital as the real subject of globality.
As Davenport argues, interstate relations and global corporate power ‘rein-
force and reproduce each other: political fragmentation facilitates the mobi-
lity of capital and the uneven development of capitalist production means
that dominant classes in core powers export capital to other areas’ (Daven-
port 2011: 26). This, he adds, restrains ‘core powers from attempting to
impose political dominance through conquest’ (ibid.: 26; cf. Chase-Dunn
1981). These twin articulations of sovereignty are typically separated in IR
and IPE, yet their intermediation is revealed in the principles of legal non-
liability and political unaccountability that underpin the capitalist value form.
This phenomenon is revealed most obviously, perhaps, in the corporate
impunity of private security contractors whose exceptional legal status and
parapolitical function are articulated via a discourse of security/risk/expertise
based on practical authority linked to experience/engagement, a discourse of
market rationality based on the eﬃciency of private ﬁrms, and a discourse of
acquired authority predicated on the incorporation of governmental functions
(augmentation of states’ monopoly of violence) (Leander 2010: 471–81; cf.
Krahmann 2012). Parapolitics implies a ‘system of politics in which
accountability is consciously diminished’ (Wilson 2012: 1), and with the
intensiﬁcation of war economy ‘the marriage of government, business and
military tightens; “privatization” of military functions simply comes with the
terrain, as many corporations simply take on greater “battle-ﬁeld responsi-
bilities”’ (Boggs 2011a: 109). This permanent war system, Boggs adds, ‘legit-
imates and reinforces state power on a grand scale’ (ibid.: 110), providing
additional justiﬁcation for the security-industrial complex while minimizing
the accountability of states for human rights violations and ‘collateral
damage’ to civilians and infrastructure (Hoppe 2008). Capitalist sovereignty is
also revealed in its opposition to ‘constituent power’ as the popular ground of
political freedom – an always potential and recurring force which precipitates
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political change at contingent stages in the historical development of capital-
ism, but which typically exists outside the purview of the constituted state and
is therefore indeterminate in form. As Gupta (2002: 163) observes, the ‘capi-
talist state is such because it colludes with corporate capitalist processes’. Yet
it would be misleading to argue that these articulations of sovereignty are
identical, for the public authority of the state and private power of the
corporation embody distinct forms of intentionality:
The means-orientation of the political state may (or may be made to)
cohere with the ends-orientation of the capitalist corporation, but equally
it may not. It may not precisely because ultimately the political state
(with its deﬁnitive means orientation) is with regard to the people-land-
resources it represents, and the capitalist corporation (with its deﬁnitive
ends-orientation) has no such necessary allegiance.
(Gupta 2002: 52)
This, concludes Gupta (2002: 52), ‘means that two diﬀerent kinds of inten-
tionality are implied in the two deﬁnitions which may happen to complement
each other but which do not coincide’.
In what follows, we analyse the logic of corporate globalization as an eco-
nomic system based on diﬀerential accumulation, applying a theory of domi-
nant capital as ‘forward-looking’ power (Nitzan & Bichler 2009). We begin by
examining the consolidation of US corporate power in the twentieth century
as a feature of ‘political’ capitalism, which Kolko deﬁnes as the ‘utilization of
political outlets to attain conditions of stability, predictability and security
[…] in the economy’ (Kolko 1964: 3). In postliberal capitalism political and
economic power are not separate, but rather intertwined in a single social
order. The polity and economy of society are not discrete self-referential
action systems as autopoiesis theory claims (Luhmann 1990), but comprise a
conceptual duality reﬂecting the complementary right to compel obedience
(political control) and exclude (economic domination) (Pels 1998: 3).
Corporate power is ontologically linked to the sovereign power of the state:
as the legal embodiment of capital, corporate power is founded on legally
sanctioned immunity from law, in large part because corporatism emerged as
the ‘inescapable horizon for securing human welfare’ (Barkan 2013: 162), but
also because the corporation is a powerful form of social organization which
it is too prohibitive for states to bring under real public control (Wilson 2009:
19). Capitalist sovereignty, in eﬀect, acquires prerogative right; and the
transnational expansion of US corporate capitalism must count as a central
narrative of modern world history, even if competing models of regional
capitalism also emerged in Germany and Japan in the interwar period leading
to the creation of closed political spaces (Grossraumordnungen) in Europe and
Asia which temporarily threatened Anglo-American naval hegemony and
Soviet land power before the establishment of a bipolar world order at Yalta.1
Although the term empire oﬀers an appealing and analytically convenient
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basis for understanding transnational corporate power, attempts by modern
states to create closed political spaces fail because they are ‘incapable of
obtaining suﬃcient support in a system in which expanding and deepening
commodity production and the continuation of the multi-centric interstate
system hold greater promise for national ruling classes than the presentiment
of shares within world imperium’ (Chase-Dunn 1989: 8). As a result, the
‘centrality of markets and capitalist accumulation undercuts the tendency
towards empire formation’ (ibid.). A hegemonic state may resort to coercion to
defend corporate interests; however, as global competition from emerging
markets grows, unilateralism becomes less appropriate and less eﬀective as
‘capital is exported from the declining hegemonic core state to areas where proﬁt
rates are higher. This reduces the level at which capitalists within the hege-
monic core state will support the “economic nationalism” of their home state’
(ibid.: 147), leading to divisions between transnationally oriented and
national capitals – an intra-class conﬂict within the transnational capitalist
class (Robinson 2002, 2004a).
Our second task is to explore diﬀerential accumulation as an institutional
precondition for capitalist sovereignty. Building on the economic sociology of
Veblen, Nitzan and Bichler critically assess the diﬀerential power of dominant
capital expressed in the monopolistic organization of markets. Diﬀerential
accumulation indicates the ‘ability of dominant capital, namely the leading
corporations and key government organs […] to control, shape and transform
society against opposition’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 17). What matters is not
absolute but diﬀerential accumulation, the capacity to ‘beat the average’. The
aim is not productivity but control, which enables ‘some agents to set the
conditions under which others must act […] undermining or even destroying
the productive capacity of society in order to preserve the structural market
power of dominant capital’ (Scott 2001: 72). This applies to transnational
oligopolies which ‘inﬂuence the environment in which they operate, rather
than simply react to it in an easily predictable manner like a small ﬁrm under
“perfect competition” […] By operating at any one time in a number of dif-
ferent economic and political environments, and, what is more, by exploiting
these diﬀerences, [global corporations] are even more powerful and “unpre-
dictable” than oligopolies conﬁned to a single country’ (Panic´ 2011: 143).
This ‘unpredictability’ reveals the directionless character of transnational
corporate capital as the subject of globality which in a ﬁnancialized global
economy cannot easily be contained within or subordinated to the culturally
determined interests of territorial states.
Finally, we shall examine transnational neoliberalism as the ideology of
corporate globalization that articulates the prerogative power of capital.
Transnational neoliberalism has its origins in the accumulation crisis of the
Keynesian national welfare state and the deregulation of ﬁnance capital in
the 1980s. Anticipating the discussion in Chapter 5, we assess the extent to
which transnational neoliberalism is consistent with the national interest of
the advanced economies of the West where debt, monetary instability and
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negative demographic trends are reducing the capacity of governments to
create growth. This breach in the growth-oriented logic of Western capitalism
is already corrosive for Western economies, causing social fracture and poli-
tical instability as inequality and oligarchy triumph on the ruins of social
democracy. While globalization has increased GDP per capita among the
global elite and among the new middle classes of India and China (Milanovic
2012), it has done so by freeing global capital from dependence on the tradi-
tional matrix of consumerism in Western economies (Westra 2010). This
reﬂects the proletarianization the Western middle class as an exhausted social
force in low-growth, deﬂation-prone economies of America and Europe that
are dependent on bank-created private debt to sustain mass consumption.
The logic of corporate power
Veblen argued that the logic of corporate power lies in the capacity of the
capitalist to ‘block the industrial process at some one or more points. His
strategy is commonly directed against other business interests and his ends are
commonly accomplished by the help of some form of pecuniary coercion’
(Veblen 1904: 21). Corporate rivalry, he added, is a ‘struggle between rival
businessmen and more often than not the outcome of the struggle depends on
which side can inﬂict or endure greater pecuniary damage’ (ibid.). Our
primary question, however, is not whether markets are ‘free’ – as Žižek (2010)
observes, the myth of free trade smoothes over the reality of persistent market
failure – but why we have corporations rather than markets in the ﬁrst place
(cf. Bodie 2012). One answer lies in the nature of corporate organization
as a mode of power founded on the principle of institutionalized advantage:
in corporate social discourse – at least since Coase’s (1937) theory of the
ﬁrm – corporations operate outside market structures because the costs of
maintaining market share and control over commodities and markets are too
high if exposed to competition. In practice, it is too expensive for ﬁrms to
operate in a free market for labour-power because commercial proﬁtability is
linked to investments in specialized human capital secured and defended by
inculcating loyalty and conformity in return for legal guarantees of employ-
ment. The corporate workplace is a ‘totally administered system’ where
unequal wealth is ‘translated into naked institutional and social power’
(Boggs 2011b: 26).
The status of corporate power in a global economy raises questions about
the prerogative right and the legal accountability of capital, yet the logic of
corporate power is poorly understood – despite the eﬀorts of writers like
Bakan (2002), whose exposure of corporate psychopathology in The Cor-
poration was adapted into an eponymous ﬁlm revealing the hollowness of
corporate social responsibility in American media discourse. Addressing the
systemic corruption of the US political and legal system by corporations,
Bakan notes that the myth of corporate legal personhood exists to protect
those who ‘own and run large corporations from legal liability, leaving the
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corporation, a “person” with psychopathic contempt for legal constructs, the
main target of criminal prosecution’ (Bakan 2002: 79). The decision on whe-
ther to comply with law is, he adds, a ‘matter of costs and beneﬁts’, for even
where costs of non-compliance are substantial, these are factored into the
normal accounting strategies of managers and lawyers.
However, while this type of critical investigative approach is valid, it fails to
provide an adequate theoretical framework for explaining how capitalist
sovereignty is articulated through the objective economic domination of the
corporate business form. To achieve this we must understand that corporate
social organization is the most eﬀective means devised for accumulating and
concentrating capital and for advancing the range and complexity of human
economic activity through extended systems of logistics, extraction and
ﬁnancial control. Corporate hegemony is not a pathology or ‘unintended
consequence’ of capitalism, but the logical institutional form assumed by
capital to overcome natural, legal and moral constraints which impede the
valorization of value in the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Imper-
sonal and combined ownership allows corporations to withhold valued
resources from social use, restricting the industrious/creative capacity of
society while co-opting or incorporating counterhegemonic initiatives to promote
non-corporate organizational forms (Bruno & Karliner 2002).
Since the nineteenth century the corporation has acquired the legal status
of personhood in US law – a legal ﬁction that has become a norm of inter-
national business law. In US law, argues Ransel, corporations held no rights
as such, only ‘privileges granted them by the people of their chartering states,
because there are only two parties to the Constitution, the people, who are
sovereign and have constitutional rights, and the government, which is
accountable to the people, and has duties it must perform to their satisfaction’
(Ransel 2009: 1). The acquisition of legal personhood was made possible
because ‘corporations are a creation of government, and government must
perform to the satisfaction of the people’. As a result, they ‘would have to
discontinue being a creation of government – which serves the people – and,
in eﬀect, become people, entitled to the rights of the sovereign under the
Constitution, if wealthy corporate shareholders were to continue minority
rule’ (ibid.).
Nace (2003) locates three stages in the consolidation of corporate rights in
US law and subsequently international law: ﬁrst, corporations beneﬁted from
the legislative creation of quasi-rights, yet remained constrained by charters
regulating their size and longevity, extent of ownership, geographical scope,
liabilities and proﬁts; second, corporations successfully challenged legal
restrictions on their freedom to act through judicial admission of corporate
constitutional rights; third, corporations gained global rights through the
negotiation of international trade agreements which enable business to oper-
ate with a minimum of legal and ﬁnancial constraint in multiple jurisdictions
by universalizing from particular legal and ﬁnancial norms operative in their
countries of origin.
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It is in the US that corporations ﬁrst acquired political power not simply by
eliminating legal constraints on their growth and inﬂuence over government
policy but by actively deﬁning the structure and substance of American
society as the ontological ground for the self-valorization of capital. Corporate
power also emerged as a primary determinant of the socialization of labour
for the normative and substantive reproduction of consumer culture. In the
1890s intensive competition, weak demand, organized labour and over-
capacity all conspired to produce deﬂation and reduce proﬁts, with the result
that capital’s share of income declined as the cost of new ﬁxed capital
(machinery) and variable capital (labour) rose. This fuelled an accumulation
crisis characterized by ‘bloated inventories, feverish competition, and more
business closures as simultaneously rising interest rates entice[d] capital away
from productive to speculative endeavours’ (Westra 2010: 32). Exiting this
crisis called not only for changes to statute at state and federal levels and the
disciplining of labour, but the cultivation of a new class consciousness among
corporate elites, and the transcendence of traditional petty bourgeois hostility
to corporate power fuelled by a populist preference among industrial workers
and artisans for the political economy of republicanism (dispersed assets/
competitive markets/autonomous labour-power). With the intensiﬁcation of
class conﬂict, American society faced a ‘stalemate’, and the crisis of 1896–97
demonstrated in stark terms that ‘the social foundation of economic growth was
the central and unavoidable issue of American politics’ (Livingston 1986: 54).
Yet the depression of the 1890s facilitated a major structural adjustment of
the US economy and validated the corporate critique of ‘unfettered competi-
tion among entrepreneurs whose enterprise was “excessive”, “wasteful” and
“ruinous” because it produced a volume of commodities that overran remu-
nerative demand, reduced prices and proﬁts, and transferred income from
capital to labor’ (Livingston 1986: 54–55). This period of US history is
popularly known as the ‘Progressive Era’, but as Kolko (1964) argues, it was
less a triumph for middle-class opponents of corporate power than a victory
for conservative capitalist interests who favoured federal regulation to reduce
competition and stabilize proﬁts (cf. Weinstein 1969). The corporate rationa-
lization of US society was achieved at the expense of smaller propertied
interests, who, albeit formally equal subjects under US law, could not com-
pete with corporations at an interstate level. The Progressive Era eﬀectively
reduced intercapitalist competition and the dependence of capital on skilled
labour (Saros 2009). It also led to the privatization of monetary policy in the
US with the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913, completing the transi-
tion from self-regulating market libertarianism to political capitalism, while
transferring the right to create new currency to ﬁnanciers (Livingston 1986: 229).
Thompson notes the signiﬁcance of oligopoly for entrepreneurial capitalism
in that the ‘most likely candidates for entry into corporate dominated markets
are other giant enterprises having requisite ﬁnancial and organizational
resources, and looking for ventures with above normal expected proﬁtability’
(Thompson 1974: 6). In the corporate state, he adds, competition ‘resembles a
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contest among giant enterprises for consumer patronage and loyalty than it
does an impersonal struggle of nameless ﬁrms against omnipotent market
forces’ (ibid.). The corporate social form oﬀers a practicable combination of
conﬂictual and hierarchical value orientations that is inconsistent with the
ideal of inter-ﬁrm competition in market libertarianism. This model of busi-
ness organization based on large vertically integrated multiunit enterprises
quickly superseded the decadent social form of family enterprise established
under British hegemony. Against the backdrop of the Depression, the corporate
model was supported by Federal government policies to stimulate aggregate
demand and new measures to promote full employment – primarily within
the corporate sector, which by the 1940s accounted for more than four-ﬁfths
of US GDP (Arrighi et al. 1999a). After 1945 the corporate model was
adopted on a global scale, reﬂecting the rise of the US to global hegemony,
although as the ‘ranks of multinational corporations were swollen by these
new arrivals, a global system of production, exchange and accumulation came
into existence that was subject to no state authority and had the power to
subject to its own “laws” even the most powerful states, the United States
included’ (ibid: 146).
Yet, while historians view organizational innovation as the principal inde-
pendent variable for explaining the success of corporate capitalism, it is clear
corporate organization – like the culture it organizes – instantiates the sover-
eign constitutive logic of capital in its postliberal transnational form. That is
to say, structural features of capitalist organization (global division of labour,
rules-based trade, etc.) do not come into existence independently of the capi-
tal relation, but are determined by changes in the value form-determined
character of production organized through global networks of corporate
power. Perrow protests that academic discussions of corporatism fail to ‘take into
account any of the many characteristics of organizations that shape society’
(Perrow 2002: 11), but organization itself cannot be abstracted as a causal
variable from the objective socioeconomic conditions of capitalism which
necessitate changes in the legal and technical regulation of ownership and
control. Perrow is correct to argue that under corporate capitalism large-scale
organization is a necessary condition to maintain the concentration of power
required for the reproduction of capitalist class domination; yet it is capitalist
relations rather than formal organization that predetermines the rationaliza-
tion of social norms and political-organizational practices in corporatism, a
process which seems certain to accelerate as alienated labour is divested of
socially productive powers and society is further weakened by a cognitive
deﬁcit of understanding (lack of global perspective) and a societal deﬁcit of
solidarity (social alienation).
The prerogative power of corporate social organization reveals the correla-
tion between capitalist sovereignty (capital as subject) and legal right expres-
sed in the ﬁction of legal personhood. From a Marxian perspective law is not
a neutral body of codiﬁed norms but a juridical condensation of past conﬂicts
of interests enforced by the threat of coercion – a social ‘truce’ expressing the
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balance of social power at given historical junctures. In the corporate state
‘law is the site of open and avowed political conﬂict that undermines even the
ﬁction of community, a conﬂict that brings to the fore the relation of power
and privilege already (and necessarily) inscribed in law’ (Dean 2009: 14). It is
not enough to reduce law to ideology, however, for this would be to rehearse
an economistic fallacy. Searching for the deeper roots of law in the economic
relations of capitalist society, Pashukanis (1924) observed that bourgeois right
articulates ideological precepts, yet a more fundamental correlation exists
between capitalist exchange and the idea of legal personality embodied in
sovereign individuals (corporations) as ‘bearers of rights’. In capitalism all
production is for exchange and production takes place on the basis of
exchange:
The form of law – with its aspect of a subjective investiture with rights –
is born in a society which contains isolated possessors of private egoistic
interests. When the entire economic life is built upon the principle of the
accord of independent wills, then – as if reﬂected in a mirror – every sort
of social function takes on a legal character – that is to say, it becomes
more than a social function: it becomes also the right of the person who
is carrying out that function. However, since private interests cannot
attain such complete development and such overwhelming signiﬁcance in
a political organization (by its very essence) as in the economy of a
bourgeois society, so subjective public rights also come out as something
ephemeral and without genuine roots, and are constantly subjected to
doubt.
(Pashukanis 1924: 155)
Right is derived from commodity-determined relations: the commodity is the
‘private property of its owner, given in return for the commodity owned by
the other. Each agent in the exchange must be an owner of private property,
and formally equal to the other agent(s). Otherwise what occurred would not
be commodity exchange’ (Miéville 2004: 282). For Pashukanis, this is a con-
ﬂictual process, for it is axiomatic that between equal rights force must decide.
In an intra- and interstate context, bourgeois right expresses the contradictory
‘opposition and equality’ of equal legal subjects, for where conﬂicts of interest
arise between formally equal individuals through exchange then a certain type
of regulation is required. This must ‘formalize the method of settlement of
any such dispute without diminishing either party’s sovereignty or equality.
That form is law, which is abstract, based on the equality of its subjects and
pervasive in capitalism’ (ibid.). In eﬀect, the ‘equality of distinct and diﬀerent
individuals is in exact homology with the equalization of qualitatively diﬀer-
ent commodities in commodity exchange […] Thus with the generalizing of
legal relations, “legal fetishism complements commodity fetishism”’ (ibid.: 284).
Pashukanis was executed in the Great Terror and his work discredited by
Soviet ideologists charged with codifying ‘socialist legality’ as a new juridical
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model of social regulation in the USSR and – after 1945 – in Eastern Europe.
Pashukanis became an ‘unperson’ because he refused to acknowledge the
transhistorical element of legality as a prior condition for social order which
no political system – not even fascism – can dispense with entirely (Neumann
1942).
Yet the point of this excursion into Marxian legal theory is not to highlight
the link between the commodity form and the legal form, but to indicate the
relevance of capital-logic approaches for understanding the state form of
transnational capital. As Miéville observes, Pashukanis’s real theoretical error
was not that he jettisoned the bourgeois notion of rule of law in its totality
(thereby denying any transhistorical value to the concept of rule of law), but
that in attempting to derive a coercive abstract state as a guarantor of legal
relations in capitalist society, he failed to notice that coercion is always
already implicit in the structure of the commodity form itself as the organizing
principle of capitalism. Pashukanis theorized coercion as an ‘imperative addres-
sed by one person to another’, backed up by a transcendent force (the state);
yet the principle of contestation is implicit in the very form of the commodity,
which is to say, in the sense that private ownership of commodities constitutes
a logic of exclusion. Yet violence is at the ‘heart of the commodity form. For
a commodity to be meaningfully “mine-not-yours” – which is, after all, cen-
tral to the fact that it is a commodity that will be exchanged – some forceful
capabilities must be implied’ (Miéville 2004: 287). Violence is integral to all
historical formations structured through commodity exchange, and this fea-
ture of the capital relation is extended and intensiﬁed by the corporate reor-
ganization of capitalism, the advent of permanent war readiness and the
institutionalization of diﬀerential accumulation as a precondition for
oligopoly.
This is not a deviation from the ‘correct’ course of capitalism, for the cor-
poratization of US society and the globalization of corporate power are logi-
cally entailed in the commodity form itself – and, by extension, in the legal
and political structures derived from it. Capitalist sovereignty (the actualiza-
tion of capital as the subject of modernity) is realized only through recogni-
tion of corporate legal personhood as a precondition for legal non-liability
and political unaccountability – which (like states, but unlike non-corporate
persons) have a potentially inﬁnite lifespan enabling them to accumulate
power indeﬁnitely. In this sense, corporate personhood intensiﬁes in a radical
and totalizing way the commodity-determined logic of exclusion in the doc-
trine of bourgeois right – signalling the de facto supersession of private right
over public law in the constitution of global capitalism.
Thus the speciﬁc question that presents itself is how dominant capital
secures its prerogative power as the subject of global capitalism, and what the
consequences of this are for Western power in general and US hegemony in
particular. For some, the fusion of corporate-state power in neoliberalism
indicates the absence of contradiction between economic domination and
imperial state authority: the latter is simply conceptualized as a function of
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the former, and it is through globalization that the hard power of the US
military has become an instrument for consolidating Western economic
interests (Petras 2005). Yet for others the fusion of state and corporate power
heralds the decline of Western hegemony as Anglo-American capital struggles
to prosper at the expense of its own labour force, leading to inequality, pre-
carious employment and the disappearance of ‘middle-class’ (skilled)
employment (Lazonick 2013; Lipietz 2001).
Following Duménil and Lévy (2001; cf. Kotz 2007), Westra notes that cor-
poratism entailed four stage-speciﬁc transformations in the structure of capi-
tal accumulation, namely: (i) a radical separation of ownership and
management (the technostructure); (ii) a tendency towards integration (intra-
ﬁrm transactions) and shaping of demand to guarantee commercial viability
of consumer goods (termination of market economy); (iii) oﬀsetting of high
ﬁxed costs of consumer durable production through new product lines and
geospatial expansion; and (iv) a union of ﬁnance between banking and
industry to provide credit to support consumer demand for expensive items
like automobiles and houses (Westra 2010: 80). The corporate model achieved
temporary stability through demand management, generous welfare and pri-
vate debt, but as we shall see in Chapter 5, it merely delayed an accumulation
crisis which has destroyed the class compromise of Fordism. The result is
‘neoliberalism’, which has brought to a head a ‘multiplex process that would
cement both the abdication of the state from support for consumerist capital
accumulation and fundamentally accelerate the reshaping of material eco-
nomic life primarily in the US, though increasingly across the globe’ (Westra
2010: 116).
Corporate globalization implies not simply a ﬂight of ﬁnance capital to
low-wage economies or the dependence of Western non-ﬁnancial corporations
on ﬁnancial assets (Cox 2013), but the declining coherence of advanced
nations as capital degrades the infrastructural basis of industrial society in a
‘race to the bottom’ to coerce American and European workers to compete
with low-wage earners in Asia and Latin America. For critics like Boggs
(2011a), Wolin (2010) and Cox (2012, 2013), the subordination of US foreign
policy to the interests of capital indicates the increasing control of the US
and global economy by a system-integrating transnational bloc. The largest
corporations, argues Cox, have increased
global market share across a range of industries from the 1980s to the
present, a trend which is closely linked to the growing importance of
global value chains. Such chains link a highly competitive world of small
and medium-sized business entrepreneurs at the bottom of the chain with
corporations at the top who are increasingly able to act as ‘system inte-
grators’ that set the terms for increasing complex global production net-
works […] In the contemporary global supply chains most large-scale
global corporations no longer produce a product from start to ﬁnish, but
instead use their position at the top of the global supply chain to set the
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terms for doing business with thousands of potential suppliers, who are
engaged in ﬁerce competition to be included in these global production
networks.
(Cox 2012: 13–14; cf. Cowling & Tomlinson 2005)
The result is an increasingly decentred global economy that articulates cor-
porate power through the institutionalization of diﬀerential accumulation in a
global network of value chains that facilitate a periodic return to proﬁtable
investment (‘business as usual’) through cycles of overaccumulation followed
by a managed destruction of wealth in regimes of ‘anti-production’ character-
ized by ﬁnancialization, recession and war. The trigger for ﬁnancialization
was market liberalization in the 1980s, an attempt to correct historically high
levels of inﬂation inherited from the 1960s and the end of the New Deal
(Kawamura 2013: 39). Global corporations, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial, have
grown to depend on the ﬁnancialization of leveraged proﬁts to compensate for
falling rates of proﬁt experienced by even globally competitive ﬁrms in the 1970s
(Cox 2012), but banks in particular have extended the limits of discretionary
lending to integrate broader sections of the working class into the credit/debt
nexus of capital – accelerating the global ﬁnancial crisis when hundreds of
thousands of US mortgage holders defaulted in 2007. Rather than protect
borrowers, regulatory policies have tended to shield ‘system-relevant’ institu-
tions from the eﬀects of ﬁnancialization, underlining the ‘institutionalized
relationship between ﬁnancial capital and the US state that is the product of a
long-term transformation in global capitalism […] responsible for a widening
gap between rich and poor – in the US and globally’ (ibid.: 14). The sub-
sequent transfer of corporate debt to the public increased the power of the
banking sector which eﬀectively exploited the ﬁnancial crisis to eﬀect a lever-
aged buy-out of the US economy (Ivry 2014), while extending opportunities for
speculation in peripheral economies as emerging markets seek to develop
their own capital markets and regional structures of ﬁnancial integration
independent of Western control.
Dominant capital and corporate agency
As Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 251) argue, the modern corporation ‘emerged
not to enable large-scale industry, but rather to prevent it from becoming
“excessively” productive’. Following Veblen, they suggest that the growth of
capitalist competition after the Civil War led to a massive growth in pro-
ductivity to satisfy rising demand, and that if this ‘pattern of competitive
production were to continue, industry would tend to generate much more
output than could be proﬁtably sold, bringing pricing down and business
enterprise to a halt’ (ibid.: 252). The rise of the corporation in the US was a
response to the need to reduce competition and curb overproduction by
reducing the number of small businesses through vertical and horizontal
consolidation. In the 1890s, they observe, the US witnessed a
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widespread incorporation of business ﬁrms, the rapid growth of stock and
bond markets and the expanding use of credit as a form of ownership. It
was during that period that the separation of business from industry was
ﬁnally completed. Firms were turned into corporations and investors into
absentee owners of discounted future earnings. From then on, the pre-
dicament of excess capacity remained a more or less permanent feature of
US capitalism.
(Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 252)
Consolidation was facilitated by mergers and acquisitions which meant that
companies required a quantitative pecuniary value: in eﬀect, capital had to
become ‘vendible’, stimulating the development of capital markets as a means
to drive the growth of equity while retarding ‘excessive’ competition and
productivity growth. From this perspective, dominant capital thrives only by
limiting competition and restricting the industrious activity of society for its
own gain through mergers and acquisitions which generate the power to
increase earnings, set market prices and reduce risk. The maturity of capital
as a mode of power correlates with the variable level of sabotage which can
legally be inﬂicted on communities, because the corporation – like a bellicose
state – can only increase relative gain through the production of uncertainty,
instability and dissonance: ‘It is only by propelling industry in ways that
interfere with and partly hamper its open integration, coordination and the
well-being of its participants that business earnings can be appropriated and
capital accumulated’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 227, 256–58). Corporate power
is also conditional on the capacity of corporations to sustain monopolistic/
oligopolistic market conditions over time in partnership with the state: serious
capital accumulation ‘is only possible when one ﬁrm or a small group of ﬁrms
has a quasi-monopoly of world-economy-wide production […] We call such
quasi-monopolies leading industries, and they foster considerable forward and
backward linkages’ (Wallerstein 2011b: 1).
The primary issue here is not the economic power that inheres in the mere
act of controlling resources, but the ways in which absentee ownership and
the institutionalization of social exclusion deny economic power to a majority
of citizens – a point Marx recognized in his analysis of the composition of
total social capital.2 In contrast with Marx, however – who was more con-
cerned with deﬁning the substance of capital – Veblen (1923) approached
capital as a pecuniary value based on its capacity to incapacitate society: the
corporate organization of the US in the early twentieth century led to the
institutionalization and political legitimation of ‘strategic sabotage’ as a basis
for realizing pecuniary value – that is, the pecuniary capitalization of earning
power which depends less on capacity to produce than on capacity to
incapacitate:
With the twin emergence of the modern corporation and the modern
state, capitalism has acquired a ‘civilized’ face: absentee ownership has
Corporate globalization 59
become a legitimate norm; open violence has been replaced by latent
threats underwritten by hefty advertising budgets, bloated security ser-
vices and overﬂowing jails; and power has solidiﬁed into a mystical
structure (at least for those subjected to it). In this new order, the power
to incapacitate – or sabotage, as Veblen liked to call it – becomes a fully
legitimate convention, carried out routinely and invisibly through the very
subordination of industry to business. The blueprints of capitalist pro-
duction are already programmed for business limitation […] In order to
merely earn the normal rate of return, all the owner has to do is own.
(Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 232, emphasis added)
Although Nitzan and Bichler insist that strategic incapacitation is a common
feature of all systems of hierarchical production that exist at the expense of
(rather than in the service of) their constituent populations, it is clear this
model of order reached its zenith with corporate capitalism, which thrives not
on eﬃciency but market power – the power to determine the extent (or exis-
tence) of competition and hence the power to set prices and establish control
of markets: value is created not by promoting maximum growth, but by sus-
taining diﬀerential earnings. If maximizing eﬃciency and growth were the real
aims of business, then diﬀerential accumulation would be impossible and
business would be susceptible to unmanageable uncertainty and risk. In such
conditions capital could not be sovereign; on the contrary, sovereignty would
pass to workers/consumers, who would acquire the leverage to force corpora-
tions to make and sell socially useful low-cost goods or go out of business. To
demonstrate this, Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 237–38) plot a time series mea-
suring proﬁtability against unemployment, revealing the disutility of full
employment for maintaining diﬀerential rates of return by corporations:
‘Business as usual’ (the necessary level of strategic limitation imposed on
industrious communities) is deﬁned as a median point between the extremes
of maximum sabotage (complete incapacity) and minimum sabotage (full
capacity leading to overproduction and loss of earnings). For this reason, the
persistence of recession is not in and of itself an issue for dominant capital,
only its capacity to ‘beat the average’ rate of return in a relative sense.
Although most mainstream economists insist that income share of capital and
unemployment should be negatively correlated, in the US the correlation is
positive, rising in downturns and falling in upswings. This was the case in the
1930s, and is the case now as the income share of the top 1 per cent rises due
to upward redistribution amid general economic stagnation and rising poverty
(Nitzan & Bichler 2014).
The search for above-normal returns is the conditio sine qua non of capi-
talist power based not simply on the ability of corporations to increase and
maintain proﬁt rates relative to their rivals, but on the capacity of dominant
capital as a power bloc to restrict average rates of return in the wider econ-
omy and prevent eﬀective government protection of public enterprises. The
means for achieving this outcome are extensive, including ‘direct limitations’
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(predatory pricing, etc.), and indirect strategies such as ‘patent and copyright
laws, industrial policies, ﬁnancial regulations, preferential tax treatment, legal
monopolies, labour legislation, trade and investment pacts and barriers and,
of course, the use of force, including military, for diﬀerential business ends’
(Nitzan & Bichler 2014: 247). The limitation of democracy in the corporate
state follows similar principles: to reduce levels of political unmanageability
and risk, corporate-state elites routinely limit civil liberties and reduce execu-
tive accountability to legislative and judicial institutions. In this way, the
constituent power of subjects (popular sovereignty) and the mediating role of
their representatives are both overwhelmed by the constituted prerogative
power of the state which responds to the private lobbying power of vested
interests, extending and intensifying the relations of domination and elite rule
(Domhoﬀ 2014).3
The capital relation is the determining factor in diﬀerential accumulation
because capital itself is power: the aim of corporate capitalism is not pro-
duction but control over production through complex global networks of
extraction, production and supply in competition with other transnational
concerns (brands) which generate similarly above-average rates of proﬁt. It
was declining proﬁtability in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector that drove
globalization, leading US corporations to draw on the power of government
to advance the interests of transnational investors by ‘enacting trade and
investment agreements that provided legal, institutional and political support
for the expansion of global supply networks’ (Cox 2012: 13).
This phenomenon is still visible in the pressure applied by corporate lob-
byists on the US government and the EU Commission to ratify the new
TTIP. When the secret text of the proposed agreement was leaked in March
2014, it became clear that its purpose was not free trade but to institute a new
‘investor-state dispute settlement’ (ISDS) which will allow private corpora-
tions to sue national governments if they consider that legislation has nega-
tively harmed their legal ‘rights’ – for example, by blocking corporate
investment in public services. The aim of ISDS is to depoliticize disputes
between transnational investors and public authorities over a range of issues
from environmental and consumer protection to public health and education.
Although discussions on TTIP have largely been ignored by corporate media,
if successful the agreement will establish an important precedent, enforcing
the logic of privatization and making it ‘ﬁnancially ruinous for EU countries
or the US to introduce any legislation which was not in the interests of
corporations’ (Dunt 2014: 3).
The machinic structure of corporate capitalism creates order by projecting
the social power of capital onto an inﬁnite horizon until it acquires a level of
facticity that ensures its own dynamic self-reproduction as further forms of
power are rendered quantiﬁable and open to augmentation by harnessing the
creative and innovative capacity of human communities, or through the
institutionalization of permanent and unpayable indebtedness. The ‘crucial
group’ in this machinic order is dominant capital, comprising corporate-
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governmental coalitions. By contrast, the ‘periphery’ of capital is a permanent
threat to diﬀerential accumulation: by providing competition, small
enterprises
undermine the collusive underpinnings of business ‘sabotage’ and there-
fore the very possibility of accumulation. It is only to the extent that
dominant capital can retain and augment its exclusive power against
these lesser capitals […] that the capitalization process can be sustained
and extended.
(Nitzan & Bichler 2009: 315)
Corporate sovereignty thus constitutes an exceptional form of capitalist
power which Deleuze and Guattari deﬁned as machinic enslavement – an
‘apparatus of capture’ that arises where ‘human beings themselves are con-
stituent pieces of a machine that they compose among themselves and with
other things […] under the control and direction of a higher unity’ (Deleuze
& Guattari 2004a: 457). This higher unity is capital – a mediated global
totality in which relations of power unfold logically from a single structuring
principle – the valorization of value. In neoliberal disciplinary capitalism,
however, this structure of machinic enslavement produces more subtle forms
of subjectivation through the allocation of complex identities and roles sup-
portive of the credit-debt nexus which ‘constitutes the human being as subject
linked to a now exterior object, which can be an animal, tool, or machine.
The human being is no longer a component of the machine but a worker, a
user’ (ibid.). Subtle modes of subjectivation thus reconstruct the totality; their
integration in the structure of alienation is produced through conformity,
buoyed by the corporate culture industry as an ancillary structure of political
socialization which disseminates a complex array of private rewards and
dividends that anaesthetize and immobilize public opinion.
Separation of ownership and control, restriction of competition and repro-
duction of dominant capital through diﬀerential accumulation and the inter-
pellation of subjects reinforce the power of corporate elites which constitute
the human personiﬁcation of capitalist subjectivity. As Marx argued:
As the conscious bearer of this movement [of capital] the possessor of
money becomes a capitalist […] The objective content of the circulation
we have been discussing – the valorization of value – is his subjective
purpose, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more wealth
in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operation that he
functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personiﬁed and endowed with
consciousness and a will.
(Marx 1859: 254)
If capital is understood as the subject of modernity, then to explain corporate
agency it becomes necessary to examine more closely the ‘interests of the
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various contenders for control, the information that is available to them, the
conditions under which each may enter the dominant coalition, and the
consequences for corporate behaviour that follow from the particular com-
position of the coalition’ (Scott 1997: 43). Where impersonal possession
becomes the norm, argues Scott, ‘control is structured through corporate and
institutional shareholdings, but corporate rule is exercised by the individual
agents who represent the shareholders and ﬁnanciers […] The corporate
strategy that is formulated by corporate rulers is the outcome of their struggle
to determine corporate behaviour’ (ibid.).
Corporate agency is a characteristic feature of all capitalist economies, but
the hegemonic core of Anglo-American ﬁnancial capital is constituted in
‘constellations of interests’ – intercorporate shareholdings which form struc-
tures of impersonal possession that are controlled by dominant coalitions of
directors and investors. The core of Anglo-American dominant capital is
formed by constellations of ﬁnancial interests, ﬁnancial intermediaries that oper-
ate through interlocking networks of directorships and inter-investment,
maintaining strategic control over the long-term direction and management
of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial businesses. These constellations can be com-
pared broadly with similar structures of ownership and control in other capi-
talist systems, including ‘corporate ﬁliations’ in Germany (enterprises with
overlapping vertical ﬁliations), and ‘alliance capitalism’ in Japan, but in a
general sense it is the balance between corporate blocs ‘that deﬁnes the char-
acteristics of the major forms of capitalist development and their particular
structures of impersonal possession’ (Scott 1997: 52).
Scott also observes the relative impact of variant forms of impersonal pos-
session on corporate agency, and notes critically that academic ‘discussions of
corporate strategy have often taken a rather simplistic view of markets, seeing
enterprise behaviour in terms of the interaction of supply and demand. Very
little attention has been given to the role of “non-market” factors in struc-
turing commercial relations’ (Scott 1997: 204). Non-market structures come
into being or increase in power where advantages for accumulation outweigh
the cost of their maintenance. Yet there is a reluctance in liberal economic
theory to acknowledge both the extent to which corporate agency is deter-
mined by motives of power rather than productivity, and the weakness of
ordinary shareholders in constraining the actions of major institutional
shareholders and corporate directors through eﬀective corporate governance.
Echoing Simon (1945), Scott concludes that in the real world, corporations
‘formulate strategies on the basis of their knowledge of the economic envir-
onment as they perceive it […] Business leaders can never be sure that they
have chosen the optimal course of action’ (Scott 1997: 218–19). This creates a
tendency towards ‘satisﬁcing’, leading to a ‘search for those courses of action
that will generate suﬃcient proﬁts for them to survive over the long-term’
(ibid.: 219).
Recent studies of corporate power challenge the neoliberal ‘corporate gov-
ernance doctrine’ in IPE which overstates the democratizing eﬀect of
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shareholder activism on corporate agency, rationalizing the failure of share-
holders to exert control as a result of inadequate governance strategies. As
Soederberg (2010: 12) argues, it is only by acknowledging the ‘material con-
ditions of our social existence that we can understand more fully the para-
doxes, the nature of power and the politics of domination and resistance
inherent in the corporate governance doctrine’. To achieve this, she argues, we
must accept four premises, namely: (i) that the corporation is a social relation
of capitalism rather than an autonomous entity (and that the evolution of
corporate power as a vehicle for capital accumulation is inextricably tied to
the contradictory logic of capitalist societies); (ii) that existing studies fail to
emphasize the historical importance of credit as a condition for accumulation
in capitalist economies where personal liability has been replaced by legal
non-liability; (iii) that the growing power of institutional investors has led to
greater economic interdependence between publicly traded corporations and
social security capital (‘labour’s capital’), which has in turn increased incen-
tives for workers to accept the status quo by linking their savings to the per-
formance of corporate actors; and (iv) that the capitalist state continues to
play a major role in depoliticizing the contradictions of private ownership
through neoliberal market ideology (ibid.: 16; cf. Holloway & Picciotto 1978;
Dean 2009).
Yet the role of the corporate state is also to manage overaccumulation and
the declining rate of proﬁt. In periods of prosperity, capital accumulation
assumes ‘a relatively constant composition, absorbing progressively larger
numbers of workers into the production process’ (Itoh 1988: 301), but as
Westra (2010: 32) argues, rapid accumulation spurs a new period of ‘pre-
cipitancy which reveals the existence of a superabundance or over-
accumulation of capital in relation to the size of the working population’.
Once rising wages reduce proﬁt, the economy is propelled into crisis as busi-
nesses close and interest rates ‘entice capital away from productive to spec-
ulative endeavours’ (ibid.). At this point the state typically assumes an
extraordinary function of demand management, and as we shall see in
Chapter 5, intensive accumulation based on extraction of relative surplus-
value does not destroy the labour force (as in the case of absolute surplus-
value), but operates by tendentially expelling variable capital (labour-power)
from production, which in turn leads to an increase in the organic composi-
tion of capital (technology, ﬁxed capital, etc.) and a decline in the general rate
of proﬁt. For some Marxists this constitutes a general economic ‘law’; for
others, it is an economic expression of class struggle. In expansionary
moments of the cycle, however, overaccumulation is typically accompanied by
an increase in speculative trade and credit growth, creating inﬂationary debt
bubbles and the eventual collapse of commodity and equity markets as
investors sell oﬀ devalued assets ahead of market corrections.
Bracketing for the present the distinction between excess-commodity and
excess-capital approaches to declining proﬁtability, we may agree with Itoh,
who notes that the inner contradictions of capital ‘appear most obviously in
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those periodical self-destructive crises, in the process of business cycles’ (Itoh
1988: 290). Overaccumulation reveals the dynamic quality but also the
potential inner limits of capital in its present phase: this tendency takes the
form of rivalry between concentrations of capital for control over material
and human resources, leading to a contradiction where on the one hand cor-
porations seek to increase proﬁts by expanding productive capacity beyond
the natural limit of the market (while sustaining a necessary quantity of ‘lack’
by failing to satisfy elementary social needs), yet on the other hand seek to
reduce economic activity at the cost of destroying the productive capacity of
society and creating unemployment. It is corporate ﬁnancial capital that
brings the modern state form of capital into being as an active economic
actor which ‘contributes to retarding the fall of the rate of proﬁt of private
capital or even to compensating for it in crises by a policy of “socialization of
losses”’ (Altvater & Hoﬀmann 1990: 147). There is no alternative to this
ﬁduciary system because corporate capital requires the state to overcome an
irresolvable antagonism between production for private proﬁt and under-
consumption by absorbing into itself the mass of surplus-value that cannot be
realized and invested proﬁtably. At the point of downturn, which Marx
termed the absolute overaccumulation of capital, no additional investment of
capital produces any increase in surplus-value, which therefore goes into
precipitate decline. When this occurs, further proﬁtability depends on the
capacity of capital to purchase labour-power below its actual market value by
sustaining conditions of dependency, undermining the productive capacity of
society and the possibility of consumption either by diverting capital into
militarized accumulation to absorb excess capacity (fascism), or by ransack-
ing public budgets through austerity programmes which sabotage the liveli-
hoods of productive and unproductive citizens (neoliberalism). The cyclical
onset of recession signals the return of a bear market that re-establishes con-
ditions for valorization, enabling corporate-state elites to restructure the
political economy of capitalist power within and between regimes of accu-
mulation. Paradoxically, therefore, capitalism tends towards the securitization
and authoritarian re-regulation of society at a global level, reasserting the
power of the state form of capital as the ‘concentrated force of free economy’
(Bonefeld 2013).
Transnational neoliberalism
Three approaches have been developed in international political economy to
explain the occurrence of neoliberal hegemony, namely state power relations
theory, the theory of the transnational capitalist class and the theory of pri-
vatized authority (Plehwe et al. 2006). The ﬁrst examines neoliberal hege-
mony as a function of US state hegemony and has been advanced primarily
by neorealists who do not – as Plehwe argues – appear to have noticed that
neoliberalism was gaining support before the US economy went into decline
in the 1970s, and certainly before the dramatic reassertion to US economic
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and military power in the 1980s which destroyed détente and accelerated the
collapse of the Soviet Union (Halliday 1986). The second approach, asso-
ciated with the Amsterdam School (Overbeek & Van der Pijl 1993; cf. Sklair
2001; Bieler & Morton 2006; Carroll 2010), stresses the ideological links
between neoliberalism and transnational corporate power, focusing on the rise
of a global investor class with interests distinct from those of national capitals.
Transversing this perspective, a third approach stresses the inﬂuence of trans-
national private authorities in global economic governance – speciﬁcally those
agencies engaged in the advancement of neoliberalism. The category ‘private
authority’ is pluralistic, and includes not just corporations but also advocacy
networks, think tanks and international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that inﬂuence policy at national, regional and global levels (Stone
2000; Taylor 2010). Supporters of this view argue that despite potentially
overstating the relevance of transnational non-state actors, it grounds a
transnational civil society perspective which ‘provides us with crucial insights into
the contribution of a wide range of civil society forces in the transformation
of order and hegemonic constellations’ (Plehwe et al. 2006: 16).
Neoliberalism must properly be understood as a hegemonic class project of
the transnational right aimed at reasserting capitalist sovereignty through the
consolidation of corporate hegemony. Capitalist sovereignty is formally
instantiated only through the establishment of corporate personhood as a
precondition for legal non-liability which intensiﬁes the form-determined
logic of exclusion entailed in the doctrine of bourgeois right. Globalization in
turn signals the instantiation of bourgeois right at a transnational level –
incorporating the anarchic geopolitical logic of international relations into the
geoeconomic logic of corporate power. In its original form, argues Dean,
neoliberalism had a ‘critical purchase’, but has since evolved into such a
‘catch-all term that it not only denies the empirical diversity of political
rationalities and governmental techniques of contemporary societies but has
[…] ended up legitimating the self-description of dominant power-formations
and down-played their positively illiberal, authoritarian and despotic compo-
nents’ (Dean 2014: 70). Neoliberalism is neither a completed project nor
unchallengeable reality, but a partial and always temporary resolution of
contradictions in the organization of corporate power produced by uneven
economic development and global ‘free trade’. It is not a coherent political
theory but a context-dependent discourse condensing market rationality, pri-
vate power and international competition which builds upon existing eco-
nomic forms and cultural practices while eroding embedded structures of
national economic organization through the creation of competition states
adapted to corporate globalization (Desai 2006; Cerny et al. 2005; Shaikh
2005).4
Considerations of space rule out an extended analysis of the intellectual
origins of neoliberalism – a topic well covered in the literature (Menz et al.
2005; McVeigh 2005; Aidi 2009; Bedirhanog˘lu 2008; Birch & Tickell 2010;
Smith et al. 2010; Dussel-Peters 2006; Bohler & Neunhöﬀer 2006). The term
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‘neoliberalism’ has its origins in economic debates in the 1930s in the US,
Germany and Britain between right-wing liberals keen to reinvigorate classi-
cal economic theory. In the 1940s, an international network of academics
emerged centred on Friedrich Hayek, which sought to mobilize academic and
political opinion against socialism. The network maintained a radical stance
through an extended war of position rather than subscribe to ‘feasible change’
(Plehwe 2009: 6; cf. Birch & Tickell 2010). Monetarist ideology was inserted
in and rearticulated through nationally speciﬁc counterrevolutionary projects,
most powerfully in the authoritarian-populism of the New Right in the US,
Britain, Chile and Argentina, where experiments in neoliberal regime change
were conducted (Harvey 2005; Miller 2010; Haslam 2005; Durham & Power
2010), although paradoxically the emphasis on private authority advocates a
rationality that ‘appears in a fetishized form as neutral and devoid of politics’
(Cutler 2011: 49).
For Cutler, neoliberalism is an economic regulatory regime speciﬁc to the
international political economy of capitalist globalization – a mode of reg-
ulation ‘exercised by corporations under the global investment regime [that]
eﬀectively freezes out democratic participation’ (Cutler 2011: 51). Drawing on
the ideology of desire in commodity-determined society, neoliberalism also
‘seduces the individual to give himself or herself up to a deﬁnition of a con-
sumer subject and object, promising pleasure, happiness, wealth and success’
(Penttinen 2000: 218). This dogma of private citizenship and consumption
reconstructs the Lockean ideal of the ‘ownership society’ founded on bour-
geois right and non-interference, in which prudent citizens trade their loss of
social rights for a ‘healthy economy coupled with a revival of the punitive
nineteenth century language of moral failure, individual blame, the shame of
“dependency”, and the celebration of “personal responsibility”’ (Somers
1999: 123).
A key intellectual source of neoliberalism is Nozick (1974), who believed
that exclusion was ultimately beneﬁcial because while bourgeois right creates
exclusion, it puts ‘resources into the hands of those who can use them most
eﬃciently and proﬁtably’ (Plant 2010: 101). It should be clear from the
discussion in the previous section that this welfare eﬀect is meaningless in the
case of corporate capitalism, which is based on sabotaging the industrious
creativity of communities (and rival independent producers) for the private
pecuniary gain of dominant capital whose aim is long-term market domina-
tion rather than competition. The ‘ownership society’ of neoliberalism is
legitimated via the ideology of free trade, yet the ﬁction of free trade between
liberal democracies is really invoked ‘to close down possibilities for the
actualization of free trade and equality’ (Dean 2009: 57). Furthermore the
prescription for material acquisition and choice undermines civic duty and
personal responsibility, illustrating the prescience of Max Weber’s concern
that cultural rationalization under capitalism would outstrip the capacity of
individuals to act rationally and morally. As sociologists have demonstrated,
ownership societies tend to foster an uncritical acceptance of presanctioned
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corporate identities, leading to a ‘neurotic immersion in and adherence to
narrowly focused routines and systems of regimentation, measurement and
control’ (Bone 2010: 732; cf. Bauman 2002; Roberts & Ng 2012; Oﬀer 2006).
The ultimate political goal of transnational corporate power is the compe-
tition state as a response to the accumulation and legitimation crises of the
1970s, indicating three processes of change, namely: (i) movement towards a
hypothetically borderless global economy and the expansion of global value
chains and international portfolio capital ﬂows; (ii) the institutionalization of
neoclassical trade theory – articulated most forcefully in the logic of com-
parative advantage; and (iii) the transition from outcome-oriented inter-
ventionism to a competition state based on the privatization of collective
assets, reduced corporate taxation and reduced welfare entitlements (Gamble
2006; cf. Leys 2008). Yet this competition state is not the creature portrayed
in Western corporate media – a lean form of administration based on mini-
mal intervention; it is, rather, a postliberal formation, signalling ‘the ideolo-
gical collapse of familiar verities of market relations, individualism, free
choice and the comfortable equation of capitalism with democracy’ (Boggs
2011a: 102). Corporate globalization is a response not only to the legitima-
tion crisis of state-democratic capitalism (Habermas 1975), but a transna-
tional reassertion of the general class interest of capital against gains made by
labour, resulting in the deindustrialization of the capitalist core and increasing
corporate investment in emerging market production via oﬀshoring to create
opportunities for a more ‘reﬁned’ division of labour while exploiting techno-
logical changes that reduce costs and raise the eﬃciency of spatially dispersed
supply chains. This reﬂects the oligopolistic power of transnational corporate
networks which act as vehicles for the restructuring of capital markets and
value chains in emerging market economies where suppliers must compete in
asymmetric markets for contracts with ‘lead ﬁrms’ deﬁned in technical eco-
nomic jargon as ‘oligopsony buyers in the market for inputs’ (Milberg &
Winkler 2013). In more straightforward language, this indicates an asym-
metric relation of power where a large number of local/regional producers
compete for contracts with a small number of powerful corporations. Led by
the US, argues Cox, the global restructuring of peripheral economies, has
been supported by a nascent
transnational class within the developing world that was increasingly
linked to global ﬁnance. In circumstances where these alliances were
particularly strong, the greater the chances for the advancement and
implementation of neoliberal policies favouring the establishment of
global supply networks, by way of laws governing foreign direct investment
and through expanded access to portfolio markets.
(Cox 2013: 13–14)
Intensive lobbying by transnational corporate-political networks has resulted
not only in the growth of foreign access to capital markets in developing
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economies – formalized in regional trade agreements (RTAs), but in the for-
mation of a transnationally oriented capitalist class which places its wealth
oﬀshore yet relies on strategic and ﬁnancial statecraft by powerful govern-
ments in the West to leverage entry into new markets where the opportunities
for corporate investment are greater than those in the depressed economies of
the US, Europe and Japan. Although successful in North-East Asia (particu-
larly South Korea), neoliberalism has been directly responsible for a restora-
tion of asymmetric relations of power between core and peripheral economies
which has undermined hopes for a ‘New International Economic Order’,
leading to a reversal of ‘priorities from developing production to securing
proﬁt and so subordinating the industrialization plans of the Third World to
the discipline of capital’ (Overbeek & Van der Pijl 1993: 19). As Milberg and
Winkler observe, this is reﬂected in the capacity of oligopolistic corporations
to ‘divide the production process into numerous steps and tiers [which] creates
both a distance between lead ﬁrm rents and suppliers, and a greater ability to
weaken labor bargaining power by creating more competition in segmented
labor markets’ (Milberg & Winkler 2013: 126). This tilt towards capital has
been formalized and extended through a reorientation of global governance
from economic development to structural adjustment, reasserting debt as a
lever of asymmetric power in the transnational political organization of capitalist
sovereignty.
Transnational neoliberalism is supported by corporate-state elites in the
West as a means for sustaining Anglo-American power, yet results in contra-
dictory outcomes. As Gill observes, the expanding inﬂuence of ﬁnancial cor-
porate power in the 1990s reﬂects the determination of a transnational
coalition of forces to enlarge its inﬂuence through an ‘extension of the struc-
tural power of market discipline’ (Gill 1993: 264). While the reorientation of
the global economy towards ﬁnancial deregulation and the erosion of
national forms of capitalism were intended to reinvigorate US hegemony (and
did so in the short term aided by the opening of opportunities for accumula-
tion and development of new digital communications technologies which
facilitate instantaneous transmission of market data between ﬁnancial cen-
tres), the hypertrophied capitalism unleashed in the 1990s has led to a decline
in US industrial power and unravelling of consumer society. Although not
reﬂected in corporate media discourse, there is growing awareness in the US
of the real human cost of ﬁnancialization and oﬀshoring which creates unde-
serving clear winners and losers as a result of shocks generated by the
unrestrained movement of global capital (Freeman 2007).
The political function of neoliberalism is to replace state-democratic capit-
alism, co-opting popular classes and labour at a subordinate level within the
transnational historic bloc, leading to a ‘precarious hegemonic constellation’
of embedded neoliberalism (Bohle 2006). As Reifer (2012) argues, rather than
continue New Deal welfarist capitalism through progressive corporate taxa-
tion, US monetary policy ‘ushered in its global demise’ (Reifer 2012). The
New Deal had subordinated private capital to public ﬁnance through
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Keynesianism, but neoliberalism made possible through the growth of global
capital markets has led to a subordination of democratic public authority to
capital, an increase in sovereign debt and the imposition of austerity, which
have poisoned debates on welfare and equality as legitimate political issues.
Whether the dismantling of US politics is an intended eﬀect of globalization
is an open question; the real issue is the distinction between globalization as
the internationalization of capitalist relations of power based on the pre-
datory search for new sources of accumulation, and globalism as a normative
justiﬁcation for the institutional complex of formal/informal transnational
organizations that mediate between states, markets and non-state actors,
through which the general class interest of transnational capital is articulated
globally (cf. Panic´ 2011).
Cosmopolitans and internationalists who criticize the unaccountability of
existing forms of global governance fail to note that the political origins of
the state form of transnational capital lie not in internationalism but in the
need for transnational corporations to augment extractive, productive and
distributive operations, necessitating new forms of policy coordination where
states converge voluntarily towards similar structures of administration and
governance. Following Sassen (1999), Reifer traces the origins of this to the
development of an international legal regime centred in the early twentieth
century in the US and UK, created to manage the complexity of cross-border
capital ﬂows. Within this emerging system of capitalist power (contested by
German fascism and other authoritarian capitalist states), international law-
yers began to play an intermediary role in ‘overlapping processes of war-
making, state-making and capital accumulation [… raising] funds on the
money and capital markets for states and ﬁrms, along with engaging in more
pure forms of ﬁnancial speculation’ (Reifer 2012: 32).
Unlike liberal capitalism, transnational neoliberalism requires not compe-
tition as a precondition for exchange but corporations with ‘system relevance’
in a ﬁnancially integrated global economy without the autonomous produ-
cers, legal protections or civil liberties associated with embedded liberalism
(Crouch 2011). Corporate capitalism, in this respect, is a ‘rigged’ political-
economic system that functions in the interests of dominant capital. Neoliberal
corporate capitalism also places a higher value on primitive accumulation
than productivity, removing entire sections of the manual and non-manual
working class from ‘traditional capitalist encasements’ (Sassen 2011: 23), thus
eroding the commodiﬁed form of labour-power itself (Westra 2010). Further-
more, neoliberal corporate capitalism ﬂourishes in a postliberal managerialist
environment founded on the privatization and instrumentalization of capital
and technical expertise, transforming societies into ‘laboratories’ for reﬁning
the means of extraction and accumulation while eroding legal restraints on
surveillance and control (Suarez-Villa 2010: 10).
Classical sociologists (Berle & Means 1933; Rizzi 1939; Burnham 1941;
Djilas 1957) deﬁned this managerialist deformation of market society as a
shift away from liberal capitalism, placing theoretical emphasis on the power
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of managers over the social surplus and the formation of a managerial ‘class
interest’. Yet the managerialist character of corporate globalization is decep-
tive: on the one hand, it requires the complicity of centralized state managers
to negotiate structural adjustment in participation with international ﬁnancial
institutions (IFIs), to privatize national assets and to suppress political resis-
tance; on the other hand, it bypasses centralized state management through
the ruthless logic of ‘new public management’ – a system of autonomization
and decentralization where policymaking is divorced from democratic scru-
tiny, where private NGOs exert disproportional inﬂuence on policy develop-
ment, and where individual government departments must ‘compete against
one another for central funding, and market-based incentives increasingly
become part of budgetary calculations’ (Hanieh 2013: 67). The implication of
the state in the privatization of national assets not only facilitates the circu-
lation of ﬁnancial capital as the real subject of global modernity – where
value is valorized as the adequate subject bearing the relation of capital – but
through increased state borrowing transforms the ﬁscal function of the state
from sovereign redistributive mechanism to net contributor to the international
ﬁnancial system.
Although the popularized myth of ‘postindustrial’ society suggests a world
beyond production and accumulation – a leisure society populated by
sophisticated consumers – insofar as they are consumers proletarianization
threatens intermediate strata in a material and spiritual sense (Stiegler 2011).
Proletarianization entails not only sale of labour-power and loss of initiative/
control, but disindividuation and social-psychological impoverishment. Neo-
liberalism also undermines working-class capacities at local, regional and
global levels, adapting modes of labour intensiﬁcation, technological innova-
tion and subtle forms of repression developed in the advanced economies to
new accumulation regimes in emerging economies – although this process
functions in reverse, as rich countries import regressive labour practices from
peripheral economies in response to corporate demands for ‘ﬂexibility’. In the
US, oﬀshoring and unemployment have decimated ‘middle-class jobs’, turn-
ing large parts of the country into ‘fourth world’ enclaves with impoverished
and socially excluded sub-populations, reduced to servicing the needs of a
narrow elite. In the UK the gutting of employment law has led to ‘zero-hour’
labour contracts allowing employers to appropriate labour-power ad hoc,
cancelling shifts without warning while demanding responsiveness and obe-
dience from workers whose fear of unemployment and ostracism are intensi-
ﬁed by inﬂows of economic migrants willing to tolerate lower job security and
wages.
As Glyn (2006: 119–20) observes, lower pay/fewer jobs is the ‘nasty trade-
oﬀ’ for workers in the West, accompanied by a reduction in welfare entitle-
ments. In both America and the EU the precarization of labour is also
fuelling right-wing populist demands for the exclusion of welfare claimants
and foreigners among indigenous workers encouraged to blame ‘metropolitan’
elites for their predicament, deﬂecting resentment from corporate tax
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avoidance, collapsing infrastructure and falling wages. In this way capital
shapes its own opposition to globalization and resolves political tensions via a
counterrevolutionary interpellation of subjects through (i) state-based narra-
tives fusing identity/power, and (ii) the (re)incorporation of workers into the
hedonistic/disciplinary logic of consumerism. The credit-debt nexus thus
‘blurs income as a stratiﬁcation signal, so that knowing someone’s income is
insuﬃcient for understanding that person’s real economic position’ (Sullivan
2012: 36). This enables declassed individuals to simulate class positions while
reaﬃrming their actual propertylessness and insecurity (cf. Leicht & Fitzgerald
2007).
Conclusion
The ‘many faces’ of transnational corporatocracy and its consequences for the
West are ably documented by Boggs (2011a) in a sustained critique of the new
power elite who preside over America’s ‘phantom democracy’. This analysis
extends the arguments of Wolin (2010) and the more pessimistic arguments of
Orlov (2011) and Berman (2011), who predict the collapse of the US in its
present political form. Yet, it is Barkan (2013) who perhaps most skilfully
captures the logic of transnational corporate power, which he deﬁnes as co-
existent with political sovereignty. For Barkan the modern corporation and
sovereign power are grounded in legally sanctioned immunity from law which
renders attempts at criticism or regulation by public authority irrelevant.
Corporations are legal creations of states which acquire power over those
states; but the evolution of corporate-state legal immunity, the victim of
which is the public, is best conceptualized as a ‘doubling’ or ‘conjoining’, by
means of which the political unaccountability of the state is extended to the
legal and organizational form of the modern capitalist enterprise.
In Chapter 4 we extend the analysis of capitalist sovereignty to the sphere
of global governance, examining the political structures of transnational cor-
porate power which Kurz (1994) terms the regulatory form of the global
commodity production system. At the core of this structure is the disciplinary
power of international ﬁnancial institutions which facilitate diﬀerential accu-
mulation by enabling dominant capital to extend its control over and capacity
to extract value in global commodity chains which allow the formation of the
general rate of proﬁt to assert itself (Starosta 2010), and which eﬀectively
exclude non-corporate actors from competing in markets, and – if the pro-
posed TTIP and Transpaciﬁc Partnership (TPP) are agreed – will penalize
public authorities that attempt to impose legal obstacles on corporate trade
and investment or access to public contracts. Before proceeding to this ana-
lysis, our ﬁrst step is to analyse the structural and ideological links between
the transnational capitalist class and the transnational capitalist state, exam-
ining the formal and informal networks of power that transgress and override
the interests of workers in national economies. We then consider Wendt’s
(2003) concept of a world state as a teleological progression towards
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supranationalism. We argue that while the scale and scope of global eco-
nomic and political governance have widened since the ﬁnancial crisis, the
principal intergovernmental organizations that comprise the state form of
transnational capital do not possess the necessary coordinative capacity or
supranational power to supersede or override state sovereignties or regional
speciﬁcities to impose ‘governance without government’ in a multipolar
world. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the emerging yet unstable transnational
state form of neoliberal capitalism must be understood in this context, namely
as the contemporary global form of the capitalist state. By augmenting the
local management of investment and capital ﬂows within national economies
and regional blocs, this emergent structure seeks to manage the economic
activity of a hierarchized and diﬀerentiated global society in its totality
through the expansion of the state circuit of capital to meet the needs of
overaccumulated capital for valorization and continual self-expansion. And as
we shall see in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, while the US dollar has functioned
for seventy years as the monetary conduit for overaccumulated capital,
absorbing surplus-value which cannot be reinvested proﬁtably in productive
activity, its position as a global reserve currency and safe haven for investors
is increasingly in question as the growth of emerging market economies and
China’s capital markets in particular attract investors away from the West
(Lynn 2015).
Notes
1 The concept of Grossraumordnung was Carl Schmitt’s answer to the Monroe Doc-
trine. He believed Germany should consolidate Europe under its economic and
political leadership as the US had done in Latin America. As an imperial sea power
in decline, Britain could not tolerate German penetration of the ‘Eurasian Heartland’,
which Mackinder (1904) termed the geographical ‘pivot’ of history.
2 In Capital volume III (1895), Marx argued that capital expansion indicates an
absolute expansion of the technical composition of capital, leading to an increase in
the means of production and the mass of labour-power: accumulation also means
multiplication of the working class; for accumulation to take place, the poor must
remain poor, in a state of need, although this later clashes with their role as
consumers.
3 This feature of American politics is revealed in a major study by US political
economists who argue that ‘economic elites and organized groups representing
business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy,
while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent
inﬂuence’ (Gilens & Page 2014: 1).
4 As Harmes (2008) suggests, cultural nationalism is perfectly compatible with neoli-
beralism because neoliberals favour economic globalization as a way of promoting
the inter-jurisdictional competition (rivalry between competition states for transna-
tional corporate investment and good credit ratings) that they believe consolidates
neoliberalism at a domestic-political level.
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4 The state form of transnational capital
Introduction
Writing shortly before the global ﬁnancial crisis which alerted many to the
insolvency and instability of the Western ﬁnancial system, Olivier Giscard
d’Estaing – chair of the French Comité pour un Parlement Mondial, stated
that the overwhelming task facing world leaders is to ‘restore conﬁdence in
the G[7] and global governments and corporations’ (D’Estaing 2007: 23). For
D’Estaing, the absolute priority for international politics is the consolidation
of global governance through an intensiﬁcation of political interaction
between state and non-state actors in order to resolve issues aﬀecting more
than one state or region in the absence of a single overarching authority with
the power/legal competence to enforce compliance across the domains of
global economic and political security.
Reﬂecting the institutionalist bias favoured by Western liberal elites,
D’Estaing suggests two ways of restoring conﬁdence in the public and private
institutions of global governance, namely promotion of greater transparency
at all levels of public and private decision making, and ethical responsibility
in public and corporate life, for – in his esteemed opinion – the ‘capitalist
system does not work if people do not behave in a moral manner, if they
cheat or are corrupt’ (ibid.: 24). Only if surveillance, visibility and ethical
responsibility are ensured and improved will it be possible for transnational
elites to consolidate existing institutions of global governance and persuade
sovereign governments of the need for supranational cooperation and com-
pliance with some form of global governmental agency (funded by a trans-
action tax on energy, armaments and transport) to manage more eﬀectively
the tensions of capitalist globalization.1 Only a genuine transnational
response to the crisis, argues D’Estaing, can address the political-economic
contradictions of neoliberal globalization by enhancing institutional structures to
legitimate corporate power and ensure eﬀective rules-based governance of the
global economy (cf. Garnaut 2013; Boyle 2010; Hicks 2002).
In this chapter we examine debates on the implications of corporate glo-
balization for global governance and transnational policy coordination after
the global ﬁnancial crisis, building on the analysis of capitalist sovereignty
and corporate power. Although our main focus is the regulatory power of the
global state form of capital – capital decoupled from the political constraints
of national economies based on a fusion of identity and power – it is also
essential to consider the structural interrelation between capital organized
through international ﬁnancial institutions and the regional, sub-regional,
national and sub-state political forms of capital as these have emerged in the
long development of the capitalist world system. This complex interrelation-
ship is in a condition of ﬂux as leading powers struggle to develop coherent
forms of multilateral governance to manage the contradictions caused by
uneven economic development and the monetary turbulence unleashed by a
crisis that has exposed the fragility of the liberal international order.
Whether the liberal order can transcend the structural logic of anarchy in
international relations depends not only on the capacity of contenders such as
China to adapt to the norms of ‘international society’ and ‘rise peacefully’,
but on the willingness of Western ﬁnancial and security elites to adapt to the
need for genuine multilateral global governance by enabling emerging market
economies to exercise a level of decision-making power in proportion to their
growing economic weight. It is in the ‘most powerful clubs of states (the
WTO, IMF and World Bank) that neoliberalism is triumphant’ (Murphy
2000: 797), yet it is simply not possible to explain the ‘nature of global gov-
ernance without understanding the ways in which powerful states construct
and pursue their strategies’ (ibid.). From a rationalist perspective, orderly
transition towards a multipolar international system is unlikely as inadequate
incentives exist for Western elites to settle for positive-sum gains and relin-
quish their prerogative to determine geopolitical outcomes through oﬀensive
diplomacy, statecraft and war.
This interpretation is supported by the attempt by the US to exploit the
crisis in Ukraine to isolate Russia in the G20 precisely as the US was under
pressure for failing to ratify reforms to IMF governance agreed by the G20 in
the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis (Stuenkel 2014). Indeed, America’s
brinkmanship contradicts the early ‘G20 spirit’, according to which ‘advanced
economies would support a greater voice for emerging economies in global
governance arrangements and the latter would take more responsibility as
full-ﬂedged stakeholders of the global economy’ (Lombardi, cited in Call-
aghan 2014: 1).2 To this extent, at least, Bremmer’s (2012) conception of a ‘G-
Zero’ world order in which no state or alliance of states can provide global
leadership, seems disquietingly correct. This failure to embrace multi-
lateralism, argues Lombardi, is likely to ‘give new momentum to regional
alternatives like the Chiang Mai Initiative which set up currency swap lines
between […] Asian countries’ (ibid.). It is also likely to accelerate the devel-
opment of international monetary reset as the BRICS economies move to
establish their own currency-swap arrangements and conduct trade outside
the dollar system (Chandran 2015). Western condemnation of Russia over its
policy in Ukraine reveals the link between Western ﬁnancial and security
interests after Russia – in its bid to promote multipolarity – hinted in January
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2014 that the G20 should proceed with IMF governance reforms without
explicit US support (Harding 2014). Yet prevarication by the US is unlikely
to silence calls from emerging economies for reform of transnational institu-
tions to limit the fallout from Western mismanagement of the global economy
and to expedite the introduction of a suprasovereign global currency based on
the IMF special drawing right (SDR) model (Yong & Pauly 2013).
As a precondition for the reproduction of capitalist relations of power,
sovereign states do not cease to exist in a ﬁnancialized global economy. In
contrast with traditional geopolitics which is deﬁned by the logic of ‘national
security’, capitalist geopolitics is deﬁned by what Apeldoorn (2014) terms
‘ruling class security’. Within the emerging global totality, the state becomes
‘immanent to the ﬁeld of social forces, enters into their service, and serves as a
regulator of the decoded and axiomatized ﬂows’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1977:
235, emphasis added). Indeed, it is important not to view the interrelation
between world space and national territoriality as a
zero-sum game in which the importance of the former is presumed
necessarily to entail the decline of the latter. By conceiving geographical
scales as mutually exclusive rather than as co-constitutive, relationally
intertwined levels of social interaction, this dualistic conceptualization
cannot adequately theorize the essential role of sub-global transforma-
tions – whether of supranational political-economic blocs, national state
territories, regions, cities, localities or places – in contemporary processes
of global restructuring.
(Brenner 2011: 122)
The question is not whether the state form of transnational capital has
undermined the national state by appropriating its powers, but how states will
execute their competences in an integrated global economy. Despite predic-
tions of its demise by ‘hyperglobalists’ (Friedman 1999; Jha 2006), the West-
phalian state identiﬁed by Gellner (1983), Mann (1993) and Giddens (1985)
as a ‘power container’ remains an eﬀective structure for managing the con-
tradictions between security, identity and sovereignty, ensuring the stable
organization and reproduction of its internal properties. Yet the role of the
state is being transformed through the assertion of capitalist sovereignty and
the development of interlocking arenas of transnational agency corresponding
to the changing juridical requirements of capital. To understand this process
it is essential to consider the triadic structure of interstate, intercorporate and
corporate-state bargaining which characterizes global political economy
(Stopford & Strange 1991).
The state form of capital is a dimension of political-ideological organiza-
tion which stands above social reproduction yet remains integral to it. While
cosmopolitans embrace supranational agencies that transcend the juridical
limits of sovereign power (Held 1995; Archibugi 2003), critical theorists
approach global governance with scepticism: who, or more precisely what, do
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these emerging structures/global actors represent, and how can they be made
accountable? (Peet 2009).
To understand corporate globalization, we must explain how the state form
of capital sustains the juridical conditions for global accumulation, for the
core indispensable function of the capitalist state is neither to reproduce the
necessary illusion of a neutral political order standing above class divisions
based on property ownership, nor to establish the general societal interest in
atomized societies, but to ensure the continuous uninterrupted reproduction
of total social capital. While it is impossible to derive the content of state
power from accumulation in any direct sense, ‘the starting-point for the
analysis of this activity, of the development of the state and its limitations,
must be the analysis of the process of accumulation and its contradictory
development’ (Holloway & Picciotto 1978: 25).
The tendency towards absolute overaccumulation reveals both the
dynamism and inner limits of capital: in all branches of production and
exchange this tendency appears as rivalry between concentrations of corpo-
rate power for control over human and material resources. This creates a
contradictory tendency where corporations maximize expected proﬁts on the
one hand by expanding the productive capacity of the societies in which they
operate beyond the limits of the market, while on the other hand production
is periodically returned to the limits of the market by collapsing economic
activity at the cost of destroying productive capacity which fails to generate
expected rates of surplus-value. This process operates across spatial scales but
typically leads to global recession because there are no geographical limits to
the collapse of demand in the core consumer economies. Capitalist value is
therefore indistinguishable from crisis, and its expansion and contraction
develops through recurring cycles of decadence, destruction and renewal, re-
establishing conditions for accumulation while enabling consumers to forget
the origins of previous crises in the overrapid expansion of economies, the
irrational exuberance of asset-price inﬂation and unrealistic performance of
the ﬁnancial sector through the growth of new synthetic values (Jameson
2011).
In the following sections we examine the institutional structures of ﬁnancial
regulation which facilitate the directionless expansion/contraction of capital
in the global economy and the consolidation of capitalist commodity chains
within and between territorially demarcated regimes of production and con-
sumption. Here it will be necessary to review developments in the literature
on global governance, focusing on the debate between institutionalists, inter-
nationalists and cosmopolitans who attach normative signiﬁcance to supra-
national policy coordination, neorealists who question the viability of
transnational governance and the capacity of intergovernmental institutions
to enforce multilateral decisions, and critical theorists who highlight the dan-
gers of technocratic governance as the alienated political form of corporatism.
We then examine the surveillance function of transnational institutions which
articulate capitalist sovereignty, imposing ﬁnancial discipline on the global
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economy. Our primary concern is not the legal competence of IFIs or their
capacity to enforce compliance – issues dealt with elsewhere in the literature
(Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Picciotto 2011; Kirton 2013; Avgouleas
2012; Lin 2013), but the channels through which capitalist sovereignty is
projected and diﬀused in a decentred global capitalist order. Institutions of
global governance continue to privilege transatlantic interests, despite the
shifting centre of gravity in international trade towards emerging economies.
The implications of this contradiction are clear, for in a decentred global
economy increasingly managed by private corporations, the West dominates
the international community but is no longer in a position to determine the
future of globalization because capital is no longer concentrated exclusively in
Western ﬁnancial centres.
Towards a world state?
Few observers question the importance of global governance in international
politics, yet there is disagreement over the extent to which institutions of
global governance possess the multilateral authority or legitimacy to resolve
global issues. There is also disagreement over the extent to which global
governance can evolve into a consolidated form of ‘world government’ – a
world federation with executive authority, supported by a world parliament
and world court, with a mandate to make decisions binding on all states.3
Realists stress the contradiction between sovereignty and transnational orga-
nization, arguing that attempts to enforce supranational authority fail if con-
fronted by noncompliance or defection by principals. Yet government and
governance are distinct concepts: ‘governance should not be understood as a
weaker or less developed form of rule because it lacks a uniﬁed government.
Although global governance may seem amorphous, it operates at more levels
than formal systems’ (Sinclair 2012b: 28). It is the decentred and diﬀuse
character of global governance that distinguishes the state form of transna-
tional capital from earlier experiments in liberal internationalism which
sought to impose norms of interaction on a fragmented world.
Discussing the changing nature of transnational governance following the
global ﬁnancial crisis, one conservative journalist observes that the word
global has acquired ‘sacred connotations’: ‘Any action taken in its name must
be inherently virtuous, whereas the decisions of individual countries are
necessarily “narrow” and self-serving. (Never mind that a “global agreement”
will almost certainly be disproportionately inﬂuenced by the most powerful
nations.)’ (Daley 2009: 14). Reﬂecting the natural scepticism of the conservative
mindset, however, she adds:
There is a whiﬀ of totalitarianism about this new theology, in which the
risks are described in such cosmic terms that everything else must give
way. ‘Globalism’ is another form of the internationalism that has been a
core belief of the Left: a commitment to class rather than country seemed
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an admirable antidote to the ‘blood and soil’ nationalism that gave rise to
fascism.
(Daley 2009: 14)
Daley is fearful of globalist projects that detract from the discursive legit-
imation of the nation-state, and associates ‘globalism’ not with the inter-
nationalization of capitalist relations of power but with a socialist world state
which, like the Soviet Union, would presumably develop into a similar model
of tyranny (cf. Goodman 1959). Yet the idea that globalization is leading to
socialism is unsustainable, even if conservatives indicate parallels between the
Soviet Union and the EU as ‘failed’ experiments in supranationalism based
on the coercive alignment of interests between nations. It is no less misleading
to conﬂate Marxism with the positivistic form of historical materialism pop-
ular during the Second International. The real subject of global modernity is
not a class for itself that personiﬁes the ‘spirit of the age’, but the relations of
power constituted by capital whose sole purpose is value augmentation – a
‘purely quantitative measure of its achievement which negates all content’
(Arthur 2002: 141).
The conservative equation of globalism and socialism has so far failed to
gain resonance among a depoliticized generation that takes globalization for
granted. The appeal of reactionary anti-globalism is restricted to nationalists
and neofascists who reject prima facie all forms of supranationalism that
detract from the inward-looking orientation of culturally bounded ‘commu-
nities of fate’, or who equate the emancipatory potential of capitalist moder-
nity with the ‘totalitarian straightjacket of egalitarianism’ (Krebs 2012).4
Globalization has indeed led to a partial homogenization of distinctive cul-
tures, often obliterating the traditional existence of autochthonous peoples
unable to adapt to the rationalizing eﬀects of capitalism. Yet few serious
observers equate the uneven development and iniquitous distribution of
wealth created by neoliberalism with ‘global socialism’ (Svedberg 2004;
Rapley 2004; Navarro 2007; Lazzarato 2009; Collins et al. 2008). On the
contrary, the main consequences of globalization are: (i) growth and intensi-
ﬁcation of intergovernmental decision making in the management of global
monetary and trade issues; and (ii) a disaggregated network of overlapping
global, regional and transregional regulatory authorities to manage the
security and environmental threats aﬀecting multiple states where no means
of compliance exists, as a result of which participant states show a propensity
to converge towards similar forms of political and legal administration, either
voluntarily or to avoid violating global norms.
Global regulatory institutions are considered valuable because they ‘create
norms and information that enable member states and other actors to coor-
dinate their behaviour in mutually beneﬁcial ways’ (Buchanan & Keohane
2006: 3; cf. Keohane 1984). In addition, they ‘reduce transaction costs, create
opportunities for states and other actors to demonstrate credibility, thereby
overcoming commitment problems, and provide public goods, including rule-
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based resolution of conﬂicts’ (ibid.). However, it is immediately apparent that
any transnational ‘institution can only perform these functions if those to
whom it addresses its rules regard them as binding and if others within the
institution’s domain of operation support or at least do not interfere with its
functioning’ (ibid., emphasis added).
The challenge of global governance has led to contradictory responses from
the principal theoretical traditions in IR and IPE reﬂecting the wide diver-
gence of academic opinion on the extent to which norms of reciprocity reg-
ulating international society can be formalized into transnational rule-making
institutions, and the extent to which this development is necessary, desirable
or inevitable. While liberals and English School theorists stress the impor-
tance of reciprocity and multilateralism as evolving features of international
society, reﬂecting an ideal-typical interpretation of world order based on a
projection of Western values in international relations theory (Keene 2009),
critics insist that transnational rule-making regimes only mitigate the struc-
tural logic of anarchy in international relations by advancing temporary and/
or limited modes of cooperation because: (i) their authority is contingent on
the willingness of sovereign actors to acknowledge the validity of rules to
structure collective behaviour and restrict some actions; and (ii) such institu-
tions are unlikely to survive the eclipse of a hegemon with the determination
to defend a given status quo and the international authority to enforce mini-
mum standards of compliance (even where the hegemon itself refuses to
comply).
From a realist perspective the geocentric idealism of liberalism is indicative
of a ﬂawed commitment to supranationalism which runs through inter-
nationalist and cosmopolitan ideologies of power – positing a uniﬁed global
social order ‘stripped of power, national interests, and interstate conﬂict; its
proponents envisage a world nearly devoid of either domestic or international
politics, a world in which technocrats, bureaucrats and experts can solve
issues outside the realm of domestic and international politics’ (Gilpin 2000:
245; cf. Schmitt 1950). Realists are willing to recognize opportunities for
conditional cooperation where uniﬁed state actors remain the primary units
of political rule and the potential for interstate conﬂict is structurally deter-
mined and omnipresent, but ‘peace’ is understood as a period of subdued
rivalry between two or more periods of open hostility, because states have an
‘incentive to conceal or misrepresent information to gain strategic advantage’
(Mastanduno 1999: 22). On this view, states are concerned largely with
ensuring freedom from threat in a world where enmity is inescapable: not only
are periodic outbreaks of conﬂict inevitable – either because states seek rela-
tive gains from conﬂict or fail to prevent crises from escalating into open
warfare – but cooperation between states within transnational institutions is
dependent on perceptions of relative advantage. Even critical realists such as
Bacevich (2008) who disavow US exceptionalism defend a deﬁnition of
exclusive sovereignty that privileges state actors as primary units of analysis
in IR, questioning liberal theories of normative commitment and
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constructivist theories of structural/ideational change that emphasize the
mutual constitution of international society based on a ‘logic of appropriateness’
(cf. March & Olsen 1989).
For institutionalists, by contrast, transnational regulatory regimes are a
‘necessary component of the international system which arise out of the self-
interested cooperation between states’ (Emadi-Coﬃn 2002: 9). Rosenau
(1992) argues that the purpose of governance is to create a plurality of
mechanisms for steering global processes. In response to neorealism, neo-
liberals highlight a broader range of shared policy goals in the transition from
state-centric geopolitics to supranationalism, leading to consolidation of a
rules-based order integrating autonomous territorial units. As Keohane (2001:
1) argues, ‘interdependence and the lack of governance, when combined,
make a deadly mixture’.
For Keohane and Nye (1997), global governance presupposes a plurality of
channels of action in the organization of interstate and supragovernmental
relations, which implies recognition of three phenomena, namely: (i) multiple
channels linking complex societies, including interstate diplomatic relations,
transgovernmental relations between nongovernmental elites, and transna-
tional interconnections between non-state actors; (ii) multiple international
agendas (economic security, environmental protection, etc.); and (iii) a pre-
sumption in international society in favour of a norm ruling out the unilateral
use of military hard power to resolve territorial disputes. Despite its origins in
liberal political theory, neoliberal institutionalism retains a strongly realist
emphasis on the centrality of rational state actors in international relations –
‘uniﬁed entities with particular, speciﬁable goals, rather than composites of
many diﬀerent domestic actors and competing interests’ (Sterling-Folker
2010: 117). Transnational cooperation and norm compliance are feasible but
only where states identify opportunities to advance their self-interest through
collective action. Institutionalists assume general recognition of the need for
compliance with rules-based regimes, but even where global institutions create
expectations of future interaction (‘iteration’), such cooperation may be diﬃcult
to sustain in a geopolitical order characterized by uncertainty and insecurity.
Focusing on the absolute rather than relative beneﬁts of long-term func-
tional interdependence and cooperation with transnational regulatory
regimes, neoliberals depart from the neorealist paradigm, yet neoliberalism
oﬀers an essentially static model of international politics reminiscent of nor-
mative functionalism: by emphasizing the capacity of transnational institu-
tions to enforce world order, and by exaggerating the importance of
institutional design as a way to increase compliance, the model assumes the
inﬁnite reproducibility of the existing balance of power and thus fails to pro-
vide a dynamic theory of change in the world system linked to economic
development. Institutionalism is thus conservative in orientation: its purpose
is to sustain an eternal present in the interests of Western capital which rules
out alternative modes of cooperation and emancipatory development
(Agathangelou & Ling 2009).
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Moving beyond neoliberalism, internationalists and cosmopolitans posit
theories of world order and supranational democracy that build on complex
interdependence, but also call for just institutions, moral reciprocity and
‘citizen eﬃcacy’ as counterweights to Realpolitik (Cabrera 2004). This nor-
mative approach reﬂects a universalist tradition in Western political theory
dating back to Ancient Greece, whose thinkers identiﬁed (i) the need to deﬁne
a common purpose for civilized mankind, and (ii) enduring peace as a
condition for the realization of human potential.
Transgressing the doctrine of exclusive sovereignty, a democratically con-
stituted international community acting in and through multilateral institu-
tions constitutes more than a ‘great power concert’ and thus enjoys a
cosmopolitan prerogative to override sovereign exceptionalism to advance the
concerns of liberal universalism – according to which the ‘universal’ princi-
ples associated with the Western Enlightenment tradition (individualism,
secularism, materialism, etc.) should apply to all states regardless of their
cultural heritage. Contra Rawls (2001), who rejects a uniﬁed global regime
with the legal power of government as a potential source of tyranny (and
perpetual warfare), cosmopolitans stress that world citizenship requires more
than simple adherence to mutually acceptable legal norms, for if we take ser-
iously a universalist approach to moral obligation beyond state borders, then
there is no option but to strive for supranational political and legal structures
to distribute resources and enforce compliance with norms in international
law (Cabrera 2004).
On this view, global governance becomes an ‘arena within which the inter-
ests of both states and agencies of civil society are articulated and reconciled
in the process of global policy formulation’ (McGrew 2011: 279), although
recent studies focus more speciﬁcally on the problems of multilateral coordi-
nation, legitimacy and accountability that bedevil attempts to institutionalize
‘postsovereign’ decision making, particularly in the evolving informal con-
vening power of the G20 (Subacchi & Pickford 2011; cf. Wouters & Rama-
poulos 2012; Kirton 2013; Smith 2014). As Scholte argues, there is a ‘danger
that governance agencies exploit these postsovereign circumstances of diﬀuse
polycentric decision making to avoid accepting responsibility for their actions
and omissions’ (Scholte 2011: 19). However, he cautions, ‘to reaﬃrm
accountability in respect of polycentric public policy networks requires a shift
in assumptions away from a now obsolete “sovereigntist” mindset that seeks
to attach ultimate responsibility to a single highest authority’ (ibid.). This point is
echoed by Bjola and Kornprobst, who stress a tension between demands for
collective action and the fragmentation of collective agency created by the
privatization of political power in international politics: collective action, they
argue, ‘sustains global ordering, while fragmentation of collective agency
undermines it. This fundamental summarizes the main challenge of global
governance: how to create political order among a multiplicity of actors
having diﬀerent identities […] and power resources’ (Bjola & Kornprobst
2011: 3).
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Whether cosmopolitanism has a future outside scholarship depends on
whether states might be willing to support the actual development of diﬀuse
and ﬂexible forms of popular global participation, and whether ‘global citi-
zens’ could acquire the competence to support these systems and fashion a
moral framework for international relations (cf. Heater 2000: 191). This is
doubtful, for while cosmopolitans seek to augment existing interstate
arrangements to enhance accountability/legitimacy, transnational institutions
with extensive regulatory powers might in fact contradict the liberal demand
for limited government (McGrew 2011).
Yet for supporters of a postsovereign global order, governance with gov-
ernment remains inadequate to the task of enforcing global justice and resol-
ving planetary issues. The solution is a globally empowered political authority
with the right to override sovereignty – a world federation with the power to
transcend the legislative and executive limits of intergovernmentalism in the
domains of global political economy and international security, leading to the
possibility of governance without government – a new ‘political order with
other means or through other modes than with classical government tools’
(Guzzini 2012: 4). In this vision, argues Guzzini, ‘governance is not thought
of in terms of (state) government but beyond it; indeed, order through gov-
ernment (by whatever actor) is but a part of governance’ (ibid.). This implies
new systems for steering, coordination and regulation in which transnational
organizations act in accordance with their own supranationally constituted
authority to formulate policy on behalf of states, in partnership with corporate
and non-state actors, leaving states to implement supranationally constituted
policy within their own limited sovereign jurisdiction.
Yet two objections to this ideal can be identiﬁed: on the one hand, while
issues of high politics can be co-determined within a security alliance such as
NATO, they cannot be democratized because they are decided by profes-
sional elites responding to the exigencies of international politics which citi-
zens are powerless to understand or inﬂuence; on the other hand, even where
states are internally democratic or encourage a positive spill-over eﬀect for
foreign policy, this is no guarantee for a democratization of international
politics because in spite of the interdependencies created by globalization,
the allocation of resources in the global economy is determined by private
corporations rather than public authorities.
Nevertheless, federalists such as Tännsjö (2008) look towards the EU to
support their demand for genuine supranationalism. As the most advanced
regional organization, the EU is presented as a model for transnational
democratic coordination which could be emulated at a transnational level by
creating a ‘world parliament’ to deliberate on the formulation of international
law on the model of the European Parliament in Strasbourg (Tetalman &
Belitsos 2005). Despite its treatment of Greece as the weakest economy in the
eurozone (and its interference in Greek and Italian democracy with the
appointment of non-parliamentary caretaker governments in 2011), neo-
functionalists applaud the EU as a beacon of Enlightenment values and ‘soft
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power projection’ which states along its eastern and southern periphery are
encouraged to emulate (Joﬀé 2001). Trends towards constitutionalism in the
EU, it is argued, have transformed the EU from a ‘treaty-based intergovern-
mental regime to an entity representing an embedded continental liberal
market order underwritten by an emphatic corpus of supranational law’
(Rosamond & Wincott 2006: 1). However, Europeanization has led to a
situation where
the ‘imagined community’ of the nation which served as the aﬀective
basis for the post-French Revolution social contract, as well as its
modern institutional counterpart, the welfare state, is […] under critical
duress as states lose control over what were once referred to as the
‘national economies’.
(Trägårdh 2004: 2)
Under the leadership of Germany and France, member states have been
reformed into ‘complex structures of strategic coordination’, leading to a
partial destatization of the Union as a regional political structure of transna-
tional neoliberalism (Jessop 2004: 65). This has intensiﬁed the ‘ecological
dominance’ of ﬁnancial capital over competing fractions of capital in the
regional political economy of Europe and its near periphery, where ‘proﬁt-
oriented, market-mediated capitalist economic order [… exerts] a greater
impact on the evolution of other social orders than these orders have on it’
(ibid.: 74). As the monetary and ﬁscal problems of the eurozone have
revealed, the contradiction between capitalist sovereignty and capitalist
democracy has led to a crisis in the ‘spatio-temporal ﬁx’ of multilevel regional
governance, for despite facilitating a sophisticated articulation of interests via
a hierarchy of decisional scales, ﬁnancial capital ‘can freely jump these scales,
while accompanying modes of social regulation cannot perform this feat so
easily’ (Kramsch & Hooper 2004: 5).
The ﬂight of capital from Greece in 2011 and the angry response towards
George Papandreou’s proposed referendum to facilitate Greece’s exit from the
eurozone indicate the depth of the contradiction between supranationalism
and popular sovereignty, which resulted in the collapse of the Greek economy,
the resurgence of Greek fascism, and the reperipheralization of the Hellenic
state.5 Those who defend the ideal of a capitalist peace based on the
assumption that private property rights and contractual obligations encou-
rage cooperation or that market economies are better able to ‘indicate resolve’
overlook the ﬁnancial violence inﬂicted by the ‘Troika’ (IMF/European Central
Bank/EU Commission) that prevented Greece from reasserting its monetary
sovereignty and defaulting on its ‘odious debt’ – a debt inherited from past
authoritarian governments, which forces peripheral economies to become net
creditors to the rest of the world (Manolopoulos 2011; cf. Woodley 2013).
Ironically the cosmopolitan ideal can be traced back to Antiquity, for
allusions to the idea can be found in Aristotle’s famous letter to Alexander of
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Macedon, suggesting that the interests of classical civilization could best be
served through the achievement of ‘lasting peace’ (Stern 1968: 35). Aristotle
calls for a focus on that which is ‘common to all men’ (ibid.: 41), although
Alexander’s own more modest and pragmatic goal was to co-opt the Persians
into his uniﬁed empire through limited self-rule under his suzerainty (cf.
Heater 1996). As Stern notes, while Aristotle’s letter ‘speaks of all men living
in concord, it does not expressly say that they will live together in equality […
his] interest is centred on the future happiness of mankind brought about by
general peace rather than on equality between Greeks and barbarians’ (ibid.: 42).
The ideal of world government subsequently reappears in European history,
and is typically linked with ‘benign hegemony’ – that is to say, under bene-
volent leadership geopolitics is ‘frozen’ and ‘world union’ achieved without
tyranny. This theme takes shape in the writings of pan-Europeanists of the
early modern era, including the Project for Perpetual Peace by Abbé Saint-
Pierre, and the General Consultation Concerning the Improvement of Human
Aﬀairs by Johannes Komensky (ibid.). Other examples can be found, indi-
cating the continuity between Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and Renais-
sance neo-Stoicism, leading to the famous defence of ‘global paciﬁc
federation’ in Kant’s Perpetual Peace. In contrast with Hobbes, who favoured
a lawful interstate order, and Rousseau, who believed in the moral perfect-
ibility of states, Kant saw world republic as desirable yet implausible. Instead
he stressed the possibility of domestically well-ordered republican states which
would be less likely to precipitate conﬂict. Heater identiﬁes ﬁve types of
appeal in the literary output of cosmopolitan thinking:
The ﬁrst appeal is the felt need to give political reality to the belief that
states are artiﬁcial in the context of the recognised essential unity of
mankind. Second is the crude urge for world power. Thirdly, some ideol-
ogies have contained the ambition of their worldwide political accom-
plishment. In the fourth place, much support has been accorded the idea
of world political unity because of the proclaimed practical beneﬁts that
would ﬂow from the arrangement. Finally, the possible methods have
ranged from conquest to acceptance of mass popular will.
(Heater 1996: 202)
It is this belief in a foreordained destiny that drives constructivists like Wendt
(2003) to assume the inevitable emergence of a world state through tele-
ological reasoning, positing world government as an outcome linked to a
design or purpose implicit in and necessary for the fulﬁlment of human history.
Falk deﬁnes world government as a political system founded on ‘compul-
sory peaceful settlement of all disputes by third-party decision in accordance
with law; general and complete disarmament at the state and regional levels;
a global legislative capacity backed up by enforcement capabilities; and some
form of centralized leadership’ (Falk 1995: 207). While world government
may appear unfeasible in practice, for Wendt it is ‘made inevitable by the
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interaction between a self-organizing, bottom-up process and a structural,
top-down one: struggles for recognition mediated by technological change at
the micro-level, conditioned by the logic of anarchy at the macro[-level]’
(Wendt 2003: 494).
On this view a world state is both desirable and inevitable given the
demand for security, enabling collective identity formation and collective
political authority to reduce the risks posed by the production of new
destructive military technologies. This process, he believes, will lead to a
‘universal security community’ – that is to say, a supranational authority
mandated to make binding decisions over the use of coercion. Eventually, the
resistance of powerful state actors who enjoy the beneﬁts of sovereignty will
be reduced as they ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to insulate themselves from escalating
risks and violence. Humanity has three choices, namely a paciﬁc federation of
republican states, an anarchical society with states as self-suﬃcient totalities, or a
world state. As it is currently constituted, the international system must inevitably
evolve towards world government as a ‘stable end-state’, although Wendt
recognizes that this supranational authority would co-exist alongside the irre-
ducible pluralism of national cultures, and that a centralized supranational
executive would be unlikely:
As long as binding choices can be made, decision making in a world state
could involve broad deliberation in a ‘strong’ public sphere rather than
command by one person. In short, as long as it has a common power,
legitimacy, sovereignty and agency we should not prejudge the form a
world state might take. The EU is already not far from meeting these
requirements on a regional level. Were a ‘completed’ EU to be globalized
it would be a world state.
(Wendt 2003: 506)
He accepts that great powers will resist surrendering their right to the uni-
lateral use of force, yet insists that in a world of ‘rogue powers’ with destruc-
tive military arsenals it will be rational to join a world state with security
based on an extension of the ‘NATO model’ rather than a United Nations
(UN) army: ‘Individuals and states alike will have lost the negative freedom
to engage in unilateral violence, but gained the positive freedom of fully
recognized subjectivity. The system will have become itself an “individual”’
(Wendt 2003: 525).
In response to Wendt, realists argue that without a means to overcome
social and cultural homogeneity world government is an impossibility. In
addition, a world state could hardly function as a disinterested ‘technocratic
actor’ supplying impartial justice because its oﬃcials would inevitably be
driven by their own functional interests and priorities – precisely as the Eur-
opean Commission has developed interests at variance with those of its 28
member states (as in the case of Greece). Although a hypothetical world state
might reduce the incidence of military conﬂict as the ‘court of last resort in a
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world of anarchy’ (Tetalman & Belitsos 2005: 78), for realists a plurality of
states that preserves the unique qualities of nations is preferable to a mono-
lithic entity controlled by a universalizing governmental rationality. This
argument was emphasized by Schmitt (2003), who observed that a perfectly
functioning world state would close oﬀ the possibility of the political by
eliminating the ‘empty space’ necessary to facilitate future historical action,
‘creating a perfectly ordered world that excludes the possibility of conﬂicts
and resistance – at least any meaningful resistance’ (Ojakangas 2007: 208).
Such a world would be ‘devoid of meaning, because it would become an
automaton, a “self-propelling machine”’ (ibid.). There must be something
that still stands outside and transcends this perfectly functioning order – a
vital space for political action as a condition of possibility for rupture and,
therefore, for the enactment of constituent power. As Schmitt argued crypti-
cally in Political Theology, it is through the exception that the ‘power of real
life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by
repetition’ (Schmitt 1985: 15).
Wendt also comes in for criticism by IR scholars opposed to realism.
Shannon (2005), for example, argues that because agency is denied by the
logic of inevitability in his teleological method, Wendt seems ready to aban-
don the constructivist emphasis on contingency and indeterminacy in the
intersubjective production of institutional norms and practices in interna-
tional politics. Furthermore, Shannon argues, Wendt views struggle for
recognition as an exclusive monocausal motive for agents, and his excessive
emphasis on inevitability makes it diﬃcult to examine or even imagine the
unpredictable social and political context in which a world state might actu-
ally come into being. Instead, Wendt predicts transnationalism as an outcome
conditional on nationalism, where submission to a supranational global
authority on a macro-level follows a struggle for national recognition at the
micro-level:
Wendt’s reference to nationalism acknowledges both the inﬂuence of non-
state agents and the potential for system disintegration, yet he tries to
reconcile this with his teleology by claiming that such a ‘step back’ is a
‘precondition for moving forward’. In fact, Wendt says a [world state] is
only possible if it embraces nationalism, which seems contradictory since
nationalism is about self-rule and statehood.
(Shannon 2005: 584)
In Wendt’s defence, there are historical occasions when precisely this has
occurred – for example, the accession of Eastern European states to the EU
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet as a general theoretical position,
Wendt’s reasoning makes little sense because ‘fragmentation is rewritten as
evidence of consolidation, raising falsiﬁability problems as well as the logical
conundrum of why new nationalist groups achieving independence from tyranny
would turn and submit to another superstate’ (Shannon 2005: 85).
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For constructivists, the ﬂaw in Wendt’s reasoning lies in his methodological
assumptions, namely a scientiﬁc-realist commitment to the unitary actor in
IR theory: while Wendt is a leading ﬁgure in constructivism, he is biased
towards systemic constructivism, and approaches his task from within the
state-centric framework of realism. He therefore ‘risks becoming hijacked by
this orthodoxy: his theory must reproduce it […] Through his statist theory,
he reproduces the embedded understanding of politics of a narrowly deﬁned
international society – which might appear out of touch with world politics’
(Guzzini & Leander 2006: 74; cf. Reus-Smit 2005a).
Wendt belongs to a tradition of social theory strongly committed to synth-
esis, and the point of his intensely theoretical labour is to ‘abstract, reconﬁ-
gurate, indeed sometimes “assimilate” apparently antagonistic theoretical
positions within one (his) social theory’ (Guzzini & Leander 2006: 73). He
also problematizes the epistemological assumptions of rationalism in neo-
liberal/neorealist debates, aﬃrming the intersubjective and ideational con-
struction of social reality which reproduces structures that in turn acquire
quasi-permanent features that reﬂexively order the lives of individuals. From a
Marxian perspective, however, the obvious conceptual weakness of idealism
lies in the assumption that the structure and organization of international
trade and security are products not of material determinations but of idea-
tional processes conditioned through mutually constitutive intersubjective
engagement. This recalls Giddens’s (1984) theory of ‘structuration’, where
structures are no longer immutable reiﬁed constructs external to individuals,
but constituted through a reproduction of social patterns institutionalized in
speciﬁc contexts.
For neo-Gramscians who dislike Cox’s (1983) reconstruction of historical
materialism, this problematization of structure is not unwelcome: it highlights
a political need to explain how hegemonic structures are embedded in the
norms and practices of national and transnational communities – and how a
philosophy of praxis (collective emancipatory action) must simultaneously
function as a critique of common sense understanding by a transnational
intellectual-moral bloc in order to begin to reveal and overcome ideologically
determined social divisions (Rupert 2006; cf. Bedirhanog˘lu 2008; Lacher
2008). Yet for those who refuse to reduce structure to intersubjective relations
(collapsing material objectivity into historical subjectivity), this approach fails
to explain the objective domination implicit in embedded structures of capi-
talist power, which in the present state of neoliberal globalization acquire
political valence through formal and informal global governance – transna-
tional disciplinary regimes that augment traditional structures of political
power organized through the state.
As Joseph (2008) argues, there is little to be gained from denying that
structures possess a logic: capitalist relations of power can be understood
analytically, for capital exhibits an inner logic that can be accessed though a
dialectical analysis of its main categories. Hegemony should not, therefore, be
‘contrasted with either social structure or material conditions. Rather, these
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are its very conditions of existence. Unless we have a structurally grounded
approach, there is little basis for understanding the powers and possibilities
that agents may possess’ (Joseph 2008: 68). Rarely, he adds, is there ‘direct
reciprocity between structure and consciousness. Social structures have a real
existence that is ontologically distinct from our intersubjectivity and con-
sciousness’ (ibid.: 70). As we saw in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the structures
of capitalist power constitute a totality of social relations determining the
framework of choices available to individuals and state actors, and the point
of Marx’s theoretical intervention – which Althusser recognized – was to
analyse the economic level of deep structural relations of power (Scott 2012:
190). In addition, the sociomaterial conditions of capitalist power have an
objective existence grounded in the reﬂexive domination of abstract labour
over itself: abstract labour is not merely the ‘object of domination and
exploitation but is itself the essential ground of domination’ (Postone 1993:
125–26). The reproduction of capitalist relations of power presupposes the
existence of propertylessness workers whose labour-power constitutes a vital
(but not exclusive) precondition for generating value. As the real subject of
globality, capital constitutes itself as a self-valorizing force, subsuming human
creativity, political initiative and energy in its inexorable logic, outside which
little of value can ﬂourish.
The asymmetric structures of power that govern the political economy of
world order are inaccessible and resistant to normative critique – not because
critical theory is devoid of normative foundations, nor because there is an
inevitable contradiction between the interests of global ﬁnancial investors and
embedded political structures, but because the state form of transnational
capital that constitutes global governance bears little real relation to the cos-
mopolitan idealism of liberalism or the supranational global authority pos-
ited in Wendt’s systemic constructivism. Although cosmopolitan idealism
draws on a tradition of Western philosophical idealism that conceives world
order as an indirect eﬀect of the internal ordering of states, it excludes from
its analysis any formal consideration of the material logic of capitalist sover-
eignty in the globalization of corporate power and the institutional logic of
transnational governance as a response to deterritorialization, which reﬂects
the complex geopolitical challenge of embedding the transnational market
power of dominant corporate capital in legitimate non-market institutions
(Ebner 2011; cf. Polanyi 1944).
Indeed, cosmopolitans not only elide the implicitly ideological character of
liberal universalism in the Eurocentric idealization of ‘international society’,
but in their advocacy of governance, free trade and humanitarian interven-
tion, they casually dismiss the political virtues of sovereignty for developing
societies in the capitalist periphery that struggle to limit neocolonial depen-
dency. That is to say, cosmopolitans overlook as a matter of course the eco-
nomic and political utility of sovereign power for weak Third World states
that seek autonomy and security either by staggering their historic exposure
to global market forces (for example, Brazil), or by relying on norms of non-
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interference and reciprocity in international law (for example, Iran) as a way
to limit intervention by industrialized economies or global institutions acting
on behalf of corporate actors, and which thus have less to gain from submis-
sion to Western-led global governance (Bello 2009; Evans 2011). Cosmopoli-
tans and constructivists who attempt to deduce the normative and functional
desirability of a ‘world state’ from the perplexing plurality of transnational
institutions and regulatory regimes fail to perceive that the acceleration and
intensiﬁcation of capital ﬂows cannot be managed through traditional systems of
regulation because the institutional forms of global governance exist to
articulate and consolidate the ﬁnancial interests of corporate power which
transgress all jurisdictional limits. Cosmopolitans who assume that global
economic integration must lead to suprasovereign decision making for the
collective good of international society thus not only ignore the material
determination of capitalist geopolitics that forces states into ruthless mone-
tary and trade wars, but also the non-identity of interests between revisionist
contenders which paradoxically unites states outside the Lockean heartland.
This faulty perspective is exempliﬁed in the work of liberal globalists such
as Boyle, a Hegel scholar who posits supranationalism as a rational political
response to economic interdependence. Up to the present time, he contends,
governments have
conspired with each other, against their peoples, to maintain their own
freedom of action, in response to the threat of supranational regulation
implicit in the growth of global trade and ﬁnance. But the illusion of their
omnipotence, which they have fostered, threatens to destabilize them,
perhaps for good [… The] world ﬁnancial crisis is in fact the beginning of
a world political crisis. What went wrong with globalization after 1989
was not simply that the expansion of commerce remained too regulated.
Rather it was that, with the partial exception of the World Trade Orga-
nization, no regulation at all – political, military or economic – was
established at the global level at which the human race was becoming
interconnected and interdependent.
(Boyle 2010: 28–29)
This projection of a world state in idealist thought constitutes a false ontol-
ogy – a failure to grasp not only the absence of a unifying political centre, but
that the self-valorizing logic of capital itself is ungovernable. Transnational
governance constitutes a complex (yet partial and incomplete) interlocking
network of transnational authorities, informal regulatory regimes and para-
political modes of clandestine private governance which defy simple classiﬁ-
cation – even within the systemizing framework of Marxist IPE. Globalists
like Boyle may be correct to argue that the global ﬁnancial crisis marks the
beginning of a more serious ‘world political crisis’ – paving the way (nega-
tively, in his view) for a return to multipolarity. Yet the new nomos of the
earth is structured less by governance as ‘soft’ rule making than by the
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disaggregated power of transnational capital whose supremacy over compet-
ing national capitals and leverage over national political institutions is suﬃ-
cient to block demands for eﬀective regulation of the ﬁnancial institutions
that engineered the global crisis.
While transnational governance may be considered a functional precondi-
tion for the supranational consolidation of market rationality, it is no sub-
stitute for the localization (Ortung) of violence in demarcated zones of
economic production and political exclusion which facilitate the legal segre-
gation and appropriation of labour-power necessary for the self-augmentation
and spatial organization of capital – particularly in peripheral economies
where legal constraints are weaker and where the traditional ‘limits’ of capital
can be superseded through barbarism. This reﬂects the paradoxical decom-
modiﬁcation of capitalist wage labour in corporate globalization, a politically
regressive shift that undermines the formal contractual relation of free
exchange between capital and labour as a marketable commodity by intro-
ducing extra-pecuniary systems of coercion to manage capitalist production
in legally demarcated accumulation sites (Westra 2010). It also reﬂects the
totalitarian organization of subjects in zones of legal uncertainty where state-
based juridical sovereignty ‘no longer orders forms of life and juridical rules
in a determinate place but, instead, contains at its very centre a dislocating
localization that exceeds it and into which every form of life and every norm
can be virtually taken’ (Agamben 1998: 175).
Networks of transnational power
Global governance is thus a means for embedding the asymmetric private
power of transnational capital in nonmarket institutions in an integrated
global economy where national economies are increasingly conjoined by
intensiﬁed ﬂows of trade and investment. The endurance of ‘old world’ poli-
tics in a globally integrated economy should not blind us to the expansion
and consolidation of transnational corporate power through a range of
formal and informal organizations connecting corporate-state elites within
and between legal jurisdictions, as a result of which the future of global
capitalism is partially independent of its formal sanction by states. In eﬀect,
global governance is a consequence of the legal vulnerability of a transna-
tional capitalist class whose ﬁnancial interests are at variance with those of
states, and whose global political power cannot be validated democratically.
In Marxian IPE global governance is understood as functional to but in
tension with globalization. Lenin emphasized a connection between transna-
tional organizations and the dynamics of rivalry between European empires
for control over territory and markets. He maintained a realist perspective,
believing that ‘international institutions represented the temporary and
inherently unstable arrangements reached by imperialist powers engaged in an
endless struggle to repartition the world among themselves’ (Callinicos 2002:
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252). Kautsky (1927), on the other hand, argued that while relentless colonial
conquest had operated unchecked until 1914, it was not impossible that
ﬁnance capital might eventually realize that ‘this way of trying to increase
proﬁts endangers its entire capital and that it would be more proﬁtable to
shift to an ultraimperialism, an international cartelization of the ﬁnance
capitalists of all countries’ (Kautsky 1927: 292–93).
These divergent perspectives are reconciled in the present epoch in the form
of a transnational capitalist class whose transnational power derives not only
from inﬂuence in state legislatures, but from the principle of absentee owner-
ship that sustains dominant capital and enables predatory corporations to
sabotage local economies of production and consumption. While Lenin
rejected Kautsky’s view that competing capitals would ‘fuse’ into a global
monopoly that transcended imperial states (siding instead with Bukharin
(1917), who predicted the contradictory development of capitalism in a world
of nation-states), the state-centric logic of US hegemony after 1945 has given
way to a more geocentric system of transnational class power which operates
through informal and formal institutional structures of global governance,
reﬂecting the embedded power of a diﬀerentiated class of global investors,
ﬁnanciers and international civil servants who collectively oversee an unevenly
integrated global economy that has clearly evolved beyond the capacity of the
US to manage through statecraft.
Poulantzas (1975) was correct to argue that a US-centric international
economy depended on the reproduction of relations of domination operating
in the hegemonic power in metropolitan and semi-peripheral economies, but
only if we are also prepared to revise the notion of competing national capi-
tals can we observe the actual divergence of transnational corporate capital
from the interests of sovereign states in the present period – a phenomenon
Poulantzas, in his defence, could not have foreseen. Poulantzas rejected the
deceptively neutral ideology of globalization not because he failed to identify
the internationalization of capitalist social relations, but because any inter-
pretation of internationalization based on the idea of ‘global integration’ is
misleading as it conceals the real determination of uneven and combined
development in the asymmetric relations between the capitalist core and per-
iphery, and the continued relevance of the national state for the defence and
hegemonic articulation of local/regional capitalist interests. The hegemonic
ideology of globalization represents a ‘spatialized abstraction’, an ‘abstract
process whose uneven development would be simply the “dross” of its
concretization into social formations’ (Poulantzas 1975: 49–50).
Transnational capital is concentrated in the US, EU and globally sig-
niﬁcant capital markets in Asia, Latin America and South Africa. As Sklair
(2001), Robinson (2004b) and Carroll (2010) argue, the power bloc in
national capitals is increasingly composed of factions that, by virtue of their
own relative exposure to the transnationalization of capital (and US ﬁnancial
capital in particular), come to reﬂect at diﬀerent levels of intensity the inter-
ests of non-national capitalist interests. In neoliberal global capitalism, there
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is no absolute dividing line between those oriented towards foreign capital
and those who champion domestically owned industrial and commercial
interests. Networks of capitalist power are heterogeneous and the national/
transnational divide cuts across rival capitalist interests – in part due to the
involvement of the state in fractional reserve banking as a means for stabi-
lizing overextended credit infrastructures and maintaining dominant capital
against market forces and deﬂationary pressures in the economy. This is not
simply a result of insider rent seeking in systemically relevant corporate
ﬁnancial institutions, but a consequence of the fact that ﬁat monetary systems
are based on continuous market intervention, in which decisions on monetary
policy are the result of ‘administrative decisions not of market forces, and in
which the banks and large parts of the ﬁnancial industry cannot be free
enterprises but must end up under the tutelage of the state’ (Schlichter 2011:
239). In extreme circumstances, a domestic bourgeoisie may challenge the power
of transnational capital and ally itself to popular classes in defence of ‘sovereign’
interests – for example the decision by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to
strip the Spanish corporation Repsol of its controlling stake in Argentina’s oil
industry in 2012. However, it is more likely that a mutuality of interests
between national and transnational capitalists will induce a form of solidarity
that conceals the diﬀerentiated interests of rival fractions of capital in the
ruling power bloc.
Sklair (2001) notes that the transnational capitalist class comprises multiple
elements and is constituted through a wide range of transnational practices
that ‘transect’ borders, involving four fractions of capital, namely transna-
tional corporate executives, politicians and international civil servants, global
professionals (lawyers, lobbyists, economists, accountants, management con-
sultants, etc.), and consumer elites. Although closely linked to the dominant
narrative of consumerism (Carroll & Carson 2006: 52), this heterogeneous
grouping is too variegated to constitute a formally uniﬁed class for itself, and
thus co-exists adjacent to national corporate and political elites who maintain
more limited geospatial and commercial horizons.
Nodal intersections of transnational ﬁnancial networks are located in
Europe and North America, but as accumulation becomes transnational, this
is leading to a greater geographical diﬀusion of corporate power. Despite the
inﬂuence of elite policy gatherings such as the World Economic Forum or
Bilderberg, the transnational capitalist class ‘exists neither as a free-standing
entity (it is deeply embedded in national business communities) nor as a
homogeneous collectivity’ (Carroll 2010: 228). Such gatherings reﬂect the
accessibility of national-state managers to the lobbying power of corporations
and transnational think tanks which seek to inﬂuence the careers of future
leaders and the formation of international economic legal structures to facil-
itate corporation trade and investment, such as the TTIP deal discussed in
Chapter 3 (Skelton 2014).
For Robinson, on the other hand, this transnational class may not be a
uniﬁed or homogeneous group but is still a class in and for itself: as a
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cosmopolitan elite it is symptomatic of globalization, aware of its globality
and geopolitical agency as states are ‘transcended by transnational social
forces and institutions grounded in the global system rather than the inter-
state system’ (Robinson 2004a: 56). Robinson distinguishes four uses of the
term hegemony, namely domination, leadership, leadership within historic
blocs, and multilateral consensus (cf. Worth 2009). The class hegemony of the
global capitalist elite requires us to ‘abandon outdated and restrictive state-
centric conceptions of hegemony to a geocentric perspective’ (Robinson
2004a: 54–55). Whereas Poulantzas denied that internationalization leads to
integration, for Robinson ‘globalization is the basis for the emergence of a
single global society marked by transnational political and cultural processes
and the global integration of social life’ (Robinson 2004b: 9). Whereas inter-
nationalization implies a purely quantitative extension of ‘intranational’
commerce, transnationalization indicates the point at which
national capitals fuse with other internationalizing national capitals in a
process of cross-border interpenetration that disembeds them from their
nations and locates them in a new supranational space opening up under
the global economy [… N]ew forms of organizing globalized production
are important because […] they contribute to the development of world-
wide networks that link local capitalists to one another and generate an
identity of objective interests and of subjective outlooks among these
capitalists around a process of global (as opposed to local) accumulation.
Therefore they function as integrative mechanisms in the formation of the
TCC and act to shift the locus of class formation from national to
emergent transnational space.
(Robinson 2004a: 62)
The reproduction of the transnational capitalist class is closely linked to the
cycle Marx termed the ‘circuit of capital’, namely the conversion of money
into capital and through transnational production into greater quantities of
money.
At the centre of this circuit of capital is the ﬁnancial core of the transna-
tional capitalist class – an interlocking global network of 160 directors of
ﬁnancialized corporations who collectively manage $25 trillion of funds
invested in almost every country of the world (Phillips & Osborne 2013). This
elite stratum has acquired transnational hegemony through the ‘supersession
of narrow economic interests by a more universal social vision or ideology
and the concrete coordination of the interests of other groups […] in the
process of securing their participation in this social vision’ (Robinson 2004b:
76). The promotion of this ideology is the task of international policy net-
works which coordinate international monetary and ﬁnancial regulation
through transnational forums for elite representation and consensus forma-
tion (Coen & Grant 2001; Plehwe & Halpen 2006). Viewed geocentrically,
94 The state form of transnational capital
these networks constitute an interorganizational ﬁeld which transcends
nationality: superimposed onto the existing framework of corporate power
this interorganizational ﬁeld ‘pulls the directorates of the world’s major cor-
porations much closer together, and collaterally integrates the lifeworld of the
global corporate elite’ (Carroll & Carson 2006: 66). It links clusters of inter-
corporate strategic power and its broad class interests contradict those of
Western consumers whose earning power is in decline, as it is recognized that
to make Western economies competitive again ‘would require a long-term
drop in labor costs and the standard of living to the level of many poor
nations, with a high risk of social upheaval that would imperil corporate
power and its elites’ (Suarez-Villa 2012: 26). Led by the Anglosphere, trans-
national ﬁnancial capital is deracinated, its functionaries occupying a rareﬁed
global space supported by interlocking corporate directorships and other
mechanisms of global economic integration which ‘link local capitalists to
one another and generate an identity of objective interests and subjective
outlook among these capitalists around a process of global (as opposed to
local) accumulation’ (Robinson 2004b: 51).
Yet capitalist sovereignty cannot be viewed exclusively in terms of the
dominant market power of a transnational oligarchy separated from territor-
ial constraints – as if transnational power were merely a functional equivalent
for transcendent political authority, or as if state actors (which acquire poli-
tical control by containing time within domesticated spatial contexts) no
longer existed. As the subject of globalization, whose single goal is value
augmentation, the reproduction and expansion of the value form is con-
tingent on subjectiﬁcation – on the production of really existing human sub-
jects as an objective personiﬁcation of economic categories (commodiﬁed
labour-power, unfree labour, consumer, etc.) who not only respond to the
economic discipline of the market, but positively identify with the ‘cultural
and ideological attractions of a particular world order’ (Germain 2011: 79;
Overbeek 2013: 169).
The transnational hegemony of capital is realized not simply through ter-
ritorial or extra-territorial juridical power but in the immanent disciplinary
logic of corporate social organization as an economic mode of government
that shapes human conduct through the production of optimal economic
behaviour and the production of intangible commodities linked to the ‘grand
scheme of neoliberal social engineering’ (Suarez-Villa 2012; Barkan 2013).
Capitalist sovereignty is neither a global tyranny nor a new imperialism, as
anti-corporate activists maintain, but a global apparatus of capture facilitat-
ing the predatory enclosure and incorporation of human labour-power, terri-
tory and natural resources for the exclusive use of capital, whether the
spatiotemporal context of incorporation is national, regional or global. Central
to this is the disciplinary power of ﬁnancial capital in a posthegemonic global
growth system which is no longer subject to the will of an imperial state
hegemon, but can neither be administered by a world state with multilateral
legitimacy.
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The regulatory form of the global commodity production system
Analysing the implications of transnational neoliberalism for the reconstitu-
tion of world order, Vestergaard asks whether power exercised through global
governance is more diﬀused and dispersed, or whether neoliberalism has
intensiﬁed authority and control, constraining rather than enabling freedom.
His answer is unambiguous: ‘Never have market economies seen intervention
in so manifold ways […] Never before have predominant modes of global
economic governance taken our notion of what a market economy is so far
from a neoliberal ideal of “spontaneous order”’ (Vestergaard 2012: 172). To
illustrate his point, he examines eﬀorts by the IMF to strengthen the ﬁnancial
architecture of the global economy after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98,
an event that routinized ‘positive’ economic surveillance in addition to the
‘negative’ monitoring of states in balance-of-payments crisis already required
by IMF structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). After the crisis economic
surveillance was considered appropriate not only for economies in crisis but
as a routinized method for disciplining and ‘visibilizing’ all economies, ‘in the
best interest of the “proper functioning” of individual economies as well as of
the international ﬁnancial system as such’ (ibid.: 187). The regime of gen-
eralized economic surveillance is no longer concerned to diﬀerentiate (and
isolate) failing from healthy economies; the emphasis, rather, is on the crea-
tion of techniques to ‘render possible the meticulous control of the operations
of the economy, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its organization
and regulation’ (ibid.: 189).
As Ahrne and Brunsson (2006: 80–82) argue, standardization is key to the
production of world order, which in its ‘pure form means the production of
rules without the support of any other organizational element […] The present
degree of global order would not have been achieved without standards’. The
question is, however, for whom is this generalized economic surveillance and
visibilization carried out? For Vestergaard, the initiative has its origins in the
Financial Stability Forum created by the G7 in 1998 to identify standards for
future global economic governance – a body chaired by Hans Tietmeyer,
although other intergovernmental organizations and regulatory bodies were
already involved in agenda setting and norm setting in relation to ﬁscal
policy, banking supervision and market integrity (Vestergaard 2012: 190). In
what follows, we clarify this issue, interrogating the role of ﬁnancial capital in
the intensiﬁcation of global governance through the IMF and G20 – not
simply to enforce economic discipline for the beneﬁt of transnational inves-
tors, but as a totalizing system of controls to standardize, legitimize and
deterritorialize ﬁnancial decision making. Global economic governance is not
an option, but a response to market failure – that is, to the logical impossi-
bility of capitalist self-regulation in a period of intensiﬁed accumulation and
systemic risk and as an alternative to deglobalization and market anarchy.
‘Transnational constitutionalism’ is a means to enforce neoliberal orthodoxy
through intergovernmental institutions, although such eﬀorts may be
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hampered by the tendency of states to resist the pressures and costs of
compliance with constitutionalization (cf. Dierckxsens 2000).
Global economic surveillance was intensiﬁed after the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis, but has assumed more complex forms in the rush to stabilize the inter-
national monetary system since 2008. The logic of intensiﬁed surveillance
after 1998 and 2008 is identical, however: namely, to routinize micro-
management of national economies, both rule complying and deviant. Yet a
distinction must be drawn between these two moments in the evolution of
corporate synarchy: whereas the intensiﬁcation of surveillance initiated by the
G7 in 1998 was aimed at establishing a ‘re-engineered western-centrism’ by
stabilizing Anglo-American ﬁnancial power under the auspices of the IMF
(Willke & Willke 2012: 121; Vestergaard 2012; Stiglitz 2002; Chwieroth 2010),
the geoeconomic logic of global governance after the 2008 crisis – symbolized
by the international response to the ﬁscal instability of the eurozone – sug-
gests that Western economies are also facing increased surveillance and
micromanagement due to persistent structural rigidities, unmanageable debt,
and balance-of-payments problems. This is one reason for the elevation of the
G20 in 2009 to an intergovernmental forum aligned closely with the IMF for
managing global currency imbalances based on the convening power of
systemically important economies.
Within the G20, the concentrated authority of world leaders is separate
from the routine functioning of existing institutions of global governance
(Rothkopf 2009), while the task of managing the international ﬁnancial
system is farmed out to a revitalized IMF, which stands at the apex of a
global ﬁnancial architecture functioning as the ‘last lender of last resort’
(Rickards 2014: 202). Yet for advocates of global governance, the G20 is
unlikely to achieve a stable or enduring form as a ‘global steering committee’
unless or until advanced economies agree to submit to multilateral decision
making (based potentially on majority voting) and governance reform within
the IMF itself, by rebalancing voting rights and endowing the Fund with
greater political capital to increase its eﬀectiveness as a forum for ‘multilateral
solution ﬁnding’ (Lombardi & Woods 2008: 733). Although constrained by
the power of the US Federal Reserve, one of the main achievements of the
G20 in 2009 was the creation of a new SDR facility at the IMF to combat the
global liquidity shortage caused by declining credit and declining asset prices.
After the ﬁnancial crisis, the IMF more than doubled its SDR leveraged
lending capacity to $580 billion ($750 billion by 2014), based on ‘loans’ by
IMF members to the organization, and while such ﬁgures fall far short of the
market capitalization required for a new global reserve currency, the SDR has
emerged as a potential alternative to the dollar as a means to stabilize mar-
kets in the next global crisis – an unaccountable and opaque mechanism
‘permitting global monetary elites to solve sovereign debt problems using an
inﬂationary medium, which in turn allows individual governments to deny
political responsibility’ (Rickards 2014: 207).
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Yet the G20 is unlikely to fulﬁl its mandate as a ‘global steering commit-
tee’, ‘world cabinet’ or ‘informal consultative mechanism’ presiding over a
complex and uneven global economy unless it overcomes the contradiction
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the collective govern-
ance of interdependent public goods – a contradiction that makes the global
ﬁnancial steering of the G20 appear rather as a ‘macrocosm’ of the regional
European Stability Mechanism created by the European Council in 2012 to
safeguard ﬁnancial instability in the eurozone (Wouters & Ramapoulos 2012).
Despite lacking formal democratic legitimacy, a committee of G20 ﬁnance
ministers and bankers forced through agreements in 2009 in response to an
‘overriding need to act’, aided by the G20’s informal structure, which ‘allowed
the necessary ﬂexibility and adaptation for a swift response’ (Subacchi &
Pickford 2011: 5); however, the initial ‘spirit of the G20’ quickly waned,
revealing divergent policy agendas between coalitions of states which replicate
existing divisions at the UN. Yet the main alternatives to multilateralism are
fragmented protectionism and ﬁnancial regionalism (Willke & Willke 2012),
where organizations of geographically contiguous states or free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) manage their own ﬁnancial regulation in competition or coop-
eration with other regional blocs – for example, the complex and overlapping
trade agreements that bind member states of Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
which are set to become still more complex if the TPP is ratiﬁed.
At present, the political organization of global economic governance is still
distinguished by an ‘Anglo-American cultural footprint and by a transatlantic
organizational bias’, and continues to reﬂect the ‘hegemonic project of trans-
atlantic civil society’ (Friedrichs 2004). Intergovernmental organizations like
the IMF and World Bank cannot aﬀord to ignore their most powerful mem-
bers who retain the option of acting unilaterally and/or defecting from mul-
tilateral commitments if they perceive their own relative gains will be harmed,
because powerful states with ‘attractive outside options cannot commit to
abide by disadvantageous rules when their preferences are intense’ (Stone
2011: 1). However, if Western economies continue to guard their ‘leadership
rights’ jealously and intergovernmental institutions remain too closely identi-
ﬁed with Western interests, they will lose their legitimacy among emerging
economies in a posthegemonic global economy which are increasingly less
tolerant of Western leadership and eager to develop counterhegemonic ﬁnancial
institutions to rival Western leadership of the global economy.
To understand the changing dynamics of global governance and ﬁnancial
surveillance, it is essential to examine the organization of corporate interest
representation that drives the institutionalization of capitalist sovereignty
through the standardization, legitimation and deterritorialization of economic
and ﬁnancial decision making. In Chapter 1 it was suggested that while
capitalism has its origins in relations of domination established by European
empires in the early modern period, the political logic of globalization lies not
in imperialism but in the diﬀuse articulation of corporate power through
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geocentric structures of transnational co-governance based on surveillance
and visibilization which escape traditional categories and formulations of
juridical sovereignty in the trend towards synarchy.
The point of synarchy is not that it reproduces transcendent sovereignty,
nor that it destroys its constituent demoi through coercive homogenization
(Chryssochoou 2009), but that it depends on the standardized replication of
legal norms and rules among sub-units: states, regions, zones or other spatial
constellations created by globalization which adapt to and assimilate
mutually reinforcing codes of collective economic existence under the general
axiomatic of capital. For this reason the emergent logic of synarchy is con-
sistent with contemporary economic techniques of governance rather than
traditional models of political domination and control which depend on the
threat or application of force. Although the collectively constituted logic of
synarchy exists alongside the traditional conﬂictual dynamics of geopolitics, this
subjectifying mode of governance acquires profound signiﬁcance in con-
temporary capitalism because the scope of economic surveillance is poten-
tially intrusive and far reaching: in global capitalism, argues Bogard, the logic
of surveillance is smoothing – that is, its essential purpose is to ‘destratify
desire and the subject, to multiply channels of aﬀect and promote the emer-
gence of hybrid subjects, to free information from its connections to sig-
niﬁcation and truth, and to virtualize relations of power, all within the
axiomatic of capital’ (Bogard 2006: 76). In this sense, capitalist sovereignty is
projected and diﬀused in the postsovereign global order through a system of
intergovernmental institutions, pre-eminent among which is the IMF – the
central pillar of the global ﬁnancial system that supervises international pay-
ments and international exchange rates and which has expanded from short-
term stabilization planning to long-term structural adjustment of economies
to meet the needs of global corporate capital.
To ask whose interests the IMF serves, one must begin with its share-
holders: the principal capitalist economies whose voting rights reﬂect their
economic weight in the international monetary system and ascribed status in
the international hierarchy. However, the progenitors of IMF policy are not
sovereign governments but ﬁnancial corporations whose lending practices
create indebtedness, and whose solution to indebtedness is to coerce govern-
ments to promote liquidity and remove legal constraints on the mobility of
transnational capital through capital account liberalization – a policy once
considered an eﬃcient means for channelling investment from capital-abundant
to capital-scarce countries where expected returns are high, but which is now
understood to create destabilizing speculative ‘hot’ capital ﬂows that increase
the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises with few gains for investment or output (cf.
Henry 2003; Stiglitz 2002).
In fact, the role of the organization is more complex than this allows, for in
pushing structural adjustment on recipient states, the goal of the IMF has
consistently been to bridge the contradiction between sovereign ﬁscal and
monetary policy and transnational market rationality. As Peet argues, given
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its origins in a state-centred world system, the IMF has attempted to ‘syn-
thesize aspects of Keynesian regulation with neoliberal demands for dereg-
ulation. Resolution of this contradiction has required governance institutions
to oversee the deregulation of national economies’ (Peet 2009: 117). This
policy, he adds, has ‘involved a shift upwards in the locus of power to the
global institutional level, within geoeconomic power relations that maintained
US control’ (ibid.).
Peet highlights the close proximity of the IMF to corporate interest orga-
nizations that shape global monetary policy, in particular lobbying organiza-
tions representing banks whose primary consideration is the security of their
investments. The IMF serves ﬁnancial corporations by (i) maintaining
liquidity, (ii) providing intelligence on the real condition of debtor economies
through surveillance, and (iii) coordinating international ﬁnancial policy and
stabilizing markets. However, the principal concern of global capital is the
transformation of short-term debt into proﬁtable investment:
Bankers see any regulation that restricts capital ﬂows as an obstacle to
their business. Their ultimate aim is to keep capital ﬂowing as much as
possible. This is why they are not concerned with the immediate repay-
ment of debts as much as with potential repayment in the future. They
welcome any suggestion for an increase in lending as long as there is
some guarantee that part of their loans will be repaid in the future […]
Some analysts see rescheduling as ‘near default’, or ‘default by attrition’ –
that is, default in everything but name. A good investment banker, how-
ever, knows that the transformation of short-term into long-term debt is a
transformation of commercial loans into investment loans, and of a
commercial client into a chronic borrower.
(Peet 2009: 121)
Yet the inﬂuence of the global banking community is subtly qualiﬁed by
Chwieroth (2010), who argues that the bureaucracy of the IMF was itself
already intellectually responsive to neoliberal ideology in its professional
working culture, and oﬃcials were already advocating the abolition of capital
controls before Michel Camdessus (director in the 1990s) campaigned for
policy reorientation. ‘Without ﬁrm directives or formal rules […] the staﬀ
were provided with signiﬁcant autonomy to develop their approach indepen-
dently’. This relative autonomy, he adds, ‘permitted the staﬀ members to rely
on their own judgement and initiative to determine whether liberalization
should be encouraged informally in a given case’ (ibid.: 159).
This reﬂects the extent to which transnational institutions like the IMF or
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) acquire their own functional logic
as norm entrepreneurs, particularly where there is disagreement among principals
within the intergovernmental structures that inﬂuence policy formation – as is
the case with the IMF and G20. Yet the zealous devotion of IMF oﬃcials to
‘capital freedom’ has survived successive crises not only because its members
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espouse neoclassical orthodoxy, but because this technocratic elite operates
among a rareﬁed, self-reinforcing class of chief executives, fund managers,
lawyers and high-net-worth individuals whose normative outlook is preformed
and predetermined by ideological receptivity towards liberalization – even if
(paradoxically) non-state actors like the IMF actually combine Keynesian
macroeconomic management policies with neoliberalism, defending a form of
ﬁnancial economics that assumes a ‘world where entrepreneurs are redundant
and ﬁnancial markets have superior knowledge of customer needs and the
potential of resources – in other words a world of ﬁnancial socialism’ (Ehret
2012: 5). The reasons for this must be traced back to the leverage exercised by
dominant capital over national and transnational regulatory institutions, a
form of private political power that has successfully undermined strong
formal regulation (hard rules rather than soft law) in the global ﬁnancial
system in favour of informal interventions to correct market failure based on
the transfer of burden sharing to public authorities.
The paradoxical role of the IMF as a international ﬁnancial institution and
arm of the global investment community can be understood further if we
examine more closely the ways in which the theory and practice of transna-
tional ﬁnancial governance diverge. To illustrate this point, Buckley (2012)
examines how the IMF consistently acts in contravention of market principles
by rewarding banks and elite investors for market failure. The IMF, he
observes, does this by
selectively applying market principles and disciplines. The market is
allowed to operate unimpeded when it delivers proﬁts to international
banks and the elites in developing countries, and its operation is inter-
fered with, grossly, when market forces impose massive losses on the
banks and/or the developing country elites.
(Buckley 2012: 43)
This is exempliﬁed by the IMF’s demand in 1998 that Indonesia take on the
ﬁnancial obligations of its banking sector to foreign lenders, which led to the
widespread impoverishment of the Indonesian population, who were forced to
assume the burden of placating foreign lenders by reﬁnancing the nation’s
banking sector – a phenomenon repeated in the advanced economies after the
global ﬁnancial crisis. The IMF applies market discipline rigidly, yet simulta-
neously fails to support eﬃcient allocation when it matters: there is no para-
dox here, however, for the IMF is ‘consistent not in its commitment to the
allocative eﬃciency of markets, but in its commitment to furthering the
interests of the international commercial banks’. The result is that the Fund
‘turns its back on market principles and engineers massive interventions in the
market, and at other times when it suits the international commercial banks
and elites in debtor countries the IMF applies market principles with extreme
rigour’ (Buckley 2012: 47). This raises questions about the universalisability
of global governance processes, including legal certainty and moral hazard
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prevention which are essential for the creation of a stable environment for
‘eﬃcient’ ﬁnancial markets. Yet as Kaufmann and Weber (2012) note, if these
issues are critically examined in the light of recent developments, it becomes
clear that legal certainty and moral hazard are essentially irrelevant where the
objects of surveillance are systemically relevant institutions that are not
allowed to fail. In this respect it is increasingly clear that the political econ-
omy of world order is only partially deﬁned by market forces: within this
international economic system dominant ﬁnancial capital thrives because the
national and transnational institutions that regulate trade and investment
(and facilitate the creation of maximum shareholder value by negating
competing criteria of economic rationality) are managed by oﬃcials acting for
corporate power interests. The global economy is ‘skewed to the interests of
global corporations, it is oligopolistic, competition is often constrained and
the market regulations are aimed at controlling national governments as
much as at regulating MNCs [multinational corporations]’ (Wilks 2013: 150).
For Wilks, the sovereignty of the market is organized around two operative
principles that exert the same level of force as limited liability – the basic princi-
ple of corporate power. The ﬁrst is national treatment, which prohibits pre-
ferential treatment by governments of domestic producers but does not rule
out more favourable terms of trade with foreign multinationals. The second is
most favoured nation status (MFN), which requires states to negotiate terms
of trade with all trading partners equivalent to those of their closest partners, and
which also ensures foreign multinationals are treated equally, regardless of
their nation of origin (Wilks 2013: 151). These principles, argues Wilks, ‘have
becomes part of the DNA of international agencies and networks which reg-
ulate the global economy – the IMF, WTO, World Bank, the BIS, G7/8 (or
now G20) and the OECD’ (ibid.).
Yet despite the power of this global regulatory framework, it is limited by
an absence of constitutional rules for regulating investment and competition
because Western powers have acted to prevent their formulation and codiﬁ-
cation, preferring to rely instead on ‘soft law’ to police corporate governance.
Here it is important to note how dimensions of global decision making escape
the typical ‘global-national’ binary of political sociology as state structures
‘expand and ﬂow along with the globalization of other social institutions and
social relationships’, as a consequence of which ‘some aspects of the state
have been thoroughly transnationalized, while for others the transnational
linkages are underdeveloped’ (Major 2013: 33–4).
The Financial Stability Board created at the G20 London summit in April
2009 is a global regulatory authority tasked with coordinating the work of
national ﬁnancial authorities and norm-setting regimes, which brings together
oﬃcials responsible for ﬁnancial stability, ﬁnancial institutions, sector-speciﬁc
international regulatory bodies and central bankers in a new international
regulatory regime to stabilize the global monetary system and intensify eco-
nomic surveillance (Cleaver 2013: 196). Yet the new international ﬁnancial
architecture not only insulates monetary authorities from popular-democratic
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forces, but strengthens ties between private economic actors and public
ﬁnancial institutions, dissolving the distinction between private economic
power and public authority. This can be seen in the politics of austerity as a
policy response to the sovereign debt crisis in the West, which has resulted in
new combinations of private and public power like the European Stability
Mechanism which aggregates funds from private banks that are guaranteed
by central banks: ‘This relationship between private and public ﬁnance’,
Major argues, is increasingly ‘hand-in-glove […] precisely the opposite out-
come that Keynes had in mind when he envisioned the role that national
monetary authorities would play in regulating and stabilizing the interna-
tional monetary order’ (Major 2013: 43). Global monetary authority, he
concludes, has become the ‘gateway through which national governments
seeking ﬁnancial assistance must pass’. Largely invisible to the public, how-
ever, it is this ‘ﬁnancial dependency on a transnationalized monetary author-
ity that ﬁlls a critical part of the story of the resiliency of austerity that so
often gets missed by a sociology of globalization deﬁned by a national-global
dualism’ (ibid.).
Kirton suggests that the de facto legitimation of the G20 as a synarchic
model of global governance reﬂects the underlying instability of a global
economy characterized by uneven development, a system increasingly vul-
nerable to existential threats which – as he puts it – can ‘arise anywhere and
ﬂow fast and freely to exert their unintended and uncontrolled destruction on
even the most powerful states’ (Kirton 2013: 381). For neoliberal institution-
alists, the lesson of the global ﬁnancial crisis and the crisis of US hegemony is
the inevitable ‘messiness’ of attempts to achieve multilateralism – a problem
identiﬁed by none other than the head of the Council on Foreign Relations,
Richard Haass, which promotes international collaboration under US
leadership (Alexandroﬀ 2010).
For some, G20 summits lack the power to constitute a global political
authority (Bremmer 2012); for others, the ‘Gx’ process does indeed have the
potential to become more inﬂuential and central to the governance of the
world system – to become, in eﬀect, the ‘inner cabinet of the global polity,
compactly including all globally oriented countries, embracing the full public
policy agenda, engaging the multilateral international bureaucracies, and
most departments of national governments’ (Kirton, cited in Alexandroﬀ
2010: 3). On the other hand, as Alexandroﬀ observes, such idealism runs up
against the pragmatism of states which still see international summitry as a
vehicle for driving those dimensions of supranational co-governance that
advance their own sovereign political interests – particularly in relation to
exchange rates – or which use the Leaders’ Summit to isolate states that resist
Western geopolitical interests – a tendency on display in Brisbane in Novem-
ber 2014. Yet, while governments cope with the geopolitical contradiction
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, and the democracy
deﬁcit of compliance with unelected transnational institutions, the real ques-
tion for developed and emerging economies is not institutional legitimacy, but
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how sovereign states can operate in and through international regimes to
negotiate optimal terms with ﬁnancial capital over the regulation of global
markets to support the market share and market capitalization of transna-
tional corporate networks which constitute a dominant component of their
own economic power and geopolitical inﬂuence.
Conclusion
The intensiﬁcation of transnational governance in the last two decades tes-
tiﬁes to the equalizing vulnerability created by neoliberalism as a transna-
tionally constituted global social order in which states must continually
anticipate existential threats (‘spill-overs’) and show systemic relevance or
face oblivion. It also suggests that global economic and ﬁnancial integration
tends to proceed ahead of supporting political governance (Berglof 2012), and
that crisis management and institutional innovation are likely to remain
features of globalization in periods of turbulence. Adaptation to the new
international ﬁnancial architecture is complicated for Western states by the
increasing power of non-Western states in an integrated global economy where
emerging market economies are demanding more inﬂuence in transnational
decision making, and where new IFIs like China’s Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) are emerging as rivals to the western-led institutions
created at Bretton Woods in 1944 (Kirk 2015).
From an institutionalist perspective, ﬁnancially weakened governments in
the West must negotiate a delicate balance between national and transna-
tional priorities: in recognition of the increasing importance of emerging
economies, the established hierarchy of Western capitalist states must either
yield greater inﬂuence within organizations like the G20 and IMF to China,
India, Brazil and other middle-level economies where FDI is now con-
centrated (and thus accept revisionist demands for an adjustment to their
modus operandi and strategic direction in return for larger ﬁnancial contribu-
tions), or pursue more aggressive forms of statecraft to weaken their ﬁnancial
stability, intensify competition for control over resources, and attempt (overtly
or covertly) to control the rate at which rising economies can grow.
From a critical perspective, however, this dilemma reﬂects the contradiction
between the imperialism and the posthegemonic dynamics of global capital-
ism, where the capacity of sovereign states to activate power resources and
obtain desired eﬀects is greatly determined by their relative position within
corporate networks and ﬂuctuations in international ﬂows of capital. On this
view, globalization has not only stimulated demands for global monetary
coordination and economic surveillance through the state form of transna-
tional capital, but has also, by stimulating growth in emerging market
economies, exposed the essential anachronism of imperial state hegemony as
a model of asymmetric domination bequeathed by the decline of the European
nation-state system. The ﬁnancial leadership role of Western powers in the
primary institutions of global economic governance is still tolerated by non-
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Western powers in return for recognition of their own increasing systemic
relevance, but the horizon for global corporate policymaking is shifting
beyond the declining economies of the West that triggered the global ﬁnancial
crisis, towards multiple growth poles centred on manufacturing centres fore-
cast to play a pivotal role in global recovery and transnational corporate
strategy in the twenty-ﬁrst century. It seems clear that both rising economic
powers like China and India, and reviving powers like Russia will adapt to
Western norms of governance in the short term, but will eventually seek to
revise the existing structure of global governance to support their own
geopolitical aspirations and regional ﬁnancial interests. The role of the G20
was intensiﬁed to broaden the legitimacy of global governance in the wake of
the ﬁnancial crisis, but it cannot conceal the disparity of interests between
status quo powers that remain invested in a US-centric order and revisionist
powers that are already preparing for a multi-currency reserve system in a
posthegemonic international system.
Notes
1 See Langmore and Fitzgerald (2012), who discuss the similar idea of a ‘Tobin tax’
as a means for funding the transnational institutions required for strengthening
global economic governance.
2 Discussing the need for reform, General Counsel and Director of the Legal
Department of the IMF Sean Hagan observed that there is increasing concern that
the ‘failure by the Fund to take meaningful action to address perceived inequities
and ineﬃciencies in the decision-making process could undermine its legitimacy
and eﬀectiveness’ (Hagan 2010: 50). The global ﬁnancial crisis created momentum
for a change in voting rights, with emerging market executive directors calling for
GDP statistics to be measured not in absolute dollar terms but in accordance with
purchasing price parity, reﬂecting economic reality more closely by providing the
‘best – and most dynamic – way of measuring the relative volume of goods and
services produced by economies’ (ibid.).
3 It is important to distinguish between the normative legitimacy of international
institutions and their de facto acceptance as appropriate and ‘worthy of being
obeyed’ (Keohane 2002: 57). In practice these two dimensions overlap, because an
institution’s multilateral legitimacy is dependent on whether it is both eﬀective and
inclusive. In an ideal world, international institutions would be both eﬀective
and inclusive, but in the real world great power politics intrudes and imposes limits
on multilateralism.
4 See Dugin (2012) who, from a reactionary conservative perspective, argues that
neoliberalism threatens to ‘drown the world in a universal sameness’. Like Krebs,
Dugin oﬀers a purely cultural critique of neoliberalism devoid of theoretical analy-
sis of the links between ideology and the economic relations of ‘post-political’
society.
5 The value of the Greek economy fell from US$341 billion in 2009 to $242 billion in
2014 – a decline of 44 per cent (data from www.tradingeconomics.com).
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5 The crisis of Western economic power
Introduction
In this chapter we examine the crisis of Western economic leadership within
the structural development of global capitalism. It was suggested in Chapter 3
that the crisis of Western ﬁnancial capitalism indicates not the end of capit-
alism as an historically speciﬁc mode of power that accelerates yet (periodi-
cally) destroys human productivity, but its reorganization and reconstitution
in a totalizing form through the state form of transnational capital – that is,
through an intensiﬁcation of global economic integration in which ﬁnance
plays an increasing role in the generation of value. In this respect, at least,
expectations of radical change in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis have
been disappointed – not just by the relative ease with which central banks
have restabilized economies through unprecedented injections of liquidity
(reﬂating asset bubbles in the equity markets while transferring private cor-
porate debt to the public), but by the failure of Western voters to question the
hegemonic discourse of ﬁscal consolidation (austerity) propagated by corpo-
rate media. On the one hand there is wilful delusion among a naïve Western
public that current equity values are sustainable – as Chang (2014) argues,
these record asset values do not reﬂect economic fundamentals and are only
being sustained by the abnormally high levels of liquidity created by quanti-
tative easing, which can only be withdrawn at the risk of accelerating deﬂa-
tion. On the other hand, there is self-delusion on the left about returning to
‘stable’ capitalism, indicating a lack of insight into the fundamental contra-
dictions of commodity capitalism that presuppose cycles of accumulation and
deleveraging as proﬁt rates rise or decline, and as structural ineﬃciencies in
neoliberal corporate capitalism intensify. On the moderate left, argues Hein-
rich, ‘there still exists the belief that, with the “correct” economic policies, full
employment can be conjured up; “unchained” capitalism must simply be
properly regulated again’ (Heinrich 2007: 1). On the radical left, however,
there is a widespread and unjustiﬁed belief that we are heading for a ‘ﬁnal
crisis’ – ‘as if it were ever the purpose of capitalism to spread full employment
and welfare among the people. Crisis and unemployment are in no way a sign
of capitalist decline; they are capitalist normality’ (ibid., emphasis added).
This is not to suggest the crisis changed nothing – as will become clear, it
indicated the potential limits of accumulating value though ﬁnancial innovation
and technology and the dangers of technology for capitalist social relations –
only that its political impact has been contained through a condensation of
market ideology and authoritarian-populist narratives of identity-driven
consumerism which resolve the performative contradiction between subjects
as individual consumers and collective producers of nationhood, and which
function as ‘ﬂanking devices’ to marginalize counter-hegemonic anti-capitalist,
anti-racist and anti-militarist movements on the left (cf. Woodley 2013).
While serious political unrest has occurred in Southern Europe and MENA
since 2011, indicating opposition to neoliberal policies and the fragility of
pro-Western client elites (Fouskas & Dimoulas 2013; Hanieh 2013), the crisis
has not produced a decisive turning point (in the sense of ‘crisis’ [κρίνειν]
as a critical moment of bifurcation), and predictions of revolutionary change
have been premature. This has left many on the Left with few other options
than to warn of more serious crises to come, as neoliberals rehearse platitudes
about a return to growth and the need to ‘humanize’ capitalist ﬁnance (Shiller
2012).1
The eclipse of the West is a logical correlate to the resurgence of Asia and
the rise of new regional economies that seek to achieve economic growth and
geopolitical security through insertion into the global capitalist system. Yet
the decline of Western economic hegemony must also be understood in the
context of the structural crisis of accumulation haunting capitalism which
critical political economists link not only to overcapacity and declining
demand but to the inner contradiction of the commodity form which has
become more acute with the accelerated development of the money form of
capital (Lohoﬀ & Trenkle 2013). The structural crisis of valorization in Wes-
tern economies is linked to two key developments in the global economy:
ﬁnancialization and the rise of China as the world’s leading exporter whose
present expansion remains dependent on Western consumption but whose
integration into the capitalist system has internalized within its own domestic
economy the overaccumulation crisis haunting the West. However, while
China’s growth is slowing (Rabinovitch 2014; Roach 2015), and while China
faces major political challenges, if the rebalancing of China’s economy
towards a labour-intensive service sector is successful these are unlikely to
delay a shift in the centre of gravity of global capitalism from the West to
Asia, negating the violent legacy of Western ﬁnancial capital in the imperial
epoch (Hung 2008). To grasp the structural violence of ﬁnancial capital it is
necessary to reconstruct the historic linkages between Western corporate and
security elites in defence of European colonial power, a system of ﬁnancial
and military coercion that sustained Western hegemony up to the 1980s, but
which is increasingly challenged by the rise of regional power formations.
These linkages incorporated state and non-state actors in a transnational
network of ﬁnancial and military power based on the Anglosphere, supported
by local comprador elites in peripheral regions who derive(d) their authority
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and position from proximity to transnational corporations and ﬁnancial
institutions operating within OECD states.
However, an adequate account of capitalist sovereignty must explain not
simply the transnationalization of capitalist ﬁnance as a causal variable (and
its impact on regional markets and local communities), but the inner ten-
dency of capital to develop new social forms while regenerating the identical
commodity relations of power rooted in the value form. As self-valorizing
value, which produces commodities solely for the sake of production, capital
at once creates the conditions for sociopolitical change, yet neutralizes this
modernizing impulse by facilitating and intensifying patterns of uneven global
development and extreme inequality – a contradictory process that stimulates
demands for a synarchic coordination of markets and securitization of
investment from corporate actors operating in a global political economy.
Yet, however self-correcting this system, the instability of ﬁnancial capitalism
cannot be overcome indeﬁnitely because crisis is a permanent possibility of
ﬁnancial markets in which money is a commodity (Amato & Fantacci 2012).
In other words, crisis is a perpetual feature of ﬁnancialized capitalism which
‘resets’ the environment for proﬁtable investment.
Marx’s theory of money is a commodity theory of money, where a speciﬁc
commodity simultaneously plays the role of a universal medium of exchange
and store of value because it is itself the product of socially necessary labour.
The social function of capitalist money is thus to act as a commodity, the
price of which is determined by ﬁnancial markets, which in turn determine
the value of all other commodities, equities and debt-based securities in
response to price ﬂuctuations. Finance capital posits no substantive or logical
end: its sole goal is to perpetuate itself, delaying ad inﬁnitum the ﬁnal pay-
ment or closure of debt as a relation of power. The perpetuation of debt is its
purpose, and ﬁnance consistently suppresses the possibility of its own closure
by creating new conditions for the further expansion of debt and the produc-
tion of subjects (individuals, ﬁrms, cities, states, etc.), to perform relations of
dependence integral to the reproduction of indebtedness, a tendency revealed
not only in the growth of private debt among ‘libidinally exhausted’ consumers,
but in the catastrophic First World debt crisis (Stiegler 2010; cf. Pettifor 2006;
cf. Lazzarato 2012; Stockhammer 2011).
The political origins of Western economic power lie in the expansion of
the debt relation and the coercive appropriation of strategic resources for the
reproduction of industrial society in the global North – typically at the
expense of industrialization in the global South (Mishra 2013). Western Europe’s
ﬁnancial and military power arose in part due to a comparative advantage in
violence dating back to the revolution in military aﬀairs between 1500 and
1800, reﬂecting important innovations in military production and organization
(Morris 2013; Hoﬀman 2011).2
A critical factor in explaining the expansion of ﬁnancial capitalism is not
just the destructive power of Western military forces or the violence employed
in extractive industries in colonial economies, however, but the stimulation
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eﬀect of permanent war preparedness in the early twentieth century which not
only accelerated the West’s comparative advantage in violence but led to a
revolution in the organization of public ﬁnance and the peacetime adaptation
of new forms of deﬁcit spending and monetary expansion to counter the
deﬂationary tendencies of capitalist cycles. The transformation of public
ﬁnance was achieved principally through inﬂation, taxation and public bor-
rowing (Strachan 2004), but war itself also aﬀorded an opportunity to reset
economies by destroying overcapacity, creating new opportunities for credit,
investment and reconstruction. This is exempliﬁed by the second outbreak of
total war during the ﬁnal years of the Great Depression between capitalist
states whose aggregate destructive force was enhanced by the mass of idle
labour-power that could be translated into unproductive military expenditure.
As one historian notes, the Second World War led to ‘systematic destruction
not merely of armies on the battleﬁeld, but of the industrial capacity of the
belligerents and the civilian populations who could place that capacity in
motion’ (Eaves 2011: 4).
In the extreme case of global deﬂationary recession, capital facilitates a
return to proﬁtability not through higher productivity or innovation as stimuli
for ‘recovery’ – a mythic idea which brackets out the sabotage of communities
as a precondition for returning to proﬁtability – but through the destruction
of collective wealth in regimes of ‘anti-production’ and war. Recalling Har-
vey’s (1982: 442) comment that war is the ultimate form of devaluation,
Papageorgiou (2013: 39) argues that ﬁnancial crises and the wars that follow
‘perform the function of the negative, purging the mode of production of its
momentary excesses and priming a renewed technological base for the return
of accumulation’.
In the third and fourth sections of the chapter we examine the approaching
decline of Western economic power and the causes of ﬁscal and monetary
instability in the West in the light of research on the present crisis. Our aim is
not to recount the events leading up to the collapse of the US subprime mort-
gage market in 2007 – the subject of an already voluminous literature (Foster
& Magdoﬀ 2009; Ciro 2012; Friedman & Kraus 2011; Hendrickson 2013;
King 2011; Macdonald 2012; Kawamura 2013), but to oﬀer a theoretical
account of overaccumulation in a globalizing economy.
As Brenner (2009) argues, the term ‘ﬁnancial crisis’ is misleading because it
distracts attention from the underlying weakness of capitalist economies since
the 1970s, notably the declining rate of return on capital investment and the
failure of the rate of proﬁt to recover, which in turn reﬂect a tendency towards
overcapacity in global manufacturing that encouraged ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial corporations to seek alternative lucrative sources of return through
ﬁnancialization. This has led to a massive accumulation of leveraged capital
in the form of volatile investment funds (‘hot money’) in search of high-yield
outlets, but while the trigger for the global slump was the collapse of the US
housing bubble which sucked in global investment creating huge quantities of
toxic debt in the US (Kawamura 2013), the events of 2008 reﬂect a deeper
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structural crisis of valorization linked to the value form-determined character
of capital. The outcome of the crisis was predictable: unemployment, capital
ﬂight and bankruptcy led to a ‘controlled demolition’ of local economies as
systemically relevant ﬁnancial institutions acting through the national and
transnational state oﬀered ad hoc solutions to restabilize the ﬁnancial system,
stripping equity from markets, draining national treasuries and, in some
cases, ‘bailing-in’ savings from small depositors and businesses in bankrupt
jurisdictions (for example, Cyprus in 2012) to compensate global investors
who exploit collapse as an opportunity to ‘wipe out competitors, consolidate
and centralize bank power and exert an overriding control over the real
economy, the institutions of government and the military’ (Chossudovsky
2013: 2; cf. Brown 2013). The political economy of debt prioritizes ﬁnancial
gain over productivity, yet however destructive for society, debt deleveraging
is seen as ‘cathartic’ because the restructuring that follows enables ‘policies to
be adopted which clear the decks, removing subsidies and protection, and
freeing up capital from ﬁxed positions. It allows capital to regain mobility,
dissolving the spatial and institutional rigidities in which it had become
encased’ (Gamble 2006: 26).
The actions of corporate ﬁnancial elites whose venality triggered the global
crisis become comprehensible if we recognize that to remain commercially
viable banks must integrate increasing sections of the population into the
credit/debt nexus of ﬁnance – a phenomenon clearly evidenced by the unpre-
cedented growth of subprime lending in the US mortgage industry prior to
2007 (Ivry 2014). Their actions may appear morally reprehensible but must be
contextualized by examining the crisis outside the standard framework of
methodological individualism favoured by economists to understand the
dynamics of accumulation and recession. As we saw in Chapter 3, modern
capitalism is a class formation in which private corporate entities govern the
individuals and activities within their jurisdiction; however, it is also one in
which the power of ﬁnancial capital may nevertheless be approaching its own
asymptotic limits. That is to say, although the capitalist logic of value as
equivalence and substitutability underlies the basic functioning of the econ-
omy, diminishing market returns as cyclical patterns may be reaching their
upper limits, leading to a potential challenge to capitalist ﬁnance (Nitzan &
Bichler 2012; cf. Wallerstein 2006b). Far from retreating into irrelevance, the
state form of capital has re-emerged as a precondition for managing systemic
risk in advanced economies, leading to the monetization of debt (controlled
devaluation) and new forms of ﬁnancial statecraft to undermine rival stores
of value (precious metals, commodities) and weaken emerging economies. A
hybrid form of economic fascism is emerging – a ‘socialism for the investor
class’ – which will endure if three conditions for the consolidation of trans-
national corporate power are met, namely: the monetization of debt through
expansionary monetary policy; the growth of open-ended geopolitical conﬂict
to neutralize domestic political tensions and drive extractive accumulation in
peripheral regions; and investment in the apparatus of state repression and
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surveillance to manage resistance to the corporate appropriation of national
incomes.
The logic of Western military and ﬁnancial power
The economic power of the West has its origins in the system of ﬁnancial
accumulation and military violence forged by European powers in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. European economic development was
based on the ‘exclusion of the vast majority of the world’s population from
access to the natural and human resources needed to beneﬁt rather than bear
the costs of global industrialization’ (Arrighi 2007: 386). It took place under
British hegemony, a unique phenomenon in the history of international
political-economic organization. Unlike preceding empires,
Britain modelled its post-Waterloo empire on an extremely sophisticated
marriage between top bankers and ﬁnanciers of the City of London,
government cabinet ministers, heads of key industrial companies deemed
strategic to the national interest, and the heads of the espionage services
[…] Because all this was secret, it wielded immense power over credulous
and unsuspecting foreign economies. In the Free Trade era after 1846,
this covert marriage of private commercial power with government was
the secret of British hegemony.
(Engdahl 2004: 8; cf. Van der Pijl 2001; Davis & Huttenback 1986)
Although Britain’s formal empire was destroyed by the impact of the First
World War – an epochal event that brought the long nineteenth century to a
close and prepared the way for war between Germany, the US and the Soviet
Union for global supremacy – the informal system of international ﬁnance
created under British hegemony endured through a de facto alliance between
London and Washington based on tacit agreement to project Anglo-American
ﬁnancial inﬂuence in the colonial periphery and Anglo-American control over
the new oil-producing regions of the Persian Gulf. The principal goal of
British strategy was to rebuﬀ attempts by contender states to challenge its
unique role, and to retard German economic growth. Before 1914, this was
achieved by undermining Germany’s energy security and access to the
untapped oil wealth of the collapsing Ottoman Empire; after 1918, it was
achieved by undermining the ﬁnancial stability of the Weimar Republic whose
viability as a postimperial state was threatened by unpayable debt. While
collaboration between the US and UK ensured the leadership of the Anglo-
sphere in interwar international politics, however, it concealed not only rivalry
between ﬁnancial elites in New York and London for control over capital ﬂows
and energy, but the dependence of the UK on American banks whose loans to
England and France in the First World War were decisive for Allied victory.
The modern form of capitalist public ﬁnance has its origins in the First
World War, which saw the expansion of the state form of capital to manage
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the contradictory logic of accumulation in corporate capitalism, the replace-
ment of individuals by public authorities as primary holders of debt, and the
costs of ﬁnancing a war that endured much longer than expected through
expansionary monetary policy. As Clarke (1992) observes, the expansion of
the state form of capital reﬂects a constant tendency to develop the produc-
tive forces, which in turn reﬂects the tendency for capital to develop the world
market and expand capitalist relations. However, he adds, this tendency to
advance productive forces ‘without regard to the limit of the market also
underlies the tendency to the global overaccumulation and uneven develop-
ment of capital, as the development of social production confronts the limits
of its capitalist form as production for proﬁt’ (ibid.: 135). This creates pro-
blems for the management of capitalist ﬁnance, highlighting not only the class
nature of the capitalist state but the speciﬁcity of its ﬁnancial circuit. The
relation of the capitalist state to the contradictory logic of overaccumulation,
argues Clarke, is mediated by the form of the state:
[While] the subordination of the state to money deﬁnes the economic
form through which an overaccumulation crisis appears to the state, and
sets limits to the powers of the state in response to such a crisis, it does
not determine the speciﬁc political form of the state, through which the
contradictory tendencies of accumulation are mediated politically, nor the
speciﬁc responses of the state in the face of a crisis. The political form of
the state is determined by the class struggle, and most particularly by the
struggles of the working class which arise as the working class confronts
the subordination of social production to capital as a barrier to its own
physical and social reproduction.
(Clarke 1992: 136)
On the other hand, the political management of capitalist state ﬁnance
reﬂects the speciﬁcity of the ﬁnancial circuit of the state, for as Davis notes,
‘the ability of the state to ﬁnance the military, for the expansion of markets
abroad and for the discipline of labour at home, must be developed […]
capitalist competition and success at imperialist wars has often been determined
by relative ﬁscal capacity’ (Davis 2010a: 413).
The institutionalization of the warfare-welfare state was a subject of inten-
sive research in Marxist political economy after 1945 (Baran 1957; Baran &
Sweezy 1966), and need not be discussed here. What must be addressed is the
functional logic of the ﬁnancial circuit of state in the reproduction schema of
the advanced economies in which commodiﬁed ﬁnancial power supported by
state power transcends traditional commodity production in the generation of
value. For Davis, the ﬁnancial circuit of the state is a key component in the
total reproduction of capital in the advanced economies, although this circuit
diﬀers from the general capitalist circuit of capital because there is no abso-
lute expansion of value, because commodities bought by the state are
acquired to stabilize and expand the capitalist circuit, and because sovereign
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tax revenues must be adequate to meet the demands of debt servicing –
although bond auctions enable the state to evade requirements for long-term
ﬁscal stability, utilizing debt instruments to stimulate the economy through
the multiplier eﬀect (Davis 2010a: 414–5).
Under normal conditions, this is sustainable because state debt based on
governmental taxing authority is a secure asset that sustains macroeconomic
stability. In eﬀect, argues Davis, the ‘market system can improve in pro-
ductivity as a consequence of the expansion of the scale of ﬁnancial circuits,
which is a common interest of both the state and private ﬁrms’ (Davis 2010a:
419). Expanding public debt has thus become a core indispensable feature of
capitalist ﬁnance highlighting the role of war and war-preparedness as objec-
tives of state policy – less for territorial acquisition than to support the free
movement of capital. Under neoliberalism, however, it is not just debt that
increases but, paradoxically, the functional centrality of the state form of
capital to the reproduction of surplus-value. As Stockhammer notes, this
point was noted by Foucault, who observed how neoliberalism departs from
classical liberalism because it ‘does not aim to liberate markets but rather to
create markets, and subordinate government activity under this goal. Markets
do not create themselves, if left to their own, but have to be constructed and
maintained’ (Stockhammer 2011: 241). On the contrary, neoliberalism
requires ‘permanent and profound state intervention’ (ibid.).
The increasing importance of the ﬁnancial circuit of the capitalist state
becomes clear if we examine the legacy of imperial ﬁnance in the First World
War. Although imperial Britain and France were intolerant of debt – British
debts had mushroomed after the Boer War, eﬀectively bankrupting the country,
while France was still haunted by the use of irregular forms of ﬁnance during
the War of the Spanish Succession which undermined its national treasury
(Rowlands 2012) – the exigencies of ‘total warfare’ introduced during the ﬁrst
major international conﬂict of the industrial age indicate that ‘dire ﬁnancial
straits’ are not a suﬃcient reason for states to limit their geopolitical ambi-
tions or back away from conﬂict in defence of strategic interests (Strachan 2004).
In addition, the ﬁnancial history of the First World War shows how the
lucrative gains obtained from ﬁnancing the Allied war eﬀort allowed Amer-
ican banks to extend their international inﬂuence and capitalize on the mas-
sive increase in sovereign debt accrued on both sides of the Atlantic after four
years of ﬁghting, leading to a net transfer of funds from Europe to the US
which irreversibly altered the balance of transatlantic relations in America’s
favour. Conﬁdent of winning the peace, British hopes of debt forgiveness were
dashed at Versailles as it became clear the private liabilities of J.P. Morgan
had been transferred to the US Treasury in the war, increasing the functional
interdependence of US corporate-state elites. As US debt expanded to
unprecedented levels, ‘the distinction between Morgan’s interests and that of
the government became blurred. The US government increasingly made itself
[…] a useful instrument for the extension of the new power of New York’s
international bankers’ (Engdahl 2004: 55).
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Hudson (2003) notes that US insistence on repayment of war loans was
unprecedented in the history of inter-Allied warfare, and a by-product of this
was US refusal to accept exports as a substitute, leading to a huge transfer of
gold from Europe to America as payment. This policy ultimately proved dis-
astrous for the interwar economy as the use of repayment schedules and
dollar devaluation as weapons undermined hopes for trade normalization and
destroyed European hopes for recovery. Roosevelt’s belligerence at the 1933
London Conference led to debt repudiation from the Allies which temporarily
resolved the intergovernmental debt crisis yet inaugurated a dangerous period
of protectionism and imperial regionalism:
It would be false to say that the United States provoked World War II out
of malice or out of knowledge of the results of insisting on repayment of
its war debts by a world utterly unable to repay them. It is true, however,
that no act contributed more to the genesis of World War II than the
intolerable burdens the US imposed on its allies of World War I and,
through them, on Germany. Every US administration from 1917 through
the Roosevelt era employed the strategy of compelling repayment of these
war debts, above all by Britain. The eﬀect was to splinter Europe so that
the continent was laid open politically as a possible province of the
United States.
(Hudson 2003: 113)
The US was also a victim of its own beggar-thy-neighbour policies in the
1930s, unable to recover from the Depression without resorting to military
production. The US ‘came to recognize that it needed export markets to
maintain full employment and prosperity, and that bleeding Europe dry by
over-indebting it was counter-productive’ (Hudson 2003: 113).
If the First World War established a nexus of interests between ﬁnancial
and military elites in the principal belligerent nations – highlighting the cen-
trality of ﬁnance for capitalist power, war-making capacity and domestic
security, the Second World War accelerated the uniﬁcation of corporate-state
power through the institutionalization of the ‘warfare-welfare’ state. The
ﬁnancial and military power of Western economies was further consolidated
by the creation of new relations of debt and dependency between Western-led
international ﬁnancial institutions and postcolonial states, through the isola-
tion of the Soviet Union and the assault on communism in Asia, through the
violent suppression of workers’ movements in semi-peripheral economies
(Argentina, Turkey, Greece), and through patronage of client regimes in the
global South encouraged to dismantle import-substitution models in favour of
export-led growth and infrastructural development ﬁnanced by World Bank
loans (Gunder Frank 1978; Peet 2009; Perkins 2006). Hudson stresses in
particular the relevance of Robert McNamara’s appointment as president of
the World Bank in 1968, reﬂecting pressure from the US for the Bank to
redirect lending operations for the beneﬁt of Western ﬁnancial institutions
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that see long-term sovereign debt as business investment. The appointment of
McNamara, he argues, ‘may be viewed as an extension of his authority as
strategist of Pax Americana from national to global scope. Having enlarged
the Pentagon’s role in American society to one of dominance, he was […] able
to lay down explicit social policy conditions to be adopted by applicants for
World Bank loans’ (Hudson 2003: 197).
Just as Western aid was used to inﬂuence the security agenda of client
regimes co-opted into the hegemonic discourse of anti-communism, so the
resources of the World Bank were now to be mobilized as a ‘vehicle for
militant US policy abroad’, linked to Malthusian demands for population
control and controls on ﬁscal policy (Hudson 2003: 199–201). The focus of
lending was export industries as a means to increase foreign exchange reserves
and stimulate imports of high-value consumer goods, but this falsely interpreted
developing economies as ﬁrms ‘whose cash returns on the use of borrowed
funds could be depended to be in excess of the stipulated outﬂows for debt
retirement and interest charges’ (ibid.: 207). This led not to increased output
of consumer goods for domestic use but to rising imports of ﬁnished goods,
the cost of which reduced the ability of indebted states to honour ﬁnancial
obligations. Although this forced developing states into more debt, it was
consistent with America’s Cold War strategy, namely to preserve the geoeco-
nomic relations of power founded at Bretton Woods. Global lending became
conditional on structural adjustment: the World Bank had caught up with the
‘critique of state interventionism and renewal of neoclassicism that had
occurred in “professional economics” in the 1970s’ (Peet 2009: 142).
Demands for structural adjustment indicated a ‘process of change in the
international ﬁnancial system […] using capital accumulating in surplus
countries, as in the oil-exporting members of OPEC [Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries], to sectorally transform borrowing countries
toward export orientation’ (ibid.).
Hudson’s critique of superimperialism is insightful yet lacks the explana-
tory force of critical IPE which redeﬁnes neocolonial relations of power in the
capitalist periphery through dependency theory, following the critique of
comparative advantage theory advanced by Prebisch (1950). Dependency is
grounded in the weak political sovereignty given to the Third World after
1945 onwards, which Anghie describes as fractured and vulnerable, reﬂecting
the Eurocentric logic of international law whose origins lie in the distinction
between the ‘universal’ liberal civilizing force of European culture and the
‘contingent’ reality of non-European cultures. This distinction states that
Europeans are sovereign while non-Europeans are not, suggesting that the
history of the non-European world can only be explained in one way: ‘it is a
history of the incorporation of the peoples of Africa, Asia, the Americas and
the Paciﬁc into an international law which is explicitly European, and yet,
universal’ (Anghie 2004: 6).
From a world systems viewpoint, Frank examined the economic causes of
dependency, observing that growth in the North can and does lead to growth
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in the South, but more often creates distortion. This paradox was not antici-
pated by neoclassical economics, he argues, which assumes that growth is
universally beneﬁcial (even if the beneﬁts are not apportioned equally).
Capitalism, argues Frank (1975, 1978), creates a global division of labour that
sustains underdevelopment, where dependent states export minerals, com-
modities and labour, while importing capital, obsolete technologies and ﬁn-
ished goods. This forcibly orients dependent states to the operational interests
of transnational ﬁnancial institutions in OECD economies: resources ﬂow to
dependent states but their allocation is determined by the interests of corpo-
rate elites rather than the development needs of dependent states. This sus-
tains conditions of poverty and underdevelopment in the global South, yet
this global division of labour is a core indispensable condition for the asymmetric
consumption of resources in a globally integrated economy.
Laclau (1971) is critical of the abstraction of Frank’s theoretical premises,
and his failure to diﬀerentiate between ‘capitalist mode of production’ and
‘participation in a world capitalist system’. The development of under-
development, he argues, derives from an historic logic of superexploitation in
colonial economies which was designed to compensate for the low organic
composition of capital – expressed as the low technical level of the productive
forces. In the colonial epoch this encouraged corporations under imperial
protection to ﬁx social relations of production in an ‘archaic mould of extra-
economic coercion, which retarded any process of social diﬀerentiation and
diminished the size of their internal markets’ (Frank 1971: 37), which has
continued in the postcolonial period (cf. Carchedi 2001: 217). As Westra
observes, in the ‘twilight zone’ of the global South, capitalist development has
not just been uneven but stunted:
the modalities of capital accumulation never became central to the
material economic reproducibility of most Third World societies. The
stunted modalities of capital, and persisting pre-capitalist forms (whether
they were original or spawned under historical conditions of contact
between then capitalist and non-capitalist economies), then tended to work
against each other in fashions extremely toxic for the material-economic
reproducibility of human life in the Third World.
(Westra 2010: 182)
Although many developing economies rejected neocolonialism in the 1960s
and 1970s and joined the Non-Aligned Movement to escape the ideological
embrace of Western liberalism, the destabilization and/or violent overthrow of
national-popular governments in the periphery led through an expansion of
the debt relation to their reincorporation into the political economy of ﬁnance
and the abandonment left-populist/corporatist alternatives to capitalism. The
nihilism and violence of corporate globalization are revealed in the complicity
of democracies in the state terrorism of client regimes in the global South in
an eﬀort to incorporate weak sovereign states into the political economy of
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global corporate power. This entails not only ﬁnancial support for dictators
but covert participation in the assassination and intimidation of intellectuals
and labour activists, as well as training paramilitaries for counterinsurgency.
The economic and military power of the West was restabilized in the 1980s
and given new relevance in a liberal-internationalist discourse that conceals
the continuity and magnitude of clandestine Western interventions in support
of corporate power in the capitalist periphery. Emphasizing the depoliticiza-
tion of Western imperial power in the twentieth century, Schmitt looked
beyond the myth of Anglo-American exceptionalism to suggest that the
unique feature of Anglo-American hegemony lay in the apolitical orientation
of capitalist expansion and violence, as a result of which the
economic stands in the foreground to such a degree that it is sometimes
even used to deny the fact of imperialism at all, in that economy and
politics are opposed to one another on the basis of an inherited nine-
teenth century antithesis, and the economic is situated as essentially
something non-political, the political as something essentially non-economic
[…] What the Anglo-Saxons do, in contrast to what the Prussians and
other militarists have done, is by deﬁnition never imperialism but essen-
tially something diﬀerent, because it signiﬁes only economic and therefore
peaceful expansion.
(Schmitt 1933: 29)
The importance of this observation lies in Schmitt’s reconnection of the eco-
nomic and political. As we have argued, it is the false separation of economy
and polity which prevents an understanding of capital as power – where the
augmentation of power is not simply a means to but the real end of accu-
mulation. Ownership of property is the source of corporate power, which
withholds resources from general use, much as the Enclosure Acts in nineteenth-
century England allowed speculators to exclude land from social use.
Abandoning the ‘civilizational’ legitimation of European imperialism in the
nineteenth century, however, the juridical distinction of global imperial
ﬁnance is not one between Christians and non-Christians, or ‘civilized’ Eur-
opeans and ‘barbarians’, but a ﬁnancial distinction between creditors and
debtors – that is, between sovereign entities that preside over the ﬁnancial
capacity to determine asymmetric relations of power (and thus to advance/
constrain the development of subject peoples), and weak sovereign entities
whose contingent territoriality and autonomy are deﬁned by their relation of
dependence to transnational corporate actors.
Whether this new ‘division of peoples and states is more peaceful than
those of previous centuries’, argues Schmitt (2011a: 31), is a ‘question unto
itself ’. What matters is that the articulation of hegemony in the neutral
language of ‘economic modernization’, ‘free exchange’ and ‘paciﬁcation’
indicates the juridiﬁcation of international politics in the interwar period, a
deﬁning moment in the transition from realism to ‘false normativism’,
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which Schmitt traces back to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. This agree-
ment licensed, in an ‘elastic’ form, the right of a world power to pacify the
earth by appealing to internationalism: ‘Such an elasticity, such an ability to
operate with broad terms and to force the peoples of the earth to respect
them, is a phenomenon of world-historical signiﬁcance’ (ibid.). The result
is not merely decisional sovereignty but the capacity to create order by
determining meaning through the deﬁnition and application of political
concepts: ‘with those decisive political concepts the issue is who interprets,
deﬁnes and applies them; who says, by means of concrete decision, what is
peace, what disarmament, what intervention, what public order and security’
(ibid.).
To the extent that one state pursues the ‘aggressive democratization’ of
other states, the outcome is imperial relations of power (Musgrave & Nexon
2013: 133). However, while capitalist relations of power are hierarchic and
asymmetric, their operation is concealed through the mediation of interna-
tional institutions that claim to represent the ‘international community’ (ibid.:
143). Despite attempts to construct a new justiﬁcation for empire grounded
on humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion (Dahbour 2003;
Bricmont 2006), the geopolitical agency of the Clinton, Bush (Jr) and Obama
Administrations is founded less on imperial virtue than the securitization of
capitalist ﬁnance as a transnational mode of power, as a result of which the
economic utility of military intervention has altered.
The material determination of capitalist geopolitics and the implicit corre-
lation between ﬁnancial and military power are revealed in the exceptional
force of ‘shock and awe’ as a strategy to create and annihilate opposition to
globalizing capital. The decision by the US to employ exceptional force in
Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 not only ﬁnds its origins in fascist
military strategy (Bromwich 2003), but has a dramatic parallel in the excep-
tional intervention by the Federal Reserve in the ﬁnancial markets after Sep-
tember 2008 to prevent an unwinding of debt from destroying the Western
banking system (Rickards 2011). Just as military force serves ﬁnancial ends,
the exceptional power of the dollar enables the US to sustain global liquidity
as a condition for the global ﬁat money economy: liquidity constitutes a
relation of trust – a ‘peculiar type of trust that must reign in the ﬁnancial
markets […] the trust that lenders – meaning people who buy shares, the case
of ﬁnancial markets – must feel in their ability to sell what they buy, at any
time and with no certainty’ (Amato & Fantacci 2012: 17). Conﬁdence persists
only as long as liquidity persists and vice versa, though (as Keynes recog-
nized) the expansion of liquidity is hardly ideal for society: ‘because liquidity
does not exist from the outset – or cannot constitute the basis for the func-
tioning of a system of healthy credit distribution – it can only exist as long as
no questions are asked about it, or at least as long as we pretend to know
what it is’ (Amato & Fantacci 2012: 19). Liquidity is thus a fetish, and as
‘long as people believe in the fetish, it will dispense its supposedly beneﬁcial
eﬀects. When they stop, the fetish is ﬁnally revealed for what it has been all
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along: something incapable of adequately supporting the basic relations
involved in ﬁnance’ (ibid.). It is unsurprising, therefore, that liquidity (rather
than demand) has been the driving force of business cycles in recent decades,
fuelling investment bubbles, including the bond market bubble which allows
the US to ﬁnance liabilities of $17 trillion.3 This liquidity fetish evolves in
three phases: deregulation, ﬁnancial innovation and irresponsible monetary
policy. ‘Financial deregulation and liberalization laid the foundations for
ﬁnancial engineering, while central banks have pumped more liquidity into
the ﬁnancial system every time a bubble has burst, thereby perpetuating the
bubble era’ (Arestis & Karakitsos 2013: 68–9).
America’s decision to declare a global state of exception and intervene in
energy-rich regions indicates the material determination of geopolitics in the
present era. As Fouskas and Gökay (2005, 2012) argue, NATO’s energy wars
in the ‘Eurasian Balkans’ are being waged not simply to secure oil pipelines
or to limit the evolution of a Eurasian economic and security system inde-
pendent of the US, but to prevent energy-rich states from conducting non-
dollar-denominated oil transactions, which would undermine the power of the
petrodollar cartel – the real motive for the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and
invasion of Libya in 2011. Yet the state of exception announced after 9/11
also indicates that while interventions may increase proﬁts for US defence
ﬁrms, oil companies and private contractors, their direct contribution to
aggregate capital accumulation is limited (Nitzan & Bichler 2006: 6). The real
impact of ‘cheap wars’ is felt indirectly through the exploitation of political
instability in energy-rich regions, which exerts a mild inﬂationary eﬀect on the
price of assets and consumer goods in advanced economies, which in turn
oﬀsets deﬂationary pressures by incentivizing spending, stabilizing the market
power of dominant capital and reducing the burden of debt repayment.
Although deﬂation at ﬁrst sight seems to beneﬁt households by increasing
purchasing power, it is fatal for capitalist economies dependent on debt to
ﬁnance spending and investment. Devalued currencies increase the cost for
business and government of meeting debt-repayments, and while central
banks can respond to inﬂation by raising interest rates until borrowing drops,
stimulating borrowing/spending is impossible beyond a certain point because
it is self-defeating to reduce interest rates below zero – although this policy
has been tried by the European Central Bank (ECB) to encourage lending by
charging eurozone banks for the excess deposits they place with it (The
Economist 2014). The actual cause of deﬂation is the disconnect between
wages and productivity (no more so apparent than in Germany), for if
workers’ pay does not increase commensurate with rising labour productivity
then real wages fall and so do prices because fewer people can aﬀord discre-
tionary spending. To avoid wage increases in line with rising living costs,
however, it is easier for corporate ﬁrms to maintain liquidity through mone-
tary expansion and mild inﬂation by allowing the price of key commodities
such as oil to rise – as occurred dramatically between 2003 and 2008 to the
advantage of large energy exporters like Russia.4
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The Federal Reserve’s long-term policy of credit easing has been accom-
panied by an expansionary ﬁscal policy to mitigate the threat of deﬂationary
recession following the collapse of the long boom of the 1990s (Kawamura
2013), leading to an increase in government spending on ‘homeland security’
and foreign wars which is estimated to have cost US taxpayers $3 trillion
(Stiglitz & Bilmes 2008). The inﬂationary eﬀect of ‘cheap wars’ supported by
the ‘weapondollar-petrodollar coalition’ indicates the private power of cor-
porations whose transnational interests transgress the national economic
interests of citizens in the US. Mapping the proﬁts of the ‘weapondollar-
petrodollar coalition’ against inﬂation and energy wars, Nitzan and Bichler
draw three conclusions, namely: (i) energy conﬂicts are preceded by a danger
zone when rates of accumulation enjoyed by oil companies decline; (ii) each
energy conﬂict is followed by a period in which corporations in the energy
sector achieve above-average rates of accumulation; and (iii) with one excep-
tion, oil companies consistently fail to ‘beat the average without an energy
conﬂict ﬁrst taking place’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2006: 8). This highlights the
proximity between corporate and political elites who exchange positions
through the ‘revolving door’ of corporate directorships and political oﬃces in
New York, Washington and London. Yet the power advantage gained by
dominant capital translates into a net loss for society due to the distributional
impact of inﬂation which sustains the illusion of nominal GDP growth in the
short-to-medium term (roughly a decade), but eventually erodes capital
through the debasement of the currency:
During the welfare-warfare state, inﬂation usually involved a wage-price
spiral that worked to limit the diﬀerential increases in proﬁts […] The
situation now is very diﬀerent. Workers in the United States are locked in
global competition with workers in China, India and other ‘emerging
markets’, which means that wages do not rise – and sometimes even fall –
in the midst of price inﬂation. In this context, a four percent inﬂation
translates to a four percent increase in the mark-up and to a far larger
increase in proﬁts.
(Nitzan & Bichler 2006: 14–15)
To this end America’s bipartisan political elites ﬁrst had to abandon their
duty to defend the national interest – to honour their mandate to work for the
interests of US taxpayers who watch impotently as republican democracy is
overtaken by a corporate oligarchy presiding over an entrenched system that
thrives on malinvestment (systematic misallocation of resources through cor-
porate-state corruption). Indeed, as Martenson (2011) observes, the political
betrayal of the US electorate mirrors in surprising ways developments in
Argentina prior to the collapse of 2001, a country in which neoliberal shock
therapy and ﬁxed exchange-rate currency regimes led to a ﬁre sale of national
assets, inﬂation, capital ﬂight and eventually sovereign default.
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America’s reversal of fortune from the world’s most powerful creditor to
the world’s major debtor highlights the contradictory impact of globalization.
While US ﬁnancial strategy after 1945 sought to maximize American autonomy
relative to the rest of the world, the opposite is now the case as constraints on
America’s freedom of manoeuvre (as consumer of last resort, supplier of
global liquidity and indebted state) intensify and as the utility of US military
preponderance for client states declines. Although the US retains a ‘very high
degree of ﬁnancial and military power’, suggests Konings (2008: 56), ‘it has
no inherently privileged relationship to processes of decentralized globaliza-
tion’. Eventually, he argues, the US will have no choice but to ‘bow before the
power of globalizing ﬁnancial markets and a more decentralized pattern of
[global] ﬁnancial authority’ (ibid.: 56–57).
Yet rebalancing has implications for the status of the US as a First World
state because consumer purchasing power, ‘which represents the entirety of
means of payment (wages and revenue) used in the buying of goods already
produced, already present, is strictly subordinate, as a lesser power ﬂow, to
the ﬂows of ﬁnancing’ (Lazzarato 2012: 83). Finance is the ‘power for pre-
scribing, ordering, that is, a set of possibilities for choices and decisions with
regard to the future, which anticipate what the production, power relations
and forms of subjection will be’ (ibid.: 84). As we shall see in Chapter 7, while
the impact of reserve currency diversiﬁcation is hard to predict, even if China
proceeds cautiously in its Grand Strategy, the evidence suggests that in order
to delay the arrival of a multi-currency reserve system the US will intimidate
both contenders and allies seeking alternatives to the petrodollar system,
leading to currency instability and wider geopolitical conﬂict.
Accumulation crisis
Marxian theory suggests that each ‘long-run or structural crisis (and related
sequence of periodic expansion and contraction and sectoral change) is con-
junctural in nature […] The conclusions of historical crises constitute the
beginnings not only of subsequent expansions, but also of succeeding crises’
(O’Connor 1984: 55). Furthermore, the way in which each preceding crisis is
resolved determines the form of succeeding crises – whether this entails capi-
tal restructuring, labour intensiﬁcation, mass unemployment, expansion in the
ﬁnancial circuit of the state as a component in the total reproduction of
capital, or war. Expansionary phases in capitalism lead to crises of over-
accumulation (overproduction/inﬂation/declining demand), threatening the
proﬁtability and viability of capitalist commodity production which exists
purely for its own sake rather than to meet expanding social needs. In addi-
tion, the period of recovery after each successive crisis is always temporary
while each expansionary phase ﬁzzles out more rapidly than the previous
upswing without resolving the conditions that produced it.
As Brenner (2009) observes, growth in the US from the end of the ‘dotcom
boom’ to the subprime crisis was the slowest in post-war history, yielding
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a zero increase in median family income for the ﬁrst time since 1945. While it
is assumed that capitalism consistently ‘defeats diminishing returns to ﬁxed
resources through technical change’ (Foley 1986: 45), countering the tendency
towards a lower composition of capital and longer turnover times which
negate rising surplus-value, accumulation crises actually lead to ‘rising money
prices of commodities, shortages of certain commodities and certain types of
labour-power, and higher interest rates. The economy then reaches a point
where aggregate demand and output turn down sharply, and the demand for
labor-power falls’ (ibid.: 47). As capital withdraws from productive investment,
as medium-sized ﬁrms go out of business, and as employment law is revised
in favour of capital, accumulation ‘resumes its upward course’ (ibid.: 48).
In volume I of Capital Marx stated that capitalist accumulation depends on
a continual realization of additional surplus-value as a directionless process
that proceeds ad inﬁnitum: ‘accumulation for the sake of accumulation,
production for the sake of production: this was the formula in which classical
economics expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie […] Classical
economics takes the historical function of the capitalist in grim earnest’
(Marx 1976: 742). For Marx there is a direct link between the ways in which
labour, capital and technology are combined in the production process and
the realization of value in excess of the costs entailed in capital investment
and the material reproduction of labour-power. Where ceteris paribus the
production of surplus-value increases more rapidly than the value of
additional capital, accumulation can be sustained, but at a certain stage in the
cycle – where the level of organic composition of capital invested in capital
goods (industrial-technical capacity) overtakes consumer goods capitalization,
or where the purchasing power of new consumers is exhausted without
introducing unsustainable levels of debt, then demand collapses and produc-
tion halts (O’Connor 1984: 65–66). For Marx, the problem of over-
accumulation reﬂects the contradiction inherent in capitalist commodity
production:
The contradiction […] consists in that the capitalist mode of production
involves a tendency towards absolute development of the productive
forces, regardless of the value and surplus-value it contains, and regard-
less of the social conditions under which capitalist production takes
place; while, on the other hand, its aim is to preserve the value of the
existing capital and promote its self-expansion to the highest limit (i.e. to
promote an ever more rapid growth of this value). The speciﬁc feature
about it is that it uses the existing value of capital as a means of
increasing this value to the utmost. The methods by which it accom-
plishes this include the fall of the rate of proﬁt, depreciation of existing
capital, and development of the productive forces of labour at the
expense of already created productive forces.
(Marx 1959: 249)
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Capital is thus incompatible with real social abundance: production must
either decline or be terminated before social needs are satisﬁed because capital
is a mode of power that requires scarcity to sustain proﬁtability – that is,
where supply is restricted by declining exchange value not use value. This is
the case because the competitive valorization of capital drives demands for
innovation and productivity; yet the increasing abundance of the means of
labour and the expansion of social needs threaten the conditions under which
surplus-value can be realized proﬁtably, leading to extended periods in which
production must decline or cease completely.
The tendency of capital towards overaccumulation also highlights the cen-
trality of the state circuit of capital in facilitating consumption. The state
form of capital is determined not simply by provision of social goods that
cannot be produced for private gain, or to promote Pareto optimality, but to
‘satisfy the conditions for the self-expansion of capital’ (Eaves 2011: 4).
Capital, argues Eaves, is ‘production run amok’ – production for its own sake;
the state, on the other hand, is ‘consumption for the sake of capital’ – a
mechanism for consuming the excessive productive capacity of society
expressed as an overaccumulation of surplus-value. The expenditure of the
state is derived from ‘that portion of the surplus produced by capitals which
does not go into either the expansion of variable capital (wages) or the
expansion of constant capital (machinery, raw materials, etc.)’. The state ‘pays
for these expenditures by issuing newly created ex nihilo pecuniam’ (ibid.),
which only acquires value because it is based on a social contract predicated
on the sovereignty of the issuing state.
Yet it is capital itself that brings its state form into existence, and there is
no alternative to money creation in the advanced economies because capital
requires the state to overcome the antagonism between production for private
proﬁt and underconsumption by absorbing into itself the growing mass of
surplus-value that cannot be realized/invested proﬁtably. In addition, because
the natural state of capitalism is stagnation (rather than growth), accumula-
tion regimes tend towards ﬁnancialization, labour intensiﬁcation and the ero-
sion of legal protections for labour and the environment – threatening the
essential non-capitalist (societal and ecological) preconditions for the future
reproduction of the system (Kotz 2007). The contradictory logic of accumu-
lation can be seen as a response to the eﬀect of ‘bad inﬁnity’ in the ontology
of capital which creates demand but cannot meet social needs, and therefore
thrives on lack. Drawing once again on Hegel, Marx argued that capital is
oriented towards never completed inﬁnitude: ‘Fixed as wealth, as the general
form of wealth, as value which counts as value, [capital] is therefore the con-
stant drive to go beyond its quantitative limit: an endless process’ (Marx
1973: 270). To sustain the self-valorization of value entailed in the quantita-
tive augmentation of capital, all ﬁnite forms of realized capital (money, sav-
ings, etc.) constitute a barrier to capital’s drive towards inﬁnity and must be
returned to the circuit of capital through periodic recessions which create
scarcity and regenerate demand. Overaccumulation can also be understood in
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poststructuralist terms as a political response to the logic of capitalist excess,
for it is the state alone that is ‘capable of realizing capitalism’s supreme goal,
which is to produce lack in large aggregates, to produce lack where there is
always too much, by eﬀecting the absorption of overabundant resources’
(Deleuze & Guattari 1977: 235).
The 1930s slump ended in fascism as an historical form of postliberal
capitalism. As Eaves argues, economic fascism is ‘subject to certain condi-
tions, the most important of which is that the consumption of the mass of
society must never expand beyond that point where the sale of labor power is
threatened, i.e. must never exceed the average of the daily wage’ (Eaves 2011:
2). Although consumption must increase, he argues, it must also ‘impoverish
society on an ever increasing scale [and] the productive capacity of society
must be routinely and systematically destroyed’ (ibid.). Yet the destruction of
the Second World War testiﬁes to the utility of military conﬂict for the survi-
val of capitalism, not simply as a means for acquiring territory/resources, but
through the institutionalization of war preparedness. This assumed a variety
of forms in Europe, Australia and North America and has been extensively
studied by regulation theorists who examine the changing patterns of state
intervention and political legitimation in Fordist accumulation regimes after
1945 (Aglietta 1979; cf. Jessop 2001).
This model provided unprecedented economic and political stability in
Europe and the US for almost three decades, but led to stagnation in ‘phase
B’ of the Kondratieﬀ cycle due to a crisis of overproduction following German
and Japanese recovery in the 1960s, which destabilized the Bretton Woods
system, forcing the US to abandon gold convertibility and devalue the dollar
in an attempt to remain economically competitive. When this failed, the US
re-established the value and international prestige of the dollar by signing
deals with Saudi Arabia and OPEC states between 1973 and 1975 to
denominate oil sales exclusively in dollars in return for US security guaran-
tees, creating an artiﬁcial global demand for dollars which was then recycled
as investment in US Treasury liabilities and US banks. This dollars-for-oil
system was favourable to the US as it required less monetary discipline than a
gold standard, allowing the Federal Reserve to expand the US monetary base
exponentially. Foreign governments had no option but to lend their currency
reserves to ﬁnance US consumption, which placed the burden of the balance
of payments deﬁcit on foreign states rather than US taxpayers or US cor-
porations. Far from signalling the end of US domination of the capitalist
chain, argues Hudson, dollar devaluation became the object of US ﬁnancial
strategy (Hudson 2003: 22). This inaugurated a period of benign neglect
characterized by loose monetary policy and higher inﬂation which endan-
gered the dollar’s ‘very position as key currency and the international ﬁnan-
cial structure based upon it’ (Hudson 2003: 34–35), before the Volcker shock
when the Federal Reserve tightened credit and laid waste to America’s
industrial base through high interest rates, unemployment and recession
(ibid.: 49).
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Attempts to understand capitalist crisis by analysing regulation are useful,
but a focus on modes of intervention restricts the object of the analysis to
‘superﬁcial and transitory features of capitalism, which are one-sidedly ele-
vated to deﬁning features of a distinctive stage of capitalist development’
(Clarke 2001: 77). As a result, recession is misdiagnosed ‘as a crisis of parti-
cular “modes of regulation” of capital accumulation, which can be resolved
by developing new forms of regulation, rather than being seen as a crisis
which expresses the contradictory form of accumulation itself ’ (ibid.). As
O’Connor argues, a contradiction exists between the ends of regulation:
On the one hand, the working class/salariat forced the state to protect
and enhance the value of its labor-power and labor services, increase
stability in labor markets, compensate for losses to the value of labor-
power, and so on. In this way the state followed policies which intensiﬁed
the tendency for the rate of exploitation and proﬁt to decline. On the
other hand the state also needed to compensate for previous policies
which adversely aﬀected exploitation and proﬁts.
(O’Connor 1984: 225)
In this sense, the state is ‘constantly trying to undo with one hand what it
[has] done with the other’ (ibid.). As we have seen, neoliberals sought to
address the accumulation crisis of Fordism by reducing state regulation, cut-
ting public services and tightening ﬁscal and monetary policy while shifting
the burden of debt onto private consumers in an attempt to stimulate
demand. In addition, incentives were introduced to intensify competition
between workers in the reserve army of labour who had to accept reduced
compensation and deteriorating labour conditions. Here it is useful to distin-
guish between the intrinsic capacity (power resources) of labour and capital
on the one hand, and the hegemonic capacity (ability to use those power
resources) on the other. The intrinsic capacity of labour rests on its ability
collectively to resist changes in working practices; the intrinsic power of
capital, on the other hand, rests on its mobility – its capacity to withdraw
from investment and seek new sources of proﬁt, and to determine the juridical
framework of the capitalist state form.
For Lembcke, hegemonic capacity is the ‘ability of one class to intervene in
the process by which the opposite class generates its own intrinsic capacity’
(Lembcke 2002: 16). The power of capital and proﬁtability of its investments
thus depend on its ability to ‘maintain the accumulation process (and thus
continue to generate its intrinsic capacity) while blocking the contradictory
eﬀects of accumulation by mitigating the collectivization of the working
class – that is, to exercise hegemonic capacity’ (ibid.: 17–8). The eﬀect of the
Volcker coup was to attract funds to the US while undermining US manu-
facturing, which relocated production oﬀshore. A further eﬀect – following
Reagan’s ‘militarized counterrevolution’ – was to boost defence spending by
allowing the state to consume overcapacity as a ‘surrogate’ export market.
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Trade and balance of payments deﬁcits enabled the US government to legit-
imize reduced spending, but this policy had global implications, for given the
weight of the US in the world economy, few states ‘could aﬀord not to follow US
monetary policy and suﬀer with the US the subsequent recessionary con-
sequences of mounting unemployment and slowed growth’ (Westra 2010: 116).
Volcker’s monetary policy also sealed the fate of the developing world, leading to
a reconﬁguration of the global ﬁnancial system to exploit new opportunities
for lending as debtor states adopted SAPs in return for emergency IMF loans.
Yet the contradictions of overaccumulation cannot be resolved indeﬁnitely
by blocking collective action or internationalizing the means of production
through a global division of labour. This is a consequence of the logical con-
tradiction between two forms of wealth: material wealth and abstract wealth
(expressed in the reiﬁed form of money capital). In capitalism, material
wealth is only ever produced if it can also be represented as value – that is, if
it results simultaneously in the valorization of value, and where this ‘cannot
be achieved because the valorization of capital has ground to a halt, material
wealth also stops being produced. Goods are even destroyed because they
cannot be sold despite the fact that needs are left unmet on a massive scale’
(Lohoﬀ & Trenkle 2012a: 1). Since the 1970s, the world has experienced an
overaccumulation crisis because productivity is too high to sustain the process
of capital valorization:
Capital has to reproduce itself because otherwise it ceases to be capital
and for that purpose a continually growing workforce has to be utilized
to produce commodities. But at the same time, competition is driving an
unstoppable productivity race that […] leads to the permanent replace-
ment of labor with physical capital. That is the fundamental internal
contradiction in the capitalist mode of production that ultimately has to turn
on the mode of production itself. Speciﬁcally, if productivity is so high
that huge masses of labor-power are made superﬂuous, that jeopardizes
the very basis of capital valorization. This is precisely what is at the core
of the fundamental structural crisis that the global capitalist system has
found itself in since the end of the post-war boom.
(Lohoﬀ & Trenkle 2012a: 2)
As long as capital can overcome barriers to accumulation through inter-
nationalization this contradiction can be suspended and the spatial limits of
capital extended. However, this suspension is always temporary due to uneven
development in the global economy. The crisis of Western capitalism exists
not because of globalization but as a consequence of the intensifying compe-
tition that drives capital to escape restrictions imposed by variable capital
(labour-power) through the perpetual innovation of new ﬁnancial instruments
and deregulated foreign direct investment in emerging markets. Yet the
relentless drive for accumulation suggests that the ‘attempt of capital to
overcome barriers to accumulation by penetrating world markets has reached
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its limits as overaccumulation appears on a global scale’ (Clarke 2001: 80–
81). In this sense, the transition ‘from one phase of the cycle to the other is
not in the fact of the global character of capital accumulation but its form’
(ibid.). The recession of the 1980s led to a massive devaluation of capital, to
the destruction of surplus productive capacity and to a disciplining of labour,
followed by a consumer boom that proved insuﬃcient to restore stable and
proﬁtable accumulation in the long term. Western corporations were subse-
quently able to prosper in the boom of the 1990s not through sustained
innovation or investment but through new opportunities aﬀorded by post-
communist transition, the global expansion of the debt relation, by the capi-
talist transformation of China and its integration into the network of
transnational corporate power through the WTO (Cox & Lee 2012; cf. Westra
2012), and by the temporary collapse of Russia as a hegemonic power in
Eurasia which oﬀered Western ﬁnancial and military elites new opportunities
for intervention in regions previously closed to Western capital.
Although globalization has lifted large numbers of Asian workers out of
subsistence, it has also triggered a chronic condition of overcapacity in the
world economy which can ultimately only be resolved through controlled or
uncontrolled deleveraging. Despite the ﬂood of cheap money created by
expansionary monetary policies in the US, EU and Japan – which have
stoked ‘destructive booms’ in emerging markets that cannot easily be con-
trolled – debt overhang, overproduction and glut in the global economy are
exerting downward pressure on prices, confounding Western ﬁnancial elites
whose goal is to prevent long-term stagnation and deﬂationary recession
(Warner 2014c). In the absence of sustained growth and cautious investment,
predatory corporations in western economies have embraced ﬁnancialization,
leading economists to measure business ‘success’ by the expansion of corpo-
rate balance sheets (irrespective of the quality of assets acquired), by capacity
to leverage credit and by capacity to maximize earnings per share in order to
increase ‘shareholder value’. Financialized corporations adopted ingenious
strategies to simulate growth to the extent that ‘[t]rillions of dollars that could
have been spent on innovation and job creation in the US economy over the
past three decades have instead been used to buy back stock, the sole purpose
of which is to manipulate the company’s stock price’ (Lazonick 2013: 235; cf.
Cox 2012). As Froud et al. (2006) argue, the ideology of shareholder value
has risen to become the standard against which all corporate business activity
is judged, yet the concept is no more than an ‘artiﬁce’ that presumes to know
what market investors want (typically a 10–12 per cent return on investment
after tax) (ibid.: 42). Yet, the authors argue, if we ignore the hype and exam-
ine the ‘speciﬁcs about what management can do to improve ﬁnancial results,
then we ﬁnd a good deal of tautology combined with a fairly traditional
1980s concept of strategy’ (ibid.: 47). The reality is that ﬁnancial ideologies
like shareholder value yield disappointing results, while beneﬁting CEOs
whose remuneration has grown exponentially. A further outcome is rising
corporate malfeasance and personal enrichment – value skimming that
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privileges wealth without function because it is not founded on actual increases
in performance and requires only an ‘elite structural position where one or a
few senior ﬁgures can take advantage of ownership rights, deals or operations
close to a large income stream’ (ibid.: 60).
This trend has resulted not merely in the overvaluation of non-competitive
ﬁrms and their artiﬁcial expansion through mergers and acquisitions, but in
the haemorrhaging of salaried jobs among intermediate strata who formerly
comprised the basis for a prosperous consumer economy in the post-war era
(Lazonick 2013: 264; Roberts 2013). As Lipietz (2001) observes, it is the
aggregate of median incomes of lower-middle- and working-class wage earn-
ers that allows consumer economies to prosper, and the ﬂexibilization of wage
relations in the US has reduced the life chances of educated strata, creating a
new precariousness characterized by the declining purchasing power of low-
paid workers and an expanding class of socially excluded individuals who
have abandoned the search for employment.5 At the other extreme, CEOs
have become an ‘ineﬀectual oﬃcer class, whose role is to manage events and
avoid disaster but not to produce high performance or glorious victory’
(Froud et al. 2006: 91).
It is the form in which capital escapes the contradictions of a preceding
phase of expansion that is crucial to understanding the next phase of struc-
tural crisis, and this is particularly evident in the case of the liberalization of
capital ﬂows that followed the recession of the 1970s. Capitalism traditionally
maintains itself, argues Wallerstein, ‘by mechanisms that restore equilibrium
every time its processes move away from it. The equilibrium is never restored
immediately, but only after a suﬃcient deviation from the norm occurs, and
of course, it is never restored perfectly’ (Wallerstein 2006a: 75).
Neoliberal capitalism increasingly resembles a form of economic fascism
shorn of its oﬀensive ideological characteristics, which thrives on the post-
ponement of debt repayment through credit expansion, loose monetary
policy, the resort to ‘cheap wars’ to counter deﬂationary pressures and extend
new opportunities for accumulation, and investment in the apparatus of
domestic state repression and surveillance to manage potential resistance to
the corporate appropriation of national incomes. At present each of these
conditions is being met, with potentially catastrophic consequences for social
cohesion and political stability in the US, UK and other low-growth western
economies. As Wallerstein cautions, the mechanisms that restore equilibrium
cannot persist indeﬁnitely because secular trends start to exhibit ‘asymptotic’
properties – that is, they incrementally approach the point where continued
expansion is no longer viable without a risk of systemic collapse.
For both Wallerstein and Brenner, the recurrent ﬁnancial crises in the world
economy which began with a tightening of US monetary policy in the 1980s and
triggered the end of Japanese growth, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, the collapse of the US stock
market in 2000–01 and the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, indicate the risks
attendant in liberalizing transnational capital ﬂows on the one hand, and the
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need to rebalance living standards and Western consumerist excess on the
other. The bottom line, argues Brenner, is that to ‘resolve the problem of proﬁt-
ability that has so long plagued the system […] the system requires the crisis that
has so long been postponed’ (Brenner 2009: 9, emphasis added). The source of the
problem lies in the declining rate of proﬁt on capital invested for which the only
logical (but politically unacceptable) solution is to allow the unconditional
bankruptcy of unproﬁtable sectors of the economy, for it is only ‘by way of crisis
that, historically, capitalism has restored the rate of proﬁt and established the
necessary conditions for more dynamic capital accumulation’ (ibid.).
Despite accusations of ‘crony capitalism’ by Western commentators, Asian
economies living beyond their means in the 1990s recovered from the crisis of
1997 by accepting structural reform, although as we shall see in Chapter 6,
Asian economies have instituted regional ﬁnancial structures to prevent a
recurrence of the crisis. Yet Western elites refuse to follow the Asian example
and negotiate necessary structural changes which would lead to a loss of
international ﬁnancial prestige. Instead, the systemic crisis of the West is
concealed by the ever-larger level of abstract wealth generated through the
leveraging and securitization of debt and the creation of new investment
bubbles through credit expansion in the equity, property and bond markets.
The crisis of Western economies stems not simply from the venality of
Western bankers, therefore, but from attempts by corporate investors and ﬁnan-
cial mangers to delay the structural crisis of valorization facing the ﬁnancial
system – the approaching ‘great devaluation’ that governments have managed
to evade by pumping liquidity into the system and transferring private losses
to taxpayers to prevent deﬂationary recession, and by forcing interest rates
below market-based levels (Pento 2013b). The aim is to forestall a collapse in
currency values and assets created through the leveraging of paper claims to
future value, which are sustainable only as long as sources of conﬁdence in
the market are artiﬁcially fabricated and maintained (Lohoﬀ & Trenkle 2013:
230). Yet by drawing the state ever further into a defence of capitalist sover-
eignty, this is leading to the further statization of capital allocation in ‘liberal’
economies illustrated by the increase in the ratio of public expenditure to
GDP in the UK from 40.6 to 51.0 per cent in the period 1997–2010 (Winiecki
2013), and the tripling of Britain’s national debt from 35 to 100 percent of
GDP between 2003 and 2015. This indicates a dramatic shift away from
‘equilibrium’ as corporate-state elites struggle to sustain the accumulation
regime of ﬁnancial capital and prevent a deﬂationary spiral through manip-
ulation of currency markets to slow the transition to a posthegemonic global
growth system in which capital ﬂows are decoupled from dollar hegemony.
From ﬁnancial instability to monetary collapse
Perspectives on the causes of ﬁnancial crises diﬀer signiﬁcantly between neo-
classical theory, Austrian School economics, Keynesianism and Marxism. In
the former case, the occurrence of ﬁnancial crisis is seen largely as a
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consequence of ‘irrational exuberance’, inadequate legal regulation, excessive
government intervention in the market, and the expansion of the state itself as
an institution that is ‘too big to fail’ (Patton 2013). The target of Austrian
School theory, on the other hand, is the bloated welfare state model of Wes-
tern capitalism and the dissonance between future liabilities and future
income that is pushing Western economies towards ﬁscal collapse. A further
target of the Austrian School is the moral hazard implicit in the use of taxation
to socialize risk and ‘reward’ corporate failure, and the tendency of states to
ﬂood their economies with liquidity or promote speculative investment bub-
bles (‘Ponzi schemes’) which oﬀer easy prosperity but end in disaster as credit
expansion ends and interest rates climb (Garrison 2000).
Keynesians such as Minsky (2008), meanwhile, stress the danger of invest-
ment bubbles and ﬁnancial instability, but go further than liberal political
economists to argue that the ‘ﬁnancial structure of the advanced capitalist
economy exhibits an internal ﬂaw driving it relentlessly from robustness to
fragility, making the whole economy susceptible in the end to debt-deﬂations
of the kind exhibited by the Great Depression’ (Foster & Magdoﬀ 2009: 17).
For writers like Minsky (2008), instability is endogenously determined, and
there is a tension between the lender of last resort function of the state and
the fragility of the ﬁnancial system when the latter reaches such levels of
volatility that the former can no longer function eﬀectively. When the Federal
Reserve intervenes to protect a ﬁnancial instrument, therefore, it does so to
forestall an incipient crisis; yet it does so by creating the conditions
for a resumption in the process of increasing indebtedness – and makes
possible the introduction of new instruments. In eﬀect, the Federal
Reserve prepares the way for a type of ﬁnancing that is a necessary but
not a suﬃcient condition for an investment boom that is brought to a
halt by ﬁnancial crises […] deﬁcits of Big Government are the suﬃcient
condition. By sustaining aggregate demand, they sustain corporate proﬁts
and feed secure assets into portfolios. These conditions mean that an
investment boom will occur quite soon after a recession and the invest-
ment boom generates the demand for ﬁnancial instruments that leads to
another bout of inﬂation and crisis.
(Minsky 2008: 95)
Finally, for Marxists there is an inherent link between overdevelopment of the
ﬁnancial sector of the economy and stagnation, which neither orthodox nor
heterodox economists seem willing to discuss. As we have seen in the present
study, Marxists recognize that debt is a structural feature of all capitalist
economies, not just peripheral states in the global South that George (1988)
characterized as ‘condemned to debt’. As Foster and Magdoﬀ (2009: 20)
argue, the growth of debt and speculation are the ‘main means by which the
system [has] managed to avoid sinking into a slump, while not allowing it to
overcome the underlying stagnation tendency’.
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We have seen that Western economic power was acquired through the
expansion of Euro-American capital in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies – a process led by the ﬁnancial imperialism of the Anglosphere. Con-
sidered dialectically and historically, therefore, it is of little surprise that the
present crisis threatens to exert its greatest impact on the historic centres of
capital – the US/UK, in addition to the ageing economies of Japan, Switzer-
land, the eurozone and states in the eurozone periphery. A key feature of the
present crisis is the instrumentalization of the state form of capital to sustain
a return to ‘business as usual’ engineered through exceptional intervention in
the ﬁnancial system and the development of new forms of transnational gov-
ernance linking corporate, ﬁnancial and state actors to promote systemic sta-
bility and revalorize popular belief in ﬁnance as a means to expand
opportunities for future accumulation. However, unique as the present crisis
is – a distinguishing feature being the moral hazard created by the knowledge
that state-sponsored agencies will purchase toxic debt to prevent a collapse of
the banking system (Hendrickson 2013: 208) – the general pattern of credit
expansion, overleveraging and devaluation is also cyclical and must be under-
stood within the structural and historical context of ﬂuctuating globalization
since the late nineteenth century – the internationalization of capital ﬂows
that lies behind the international crises and military conﬂicts of the twentieth
century. At the heart of this process is the accumulation of value for investors
beyond the limits of secular cycles of expansion and contraction while per-
petuating a sense of prosperity among Western consumers whose economic
status is distorted by oﬃcial statistics on national income (GDP per capita as
a socially undiﬀerentiated measure of wealth), which conceals the true extent
of poverty and underemployment in Western economies.6
Pettifor (2006) highlights the parallel between globalization and the ﬂuctu-
ating power of international ﬁnance which culminated in what she terms the
‘third crisis of globalization’, namely the world slump of the 1930s. ‘For the
third time in 56 years’, she argues, the ‘system of economic government by
international capital markets was discredited and brought to an abrupt end.
The cost, in human, social, ﬁnancial and political terms was immense, indeed
incalculable’ (Pettifor 2006: 36). Government by international ﬁnance was, as
we have seen, temporarily brought to a close with Bretton Woods until the
recession of the mid-1970s, when political pressure was again directed at
Western governments to relinquish control over exchange rates and capital
ﬂows, with surplus economies being invited to invest their wealth to support a
massive expansion of US debt, allowing the US the ‘exorbitant privilege’ to
continue printing the world’s reserve currency (Eichengreen 2011). This pri-
vilege has allowed the US to consume global wealth and sustain an economy
in which ‘low-income countries’ earnings from exports [and] ﬁnancial inﬂows,
have been used to build up reserves of US Treasury bills, i.e. to make cheap
loans to the US rather than to undertake domestic spending to reduce levels
of poverty’ (Pettifor 2006: 49).
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At the same time, pressure from global capital has led governments in the
West to deregulate domestic consumer credit through removal of controls on
inﬂationary lending and borrowing, increasing not only average levels of
exposure to debt but the number and range of institutions and ﬁrms authorized
to issue loans. Where ‘credit is used to inﬂate the value of assets’, argues
Pettifor, then ‘even the limits imposed on borrowing by the value of assets
evaporate, like bubbles. This is because unregulated credit oﬀered to borrowers
on the basis of an asset rising in price will rise in line with the inﬂating asset’
(Pettifor 2006: 78). The result is the expansionary debt bubble that pushed the
US and UK to the brink of ﬁnancial collapse in 2008–09 as it became clear
consumers had overreached themselves, creating unsustainable levels of private
debt in addition to the unpayable national debts of both states.7
The Anglo-Saxon economies are now dependent on exponential and
unsustainable borrowing just to continue growing at meagre rates of 1.25 to
1.5 per cent annually; they are, in eﬀect, ‘one-legged’ (ibid.: 90), presenting
corporate-state elites with an acute policy dilemma: cut borrowing through
higher interest rates and reduce consumption, or reduce interest rates to
maintain the economy on life support at the risk of promoting still higher
levels of debt and future default, leading to the withdrawal of credit and a
rapid return to recession. Failure to foresee the First World debt crisis sug-
gests a blind spot in the ideology of neoliberalism which problematizes the
eﬃciency of the public sector yet fails to question the natural logic of the
privatized consumer as the ontological condition of growth: ‘that economies
are seen to be composed of consumers is now so taken for granted’, Payne
argues, that governments ‘do not even have to be aware of the historically
contingent nature of this object they call “the consumer” [as] an object of
rarefaction, and not at all “natural”’ (Payne 2012: 6). Following Foucault, he
suggests that the naturalization of the consumer as an economic ‘given’ con-
stitutes a failure of governmental rationality, for ‘[k]nowing how to govern
requires an explicit vision of the human agents for whom one is governing’
(ibid.: 44). The fact that the ‘ﬁnancial crisis has far surpassed in severity any
of the systemic issues raised by the boom and bust of the late 1980s gives
proof to the fact that there was a unique intensity and complexity to this
credit boom’ (ibid.: 147). The ﬁnancial system and its human agents were, he
concludes, left ‘vulnerable to sudden reverses brought about by an absence of
new credit money to support the already existing positions and asset prices
that the previously created credit-money open up in the ﬁrst place’ (ibid.).
The explosion of debt in Western consumer economies has been accom-
panied by an explosion in the trade for mortgage-backed securities and
ﬁnancial derivatives – a high-risk speculative activity that reﬂects the transi-
tion from the original commodity circuit of capital (M-C-M’) to ﬁnancialized
capital (M-M’), where production of value becomes dependent not on labour-
power but on the capacity of the ﬁnancial system to extract more surplus
from the general population (Foster & Magdoﬀ 2009). A central feature of
neoliberal ﬁnancialization is the accumulation of ﬁctitious capital: leveraging
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of paper claims to future in the form of volatile investment funds in search of
high-yield outlets. The present economic and ﬁnancial crisis of the West
highlights the economic contradictions raised by this expansion of ﬁctitious
capital – a quantity of surplus-value that distorts wealth production and
undermines ﬁnancial stability, but which constitutes a form of ‘accumulation
symmetrical with new processes of value production’ (Marazzi 2010: 48).
Capital, argues Goldner, ‘without resort to a full-blown depression or a
Third World War, has been struggling to establish a new standard of value to
supersede the exhausted one associated with the post-war boom’. To achieve
this, he adds, it must ‘re-equilibrate the existing total paper claims on wealth
[…] with existing surplus-value in a new, acceptable rate of proﬁt, at the same
time that it expands the reproduction of global society. Yet, because of the
preservation of ﬁctitious capital against devaluation, at the expense of material
production, it has failed to ﬁnd this new equilibrium’ (Goldner 2009: 4). Yet
ﬁctitious wealth created by securitization is still real, for the aim of capitalism
as a mode of power is to create a basis for capitalization and expand the
quantity of money available in the system by trading on future values – trades
in which nominal values of ﬁnancial derivatives lose all direct or indirect
correlation with labour-power itself, acquiring relative autonomy from local
economies of production and investment. Capitalist accumulation is a direc-
tionless process that recognizes no formal limits; it is logically incomplete
until the leveraging of value collapses in a spiral of devaluation. Supported by
states, corporate proﬁts can be made almost indeﬁnitely by innovating more
complex ﬁnancial instruments as claims on future value, but this constitutes
an extreme form of commodity fetishism, where the source of value in the
exploitation of labour is rendered covert: proﬁt is eﬀectively made by utilizing
borrowed capital to engage in speculative trades which are not tied to
commodity-based assets.
This process is ‘astonishing’ because the initial capital invested acquires a
kind of dual existence: on the one hand, argue Lohoﬀ and Trenkle, the initial
capital is held by the ‘borrower of the company issuing the shares’; on the
other hand, ‘the creditor of the shareholder holds a mirror to the initial
capital, namely a property title (loan, share, etc.) that represents a momentary
claim’ (Lohoﬀ and Trenkle 2012b: 2). Although ﬁctitious capital appears to
yield unreal values, this doubling is not imaginary, for it ‘acquires an objec-
tive social existence in the form of securities as long as the certiﬁed claim
appears to be redeemable’. This claim to value ‘represents capitalist wealth in
exactly the same way as the value that is squeezed out of living labour’ (ibid.).
In eﬀect, ﬁctitious capital displaces accumulation from the sphere of produc-
tion to the sphere of speculation, but this does not mean the end of capitalism
as a mode of production contingent on valorization. Rather, it simply points
towards the potential devaluation of presently overvalued assets – unsecured
ﬁnancial derivatives that are only overleveraged paper claims to future value.
For Lohoﬀ and Trenkle (2013), the crisis of the Western economies cannot
be explained simply through demand-side explanations based on declining
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consumption. It must also take into consideration the replacement of human
labour with technology (knowledge-based capital) in the 1980s and 1990s
(‘third industrial revolution’) which pushed more workers out of productive
wage labour than it added, while retaining labour as the primary source of
capital valorization in commodity-determined societies. This has led to a
tension between the capacity of the system to generate surplus-value through
commodity production and the compensatory growth of speculative ﬁnancial
capital derived through the generation of ﬁctitious value. To compensate for
the declining rate of proﬁt in advanced economies, ﬁnance has delayed reces-
sion and devaluation by seeking new sources of proﬁt in the future value of
ﬁnancial instruments, a strategy that fails to solve the valorization problem of
capital yet exponentially increases the fallout from a collapse in the ‘real
economy-source’ of derivatives whose present/future values are being traded.
Trade in mortgage-backed securities represents the objectiﬁcation of a
credit relation and anticipated future yields based on it, and thus constitutes
an autonomous form of capital. Though based on debt, and thus vulnerable
to an unwinding of market positions as the euphoria of market upswings
subsides, the securitized paper value of a given ﬁnancial instrument retains a
value of its own because it is the autonomous status of the value of securities
from the capital they claim to manifest that enables these securities to exist
autonomously as capital – not indeﬁnitely, but long enough for dominant
capital to generate record proﬁts. The value derived cannot be equated to the
value gained from direct exploitation of labour-power; it is, rather, a value
derived through calculated speculation, via sophisticated high-frequency
trading programmes which place multiple simultaneous bets on a representative
sample of commodities and securities. This is simply a process of value crea-
tion, as a consequence of which money capital becomes the source of its own
growth, expanding and contracting, leaving debt in its wake. Although
orthodox Marxists claim that in commodity-producing societies value is gen-
erated only through commodiﬁed labour-power, if we accept the impure and
uneven development of capitalism outside the capitalist economies of the
West and the unconstrained growth of ﬁnance as a proﬁtable alternative to
manufacturing, it is clear that not only are the traditional ‘modalities’ of
capital accumulation not central to the reproducibility of emerging market
economies (Westra 2010: 182), but that the direct exploitation of labour is not
(as Marxists assume) an ineliminable condition for creating surplus-value
because trades in securities and ﬁnancial derivatives always already take place
under capitalist relations of power characterized by the general subsumption
of human labour as a commodity for capital expansion.
However, the displacement of accumulation from production to speculation
fails to eliminate the valorization problem for capital, and merely moves the
problem to a higher and more problematic level with potentially more serious
implications for the stability of ﬁnancialized economies. For, if faith in the
realization of future value begins to collapse because it is foreseeable that the
real-economy basis to which the property titles correspond has eroded
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(Lohoﬀ & Trenkle 2012b: 1), then the stability of the wider system is placed
in danger. The global (Western) ﬁnancial crisis occurred because the
mechanism required to postpone a structural crisis of valorization eventually
failed, thus calling into question the viability of capitalism as a form of
abstract wealth production in which only those commodities that augment
value are conditionally produced. In April 2009 coordinated action between
states convened at the G20 prevented a seizure of the global banking system
from sending the world economy into freefall, but while Western governments
managed to forestall an unwinding of securitized debt through expansionary
monetary policy, higher borrowing, economic stagnation and rising inﬂation
will eventually lead to demands for a rise in interest rates. In contrast with the
US, where economic stimulus has enabled the ﬁnancial system to recover
temporarily by fuelling another bubble in the equity and bond markets, the
ﬁscal response of policymakers in the UK and eurozone is to tighten ﬁscal
policy in the vain hope of balancing national budgets – treating the vital
support systems of capital (education, welfare, healthcare) as ‘ballast’ to be
hauled overboard to oﬀset the ‘systemically relevant’ needs of the ﬁnancial
sector: ‘Above all else, what has to be prevented […] is the collapse of the
towering mountains of irredeemable payment promises. For that reason, most
of the newly created ﬁctitious capital ﬂows back into the ﬁnancial sector
directly and less and less of it enters into circulation in the real economy’
(Lohoﬀ & Trenkle 2012b: 3).
In earlier recessions the state returned the economy to growth by lowering
interest rates and promoting increased borrowing, but the economic eﬀect of
lower interest rates has been muted by the fact that asset prices are over-
valued due to counter-deﬂationary policies. As Palley argues, ‘rather than
increasing asset prices and generating a positive wealth eﬀect on consumption
as in the past […] lower interest rates diminished the decline in asset prices
that would otherwise have occurred’ (Palley 2012: 133). Although falling
demand is not the underlying cause of the present crisis, declining wages and
debt are preventing Western economies from combating stagnation as house-
holds run out of money. Yet deﬁcit reduction and ﬁscal tightening merely
threaten deeper stagnation, exacerbating budgetary imbalances by reducing
tax revenue.
To maintain the banking cartel that controls the ﬁat money system, the US
economy has been ‘abandoned to the competition’ as the Federal state aban-
dons responsibility for investment in national infrastructure (Garcia 2013).
Global corporations ‘with American names’ may be competitive, argues Faux
(2006: 190), ‘but the US economy – the collection of workers, businesses and
infrastructure that produces in America – is clearly not’. Although frustrated
by deﬂationary counter-pressures in the advanced economies, the policy of
‘simmering’ inﬂation allows corporate-state elites to reinﬂate asset prices and
monetize US debt at the expense of workers and international creditors. In
this way inﬂation becomes a surrogate for economic growth while easing dis-
tributional conﬂicts (Krippner 2011: 140), but in inﬂationary credit
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expansions ‘wealth is transferred from the public in general to the earliest
recipients of the newly created credit money. In practice, the earliest recipients
are interest groups with the strongest political connections’ (Boyapati 2011:
1). This is referred to as the ‘Cantillon eﬀect’, after the eighteenth-century
Irish-French physiocrat Richard Cantillon, who observed that expansionary
monetary policies lead to a transfer of wealth from those who hold traditional
assets to whomever is closest to the issue of new money, namely ﬁnancial
institutions with ties to the money-issuing bank. This is possible because the
transfer of wealth in periods of inﬂation is concealed from a majority of the
population and because rising prices create a ‘general state of euphoria, a
false sense of wellbeing, in which everybody seems to prosper’ (Hayek 1970,
cited in Boyapati 2011: 1). However, even harnessed to the market-distorting
power of ‘systemically relevant’ banks that work alongside the Federal
Reserve to support the US dollar, this strategy is unsustainable.
The US can delay dollar devaluation in the short term because it is still
able to print the currency in which its debt and balance of payments deﬁcit
are denominated, and because investors in Asia and the Gulf are still com-
mitted to the US monetary system and believe the Federal government itself
is ‘too big to fail’, which in turn enables the US Treasury to borrow privately
issued bank money to ﬁnance the deﬁcit without paying the equivalent price
of an immediate decline in the value of the dollar. Yet a consensus is emer-
ging that the US (and therefore the UK) is on a path to collapse because it
has resorted to monetary expansion to manage national ﬁnances and simulate
recovery without a corresponding structural adjustment of its economy (as
occurred in Asia after 1998), or a formal correction in the value of its cur-
rency, fuelling anxieties among investors over long-term asset values. As one
journalist observes, expansionary monetary policy (in place of structural
reform) has created an addiction to central bank money that Western
governments are reluctant to address:
Unconventional monetary policy is meant to work on the ‘hair of the dog
that bit you’ principle. By ﬁghting a crisis caused by too much money
with yet more money, the central bank hopes to restore the economy to a
‘normally’ functioning machine, at which point saner voices are meant to
take over and a more sustainable form of growth establishes itself […]
Unfortunately, the near free money environment has gone on for much
longer than anyone anticipated. What’s more, we seem quite incapable of
easing ourselves oﬀ the life support. Every time central bankers try, the
economy stalls anew and they are forced to backtrack.
(Warner 2014b: 1)
The US and UK are not alone, or course, for as paper currencies worldwide
decline in value against commodities and precious metals, all the major
industrialized economies will be tempted to engage in competitive devalua-
tion, adopting beggar-thy-neighbour monetary policies – including the
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eurozone and Japan. However, unlike the eurozone, which has imposed
structural reform on states in the currency area (limiting sovereignty over
ﬁscal policy), or Japan, whose debt is oﬀset against its citizens’ savings, the
US and UK are constrained by unmanageable public and private debt. This,
combined with low growth and historically low interest rates, has encouraged
both economies to ‘steal’ growth from emerging markets, creating the risk of
currency wars which always ‘begin in an atmosphere of insuﬃcient internal
growth. The country that starts down this road typically ﬁnds itself with high
unemployment, low or declining growth, a weak banking sector and
deteriorating public ﬁnances’ (Rickards 2011: 38).
As the world’s largest debtor, the US is thus free-riding on the international
monetary system, leveraging its trade deﬁcit and debt as weapons to export
inﬂation to emerging markets while exploiting the privileged status of the US
dollar as the premier reserve currency to externalize and conceal its domestic
economic and political contradictions. In the short term, argues Prasad
(2014), the US-led banking cartel can continue to attract foreign investors as
long as a ‘delicate political equilibrium’ is sustained – that is to say, as long as
domestic holders of US securities retain their faith that the Federal govern-
ment will not resort to hyperinﬂation. It can also even try to drive money
capital into government-sponsored debt by reclassifying private bank deposits
as ‘paper investments’, turning depositors’ funds into potential bankruptcy
disbursements as the primary instrument for bank ‘bail-ins’ in the next
ﬁnancial crisis (Schortgen 2014).
In the long term, however, these tactics are unsustainable, for once it
becomes clear that the Federal Reserve can no longer guarantee liquidity (and
as a result of rehypothecation and constraints on supply, lacks adequate phy-
sical gold to oﬀset its balance of payments deﬁcit and honour requests by
central banks for repatriation of their bullion); once it becomes clear that
monetary expansion and deﬁcit spending are reaching critical thresholds,
leading to unpredictable non-linear consequences (cf. Mishkin et al. 2013;
Moran 2012); and once rival currencies acquire a larger share of central bank
currency reserves, the status quo will become untenable and exit from the US
dollar will accelerate – although this process will be chaotic and potentially
catastrophic for the rest of the world since an unplanned reset in the value of
the dollar would lead to revaluation in the value of all assets priced in dollars
(except gold). To guarantee global liquidity in the next crisis, argues Rickards
(2014), some form of top-down multilateral money creation based on the
IMF’s SDR facility may be necessary to prevent a disorderly restructuring of
the global monetary system – that is, to put in place an alternative multi-
lateral currency arrangement before investor conﬁdence in the dollar evapo-
rates and before non-Western economies move to conduct trade transactions
in other currencies.
Yet some observers argue that foreign investors are already exiting long-
term US debt – evidenced by the increasing purchase of short-term US
Treasury liabilities since 2008 – and predict that the rate of foreign buying
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cannot keep pace with the rising rate of US debt issuance (Skarica 2011: 42),
even if the appearance of status quo is maintained in the short term by sup-
pressing gold through sell-oﬀs of gold paper derivatives, extending the
maturity of US Treasury securities already purchased by the Federal Reserve,
or even prompting foreign investors to purchase dollar assets via ‘cut-out’
arrangements (e.g. Belgium), to create the impression that international
demand is steady and prevent the dollar from sliding (cf. Mackenzie 2014).
Above all, it is the appearance of a strong dollar that must be defended –
even if major surplus economies like China are seeking alternatives to the US
bond markets and conducting major international trade transactions in their
own currencies.
In the short term, therefore, the fragility of the international monetary
system seems to ensure the paradoxical stability of the US dollar (Prasad
2014). Yet as debt-to-GDP ratios deteriorate and interest rates rise, the cost of
servicing US debt is likely to rise to more than 30 per cent of Federal gov-
ernment spending by 2016 (Pento 2013a: 159), creating further instability in a
bond market already massively overinﬂated by Federal Reserve asset pur-
chases. Global monetary reset is likely to be accelerated by the decision of
major energy producers like Russia, Iran or Saudi Arabia to cease trading in
US dollars and accept alternative currencies for oil and gas exports, obliging
central banks around the world to rebalance their reserves away from the
dollar – though, as we shall see in Chapter 7, it is clear that Western security
services will attempt to destabilize any state that tries to exit the dollar system
early. Although it is unlikely that a direct hostile assault on the dollar would
take the form of dumping US Treasury securities on the market, if transna-
tional investors unload dollar assets, the Federal Reserve will be forced to
raise interest rates to sustain competitive bidding for longer-maturing bonds
(Rickards 2011; Tanous & Cox 2011).8 Yet, as the US government itself must
be aware, this is unlikely to sustain investor conﬁdence indeﬁnitely, leaving US
corporate-state elites with three options, namely: (i) devaluation (creating
price inﬂation and political instability in emerging markets which appear to
oﬀer investors alternative havens) (Bond 2007); (ii) suppression of the gold
market through derivatives trading in ‘paper gold’ to defend the dollar-
denominated international payments system; and (iii) radical currency reva-
luation leading to the replacement of the defunct dollar with a new gold-backed
monetary unit with variable global/domestic conversion rates to ensure the
continuity of transnational class power and the preservation of plutocratic
wealth.
Conclusion
As one study on the international monetary system argues, since 2007 ‘the
West has been assailed by the longest-running crisis since the 1930s, hollow-
ing out the natural ambitions of the countries that used to run the world, and
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weakening the natural pull of the US and European currencies’ (OMFIF
2013: 3). In the new global economy capital is sovereign, and it is impossible
for states to resist international pressure for a return to sound money as a
means of payment and store of value for transnational investors. Capitalist
sovereignty is contingent on the unconstrained global circulation of money
capital, and as Goldner (2009: 1) rightly observes, it is the general pattern of
capital to ‘cheapen all commodities, including the universal commodity labor-
power’. Since the recession of the 1970s, Western states have resorted to
inﬂation to conceal distributional conﬂicts in the absence of robust economic
growth, accompanied by ﬁnancialization to compensate for declining proﬁt-
ability in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. This has fuelled the accumulation
of ﬁctitious capital through an intensiﬁcation of the debt relation and the
development of new ﬁnancial instruments to expand corporate balance sheets
and satisfy demands for continually rising shareholder value, exaggerating
price-to-earnings ratios. The primary threat to the economic future of the
West is not the debt relation itself, however, but the liquidity fetish that has
been the driving force of the credit cycle since the 1970s and which is desta-
bilizing bond markets at the risk of devaluation or default. As Warner argues:
Monetary activism may have helped save the UK and the US from
greater calamity after the ﬁnancial crisis, but it only steals growth from
the future and from others. One eﬀect of loose money is currency deva-
luation, which might give a temporary boost but merely shifts the deﬂa-
tionary problem onto other states. This in turn produces a race to the
bottom as each country attempts to outdo the other. Globally, it’s a zero
sum game.
(Warner 2014c: 2)
This zero-sum game will not harm global investors, particularly those with
the foresight to invest in gold before it is remonetized, or exit bond markets
before debt auctions fail. Those economies and corporate investors that do
exit the dollar system at the earliest point are likely to become the leading
players in a post-US-centric global economy (cf. Willie 2013), though mone-
tary reset will cause massive capital ﬂight and strip wealth from US con-
sumers following the example of similar sudden economic adjustments in
history, including Thailand, Russia, Argentina and Greece. This will mark the
beginning of the end of a complex international monetary system centred on
the US – a system that eﬀectively disguises and suppresses its own volatility
through continual expansion of the credit-debt nexus and the creation of ever-
greater asset bubbles to compensate for the political failure to address the
accumulation crisis of Western ﬁnancial capitalism. Given the irresistible force of
changing global capital ﬂows, however, monetary reset will also accelerate
global economic rebalancing, potentially recreating the economic conditions
for a (temporary) return to proﬁtable accumulation as the economic centre of
gravity in a post-US-centric growth system shifts towards Asia.
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Notes
1 Shiller defends the idea of (regulated) ﬁnancial capitalism as a legitimate expression
of the aggressive competitiveness of human culture, arguing that it ‘creates a safe
venue for power struggles without violence. Achieving such a system requires
appropriate innovations that humanize ﬁnance […] There is no known economic
system that can perfect aggressive human impulses, but they can be softened’
(Shiller 2012: 1). This may, of course, be true in a purely formal sense – that is,
where business is viewed naïvely as a game driven by ‘animal spirits’ which must
be ‘tamed’ without undermining proﬁts. Yet the author is unable to conceptualize
either the brutal origins of capitalist ﬁnance in primitive accumulation, or the
symbolic violence of ﬁnancial power as a destructive machine that creates ﬁctitious
value through a massive leveraging of debt and intensiﬁcation of risk, with
catastrophic human consequences when the system eventually collapses.
2 Although Hobson (2004) highlights the superior development of military
technology in China in the thirteenth century.
3 See Middelkoop (2014). Figures valid for December 2013. In the US, the Federal
Reserve now owns 12 per cent of US Treasury bonds. In the UK, where the
national debt reached 99 per cent of GDP in 2014, the Bank of England has
acquired 25 per cent of UK Treasury liabilities through its Asset Purchase Fund.
4 See moneyweek.com/prices-news-charts/oil. Rising oil prices carry geopolitical risks
for the US, beneﬁting major energy exporters like Russia, which was able to pay oﬀ
a large part of its national debt during the oil price boom of the 2000s. High oil
prices also harm the global mining industry and the US oil industry by increasing
the cost of exploration and extraction.
5 The US Federal Bureau of Statistics estimates that only 62.8 per cent of Americans
of working age are in employment. See: data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000
(online data obtained 28 January 2014).
6 For a statistical breakdown of real poverty rates in the US, see www.povertyusa.org/
the-state-of-poverty/poverty-facts.
7 On the UK’s unsustainable consumer debt, see Titcombe (2014). UK consumers
possess 70 per cent of the credit cards issued in the EU, on which interest is charged
at an average of 17.5 per cent.
8 Rickards (2011: 162) argues that if China, for example, wished to divest itself of
dollar assets without drawing ire from the US and without threatening the value of
its vast remaining holdings, it could simply switch from longer to shorter maturing
bonds without reducing its holdings: ‘shorter maturities are less volatile, meaning
the Chinese would be less vulnerable to market shocks. This shift would also make
the Chinese portfolio more liquid, vastly facilitating a full Chinese exit from Treas-
ury securities.’ The eﬀect of this, he adds, would be like ‘shortening the fuse on a
detonator’ (ibid.).
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6 Towards a posthegemonic global growth
system
Introduction
Resolution of the crisis of neoliberal capitalism suggests two possible out-
comes. The ﬁrst points towards a reversal of globalization as growth in
emerging market economies slows and the volume of world trade declines,
leading to a fragmentation of the global economy and a return to economic
nationalism. This outcome is possible, but unlikely, for four reasons. In the
ﬁrst place, although the momentum towards global economic integration has
slowed during the global recession, IMF forecasts suggest that growth in
emerging markets will average 5.0 per cent in 2015 – compared with 2.2 per
cent among G7 nations (IMF 2014).1 Indeed, long-term forecasts suggest
emerging market economies will continue to grow by an average of 6.7 per
cent annually between 2013 and 2030, and will eventually account for around
75 per cent of exports (Roland Berger Consulting 2011), although this – as
suggested in Chapter 5 – may not prevent Western economies attempting to
‘steal’ growth through competitive devaluation. Second, emerging economies
are likely to remain attractive destinations for FDI despite the slump in
global trade in the period 2010–14. Third, it is clear that in the new economic
geography of regionalism corporations in emerging economies have the
potential to reduce operating costs by locating labour-intensive stages of
production in low-wage spatial units (Buckley & Ghauri 2004), while bene-
ﬁting from rising consumer demand as developing economies experience
intensive urbanization and growing aﬄuence. Finally, it is clear that emerging
market economies have the option of reorienting their commercial strategies
to take greater advantage of regional trading blocs aimed at facilitating a free
ﬂow of corporate investment between states within regional spatial contexts –
exempliﬁed by the growing importance of ASEAN in South-East Asia or the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the MENA region. Regional organiza-
tions of this type are not counterhegemonic in any explicit ideological sense,
given their political and commercial ties to the US and EU, which actively
promote Western corporate interests by lobbying regional organizations in a
formal or informal capacity – for example, the campaign to deny India full
member status of APEC because this might tip the balance of power within
the organization towards Asia (Sahoo 2012). Yet, regional organizations are
multilateral in structure and outlook, seeking to facilitate corporate invest-
ment and drive economic growth across their respective regions rather than
advance the sovereign interests of any single (proto-)hegemonic state actor.
A second outcome is more probable, therefore, namely a posthegemonic
resolution of the crisis leading to new forms of capital restructuring and eco-
nomic rebalancing in favour of emerging market economies, compensating for
(yet potentially accelerating) the decline of the EU and North America as
Western economic power is undermined by devaluation, rising debt, unemploy-
ment and capital ﬂight. This may or may not herald a new post-Eurocentric
‘global modernity’, as Dirlik (2001) believes – particularly in view of the
continuing dependence of China on the US and EU consumer markets (cf.
Westra 2012). However, there is evidence to support the view that a recovery
of global trade over the next two decades – and thus a continued globaliza-
tion of capital – is contingent less on a recovery of the West to its former
status than on the further penetration of and entanglement of households in
emerging market economies by ﬁnancial instruments and products as capital
moves forward to escape its existing spatial and historical limits outside the
advanced capitalist states of North America, Japan and Western Europe
(Bryan 2012: 173; cf. Harvey 1982).2
What is certain, however, is that while sustained rapid growth was restored
in Asia in the ‘Golden Age’ of post-war capitalism after 1945 (Garnaut 2013),
exit from the accumulation crisis of the 1970s accelerated integration of
emerging economies into the global ﬁnancial system as non-Western cor-
porations began to challenge the hegemony of Western multinationals for
control of markets (Guillén & Ontiveros 2012). In addition, it is clear that
emerging economies have recovered far more rapidly after the recent ﬁnancial
crisis than the advanced economies, whose share of global GDP declined
sharply from 57.6 per cent in the period 1986–2007, to 47.9 per cent in the
period 2008–10 (Prasad 2012; cf. Marinov & Marinova 2013). Assuming the
stability of the world economy remains unaﬀected by rising geopolitical ten-
sions between China, Russia and the US (see Chapter 7), global rebalancing
points towards a multipolar growth system in which the Washington con-
sensus will be increasingly challenged by posthegemonic/counterhegemonic
regionalism. One of the clearest expressions of this phenomenon is the desire
of South-East Asian governments to avoid a repeat of the humiliation
experienced after the 1997 crisis when IMF support was made conditional on
painful structural adjustment. This helps to explain the determination of East
Asian economies to accumulate foreign exchange reserves as a hedge against
turbulence and the trend in the region towards closer economic and ﬁnancial
integration (Wheatley 2013a; Ziltener 2012).3
In this chapter we examine the expansion of transnational capital in Asia
and beyond, assessing the causes and consequences of globalizing capital
outside the Lockean heartland as the world economy moves towards a mul-
tipolar growth system. The key question is not when the balance of
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geoeconomic power will shift, but whether the transition from a US-centred
world economy will lead to rebalanced multilateralism (where global
instabilities created by the imbalance between surplus and deﬁcit economies
are – if not fully resolved – then at least partially addressed), or fragmented
regionalism (where interstate/interregional conﬂicts increase as corporations
compete more aggressively for global share of emerging markets within
regional accumulation regimes).
This leads to a secondary question, namely whether corporate-state elites in
the Anglosphere are in a position to accept and adapt to reserve currency
diversiﬁcation, which will inevitably undermine their ability to delay neces-
sary adjustments in global balance of payments and their associated capacity
to coerce non-Western governments to orient their monetary policies in line
with the dollar. As noted in the previous chapter, it is far from clear whether
overleveraged economies living beyond their means can tolerate reserve cur-
rency diversiﬁcation without resorting to defensive statecraft, increasing the
possibility of volatility in currency markets and geopolitical conﬂict. As we
shall see in the ﬁnal chapter, the implications of posthegemonic regionalism
and reserve currency diversiﬁcation for world order are complex and unpre-
dictable as the US struggles to cope with demands for global liquidity while
disengaging from its role as ‘provider of global security’ in preference for an
informal role in sustaining Western corporate inﬂuence in Eurasia, Africa and
Latin America. Although the US has presided over a monetary policy of
benign neglect for decades without having to restructure its ﬁscal or monetary
system to satisfy ﬁnancial markets, investor conﬁdence in reserve currencies
ultimately depends on whether they reﬂect economic fundamentals and/or
whether the issuing nation has the ﬁscal capacity to sustain liquidity during
crises. While there are no immediate threats to the dollar from either the euro
or renminbi, as a component of global currency reserves the US dollar has
declined relatively quickly from 70 per cent in 2000 to 62 per cent in 2013
(Wheatley 2013b).
Lin and Dailami ask whether the world is actually ready for economic
multipolarity – not simply the decline of a US-centred world economy but a
multilateral global growth system driven by emerging market economies:
Throughout history, paradigms of economic power have been drawn and
redrawn according to the rise and fall of those countries best equipped to
drive global growth and provide stimulus to the global economy. Multi-
polarity, meaning more than two dominant growth poles, has at times
been a feature of the world economy. But at no time in modern history have
developing countries been at the forefront of a multipolar economic system.
(Lin & Dailami 2011: 1)
By 2025, they predict, six emerging market economies (China, Brazil, India,
Indonesia, South Korea and Russia) will collectively account for 50 per cent
of global growth, a development that will put pressure on the international
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monetary system. As these states ‘pursue growth opportunities abroad and
are encouraged by improved policies at home’, they argue, ‘emerging market
corporations will play an increasingly prominent role in global business and
cross-border investment, while large pools of capital within their borders will
allow emerging economies to become key players in ﬁnancial markets’ (Lin &
Dailami 2011: 1).
The importance of this cannot be overstressed: not only does it highlight
the potential threat to the petrodollar cartel, but for the ﬁrst time in history it
raises the possibility that non-Western state actors and corporations will
assume a place ‘at the helm’ of the global economy as emerging market ﬁrms
increasingly dominate their own industrial sectors. This will put additional
pressure on the West to adapt to a multilateral framework for managing
cross-border trade and investment – although Western elites will resist calls
for a multipolar global ﬁnancial regulatory regime until it becomes unavoidable.
It will also place pressure on the West to support international development
more energetically in response to growing North-South interdependency,
particularly in view of the neoliberal argument that eﬀective transnational
governance depends on ‘leveraging that interdependency to strengthen inter-
national cooperation and boost worldwide prosperity’ (Lin & Dailami 2011: 1).
From a critical IPE perspective, however, the expansion of the global
economy and the movement of capital away from the West suggests a sus-
tained period of ‘poverty capitalism’ rather than rising prosperity. As Heinrich
argues, capitalist development in India and China
is at its very beginning […] If in the course of the next few decades a
middle class with purchasing power emerges in them – albeit comprising
merely 20 to 30 per cent of the population, with the rest living in poverty,
that alone would constitute a market of 600 to 700 million people, far
larger than the expanded European Union.
(Heinrich 2007: 1)
More importantly, he adds, the ‘massive army of poor people [in Asia]
ensures a stream of cheap labor for the decades ahead. For capital, all
manner of things might become scarce in the 21st century, but cheap labor
will not be among them’ (Heinrich 2007: 1, emphasis added). In periods of low
growth and intensiﬁed competition it is critical for corporate elites to pay
attention to the costs of horizontally integrated multinational ﬁrms because
commitment to particular sources of supply or demand of goods or services
becomes more risky and expensive, encouraging businesses to switch produc-
tion to cheaper sources of supply (Buckley & Ghauri 2004: 84). While the
capacity of corporations to generate high proﬁts in the West is declining, rates
of value augmentation are likely to increase globally as corporate actors shift
their focus from depressed markets, leading investors to expand their presence
in the Asia-Paciﬁc region where the urban proportion of the population
increased from 33 to 43 per cent in the period 1990–2011 (UNESCAP 2012),
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the majority concentrated in ‘super-agglomerations’ such as Shanghai,
Mumbai, Kolkata, Manila, Bangkok and Jakarta – cities which, through a
deepening global division of labour, have evolved into geoeconomic ‘hubs’ for
the twenty-ﬁrst century.4 This process is being driven not simply by state
actors, however, but by the global and regional commercial strategies of
corporate capital.
In what follows we assess the interrelation between regionalism, globaliza-
tion and economic development, and examine the theoretical contribution of
the new economic geography – an innovative sub-discipline of IPE concerned
with the spatial reordering of the world in accordance with the shifting geoe-
conomic priorities of capital. Regional economies can be deﬁned as ‘synergy-
laden systems of physical and relational assets, and intensifying globalization
is making this situation more and not less the case’ (Scott & Storper 2003:
579). Regions constitute an ‘essential dimension of the development process,
not just in the more advanced countries but also in less developed parts of the
world’ (ibid.), contributing to the ‘global mosaic of regional economies’ that
cut across territorial boundaries, while extending the economic frontiers of
capitalism beyond the core industrialized world (Scott 1998: 46–73).
Our primary concern is the geoeconomic logic of regional organizations
and FTAs through which capital organizes trade and investment and exploits
synergies between economies whose relations are determined by propinquity
and proximity, in order to facilitate a more proﬁtable allocation of capital in
the wider global economy. Scholars working in this ﬁeld of global political
economy and economic geography are concerned primarily with the func-
tional and political character of the new regionalism as a meso-level feature
of global governance in a decentred capitalist world system driven by the
competing pressures of globalism and statism. Central to this ﬁeld of research
is the inherent tension between the global multilateral trading system
advanced by global agencies like the IMF and WTO, and the growing
importance of regional formations as institutional mechanisms for maximizing
corporate proﬁtability.
The economic geography of competitive regionalism
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist between the ‘autarkic’ regional blocs created by
revisionist powers in the 1930s in opposition to the global imperial power of
the Anglosphere, and the competitive regionalisms of contemporary globali-
zation (Telò 2007). Most important, perhaps, is the fact that present devel-
opments are a structural phenomenon of international relations in a globally
integrated economy rather than a consequence of interimperial conﬂict: post-
hegemonic regionalism is an integral feature of globalization, which requires
transnational corporate actors to coordinate their commercial strategies
through trading blocs, customs unions and other regional organizations that
mitigate the impact of trade liberalization while improving terms of trade for
corporate entities seeking to grow and invest transnationally.
Towards a posthegemonic global growth system 145
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences also exist between contemporary regional forma-
tions, particularly strong/closed supranational structures like the EU and
weak/open intergovernmental trade agreements (Lane 2012). Liberal global-
ists theorize regionalization as one step in a logical progression towards a
rules-based global capitalist economy managed by transnational and transre-
gional governance structures; for realists, on the other hand, deepening
regional projects are potentially incompatible with this vision because regio-
nalization can also result in a zero-sum game between state-centred blocs that
compete for market share (geoeconomic realism), consolidating speciﬁc roads to
capitalism based on competing models of economic and cultural organization
(Telò 2007: 10).
One example of this would be the geopolitical tensions between the EU and
the new Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) under Russian patronage, which
have contributed to the crisis in Ukraine. Although these tensions have been
successfully leveraged and exploited by the US to sabotage Russia’s deepening
economies ties with the EU (see Chapter 7), realists are rightly sceptical of the
cosmopolitan vision of global multilateralism, for while capital constitutes the
dynamic and directionless force driving globalization – the real subject of a
new global sociality – globalization is taking place in a world of nation-states
and cannot be detached from geopolitics, not least the transnationally con-
stituted agency of the Anglosphere. Indeed, it is unrealistic to expect militar-
ized states like the US to forgo their hard-power advantage and relinquish
their prerogative to engage in coercive diplomacy and/or direct intervention to
achieve outcomes consistent with their geopolitical interests. Although many
celebrate the rise of competitive regionalism in Asia, Africa and Latin
America – highlighting the growth of both East-South and South-South
cooperation and regional challenges to the Washington consensus (Bhatta-
charyya 2011; Smith 2011; Flores-Macías 2012; Broadman 2007; Wylde 2012;
Pieterse 2011), Western economies will act to counter Russian, Indian and
Chinese penetration of markets in the Balkans, the greater MENA region and
Latin America.5
The rise of competitive regionalism and the emergence of new global
growth poles in a decentred world economy require us to rethink the question
of economic rebalancing from a critical perspective – that is, in terms of
the contradiction between the means and conditions of accumulation where the
‘necessary means to regulate and control the political basis of capital – the
wage-labour relation – contradict the ability of capital to expand’ (Smith
2008: 196). Capital reinforces spatial integration despite self-imposed geo-
graphical barriers. However, adds Smith, it is here that the contradiction of
capitalist globalization becomes clear:
First, to the extent that capital escapes one set of spatial barriers, it
reimposes them at a diﬀerent scale. New supranational regions require
political institutions to match, and the development of the EEC [Eur-
opean Economic Community] in particular owes much to this process.
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The new spatial ﬁxity brings back the old contradictions in spatial
integration and is no spatial ﬁx. But more important the tendency toward
the internationalization of capital is severely restrained by the necessity of
the nation-state as a means of political control.
(Smith 2008: 196)
As argued in Chapter 4, the state form of capital has evolved in accordance
with the internationalization of capitalist relations of power under US
hegemony, hastening the growth and intensiﬁcation of global governance –
although the synarchic capacity of the transnational capitalist state is dis-
torted by asymmetric relations between powerful state actors who prefer
‘governance with government’ to supranationalism. For this reason, Brenner
(2011) rejects geocentric interpretations of world order in contemporary
global capitalism that posit a borderless world where states (and geography
itself) no longer matter: spatial displacement leads to the creation of new
spaces of production which are contingent on state ﬁscal, monetary and
security policies, geographical contexts and labour conditions (cf. Harvey
1989).
As Brenner argues, critical social scientists must examine more closely how
sociospatial conﬁgurations are rescaled rather than levelled through corporate
globalization to ensure that the eﬀort to ‘transcend state-centric modes of
analysis does not entail a denial of the national state’s continued relevance as
a major locus of political-economic regulation’ (Brenner 2011: 103). The orga-
nization of state space and world space is being radically reformed, and the
contemporary form of capitalist spatial organization is now increasely inter-
twined with ‘historically speciﬁc patterns of uneven development insofar as it
entails the systematic privileging of some locations, places, territories, and scales,
and the marginalization and exclusion of others’ (ibid.: 106). The result is a
multiscalar reconﬁguration of the world economy into a hierarchy of local
agglomerations and regionally organized subnational/supranational scales which
facilitate corporate trade and investment. There is little to be gained by extra-
polating from the national-state to global-state form of capital when the com-
plexity of mediating scales is determined by a wide variety of contingent criteria,
for corporations employ spatially diverse market-seeking and asset-procurement
strategies, operating through complex diﬀerentiated networks of subsidiaries and
localized spatial monopolies which serve to increase ‘specialization and
localization to enhance the division of labour globally’ (Buckley & Ghauri 2004:
86).
Global economic restructuring, argues Brenner, heralds a ‘new wave of
deterritorialization and reterritorialization in which global socioeconomic
interdependencies are being signiﬁcantly extended in close conjunction with
the establishment, or restructuring, of relatively ﬁxed forms of capitalist
sociospatial organization at diverse subglobal geographical scales’ (Brenner
2011: 122). This leads not to one single scale becoming dominant but to
dynamic changes in the relations between spatial scales, creating an
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‘institutional mosaic composed of multiple, partially overlapping institutional
forms and regulatory conﬁgurations that are neither congruent, contiguous
nor coextensive with one another’ (ibid.: 113). As the advanced economies
attract less investment, the driving force of the new economic geography is the
inﬂow of direct corporate investment into emerging and transitional econo-
mies – 53 per cent of which ﬂowed to East, South and South-East Asia
between 2006 and 2011 (Iammarino & McCann 2013). Although the majority
of this FDI ﬂows from advanced to developing economies (89 per cent), the
decision by transnational corporations to locate production in developing and
transitional economies is accelerating transfers of capital, technology and
innovation from advanced to backward regions, rebalancing the global economy
away from the old industrial engines of the US, EU and Japan.
As such, the ‘ﬂat earth’ theory of global free trade popularized by liberal
globalists is a ﬁction. On the contrary, removal of barriers to trade ‘can
actually make geographical proximity more rather than less important. Many
economic activities beneﬁt from co-location, whether for reasons of simple
logistics, shared inputs, or beneﬁts of face-to-face contact’ (Iammarino &
McCann 2013: 12; cf. Arita & McCann 2000). While managerial hierarchies
and standardized procedures of global corporations function as ‘distance-
spanning devices’, the ‘most robust and innovative ﬂat networks are
disproportionately local’ (ibid.: 13). The implications of this critique can be
understood more clearly if we consider the economic logic of regional trading
blocs, through which corporate and state actors negotiate terms of coopera-
tion to manage the pressures of globalization in a post-Fordist capitalist
system characterized by a persistent tension between multilateralism and
regionalism – that is, between demands for global economic integration and
the consolidation of market share on the one hand, and regional economic
integration on the other. The growth of regional trade agreements is a less
familiar dimension of neoliberal globalization, and debate over their role in
the global economy raises familiar divisions between orthodox economic
theory and critical political economy.
For neoliberals the formation of regional trade agreements is explained in
terms of the ‘unambiguous gains to ﬁrms and consumers in founding member
countries. Unambiguous gains from trade bloc entry lure countries to enter
the bloc which results in the growth of bloc. This growth then generates gains
to existing member countries’ (Cumberworth 1996: 3), although there is some
debate over the optimal size of trading blocs for maximizing returns and their
welfare implications for global growth (Krugman 1991; Deardorﬀ & Stern
1994). As one WTO economist argues, regionalism represents ‘a challenge
because [regional trade agreements] can result in trade and investment diver-
sion leading to higher welfare costs for non-participants; an opportunity
because RTAs may create regional dynamic forces in favour of freer trade
which, in turn, can generate important welfare beneﬁts for the rest of the
world’ (Puche 2000: 123). Completion of the Uruguay Round of trade nego-
tiations in 1994 was intended to create a single global market – albeit without
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universal regulatory convergence; yet capitalist globalization has simulta-
neously accelerated the development of regional trading blocs because trade
among already existing (‘natural’) trading partners has intensiﬁed at a faster
pace because regional blocs represent ‘“safe havens” for many smaller coun-
tries that [can] not aﬀord a “wait and see” strategy in the international arena’
(ibid.: 124).
From a critical IPE perspective, on the other hand, the development of
regional trading blocs reﬂects both the uneven development of global capit-
alism as a world system and the shifting dynamics between advanced and
emerging market economies in a decentred global economy as states grouped
within overlapping regional blocs and coalitions of states (NAFTA, EU,
ASEAN, EEU, GCC, etc.) become the principal actors in the world economy
(Switky 2000: 26). Regional economic integration can be understood either as
a one-oﬀ event leading to a static outcome, or as a dynamic process that
generates its own momentum (the ‘spillover eﬀect’), but the economic logic of
regionalism is identical in both instances, namely to articulate modes of reg-
ulation consistent with the political economy of corporate capital. That is, in
a global economy characterized by uneven development, in which the multi-
lateralism of the post-war era under US leadership is disintegrating into
posthegemonic regionalism, regionalization provides a post-Fordist solution
to the demand from transnational corporations for both ﬂexible production
techniques and a ﬂexible deployment of labour and capital within trading
blocs/customs unions which constitute a step towards the reconstruction of
the capitalist state at a regional and interstate level (Michalak 1994: 44),
separate from yet coextensive with the state form of transnational capital
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The ‘tension between multilateralism and
regionalism’, argues Michalak, has ‘contributed to the international instabil-
ity and long-term crisis of capitalism. However, the exact nature of the
emerging new relations is not entirely clear’ (ibid.).
What is clear is that multilateral trade liberalization and regionalization
constitute two contradictory manifestations of the same basic tendency
towards overaccumulation in capitalism, the function of which is to ensure
the uninterrupted ‘expansionary reconstruction of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction’ (Michalak 1994: 50). In theory, regional trading blocs should act as a
hindrance to the freedom of global corporations to exploit diﬀerences in tax
regimes and ﬁnancial regulations between national economies, but the oppo-
site is in fact the case: regional trading blocs allow corporations to shelter
behind protectionism and thus should be understood as an attempt to ‘rein-
state national regulation on a continental scale’ (ibid.: 55). The reality is that
transnational corporations are far more regional than global in their spatial
extent, which Michalak attributes to the desire of transnational corporations
to enjoy the best of both worlds by exploiting the ‘economic advantages and
ﬂexibility of large markets as well as the protection aﬀorded by regional
trading arrangements’ (ibid.: 57). This reveals not only the weakness of neo-
liberal trade theory, but the economic reality of strategic trade intervention as
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a means for corporate-state actors to manage trade relations via participation
in regional blocs that contradict laissez-faire – a tendency already present in
the rise of the transnational corporation as the principal organizational form
of oligopolistic capital.
In the search for value, transnational corporations also exploit political
linkages and superior economic-cultural intelligence that pertain within
regional contexts for commercial advantage. Intraregional cross-border inte-
gration allows transnational corporations to develop diﬀerentiated networks
of subsidiaries sensitive to local market conditions. Although regional for-
mations may lack geographical contiguity and coextensivity, there is evidence
to suggest that capital beneﬁts from propinquity and proximity in the orga-
nization of production and perennial search for value, and that global strate-
gies may actually yield lower rates of proﬁt. Cross-border integration within
and between corporate ﬁrms depends on the formation of diﬀerentiated net-
works of suppliers and subsidiaries which must adapt to the simultaneous
(and potentially contradictory) pressures of global integration and sensitivity
to local market conditions (which in turn depend on the type of cross-border
investment involved and types of commodity being produced). Yet propin-
quity of production and superior geographical and cultural intelligence allow
corporations to take advantage of the higher intensity of exchange between
neighbouring countries (Ziltener 2012: 98), to obtain information on rivals
and reduce aggregate risk in ways that are simply not possible in global
markets.
This reveals the underlying logic of regional trading blocs, namely to allow
capital to gain preferential access to foreign markets and maximize commer-
cial relations with states that are also members of the same regional entity.
Although exclusive regional formations hinder global multilateralism by con-
taining trade within closed regions and/or reducing global capital ﬂows, they
advance trade by consolidating markets at a regional level and promoting
intraregional homogeneities which promote economic and ﬁnancial integra-
tion. This process is well established in the EU and needs no elaboration here
(see Matousek & Stavárek 2012), but developments outside Europe suggest
that regional ﬁnancial integration is emerging as a strategy for diversifying
and sharing risk, and for maximizing asset returns. Lower transaction costs
follow integration of ﬁnancial markets at every spatial level, increasing
demand for assets, while encouraging higher levels of risk diversiﬁcation. This
happens, argues Martin, because a ‘decline in transaction costs increases demand
for assets in the area, so that the eﬀective size of the market is enlarged’
(Martin 2011: 20). The tendency towards ﬁnancial market segmentation, he
adds, ‘means that there is a ﬁnancial home market eﬀect favourable to large
markets. Both regional and ﬁnancial integration means that smaller and
poorer countries gain. The greater the diﬀerence in size and development
among countries, the greater is the gain’ (ibid.). In a broader economic sense,
regional integration allows small economies to counterbalance dominant
players such as Germany in the eurozone, although states like Germany can
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exploit their leading position to advance their own national economic and
foreign policies (Bulmer 2013).
The challenge of emerging market economies
Attempts to theorize and explain the present transformation of the global
economy highlight diﬀerent aspects of the process. For some authors, the
main development is the rise of Asian regionalism, centred on China and
ASEAN (Katzenstein 2006), but also the broader Asia-Paciﬁc community
(APEC) within which China must compete for inﬂuence with the US. For
others the most important development is the transregional rise of emerging
market economies (notably the BRICS) and the challenge these present to
corporate interests linked to the advanced industrial economies of the West
(Marinov & Marinova 2013; Nayyar 2013; Desai 2013; Guillén & Ontiveros
2012). For still others, the main issue is the decline of Japanese pre-eminence
in Asia as one corner of the ‘old Triad’ and its replacement by China, South
Korea and other leading emerging market nations, which along with the US
and the EU comprise three opposing blocs in a global political economy
(McAllister & Sauvant 2013). Finally there are those who argue that, in the
absence of real structural reform, the US itself is in terminal decline and can
no longer compete in a posthegemonic world system (Janszen 2010; Roberts
2010; Robert & Maruschzik 2013), or at least cannot do so without falling
back on its traditional hard-power advantage to undermine rivals through the
projection of coercive ﬁnancial and military power (Nazemroaya 2012; Petras
& Veltmeyer 2011). We shall deal with this latter issue in the ﬁnal chapter. In
what follows here we examine the rise of new growth poles in the global
economy and assess the scale of the challenge presented by emerging markets
to the economic hegemony of the US, Europe and Japan.
For some critical international theorists, the global ﬁnancial crisis is evi-
dence of a trend towards deglobalization, signalling the end of the Washington
consensus. Bello (2013) is representative of this view, arguing that the source
of the crisis lies in the complex interdependence of a hyperglobalized econ-
omy that depends on a structural imbalance between indebted consumer
economies in the West and ‘chain-gang’ export economies in the East (cf. Cox
& Lee 2012; Westra 2012). Bello suggests that while there are pressures within
China to disentangle its economy from the US-China nexus forged in the
1990s, the most powerful collective lobby in China (state technocrats, entre-
preneurs, party-state managers, foreign investors, etc.) is opposed to relying
on domestic demand to fuel future growth. On the other hand, however, he
recognizes that the triumph of austerity in the US and EU will ‘surely elim-
inate these two areas as engines of recovery for the global economy’ (Bello
2013: 57), forcing China to consider alternatives to export-led growth –
potentially decoupling the People’s Republic from the present framework of
globalization.
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However, while there is no question emerging economies are beginning to
challenge Anglo-American and Japanese power in the global economy, and
that relative growth rates between the West and emerging markets are sharply
divergent, the evidence suggests that since the Asian crisis cyclical inter-
dependence has intensiﬁed (Dervis¸ 2012; cf. Kose & Prasad 2010), and fore-
casts of the death of neoliberalism are overstated. As suggested in Chapter 1,
it is precisely through cautious adaptation to globalization that previously
authoritarian states such as Brazil, China, South Korea, Indonesia, Russia
and Mexico have progressed out of isolation and stagnation: although ‘vari-
eties of capitalism’ are relevant in a cultural-geographical sense, and although
capitalist globalization has been marked by a parallel acceleration of region-
alism, adaptation to an economic system forged in the West has enabled
emerging market economies to develop towards convergence with the US and
EU (measured in terms of purchasing price parity) as new growth poles in the
global economy. Pressure to satisfy the rising expectations of their own
population is suﬃcient in and of itself for emerging market leaders (revisionist
or not) to adapt to the discipline of global markets – even at the price of
generating unrealistic expectations of exponential growth in the face of
increasing energy scarcity (Klare 2008).
As Guillén and Ontiveros argue, although there is no doubt that the crisis
of neoliberalism ‘fundamentally challenged the assumptions and institutions
that underpinned the growth of the global economy in the second half of the
twentieth century including the roles of ﬁscal and monetary policies, the wel-
fare state, and international monetary cooperation’ (Guillén & Ontiveros
2012: 16), there has been a failure in any meaningful sense to challenge, dis-
credit or modify the growth-oriented market ideology of capitalism. While
status competition and conﬂict over scarce resources are set to increase as
global convergence proceeds (Davies 2012), there is little indication that the
subordination of human labour-power and creativity to the process of
expanding value or the subsumption of the biosphere to the requirements of
capital are in general retreat.6
It was suggested in the last chapter that the future growth prospects of the
West have been diminished by the negative consequences of ﬁnancialization.
Developments in the US and UK are particularly concerning for, in contrast
to the eurozone, where oﬃcials have at least revealed the extent of the crisis in
the ‘Club Med’ states, Anglo-American elites have failed to address the con-
straints of the FIRE (ﬁnance, insurance and real estate) economy and the
stagnation of investment, as consumption (fuelled by low interest rates and
increased personal debt) once again begins to take oﬀ (Warner 2014a).
In sharp contrast to the stagnation of the advanced, high-income economies of
the West, emerging market multinational corporations in the Asia-Paciﬁc
region lie at the centre of the shift in the distribution of global economic
power. In contrast with the post-1945 period when capital ﬂowed primarily
between developed economies, the transition towards a posthegemonic global
economy is leading to the growth of FDI between core and emerging market
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economies and an intensiﬁcation of trade between economies in the global
South (cf. Bhattacharyya 2011; Broadman 2007). By 2010 multinationals in
emerging market economies already accounted for 29 per cent of global cor-
porations, with the highest number in China (Guillén & Ontiveros 2012: 27).
By 2030, more than 50 per cent of ‘cumulative foreign direct investment will
be accounted for by emerging market multinationals, and half of the Fortune
Global 500 ﬁrms will be emerging market multinationals’. Many of these
ﬁrms, which invest to acquire market access and procure resources, brands
and technologies, ‘grew big in [their] domestic market and are now seeking to
expand their selling opportunities by making greenﬁeld investments and
acquisitions abroad’ (ibid.). This expansion of emerging market corporate
power is due not only to investment strategies, but to the experience of capi-
talist development in developing regions which employ local forms of ﬁnance
to bolster growth regimes against the backdrop of ﬁnancialization in the West,
and which beneﬁt from a global division of labour as capital secures the
expansionary reconstruction of new sources of accumulation on a transnational
basis.
In Chapter 5 it was noted that the crisis of accumulation in state-democratic
capitalism in the 1970s led to a spatial expansion of trade and FDI in regions
where development has consistently lagged behind the West. The inter-
nationalization of capitalist relations has led to an acceleration of modernization
in non-Western economies, which are less constrained in their capacity to
adapt to change, in contrast with Western economies which initiated the
process of globalization but ﬁnd it diﬃcult to adapt to new standards and
processes in the global economy. This phenomenon was originally theorized
by Trotsky (1932) in the ‘law of uneven and combined development’, which
Jan Romein reformulated as the ‘law of the handicap of the head start’,
according to which those states at the forefront of economic modernization
are rarely able to sustain their lead when confronted by competitors who
import capitalist relations of production and exploitation and learn from the
mistakes of pioneers (Van der Linden 2007).7 This phenomenon is evidenced
dramatically by the rapid economic modernization of East Asia following the
spectacular rise of Japan, which not only beneﬁted from emulating and
adapting production techniques developed in Europe and America, but which
(like West Germany) took advantage of defeat and reconstruction under the
US security umbrella to completely rebuild its economy. Trotsky originally
deﬁned uneven and combined development with reference to the supersession
of England as the world’s premier economy in the interwar period:
Although compelled to follow after the advanced countries, a backward
country does not take things in the same order. The privilege of historic
backwardness […] permits, or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is
ready in advance of any speciﬁed date, skipping a whole series of inter-
mediate stages. Savages throw away their bows and arrows for riﬂes all at
once, without travelling the road which lay between those two weapons in
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the past. The European colonists in America did not begin history all
over again from the beginning. The fact that Germany and the US have
now economically outstripped England was made possible by the very
backwardness of their capitalist development […] The development of
historically backward nations leads necessarily to a peculiar combination
of diﬀerent stages in the historic process. Their development as a whole
acquires a planless, complex, combined character.
(Trotsky 1932: 26–27)
The internationalization of capitalist social relations led to the supersession of
the US by Japan and West Germany as exporting nations – followed by
South-East Asia in the 1980s and China in the 1990s. Capital accelerated
economic development and accumulation, although the ‘forces that have
made East Asian capitalism so dynamic for so long have inevitably brought
[…] challenges. The continuous process of capital accumulation and the per-
ennial reconstitution of markets as the principle of the economy have unlea-
shed constant political, demographic and economic pressures’ (Walter & Zhang
2012: 3; cf. Bond 2007).
For Avineri, the economic ‘advantages’ of backwardness theorized by
Trotsky can be summarized in the following schematic model:
1 backward societies are subject to exogenous sources of change through
interaction with developed societies;
2 the eﬀect of this interaction for the backward society is traumatic;
3 the eﬀect of this interaction leads the backward society to emulate those
features of the developed economy that make it advanced;
4 emulation allows backward economies to adopt ready-made models
allowing them to skip various stages of societal modernization and
technical innovation;
5 this accelerated telescoping of development creates dissonance/
pathologies between pre-modern and modern development forms; and
6 the result is ‘uneven and combined development’ – a non-uniform and
potentially combustible process (Avineri 1977: 70–73).
Trotsky’s analysis was based on the unique historical experience of Russia, a
backward state that did indeed succumb to the contradictory and combustible
combination of archaic and modern forms in 1917, leading eventually to
Trotsky’s exile and the rise of Stalin. However, notwithstanding the ﬂawed
brilliance of Trotsky’s incomplete attempt to lend theoretical rigour to the
concept of ‘permanent revolution’, it is the assumption of accelerated
development that really matters, for while the state form of capital was
fundamental to the postcolonial experience of the global South in the
twentieth century, the primary consequence for non-Western societies of pro-
longed exposure to empire is that ‘capitalism in the West [has] had the long-
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term eﬀect of transforming backward societies in a direction historically
unprecedented’ (Avineri 1977: 79).8
In East Asian economies, in particular, this process has been phenomenal,
rendering the Asia-Paciﬁc region the most important theatre of global cor-
porate investment as emerging market corporations develop their physical
and intellectual infrastructure and scale the hierarchical ladder of the world’s
most important companies, accounting for 41 per cent of global cross-border
investment in 2012 (Guillén & García-Canal 2013: 4). It is not only emerging
market transnational corporations in Asia that have grown in recent decades,
but also those in Latin America, Russia, India and the Middle East – regions
where cooperation and collusion between state and corporate elites help to
shield the latter from the market pressures that force many Western non-
ﬁnancial corporations to concentrate on short-term market results as a means
to deliver shareholder value.
However, while combined and uneven development of global capitalism
intensiﬁes the trend towards ‘co-existing multiplicity’ in world markets, turn-
ing the ‘descriptive fact of unevenness into a germ of interactive mutation’
between constituent elements in the capitalist world system (Rosenberg 2013:
583), emerging economies are never fully immune from what Trotsky termed
the ‘whip of external necessity’, namely the violence of ﬁnancial and mone-
tary dislocation originating in the metropole which has intensiﬁed since the
Federal Reserve initiated quantitative easing in 2009, destabilizing regional
economies such as Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Iran, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and
Russia. While economic fundamentals favour emerging economies, their
ﬁnancial and monetary stability are also undermined by the absence of
recovery in the West, as Western governments ‘combine vast handouts to the
banks with austerity for the masses […] promoting growth and job-creation is
always linked to so-called “structural reforms”, a euphemism for the
destruction of all forms of economic security for workers’ (Grey 2013: 1).
Austerity depresses demand for imports from emerging markets, which in
turn reduces the capacity of emerging market corporations to drive growth
and recovery in the global economy. In addition, it is clear Western central
banks are content to export deﬂation via quantitative easing – a monetary
version of ‘currency war’ where stimulus enables central bankers to counter
falling prices in their own economies by exporting deﬂation to less developed
regions of the global economy, adding to concerns about ﬁnancial resilience
in emerging markets (Hooy et al. 2013; Devereux & Yetman 2011).
Yet emerging market corporations are still able to leverage backwardness to
their own advantage, adapting ready-made models which allow them to skip
speciﬁc stages of modernization and innovation, for the rise of emerging
economies and regions in the capitalist periphery is also driven by the chaotic,
risk-prone nature of corporate investment in developing regions which lack
the historically matured ﬁnesse of Western ﬁnancial capital as a coercive lever
of power. In contrast with Western multinationals, ‘emerging market multi-
nationals started their international expansion lacking proprietary technology
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and strong brand reputations, so they had to compete with diﬀerent weapons’
(Guillén & García-Canal 2013: 13). In addition, relative ‘scarcity of resources
such as capital or skilled labor invited emerging market multinationals to
innovate, to make it possible to accomplish more with less. They turned their
disadvantages into advantages’ (ibid.).
Central to emerging market corporate success is a willingness to take
greater risks, and to adapt to and embrace chaos by learning and proﬁting
from adverse institutional environments, a pattern suggested by the specta-
cular rise of East Asian corporations such as Samsung and Acer. Adapting to
chaotic conditions in their own domestic economies is understood to enable
such emerging market corporations to gain ‘ﬁrm-speciﬁc capabilities’ which
can then be applied in foreign markets to achieve superior performance in the
global economy, suggesting important lessons for less ﬂexible transnational
corporations in the West still struggling to exit the global recession (Guillén &
García-Canal 2013: 110, 169):
The development of emerging-market ﬁrms into a potent force for glo-
balization in their own right will have important implications for cross-
border capital formation, technology generation and diﬀusion, and
ﬁnancing of commercial activities. A number of innovative and dynamic
emerging-market ﬁrms are on a path toward dominating their industrial
sectors globally – much in the same way that companies based in
advanced economies have done over the past half century. Many emerging-
market ﬁrms have already begun overtaking their advanced-country
competitors in terms of the priority accorded to developing innovative
technologies and industrial processes, with 114 ﬁrms from emerging
economies ranking among the top 1000 ﬁrms worldwide by R&D
spending as of 2009, twice as many as ﬁve years earlier.
(World Bank 2011: 5)
This is in large part due to the determination of developing economies in Asia
to catch up with Japan and the West, but it is also due to the expansion and
intensiﬁcation of economic transmission channels between developed and
emerging market economies, both of which now constitute ‘growth poles’ in
the global economy supported by new concentrations of ﬁnancial capital.
In a World Bank study of the multipolar economy, a ‘growth pole’ is
deﬁned as any ‘economy whose domestic growth helps drive the growth pro-
cess in other economies’ (World Bank 2011: 16), in other words, an engine of
capital accumulation. The term ‘growth pole’ was initially used to refer to
‘agglomerations of ﬁrms or industries in which growth is concentrated and
that had linkages to each other and to peripheral ﬁrms. Since then, the term
has been applied to an increasingly varied set of related concepts, with
“growth pole” quickly taking on a spatial or geographic dimension’ (ibid.).
The idea of growth polarity has since been ‘extended to the global scale while
simultaneously becoming somewhat enmeshed with the concept of polarity
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(sites of geopolitical/geoeconomic power) being developed in the international
relations literature’. This, it is argued, ‘reﬂects the intuitive idea that geopolitical
inﬂuence stems ultimately from economic size’ (ibid.).
A growth pole entails a complex series of economic transmission channels,
the most important of which is scientiﬁc-technological progress as a ‘spillover’
eﬀect (technology transfer). Transmission channels are ﬂows of knowledge
which operate through ﬁnance, trade and labour migration as well as direct
transfers of physical and human capital. Scientiﬁc and technological innova-
tion have always functioned as engines of productivity growth in capitalist
economies, but their diﬀusion to emerging markets economies – in addition to
FDI in physical and human capital, is understood to be the primary reason
for the growth of productivity and income per capita in developing regions of
the global economy. However, it is also imperative to consider other prox-
imate factors such as capital accumulation, population, physical capital, edu-
cation and health, as well as structural factors like political institutions and
geography (World Bank 2011: 22). As Table 6.1 shows, whereas advanced
economies were drivers of growth in the last century, this is changing: ‘Using
a measure of polarity that captures growth spillovers via trade, ﬁnance, and
technology channels – deﬁned as a country’s multidimensional polarity
Table 6.1 Multidimensional polarity index, 2004–08 average
Economy real index Economy HBS index Economy PPP index
China 26.20 Euro area 47.34 China 63.70
US 20.33 China 41.54 US 51.26
Euro area 10.86 US 30.51 Euro area 40.15
Japan 5.59 Russia 25.60 Japan 28.15
UK 5.51 Canada 22.61 Russia 26.02
South Korea 5.41 UK 22.49 South Korea 24.57
Russia 4.79 South Korea 20.49 UK 24.01
India 4.62 Australia 20.26 India 23.38
Singapore 4.30 Brazil 19.48 Singapore. 22.95
Canada 4.08 Norway 19.25 Canada 22.92
Australia 3.27 Saudi Arabia 19.18 Saudi Arabia 21.33
Malaysia 3.12 Turkey 19.17 Turkey 21.33
Turkey 3.07 India 19.14 Mexico 21.27
Mexico 2.94 Singapore 19.11 Malaysia 21.19
Saudi Arabia 2.94 Poland 18.76 Australia 21.14
Source: World Bank 2011: 20
Note: HBS = Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson measure; PPP = purchasing price parity. Real, HBS and
PPP-adjusted indexes indicate growth rates calculated from, respectively, GDP data in real 2000
US dollars, nominal local currency converted to US dollars at current exchange rates and deﬂated
by US prices, and 2005 international PPP-adjusted dollars.
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index – the downward trend in the indexes of large advanced economies is
evident’ (ibid.: 19).9
Between 1997 and 2003 emerging market cross-border investment through
merger and acquisition (M&A) deals equalled $189 billion (4 per cent of total
M&A activity in the period) (World Bank 2011: 5–6). Between 2004 and
2010, however, this ﬁgure increased to $1.1 trillion (17 per cent of the total).
Since 2003, roughly 5,000 ﬁrms ‘based in emerging markets have established a
global presence through 12,516 green-ﬁeld investments of $1.72 trillion’
(ibid.). In addition, more than a ‘third of FDI inﬂows to developing countries
now originate in other developing countries: of the 11,113 cross-border M&A
deals announced worldwide in 2010, 5623 […] involved emerging market
companies, either as buyers or as takeover targets by advanced-country ﬁrms’
(ibid.). Indeed, whereas the global ﬁnancial crisis led to a 28 per cent fall in
emerging markets’ outward investment in 2008–09, comparatively ‘this dete-
rioration was considerably less than the almost halved FDI outﬂows from
developed economies in 2009 vs. its level in 2008’ (Marinov & Marinova
2013: 6). Most resilient among emerging markets (despite the negative inﬂa-
tionary eﬀect of US monetary policy) were the BRICS, which accounted at
year-end 2011 for more than 70 per cent of cumulative FDI from emerging
market economies (ibid.), and 28 per cent of global outward FDI in 2010
(Bertoni et al. 2013: 47; cf. McAllister & Sauvant 2013). While high-income
nations are ‘only gradually’ recovering from the ﬁnancial crisis, despite slowing in
2015 emerging market economies
swiftly returned to their fast pre-crisis growth trend. China was one of the
ﬁrst economies to emerge from the crisis, and it returned quickly to
around 10 per cent growth. India experienced a stronger contraction, but
also attained more than 10 per cent growth in 2010, and the government
is putting in place an ambitious new Five Year Plan […] to keep growth
at that level. Latin America sharply rebounded in 2010, after contracting
sharply in 2009. Even Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to return quickly
to almost 6 per cent annual growth, similar to its performance in the
years before the crisis.
(World Bank 2011: 2)
This does not mean – as Bello (2013: 119–36) correctly argues – that China or
the BRICS economies can save the world from economic depression, or that a
new dawn of East-South/South-South cooperation will suddenly overwhelm
the West. However, there is every indication that global economic rebalancing
will have geopolitical consequences as older rivalries and dependencies
between the West and global South are challenged by the growing assertive-
ness of emerging economies, changing patterns of global growth, changing
patterns of cross-border trade and investment, while generating new forms of
economic cooperation that go beyond the older structures of asymmetric
domination and dependency inherited from the imperial era.
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Nayyar (2013) theorizes the approaching transformation of the global
economy as a long-run dialectical process, focusing on the end of a long
period of divergence, where Asian, African and Latin American economies
lagged behind the West due to the asymmetries of political and economic
power created by the experience of colonialism and deindustrialization in
regions governed by European empires; and the beginnings of convergence, as
developing economies began to close the gap, reﬂected in changing patterns
of global GDP (see Table 6.2, ﬁgures adjusted for purchasing power parity).
While relative levels of development in Asia and Europe in the eighteenth
century were broadly similar, the decline of the ‘rest’ from 1820 to 1950 led to
sharp asymmetries between European and non-European societies (speciﬁ-
cally in Asia, where the share of global GDP declined from 36 per cent to 16
per cent) (Nayyar 2013: 20; cf. Amsden 2001). The subsequent coercive inte-
gration of Latin America, Asia and Africa into the European colonial trading
system, a process stimulated by capital outﬂows from Europe and increased
ﬂows of migration, set in motion a process of transformation where uneven
development eventually led to reduced asymmetries, with developing countries’
share of global GDP reaching 35 per cent by 1990 (Table 6.2).
If these data are adjusted to account for present market value, however, a
diﬀerent picture emerges (see Table 6.3). It must be stressed that while average
Table 6.2 Share of world population and global GDP, 1950–2008
1950 1962 1973 1980 1990 2001 2008
World population
Asia 55.5 52.2 54.6 55.5 56.6 57.3 57.4
Africa 9.0 9.5 10.1 10.8 12.0 13.5 14.6
Latin America 6.5 7.3 7.8 8.1 8.4 8.6 8.7
Developing countries 67.0 69.1 72.5 74.4 77.0 79.4 80.7
Industrialized countries 22.4 20.7 18.3 17.0 15.2 14.0 13.3
Eastern Europe/former
USSR
10.6 10.3 9.2 8.6 7.8 6.6 6.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Global GDP
Asia 15.6 14.9 16.3 18.3 23.3 31.0 38.0
Africa 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.4
Latin America 7.8 8.1 8.7 9.8 8.3 8.2 7.9
Developing countries 27.1 26.6 28.4 31.7 34.9 42.5 49.4
Industrialized countries 59.8 59.8 58.7 56.4 55.4 51.9 44.2
Eastern Europe/former
USSR
13.0 13.6 12.9 11.9 9.8 5.6 6.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Nayyar 2013: 50
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incomes in the developing world remain a fraction of those in industrialized
nations, average incomes as a measure of GDP per capita in the West are
exaggerated when compared with the actual distribution of wealth and
income in the last two decades. This point is stressed by Saez (2013: 7), who
notes that over the period 1993–2012 average incomes in the US grew by 17.9
per cent, while the income of the top 1 per cent grew by 86.1 per cent. During
the period of ‘economic recovery’ in the EU and US (2010–12), the fraction
of total growth captured by the top 1 per cent rose to 95 per cent, while real
income growth for the bottom 99 per cent stagnated at 0.4 per cent.10
Inequality in the UK is, by comparison, lower, with estimates suggesting
that in the period 2008–10 the top 1 per cent of British society possessed 13
per cent of national wealth (including pensions), compared with 44 per cent
for the top 10 per cent, 62 per cent for the top 20 per cent, and 10 per cent for
the lower 50 per cent (Hills & Bastagi 2013: 26). Yet the most important
feature of economic statistics is the direction of trends: on the one hand,
growth rates in Asia from 1991 to 2008 averaged 6.5 per cent, and in developing
states as a whole the equivalent ﬁgure was 5.5 per cent. This compares with
2.2 per cent in industrialized countries, where growth collapsed between 2008 and
2011 to −0.8 per cent (Nayyar 2012: 68–69); on the other hand, the global
share of GDP of developing countries has eﬀectively doubled since 1970,
suggesting an historic process of economic convergence driven by the deter-
mination of Asia and Latin America to overcome relative backwardness
through coordinated state intervention, state-managed ﬁnancial architectures,
controlled labour markets and basic welfare provision (cf. Walter & Zhang
2012: 17). As we have seen, the signiﬁcance of backwardness was identiﬁed by
Trotsky, but it was also grasped by Gerschenkron (1962), and while
Gerschenkron’s model has many limitations, its ‘generalizations from history
[…] provide analytical insights into how a mix of ideology and institutions, or
economics and politics, might foster success in countries which are later-comers
to industrialization’ (Nayyar 2013: 70).
Table 6.3 GDP and GDP per capita in developing countries and the world economy
(in current prices and at market exchange rates)
Year Developing
countries
GDP
(US$
billion)
World
GDP
(US$
billion)
GDP of
developing
countries
as % of
global
GDP
Developing
countries
GDP per
capita
(US$)
Industrialized
countries
GDP per
capita
(US$)
Developing
countries GDP
per capita as % of
industrialized
countries GDP
per capita
1970 549 3,283 16.7 209 2,873 7.3
1980 2,540 11,865 21.4 772 9,710 8.0
1990 3,851 22,206 17.3 947 19,303 4.9
2000 6,973 32,244 21.6 1,444 24,898 5.3
2010 20,362 63,151 32.2 3,715 39,723 9.4
Source: Nayyar 2013: 58
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As relative market shares of emerging and developed economies converge,
global wealth and asset holdings are shifting toward emerging markets (World
Bank 2011: 4). In sociological terms, however, the ‘winners’ of globalization
remain the transnational investor class and the rising middle classes in emer-
ging market economies whose prosperity contrasts starkly with the stagnating
or falling incomes of intermediate strata in the US and EU (Milanovic 2012).11
Measured in terms of purchasing power parity, the developing world in aggre-
gate now comprises roughly 50 per cent of global GDP, and this ﬁgure is rising
as growth in Asia, Latin America and Africa continues to outstrip the US, EU
and Japan. As Nayyar argues, the ‘idea that latecomers to industrialization catch
up with countries that are leaders, over time, exists in unconventional economic
history and orthodox theory’ (Nayyar 2012: 73). However, he cautions, this trend
cannot be taken for granted, for ‘there is nothing automatic about convergence,
just as there is nothing automatic about growth’ (ibid.). Ultimately, the process of
industrialization depends on a series of structural transformations in national
(and regional) economies, including most importantly the absorption of rural
labour by manufacturing and the rise of the tertiary sector. Statistically the evi-
dence suggests that developing economies now account for 40 per cent of global
manufacturing, of which 88 per cent is concentrated in Asia (34 per cent of
which are in high-technology industries) (ibid.: 111–13). Yet, in most emerging
markets employment in the manufacturing and service sectors is haphazard and
insecure, and a large proportion of workers survive due to informal labour, living
in slums with few legal protections or political rights. The result is an uneven
picture and, building on Amsden’s (2001) typology, Nayyar lists 14 states
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and South Africa) which have suc-
ceeded in approaching some level of convergence with the West. This group (the
‘next 14’) constitutes 73.9 per cent of the total GDP of developing nations, 75.3
per cent of developing economy manufacturing exports, and 85.6 per cent of
manufacturing value added (ibid.: 129).
McAllister and Sauvant (2013: 15) assess the growing importance of FDI
from emerging markets for the global economy. Data suggest that global
corporations headquartered in emerging economies now account for 30 per
cent of all outward and 17 per cent of inward FDI. The authors argue that
the increasing importance of outward foreign investment ﬂows by emerging
market multinational enterprises are the ‘latest discernible pattern’ in global
outward FDI: ‘In a global market once dominated by the US and the EU,
this duopoly gave way to the Triad of the US, EU and Japan.’ However, they
argue, this ‘Triad declined, as Japan entered a prolonged period of economic
stagnation […] The rise in OFDI from emerging markets has contributed to
the appearance of a “New Triad” consisting of the US, EU and emerging mar-
kets’ (ibid.: 18). However, the concept of a New Triad – no matter how sug-
gestive – must be disaggregated into a ‘multipolar FDI world’, where newer
growth poles co-exist with established economies. In this sense, they concur
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with the World Bank assessment outlined above, namely that a process of global
rebalancing is taking place in line with changes in the global balance of power.
To understand this multipolar global growth system, we need to consider
not only statistics on the contribution of emerging market multinationals to
global FDI, or their participation in mergers and acquisitions and new
greenﬁeld investment, but the wider strategies employed by emerging market
economies prior to and since the ﬁnancial crisis. Were it not for the cata-
strophic consequences of the global ﬁnancial crisis for the West, it would
be tempting to speculate that the decision to allow Lehman Brothers to col-
lapse was an act of ﬁnancial terrorism to facilitate the subsequent bail-out of
the banking sector which in turn facilitated the leveraged buy-out of America
by its ﬁnancial sector (Brown 2013; Ivry 2014), sending shockwaves through
the global economy, curtailing growth in emerging markets as the US strug-
gled with the legacy of two failed military adventures, declining international
goodwill and an unwinding housing bubble. However, while ﬁnancial coercion
is a powerful weapon – and the US ﬁnancial authorities are fully aware of the
negative impact of limited adjustments to US monetary policy on emerging
economies – such notions are simplistic and overlook the desperate attempts
by Western corporate-state elites to stem the deepening crisis in 2009 by
pouring liquidity into the international monetary system.
What is clear, though – and this point is emphasized by those who remain
sceptical of the long-term economic prospects of BRICS economies – is that
the dramatic rise of emerging economies is determined above all not by
exposure to but manipulation of globalization – that is to say, by the capacity
of economies like China, India, Russia and Brazil strategically to ‘shape the
conditions of entry of foreign goods and companies into a country’ (Beausang
2012: 13). This reﬂects not only the reality of negotiated adaptation to the
Washington consensus (and the development of revisionist alternatives to it),
but the tendency for emerging economies to rely on the state form of capital
as a stakeholder in capitalist development (Ban & Blyth 2011). From this
perspective, adaptation to the Washington consensus may be more of a
formality than a necessity, for what really matters is the capacity of capital
operating across spatial scales to leverage commercial advantage through the
oligopolistic domination of local and/or regional markets while maximizing
yields from strategic FDI. Though vulnerable to monetary policy decisions in
the US and other external factors,12 emerging economies are well placed to
take advantage of superior economic fundamentals to attract investment and
provide ﬁnancial support for emerging market corporations in regional and
global markets, which is changing the geoeconomic balance of power in the
global capitalist sytem.
New growth poles in the global economy
While nervous investors are quick at the ﬁrst sign of geopolitical risk to seek
haven in US bond markets (MacDonald 2014), the ascent of emerging
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economies continues apace. Three reasons have been suggested why the crisis
has had little long-term eﬀect on emerging market growth, namely: (i) the
regional form of globalization discussed in the previous section, which linked
to the greater intensity and complexity of commercial and cultural ties between
geographically proximate economies; (ii) the advantages of regional trade as
an alternative to global market risk and the legal complexity of rules-based
global trade under the purview of the Washington consensus; and (iii) the
formative experience of previous ﬁnancial crises in Asia, Latin America,
Russia and elsewhere, which has encouraged emerging economies to develop
mechanisms of regional ﬁnancial integration to manage exogenous shocks.
The ﬁrst point we have discussed at length and it should be clear that regio-
nalization is an essential dimension of globalization. The second point will be
dealt with in Chapter 7 as a feature of counterhegemonic regionalism, which
Western observers fear could undermine hopes for global economic integra-
tion and liberal internationalism by eroding the purchasing power of the US
dollar and reducing Western access to resources in Eurasia. The third point,
however, needs elaboration before analysing reserve currency diversiﬁcation as
a monetary indicator of geoeconomic multipolarity.
The impact of the ﬁnancial crisis was most severe in the US due to the
intensity of ﬁnancialization and the failure of the US economy to recover
from the collapse of the dotcom bubble economy in the late 1990s (Janszen
2010). In addition, the crisis exposed the frailty of a service economy
dependent on debt-fuelled consumption as increasing numbers of Americans
succumbed to bankruptcy. In the indebted consumer economies of the EU,
on the other hand, crisis highlighted the lack of correspondence between
monetary and ﬁscal policy in the absence of political unity. As Teixeira
observes, the ﬁnancial crisis ‘revealed the limitations of a legal and regulatory
strategy towards market integration which is not accompanied by the
development of political integration and mutualization of economic and
ﬁnancial risks – ultimately a federal solution for the internal market’ (Teixeira
2011: 20).
In both the US and EU, however, the crisis underlined the weakness of the
ﬁnancial system itself – in particular the banking sector, which had failed to
meet appropriate standards of capitalization (Basel II rules) to weather the
ﬁnancial storm, as well as the weakness of public institutions and ﬁscal dis-
cipline in the southern periphery of Europe. Yet above all, the ﬁnancial crisis
indicated ﬂaws in market libertarianism as states rushed to bail out the
ﬁnancial sector and provide subsidies for protected industries. This testiﬁed
not only to the proximity/interdependence of corporate-state elites (despite
neoliberal calls for non-intervention), but the political risks entailed in the
sudden lurch towards neo-Keynesianism: as soon as the turbulence had eased,
Western governments announced the imposition of ﬁscal austerity to mitigate
the increased debt burden faced by states – a futile gesture in the UK where
debt-to-GDP ratios are worse than Greece, where the current account deﬁcit
is the worst among OECD states, and where ‘recovery’ is led by a ‘premature
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return to bad habits of house price inﬂation and credit-driven spending rather
than a revival of manufacturing and productive investment’ (Evans-Pritchard
2013: 1).
Developments outside the US and EU present a diﬀerent picture. The crisis
in the West had a severe impact on emerging market economies across the
globe, but their capacity to manage and recover from the turbulence of 2008
suggests a form of ‘decoupling’ within global corporatism – a development
some writers argue is fuelling a ‘clash of capitalisms’ already present after the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis (Breslin 2012). Not only did the crisis accelerate a pre-
existing shift in the balance of economic power from West to East, but the
resilience and subsequent recovery of economies outside North America,
Europe and Japan suggest that ‘while there has been a global economic eﬀect
(and perhaps even a global economic crisis), the ﬁnancial crisis was in the
West’ (Breslin 2012: 5). Emerging markets are increasingly employing a
defensive/assertive ‘shield and sword’ strategy to protect their economies
against contagion. This strategy has entailed two defensive measures:
First – as recommended in the ‘Washington consensus’ reforms promoted
by the IMF and World Bank – they spent budget resources and annoyed
entrenched domestic interests by introducing greater competition,
honesty, transparency and stability into their domestic banking systems.
Second, governments around the Paciﬁc Rim (as well as in Brazil and
India) followed developmentalist prescriptions to protect themselves by
amassing an unprecedented quantity of foreign exchange reserves – thus
simultaneously ignoring advice from international ﬁnancial institutions.
(Armijo & Katada 2014: 1–2)
It also entails a clear oﬀensive strategy, allowing the BRICS in particular to
leverage their new wealth by lobbying for more negotiating and voting rights
in IFIs like the IMF, while oﬀering innovative loans-for-natural-resources and
tied aid to states in Latin America and Africa (Armijo & Katada 2014; cf.
Bhattacharyya 2011). This is particularly relevant in East Asia, where the
traumatic experience of 1998 encouraged regional corporate-state elites to
modify systems of economic and ﬁnancial management to respond more
eﬀectively to turbulence by accumulating foreign exchange reserves, managing
exchange rates and improving regional ﬁnancial integration. For Asian lea-
ders, the goal was to build on existing forms of sub-regional integration to
consolidate the economic and ﬁnancial security of the region by exploiting
diversities in relative levels of economic development and capability (cf.
Kumar 2004). In Latin America, on the other hand – a region scarred by the
impact of coercive neoliberal reforms in the 1980s – the crisis has fuelled a
shift towards neo-developmentalism. Developing ideas associated with the
‘new structural economics’, neo-developmentalist regimes seek to mobilize all
available labour resources, transferring ﬁnancial capital to high-wage and
high-value-added sectors of the economy, experimenting with new
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conﬁgurations of state-market and state-society relations, while imposing new
relations with international ﬁnancial capital (Ban 2013; Wylde 2012).
To explain the response of East Asian economies to the crisis of neoliber-
alism, it is important to understand ﬁrst that in a capitalist economy ﬁnancial
crises lead inevitably to security crises. To mitigate their impact it is necessary
to create structures of regional ﬁnancial governance and regulation to reduce
systemic risk, for as one Japanese economist observes:
turmoil in any state’s economic and ﬁnancial system can undermine its
very existence. Therefore, any economic crisis that cuts across national
borders can be perceived by the aﬀected countries as a ‘security’ crisis
rather than being simply an ‘economic crisis’. The economic downturn
that began in 2007 and the near collapse of the global ﬁnancial system
certainly warrant being treated as critical threats to ‘national security’ for
a number of countries throughout the world.
(Oba 2013: 110)
With memories of 1998 still fresh in the minds of Asian decision makers –
when Asian economies collapsed due to excessive short-term lending and
high-risk pegs to the US dollar (Sinclair 2012a: 13) – the events of 2008
threatened renewed instability. At the same time, however, the global ﬁnancial
crisis oﬀered Asian corporate-state elites a new opportunity to extend their
political leverage, ‘because the developed economies were in severe decline
while evaluations of the potential for developing economies rose substantially’
(ibid.: 110–11). Although Japan remains politically and militarily tied to the
US, frustrating China’s pretensions to regional hegemony, Oba concludes that
the crisis of 2007–09 ‘altered the paradigm in the Asia-Paciﬁc in ways that
reﬂect a much deeper shift in global power and in the structure of the global
economy’ (ibid.: 111). Most importantly, however, the crisis oﬀered Asian
corporations an opportunity to test the utility and resilience of regional
ﬁnancial cooperation through mechanisms such as the Chiang Mai initiative
(a multilateral currency swap agreement linking ten Asian states), the Asian
Bond Market Initiative (a credit guarantee/investment facility linking the
ASEAN+3 states – China, Japan and South Korea), and the Asian Bond
Fund Initiative (ABF – a bond issue denominated in member state currencies
agreed by Asian central banks to promote ﬁnancial mediation and stability).
In the absence of a ‘grand plan’ akin to European federalism, it is important
to note that Asian regionalism began as a ‘bottom-up’ process driven largely
by market forces and ﬁnancial instability, but has since acquired a greater
political direction as ASEAN leaders in particular identify opportunities for
closer integration (Capannelli 2011).
A key reason for the establishment of intermediated bond funds in Asia is
to allow regional economies with large foreign currency reserves to invest in
ﬁnancial assets that realize eﬃcient returns. In a report from the 12th
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Roundtable on Capital Market Reform in Asia in 2012, the key objective of
the ABF is deﬁned as developing ‘eﬃcient and liquid bond markets in the
region so that savings in the region can be better utilized to the investment in
the region’ (Kurihara 2012). At the same time, all East Asian economies have
attempted to reduce short-term borrowing from IFIs and accumulate foreign
exchange reserves, while avoiding the type of investment in high-risk securities
that caused ﬁnancial meltdown in the US and UK in 2008.
The Asian crisis generated awareness of the need for meaningful defences
against global ‘hot money’ – idle capital that seeks immediate returns without
concern for conditionality, long-term ﬁnancial commitment or managed risk.
As Coppola argues, since the Western ﬁnancial crisis erupted, ‘there has been
considerable discussion about the role of capital ﬂows in the formation of
asset bubbles and their subsequent collapse, and about strategies for mana-
ging the movements of “hot money” from country to country in search of
yield and/or safety’ (Coppola 2014: 1). Yet there is little consensus on whether
capital controls are desirable or possible to contain or regulate ‘hot money’
ﬂows of the kind that destabilized Asia. The problem, argues Coppola, is
where ﬂows of idle capital actually go when they pour into and out of local
markets. Although the UK government is reluctant, despite growing percep-
tions of risk, to check ﬂows of idle capital into the London property market,
Asian corporate-state elites are wary, aware of the damage caused by the
collapse of the Japanese property boom in 1990. To mitigate the risk to eco-
nomic security, they are seeking to exploit the higher savings rate of their
domestic populations to fund foreign exchange reserves to boost investment
and defend investors and households against ﬁnancial speculation, engineer-
ing a regional economic recovery supported by regional ﬁnancial cooperation
and increased exports to meet demand in China. Although these economies
are keen to export to the West, the fragility of recovery in the US and Europe
is stimulating the regional direction of trade and growth in Asia, albeit with-
out reducing longstanding political rivalries (Oba 2013: 126). This is one
factor in explaining the slowness of attempts to consolidate the ‘noodle bowl’
of overlapping trade agreements across Asia into a closer form of regional
integration through the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership under negotiation between not only the ASEAN+3 economies but
also India, Australia and New Zealand (Armstrong 2013). A further stum-
bling bloc is China, where openness to free trade is historically less developed,
where political reluctance to ﬂoat the renminbi is pronounced, and where
preference is shown towards bilateral partnerships rather than multilateral
agreements (Volz 2010: 211).
Developments in Latin America oﬀer a further insight into the shifting
dynamics of economic regionalism in the developing world. Critics of the
Washington consensus argue that the neoliberal model failed in Latin Amer-
ica because it ‘concentrated income, reduced employment opportunities, lim-
ited business opportunities, and restricted social rights’ (Wylde 2012: 17).
Regional perceptions of the failure of neoliberal policies have led not to a
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rejection of capitalism in the region, however, but to qualiﬁed reassertion of
developmental sovereignty in a continent where the persistence of ‘heterodox
economic traditions at a domestic level, the endogenous dynamics of the
political system, and the extent to which corporate interests or mass publics
mobilized against pro-Washington consensus technocratic elites have all con-
tributed to bringing the state back in’ (Ban & Blyth 2011: 245). This has led
to a ‘proliferation of institutional and ideational hybrids’ of the Washington
consensus in an attempt to align globalization with ‘developmental’ concerns
(ibid.), but has not fundamentally transformed capital accumulation regimes
in a region where national-economic policy remains constrained by the power
of the bond markets (Kaplan 2013).
Neoliberal scholars distinguish two main forms of ‘leftism’ in the region:
on the one hand, sensible, ‘market-friendly’ developmentalism; on the other
hand, ‘authoritarian’ left-wing populism (Castañeda 2006; Kingstone 2011).
For Wylde (2012), however, this crude distinction derives from an outdated
conceptual distinction between social democracy (which Latin America has
never experienced) and populism that fails to capture the reality of Latin
American politics. Flores-Macías (2012) oﬀers a more sophisticated analysis
of the changing character of Latin American politics, and deﬁnes the core
policy goal of the Left as social justice, political demand for which has been
stimulated with diﬀerent levels of intensity by the fragmentation of traditionally
institutionalized party systems across the region.
The shortcomings of neoliberal orthodoxy in Latin America are revealed in
the growth of poverty and inequality in the 1980s and 1990s as a hindrance to
economic progress. Despite the much-vaunted success of neoliberalism in
Chile, between 1980 and 2008 the absolute number of people in poverty
across the continent increased from 136 to 190 million, with average poverty
rates falling slightly from 40 per cent to 36 per cent (Kacowicz 2013: 118–19).
Poverty has, however, been declining more rapidly since the election of left-
wing governments across the region due to improving educational opportu-
nities, accelerating growth and the adoption of new policy models focused on
taxation, trade, labour markets and assistance transfers (Cornia 2014).
Historically, the main causes of poverty in Latin America have been
domestic (social exclusion/unequal distribution), international (dependency/
debt), and intermestic (political-institutional variables with international and
domestic eﬀects) (Kacowicz 2013: 132–3). Yet the core problem concerns the
role of the state in stimulating growth: although the IMF and World Bank
call for improvements in governance and institution building, there is an
essential contradiction between this and the neoliberal policy prescription of
‘economic conditionality’, which has led to a ‘retreat and weakening of the
state in economic and social welfare terms, as the logical economic con-
sequence of the insertion of Latin American economies into globalization’
(ibid.: 133). In a developing capitalist economy the state should function like
a ‘transmission belt’, guiding investment, but the narrow social basis of the
state in Latin America hampers fulﬁlment of this role. As Kacowicz
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concludes, neoliberals wrongly assumed the ‘economic problems of the region
resided in the state, the solutions being in the market. As a matter of fact, the
public sector of the region is roughly half the size of the industrial countries
in the Western world (ibid.: 135–6; cf. Centano 2002). In fact, the precondi-
tion for growth is the reassertion of developmental sovereignty through active
management of the economy rather than the depoliticization of economic
policymaking. This has led Latin American governments to move beyond
neoliberal orthodoxy to embrace ‘inclusive growth’ led by a strong state that
accepts the economic logic of the market, embracing globalization as an
indispensable process while pursuing a ‘pro-poor pattern of growth and strong
poverty-addressing policies’ (Kacowicz 2013: 136).
In practice, neo-developmentalism constitutes a pragmatic form of
neoliberalism inspired by two features of postliberal capitalism in East
Asia: bureaucratic autonomy, enabling the state to formulate national-
economic goals more independently of sectional interests; and public-private
cooperation, enabling the state to form political coalitions with domestic
industries (Wylde 2012: 62). Neither of these ideas is new, and neither
constitutes a departure from neoliberalism. Following Rapley (2008), Wylde
notes that in a global economy developmental states avoid import-substitution
models to satisfy domestic demand and concentrate instead on export indus-
tries likely to promote new comparative advantages derived from dynamic
eﬃciencies (allocative eﬃciencies measured over time), rather than static eﬃ-
ciencies (allocative eﬃciencies measured at a single point in time) (Wylde
2012: 66). Inclusive growth goes beyond demands for Pareto eﬃciency (where
it is impossible to make anyone better oﬀ without making any others worse oﬀ)
to recognize that not only does technical innovation entail expensive public
investment in education, but that both state intervention and market exchange
entail transaction costs: the question is not which is ideologically superior, but
which is cost eﬀective under given political-economic conditions. The appro-
priate role of the state is to lower transaction costs and it ‘may even be
appropriate to incur higher transaction costs through state intervention, if
there were savings to be made on other costs that more than oﬀset them’
(ibid.: 68). In eﬀect, neo-developmentalism advocates a revised form of the
‘competition state’ to promote growth by aligning economic goals with the
investment priorities of capital markets. In this respect, neo-developmentalism
is not a coherent ideology of post-neoliberalism but a partial and temporary
resolution of social contradictions in the organization of capitalist power
created by historical patterns of uneven economic development and back-
wardness in the region (cf. Saad-Filho 2010; Cerny 1997, 2000; Cerny et al.
2005; Leys 2008).
Considerations of space rule out detailed analysis of the divergent reality of
‘pragmatic neoliberalism’ in speciﬁc Latin American states and its socio-
political causes. For some commentators, the rise of the left in Latin America
constitutes an epochal moment, announcing the end of US ‘imperialism’ in
the continent:
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The political result of the period of mass mobilizations [2000–03] was the
emergence of ‘center-left’ regimes, a hybrid reﬂecting some of the con-
sequences of the mass power as well as the continuities of the clientelistic
politics of the past. [This period] challenged many of the fundamental
features of the ‘Golden Age’ of US imperial rule. The movements called
into question the privatizations and denationalization of the economy, the
massive illicit foreign debt, the advance towards a highly prejudicial ‘free
trade-free market’ agreement with the US and a banking system sub-
ordinated to and plundered by foreign speculators linked through overseas
subsidiaries.
(Petras 2009: 452; cf. Robinson 2008)
Yet even radical intellectuals concede that opportunities for further radicali-
zation in the region are limited, in part because of the legacy of the global
ﬁnancial crisis, but also because of traditional geopolitical alignments. Gov-
ernments such as the Lula regime in Brazil (2003–08) exemplify the more
successful features of neo-developmentalism by reducing inﬂation and
increasing the size of the middle class (Kingstone 2011: 125), as the nation
seeks recognition as a ‘big country’ with a surplus of soft power promoting
‘consensual hegemony’ in the region (Malamud 2012).
Contrary to Petras’s (2008: 454) strident prediction, Brazil was in fact one
of the ﬁrst economies to recover after the 2008 crisis and its ﬁscal con-
servatism has won it support from investors, in stark contrast with Argentina,
which is criticized for intervening in strategic industries at the expense of
foreign investors. Yet at both extremes, orthodox austerity policies have been
combined with pro-cyclical policies designed to relax ﬁscal controls and tackle
poverty as governments leverage greater state capacity to channel funds into
social spending. As Kaplan (2013) observes, this combination of statism and
austerity reﬂects a desire to escape the constraints imposed by global capital
markets on national policy autonomy, as well as an aversion among Latin
American middle-class voters towards monetary instability gained from long
and bitter experience of hyperinﬂation.
The key question for the present study, however, is not the political progress
of the left in Latin America but the extent to which neo-developmentalism
has increased ﬁnancial resilience in the region as a growth pole in the global
economy. The evidence suggests that while the signiﬁcance of the develop-
mental state is limited to political demands for public investment in education
and greater poverty reduction, its relevance for regional ﬁnancial develop-
ment may be much greater. The reason for this lies in the capacity of global
investors to erode the economic autonomy of governments by threatening to
withdraw capital in response to higher inﬂation expectations, causing ﬁnancial
shocks with potentially devastating consequences. While Latin American
states are clearly keen to move beyond IMF orthodoxy, the political fate of
the region still depends on relations with the US, Europe and transnational
investors.
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For Kaplan, this means that the capacity of Latin American states to sti-
mulate their economies ‘depends on their ability to develop alternative forms
of ﬁnancing that are less susceptible to speculative market pressures. Without
such diversiﬁcation, future ﬁnancial turbulence threatens to intensify austerity
politics’ (Kaplan 2013: 284). In contrast with the US, EU and Japan, Latin
American economies have sought to mitigate the threat of ﬁnancial turbu-
lence and exogenously generated shocks by vastly reducing their exposure to
short-term capital ﬂows, which are unsuited to ﬁnancing long-term develop-
ment goals. To insulate their economies from ﬁnancial volatility, Latin
American regimes have attempted to ‘reduce their debt burdens, fortiﬁed their
stocks of currency reserves, implemented capital controls and developed local
bond markets that are less susceptible to speculative pressures from foreign
investors’ (ibid.). This has increased freedom of manoeuvre, leading to a
reduction in sovereign risk premiums (again in contrast with advanced
economies), allowing more ﬂexibility to respond to ﬁnancial shocks with
counter-cyclical policies. At the same time, acquisition of foreign exchange
reserves allows Latin American governments further insurance against risk
and market volatility (ibid.: 286).
Although capital controls give states additional policy autonomy the
political economy of Latin American capitalism is still dependent on the lib-
eralization of ﬁnancial markets. Yet the question remains whether liberal-
ization should be achieved through international or regional ﬁnancial
integration, and to what extent the latter can be achieved without a parallel
commitment to political or even monetary integration. As Haegen and Viñals
(2003) argue, regional integration in Latin America has historically been slow
for three reasons: ﬁrst, because of historically low levels of regional trade
integration; second, because of insuﬃcient institutional cooperation; and
third, because of frequent domestic ﬁnancial crises, which have dominated
domestic policy agendas in all the major economies of Mercosur, under-
mining attempts to widen intraregional trade ties and rationalize exchange
rates. A further reason lies in the appeal of North-South cooperation with the
US in preference to South-South cooperation, which has hampered trade and
ﬁnancial integration, a trend increased by the ‘informal dollarization’ of many
weaker Latin American economies (ibid.: 10). Financial integration and
development are thus relatively retarded in comparison with Asia and the
EU, where capital markets are more advanced, and where domestic savings
rates and ratios of market capitalization to GDP are much higher (Torre
et al. 2007). Yet, with greater market liberalization and the return of
growth after the crisis, the prospects for ﬁnancial sector development in the
region have radically improved, reducing regional dependence on external
sources of ﬁnance while providing a ‘structural shield to counteract the
negative spillovers from intensiﬁed currency market volatility’ (Bréard &
Blancas 2014: 3).
We can see here a parallel, albeit on a more modest scale, with develop-
ments in Asia. In both regions, regionalization is linked to the global
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ambitions of regional powers (China and Brazil), both of which are counter-
balanced and constrained by the regional interests of middle-level economies
(Japan/South Korea in Asia, Argentina/Mexico in Latin America). Yet eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial development in both regions is linked to the ‘hub-and-
spoke’ dynamics of growth in the major regional economies – and in the
capacity of those economies individually or collectively to promote ﬁnancial
depth (ratio of the value of total national ﬁnancial assets to GDP) and
ﬁnancial resilience in the face of market turbulence caused by ﬁnancial state-
craft or ﬁnancial mismanagement in the West. However, while global inves-
tors are keen to exploit opportunities aﬀorded by bond markets in emerging
markets, increased capital inﬂows are a major source of risk as investors eye
cautiously changes in monetary policy at the US Federal Reserve and ECB.
IMF reports attest that even where developing world states draw appropriate
lessons from previous crises and pursue sound policies (i.e. policies prescribed
by the IMF), they still ‘remain at risk of destabilizing outﬂows triggered by
changes elsewhere’ (Atkins 2014: 1). In eﬀect, argues Atkins, ‘global capital
markets have become too big for many emerging markets. When capital is
pulled out by fund managers there are insuﬃcient local buyers to step in.
Turbulence inevitably ensues’ (ibid.).
Although ﬁnancial statecraft is a weapon typically used by powerful
economies to coerce weaker states (Steil & Litan 2006), as Armijo and
Katada (2013) observe, emerging markets also employ sophisticated ‘sword-
and-shield’ tactics in preference to sovereign default or expropriation of
foreign-owned assets. One answer for emerging economies is to deepen local
investor bases, enabling domestic banks to buy public debt in the event of
capital ﬂight or sudden changes in monetary policy in the US. Another
option is for states like the BRICS to pool capital through the creation of a
self-managed contingent reserve currency fund (Wild et al. 2013), or (like
China and Venezuela) to oﬀer sovereign direct lending, providing alternative
sources of ﬁnance to global capital markets. A ﬁnal option is to diversify
away from the dollar and conduct trade transactions in local currencies, a
high-risk strategy that risks the possibility of retaliation. This is the strategy
being pursued by Russia and China as the US struggles to manage the decline
of the dollar. Russia in particular seeks to disengage from the US-centred
global trading system and create a new locus of power centred on the EEU, a
transregional organization with a wider geopolitical vision which builds on
the security structures of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Coming in the wake of bilateral
energy agreements between Moscow and Beijing, this counterhegemonic
geopolitical alignment constitutes a more serious threat to the transnationally
constituted geopolitical strategy of the West than the posthegemonic growth
poles in Southeast Asia and Latin America.
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Conclusion
The development of economic regionalism is a structural feature of and logi-
cal response to corporate globalization. On one level, governments have an
incentive to join regional FTAs to limit the risks entailed in free trade and
consolidate ties with neighbouring economies based on the synergies gained
from proximity and propinquity. This can be seen most clearly in the EU,
which is now the world’s largest economic bloc, but it can also be seen in the
case of ASEAN, which is developing systems of ﬁnancial integration reﬂect-
ing the common anxiety of signatory states towards the instability of the
global ﬁnancial system.
On another level, state-hegemonic regionalism reﬂects the aspiration of
economies like Germany within the EU, the US within NAFTA, or Russia in
the EEU to maximize opportunities for trade and investment based on their
regional economic weight and corporate market power. For ‘geoeconomic
realists’, this latter point is key, and demonstrates not only the importance of
regional bloc formation but the tendency for military conﬂict to be replaced
by economic rivalry. However, whether this ultimately contradicts or con-
solidates trends towards global multilateral trade advanced through the WTO
and the US-sponsored TTIP/TPP negotiations is more diﬃcult to predict, for
the outcome depends not only on the growing power of regional competitors
to the US (China, Germany, Russia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico,
Iran), but on the capacity of the US to defend the institutional and ideologi-
cal foundations of the Washington consensus as a condition for the survival
of the dollar as a global reserve currency. In a posthegemonic global economy
capital is sovereign, and it is impossible for states to resist international pres-
sure for a return to reliable money as a means of payment and store of value
for transnational trade and investment. If global trade ceases to be conducted
in US dollars, this will end America’s ‘exorbitant privilege’ and bring about a
major restructuring of the international economy and a consequent realignment
of world order.
Notes
1 IMF (2014: 45–67) forecasts for regional GDP growth in 2015: Japan 1.0 per cent;
Europe 1.9 per cent; advanced Asia 2.2 per cent; US 2.6 per cent; Latin America
2.7 per cent; Russia/CIS 3.1 per cent; MENA 4.5 per cent; sub-Saharan Africa 5.5
per cent; developing Asia 6.8 per cent; China 7.1 per cent.
2 Bryan observes that ‘households are now also conspicuous owners of ﬁnancial
assets, through pension schemes and home ownership. Both are now part of global
ﬁnancial processes, not just of high street banking’ (Bryan 2012: 174). Financial
markets trade in securities supported by household economies: ‘This securitization
sees payments out of household income forming the foundations of globally traded
ﬁnancial assets. The eﬀect is that labour changes from a class in production also
into a form of ﬁnancial asset with a distinctive risk proﬁle’ (ibid.).
3 Prasad (2014: xiii) argues that the global ﬁnancial crisis ‘shattered conventional
views about the level of reserves that is adequate to protect an economy from the
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spillover eﬀects of global crises. Even countries that had a large stockpile found
their reserves shrinking rapidly in a short period’.
4 On the phenomenal economic and cultural development of Asian cities, see the
collected essays in Daniels et al. 2012.
5 See, for example, Nazemroaya (2012) on the expanding global inﬂuence of NATO,
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. For a comprehensive analysis of comparative
regionalisms in the twenty-ﬁrst century, see the collected essays in Fanta et al.
2013.
6 See the ‘Manifesto against Labour’ by the German-based Gruppe Krisis. The
authors argue that in the ‘wake of the microelectronic revolution wealth produc-
tion increasingly became independent from the actual expenditure of human
labour power to an extent quite recently only imaginable in science ﬁction. No one
can seriously maintain any longer that this process can he halted or reversed’
(Krisis 1999: 1). Yet, they argue, capitalism is inextricable from an ideology of
abstract labour as an end in itself – that is, to create value. For this reason, ‘the
more it becomes obvious that the labour society is nearing its end, the more for-
cefully this realization is being repressed in public awareness’ (ibid.). In Germany,
debates on the exhaustion (Erschöpfung) of a society exposed to abstract labour as
a self-destructive end in itself are advanced. See, for example, the discussion in
Martynkewicz 2013. For a non-Marxist perspective on the future of labour in
advanced ‘postindustrial’ societies, see the discussion of Beck’s theory of ‘second
modernity’ in Sørensen & Christiansen 2012.
7 Considerations of space prohibit wider discussion of the debates in Marxism on
the viability of socialist development in pre-capitalist states. While some theorists
argue that socialism in a developing (peasant) economy is possible as long as capital-
ism is fully developed in the advanced states, as Van der Linden notes, Romein fell
‘victim to a very common phenomenon among non-technically schooled intellec-
tuals’, namely, ‘overestimating a people’s capacity to adapt to technology – an
overestimation that had led Lenin to make a “tragic mistake”’ (Van der Linden
2007: 157).
8 Trotsky insisted that emerging comparatively late, ‘Russian industry did not repeat
the development of the advanced economies, but inserted itself into this develop-
ment, adapting their latest achievements to its own backwardness’ (Trotsky 1932:
9, cited in Rosenberg 2013: 590). The limits of this notion were tested by the
experience of Stalinism, which Trotsky criticized for its ‘bureaucratic distortions’.
9 A multidimensional polarity index is a quantitative measure of an economy’s
contribution to the growth of the global economy, taking into account the strength
of spillovers from domestic development to global growth through trade, invest-
ment and the diﬀusion of technology. High numbers indicate the increasing
importance of a growth pole for the global economy in a given time period. For
further graphic representations of this index, see charts in World Bank (2011: 15–20).
10 Commenting on Saez’s paper, US News observed the growth-dampening impact of
gross inequality: ‘Wealthy people handle their money diﬀerently than the rest.
They tend to save a much higher percentage of their incremental income, or invest
it in ﬁxed assets […] These forms of saving and investment do not trickle down to
create signiﬁcant wage income for others.’ On the other hand, ‘incremental money
that ﬂows to the middle class and poor people gets spent much more quickly […]
Money that ﬂows to the middle class and poor has a multiplier eﬀect, rippling
through the economy to create more jobs and income for others’ (Brodwin 2013).
11 Milanovic observes that: ‘In 1988 a person with a median income in China was
richer than only 10% of world population. Twenty years later, a person at that
same position within China’s income distribution was richer than one-half the
world’s population. Thus, he or she leapfrogged over approximately 40% of people
in the world. For India, the improvement was more modest, but still remarkable. A
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person with a median income went from being at the 10th percentile globally to
the 27th, while a person at the same income position in Indonesia went from the
25th to 39th global percentile. An average person in Brazil gained, too. He or she
went from being around the 40th percentile of global income distribution to about
the 66th. The position of large European countries and the United States remained
about the same, with median income recipients there in the 80s and 90s of global
percentiles. But if the economic crisis that currently aﬀects these countries persists,
we should not be surprised to ﬁnd the median individual in the “rich world”
becoming globally poorer’ (Milanovic 2012: 1).
12 One external factor worthy of mention is demand for commodities in Asia, espe-
cially China, whose relative economic slowdown has inevitable implications for
relative growth rates in Latin America, Africa and other commodity-exporting
regions.
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7 Capitalist geopolitics
Introduction
Until recently, argues Philip Stephens in the Financial Times, Western leaders
believed China and Russia ‘would eventually decide they wanted to be like
“us”. China would develop as a responsible stakeholder in the existing inter-
national order and Russia, albeit with missteps, would see its future in inte-
gration with Europe’ (Stephens 2014: 1). However, he adds, Xi Jinping and
Vladimir Putin ‘have decided otherwise. The world is waking up from [its]
postmodern dreams of global governance to another era of great power
competition’ (ibid.). In this ﬁnal chapter we will examine the merits of this
observation and the extent to which it accurately reﬂects the unease felt by
Western leaders and commentators towards the emergence of a post-
hegemonic order and, more speciﬁcally, the implications of Chinese and
Russian foreign policy for the ﬁnancial and strategic power of the West. For
while Russia does indeed see its future in partnership with Europe, this is
precisely what the US and UK fear the most, namely a geopolitical con-
dominium between Berlin and Moscow which excludes the Anglosphere from
Eurasia. But while relations between Russia and the West are complicated by
Realpolitik, a deeper source of conﬂict concerns the ﬁnancial logic of capi-
talist geopolitics, namely the social form of monetary power constituted by
transnational capital in a decentred global growth system in which the US
dollar now constitutes a less secure medium of exchange and store of value.
The approaching conﬂict of the early twenty-ﬁrst century is not simply a
consequence of traditional great power rivalry or the refusal of the US to
abandon its claim to exceptionalism, but a conﬂict over the right to issue and
control the international unit of exchange, particularly in the global energy
markets. Since 1944, this right has belonged to the US, which abandoned gold
in 1971 and debased the dollar in a eﬀort to sustain America’s global ﬁnan-
cial and geopolitical power. However, America’s current failure to resolve its
ﬁscal crisis is undermining the stability of the US dollar as a transnational
form of money capital, and as the global economy transitions towards a
posthegemonic multipolar growth system, US corporate-state elites are faced
with the prospect of a multi-currency trade settlement system and a loss of
monopolistic power in the energy markets.
The dilemma facing the Anglosphere is whether to resist this process
through statecraft and war, or to engage with China, Russia and Germany to
facilitate an orderly reset of the international monetary system and limit
America’s net loss of power in a multi-currency system. While the recent
conﬂicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Ukraine suggest the US is
keen to block the normal development of systemic transition in international
relations and maximize relative gains by using military force (or proxy forces
organized by US intelligence) to create ‘facts on the ground’ in geopolitically
catalytic states (Brzezinski 1997; Tellis 2011; Meyssan 2014), because America
has more to lose from an unplanned end of the petrodollar it may eventually
be necessary for corporate-state elites in the US – as the vanguard of a transna-
tional capitalist class – to abandon the status quo and engage with revisionist
states to manage the geopolitical transition to a decentred international
monetary system.
It has been argued throughout the present study that capital is sovereign: if
transnational investors cannot place their trust in devalued paper currencies
then they will locate alternative means to secure the value of capital. As a
reserve currency, the US dollar since the 1970s has provided liquidity for the
international ﬁnancial system and expanded its circulation by linking its value
to oil – hence the centrality of oil in the determination of US foreign policy.
However, the petrodollar system is now under threat – not merely from
counterhegemonic powers such as Russia, but from Western allies in the
Middle East whose long-term ﬁnancial interests are no longer strictly con-
vergent with the interests of the US. Western elites are acutely aware that if
the present status of the dollar is unsustainable then logically it will not be
sustained (Middelkoop 2014).
Expert opinion is divided, but the assumption among ﬁnancial economists
is that the world could shift towards a more or less stable multi-currency
reserve system consisting of the dollar, the euro and the renminbi, in which
gold – as an international asset that is ‘nobody’s liability’ – is set to play a key
role in cushioning global monetary reset (OMFIF 2013). Yet the same elites
are also aware that the decline of dollar hegemony implies a corresponding
decline of US geopolitical power, for without ‘king dollar’ as a means of
payment, the US will have to pay its way without the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of
unlimited credit. The real threat posed by China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela,
therefore, is not that they are retreating from the dollar as a means for settling
international trade, but rather that in their impatience to reform the interna-
tional monetary system revisionist powers may precipitate a global reset
before the US is: (i) prepared to relinquish quantitative easing as a policy tool
to prevent recession; (ii) ready to adapt to a multi-currency reserve system
without conceding an irrevocable loss of power; and (iii) in a position to
exploit domestic shale gas production as a means to reduce dependency on
foreign oil imports, and hence dependency on the petrodollar system.
To explain capitalist geopolitics, it is necessary to go beyond simplistic
analyses of the military balance of power given that the US defence budget is
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equivalent to combined defence spending in the next 13 leading military
powers, making any direct comparison irrelevant. The point is that the rise of
emerging powers and concomitant decline of the West indicate that con-
temporary globalization is no longer necessarily coterminous with Western
leadership – a trend reﬂected in the declining status of the dollar as a symbol
of US global power and the decline of European ambitions to act as a nor-
mative power in world politics in favour of investment and trade strategies to
leverage the ﬁnancial might of European capital in its near periphery. As the
unipolar order proclaimed in the 1990s fades from memory, and as emerging
capitalist powers seek pluralist alternatives to a US-centric economy, the focus of
international conﬂict is moving towards the transnational form of money
capital as the material embodiment of the global power of the investor class.
As we saw in Chapter 4, to explain the changing character of world order,
liberal and cosmopolitan IR theorists emphasize the emergence of a new
geopolitics driven by global governance and complex interdependence. Many
are critical of Western states for failing to ‘practise what they preach’ by not
extending democracy as a political means for managing global aﬀairs, but
nevertheless believe ‘consolidated democracies’ in the West have a duty to
lead by example and demand the internal democratization of non-Western
authoritarian countries (Archibugi 2008). Cosmopolitans adhere to a norma-
tive vision of geopolitics emancipated from the lethal rivalries of the twentieth
century as political power is ‘tamed’. The ‘new’ geopolitics builds on soft
power rather than force, for globalization creates ‘new political spaces that
are being ﬁlled in various ways by both civil society representatives and pri-
vate sector actors. Such patterns of participation exert strong pressure to
move the new geopolitics toward a more peaceful and less war-oriented stan-
dard operating procedures’ (Falk 2012: 1). Falk concedes, however, that ‘we
live at a perilous historical moment. The old geopolitics is relying on hard
power regardless of cost or risk, and refusing to heed experience, while the
new geopolitics is struggling with torments of infancy’. It is unlikely, therefore,
that the new geopolitics will triumph in the immediate future, but there is
‘evidence of a sharpening tension between the two modes of sustaining
security and development in the early twenty-ﬁrst century’ (ibid.). The ‘old’
geopolitics was derived from a Western-centric imperial order that is now in
decline, but hard power has become less eﬀective for achieving geopolitical
outcomes through conventional warfare (cf. Kaldor 2012). On the contrary, it is
suggested, asymmetric wars have exposed the disutility of overwhelming military
force as a means for suppressing nationalist movements and defeating
insurgencies, as the US discovered to its great cost in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This cosmopolitan vision of democratic global governance is appealing in
many respects, not least for its claim that the process of democratization is
always incomplete, even in the West (Archibugi 2008: 20). Despite the
admirable sentiment that the principles we employ to determine rights should
treat all humans as moral equals (Blake 2013), however, as a normative
approach cosmopolitanism ignores the social-material determination of
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contemporary international relations in the transnational organization of
corporate power – that is, the material determination of capitalist sovereignty
as a transnationally constituted mode of power that intensiﬁes global inter-
dependence yet ultimately depends on the manipulation of outcomes through
the ﬁnancial statecraft and violence of state actors who rehearse the myth of
equal sovereignty but implicitly reject the principles of universality and gen-
erality upon which cosmopolitanism is founded. It also dehistoricizes the
transition from state-centred international relations to geocentric global gov-
ernance, conﬂating the deterritorialization of political power in neoliberalism
with a depoliticization of the international order. Cosmopolitans mistake the
most recent trends in world politics (the rise of non-state actors as ‘global
players’) for a blueprint of international relations in a multipolar world.
This universalizing projection of liberal prerogative dissolves rapidly into
philosophical irrelevance when confronted by the increasingly unmanageable
and chaotic reality of international politics in the present period, and reveals
the failure of Western liberals to recognize that it is the contradictory agency
of the US itself which constitutes the main destabilizing force in global poli-
tics, as other states wait for the US to change diplomatic course ﬁrst – a fact
recognized even by commentators associated with establishment policy insti-
tutions (Niblett 2010a: 4). In eﬀect, cosmopolitans extend to capitalist glo-
balization a directionality and functionality abstracted from the material basis
of transnational corporate power as a denationalized accumulation regime – a
new economic order aimed at the uniﬁcation of peoples under plutocracy
(Johnson 2014). This ‘postmodern internationalism’ is paradoxically fused in
a complex dialectic with a geopolitical imperative determined by traditional
factors such as enmity and defence of identity (Cohen-Tanugi 2008), and
depends on the violence of states to negotiate and enforce the deregulation
and liberalization of markets and regions necessary to facilitate the growth of
corporate power and corporate-ﬁnancial investment by developed and emerging
capitalist economies.
Attempts to diﬀerentiate between ‘old’ and ‘new’ geopolitics fail to appre-
hend the material determination of international relations, embodied in the
new global and regional geography of transnational corporate power. Further-
more, the cosmopolitan emphasis on a non-bellicose emancipatory geopolitics
leads to a fetishization of soft power which ﬁnds its authentic origin in the
social character of the commodity form in neoliberal global capitalism as an
exchangeable unit of wealth produced for proﬁtable sale rather than use value.
Soft power is not a ‘benign’ postmodern alternative to hard power, as idealists
simplistically assume; it is, rather, a policy instrument of corporate and state
entities based on the perfectly logical assumption that attraction rather than
repulsion is the optimal means for achieving preferred outcomes. The neo-
liberal mythology of ‘soft power’ conceals the reality of branding as a pre-
condition for accumulation in the global economy. Contrary to popular
assumptions, the exercise of non-coercive soft power to achieve voluntary
compliance is contingent on more than simply network agency:
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Soft power, according to Joseph Nye, is ‘the ability to get the outcomes
you want without having to force people to change their behavior
through threats or payments’. What complicates this premise is that a
‘payment’ could be made in the currency of social capital rather than in
money, while a ‘threat’ could be made by controlling or restricting access
to social capital rather than through an economic sanction. If for Nye a
payment belongs to the category of hard power because it is based not on
attraction and free subscription but on the issuance of cash to achieve an
outcome, forms of reward and punishment implicit in networks are still
left unconsidered; that is, on occasions or in situations where subscription
to a standard was necessary rather than voluntary.
(Van der Velden et al. 2008: 8)
The fetishization of ‘soft power’ in the neoliberal imaginary is implicitly
contingent on the generation of objects of desire through branding in global
commodity chains that employ labour-power in the capitalist periphery yet con-
sistently reproduce the dominant narratives of the capitalist metropole, fuel-
ling demand for new technologies and social needs in a potentially inﬁnite
cycle of accumulation and value augmentation. Far from being at liberty to
construct or project autonomous identities, unbranded (‘non-polar’) states
occupy precarious locations within transnational networks of corporate power
which determine capital allocation and resource ﬂows in an integrated econ-
omy. As the conﬂict with Russia demonstrates, the corporate-strategic simu-
lation of ‘soft’ power to ‘attract’ Ukraine involved a stage-managed
combination of symbolic violence (right-populist political subjectiﬁcation
based on identitarian identiﬁcation, emphasizing an abstract social feature
that constitutes the ‘people’), and naked coercion (clandestine training of neo-
fascist militias motivated by antipathy towards Russians and Jews). The eﬀect
of this was explosive, igniting a localized proxy war in the Donetsk region
while destroying Russia’s attempt to assert control over its own ‘brand’ as an
energy giant with a strategic presence in Eurasian geopolitics.
In what follows we examine two key dimensions of the unfolding conﬂict
between Russia, China, the US and the EU over the future of the interna-
tional monetary system and the long-term geostrategy of states faced with the
declining power of the hegemon, building on the discussion in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6. Our ﬁrst task is to examine the geopolitical dilemma of the West
as it confronts the decline of a US-centric world and the increasing will-
ingness of states to counterbalance US power. Here it is imperative to exam-
ine the self-identity and unity of the West itself which has been undermined
by tensions between the US/UK and eurozone over the future trajectory of
the international system and Europe’s location in it. The US and EU are
dominant actors (core capitalist powers) in the international system and their
interrelationship is key to the construction of world order. However, while the
US and EU share common interests – for example, the suppression of
nationalism in the MENA region and dissemination of liberal ideology – the
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strategic priority of the EU is interregionalism (formalized relations between
regional organizations), while the US favours unilateral action and bilateral-
ism in regional contexts (weak regions held together by trade relations)
(Hettne 2007: 107; cf. Reiterer 2014).1
Despite public displays of unity within the West, however, it is vital to
understand the political and economic rivalry that informs US-EU relations,
which are complicated by the rise of China and emerging market economies
in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The spectacle of Western unity projected
at G7 and NATO summits follows the protocols of diplomatic form, but this
does not conceal the declining sense of common purpose within NATO.
Areas of divergence within the alliance are not conﬁned to issues of global
security (e.g. disagreement over Iraq in 2003), but relate to the changing
symmetries of power between the US, the EU, China and Russia, the prior-
itization of transnational issues (Niblett 2010b), and the rationality of inter-
vening in conﬂict zones in Eurasia and the Middle East to reassert Western
geostrategic and ﬁnancial leadership in the face of counterhegemonic
regionalism.
Gamble (2013) posits four scenarios for world order in the twenty-ﬁrst
century, including unipolarity (US hegemony), bipolarity (shared leadership
between the US and China), multilateralism (transnational governance
through the G20), and multipolar regionalism (the end of US leadership, and
deglobalization). He suggests that the optimal scenario for the US is the ﬁrst,
while the EU is more likely to thrive in a multilateral or multipolar world
without a single leading power, yet it is unclear whether the EU can manage
its external relations without deferring to US leadership.
Our second task is to analyse the geopolitical strategy of the principal
contender states in the new multipolar order, and the implications of Russian,
Chinese and German foreign policy for Western corporate power. Limitations
of space preclude an exhaustive analysis of international relations between the
US and regional contender states, but it is essential to evaluate the impact of
counterhegemonic regionalism as the US exports its political, ﬁscal and
monetary crises to the international community while struggling to reassert a
unilateral foreign policy in strategic conﬂict zones. As will be clear, there is
increasing evidence that Russia and China are no longer willing to accept the
terms of US international monetary policy and US leadership in international
institutions. China in particular wishes to prepare its currency for a greater
role in international trade and investment – not for the sake of acquiring
reserve currency status itself, but as a result of dissatisfaction with the dollar
system and as part of its overall plan to increase the size and wealth of
China’s economy (OMFIF 2013: 14). To achieve this as a ‘capabilities-hiding
power’ (Deng Xiaoping’s term), China is obliged to tread carefully between
compliance with existing international institutions and preparation for global
monetary reset.
Less well understood, however, are the counterhegemonic aspirations of
key US ‘allies’, namely Germany and Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical
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interests are no longer fully congruent with US policy in Eurasia and the
MENA region. On the one hand, Germany now has the capacity and
opportunity to develop as a major regional force through the expanded eco-
nomic, political and monetary institutions of the EU (with or without the
UK), while forging closer ﬁnancial links with Russia, Ukraine and other post-
communist successor states, building on the terms of the 1994 Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement and the 2003 European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) which underpin EU trade and security ties with Eurasia and the
Mediterranean periphery (Hanieh 2013: 41–43). On the other hand, Saudi
Arabia (in competition with Iran) also has the capacity and opportunity
acting through the GCC to counter Western inﬂuence in the Gulf and wider
Middle East as the region acquires a more powerful role in global capital
markets as US-Saudi relations deteriorate following the US ‘tilt’ towards Iran
in 2013 (Chulov 2014; Viden 2014).
All four are major export economies seeking to consolidate their regional
power at the expense of Anglo-American capital, inviting retaliation in the
form of ﬁnancial turbulence and geopolitical destabilization. The descent of
Iraq into renewed conﬂict illustrates the dangerous consequences of shifting
alliances in Mesopotamia – the ‘hub’ of the arc of instability in the Eurasian
Balkans – as Western powers manipulate tensions in an attempt to mono-
polize control over the ﬂow of energy resources, and as regional powers
leverage their geopolitical inﬂuence by intervening in local conﬂicts.
The geopolitical dilemma of the West
If the US becomes a threat to global security, argues Smith, it will be because
it ﬁnds the prospect of multipolarity intolerable: ‘Americans thought the
“old” world they had left behind would disappear below the horizon. Instead
it has turned into a global “new” world surrounding the US’ (Smith 2006:
138). The geopolitical dilemma confronting the US centres on the future of
Eurasia as the geographical heartland of world politics, and how to contain
the geopolitical aspirations of contender states pursuing strategies beyond
followership and partnership while containing escalating domestic crises in
American society and rising tensions within the transatlantic alliance over its
‘common purpose’.
As Mittelman (2011) argues, the global ﬁnancial crisis had a lasting impact
on world order, leading to a surge in securitization in Western ﬁnance and
defence – a trend often unnoticed by observers who fail to link the ﬁnancial
and military dimensions of Western geostrategy as the US struggles to reas-
sert its leadership in the international system and retard the formation of
counterhegemonic blocs in Eurasia opposed to Anglo-American ﬁnancial and
military power. Although our main focus is the reset of the global monetary
system and its implications for the US, this process is inseparable from the
geopolitical struggle to secure the energy reserves of Eurasia, control over
which is central to US geostrategy. This struggle will be determined by the
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capacity of the US acting through CENTCOM (the NATO command
responsible for the area) or through regional proxies to prevent Russia and
China (acting collectively or individually) from securing energy, trade and
security agreements that exclude Western corporate interests, and which in
turn could precipitate a decline of the petrodollar system as the strategic and
material precondition for Anglo-American ﬁnancial and military power.
While the US and UK depict China and Russia as revisionist powers, it is the
intrusion of the Anglosphere in the complex geopolitical and interethnic dis-
putes of catalytic states in the Eurasian Balkans that is most detrimental to
the achievement of regional peace and security, creating the conditions for
future conﬂict and fuelling demands for further Western intervention.
Unravelling the complex determinants of Western foreign policy requires us
to identify areas of geopolitical convergence and divergence between the US
and EU, the extent to which the US and EU share a ‘common purpose’, and
the extent to which individual states within the transatlantic alliance are
willing to defect from established alliance policy and/or initiate unilateral
actions in support of their own perceived corporate-strategic interests. Expert
opinion on these issues is divided between Cold War liberals who celebrate
the resilience and stability of the NATO alliance system in an uncertain and
changing world (Brzezinski 2012; Petersen 2011; Hallams 2010), neo-
conservatives who mourn the lack of common purpose and complacency of
the West confronted by rising powers and security threats (Kagan 2004,
2009), liberal internationalists seeking to preserve the coherence of the Wes-
tern alliance (Cohen-Tanugi 2008; Thies 2009), and critical international the-
orists who highlight the corporate-political agendas that drive the foreign and
military strategy of NATO states in Eurasia and Africa (Johnstone 2002;
Nazemroaya 2012; Ganser 2005; Hoﬀmann 2012).
A similar lack of consensus reﬂects academic opinion on the interconnected
issues of reserve currency diversiﬁcation. For some the dollar is too ﬁrmly
established as the world’s premier reserve currency and symbol of US power,
and is invulnerable to challenges from the euro or renminbi – particularly if
European leaders fail to resolve the political and ﬁscal crises of the EU and
Chinese leaders continue to display extreme caution over monetary policy
(Williamson 2013; Prasad 2014). For others, the end of dollar hegemony is
inevitable: all that remains to be determined is: (i) whether collapse is pre-
cipitated by the Federal Reserve itself (through hyperinﬂation), or whether an
end to quantitative easing will lead to market collapse; (ii) whether pressure
from global investors, ratings agencies and foreign governments will lead to a
sell-oﬀ of US Treasury securities; and (iii) whether exit from the dollar will
lead to a more general breakdown of the international monetary system in its
entirety (Rickards 2014; Calleo 2009; Middelkoop 2014; Ivanova 2010).
Capitalist geopolitics and monetary power are irrevocably intertwined, and
each move made on the ‘grand chessboard’ reﬂects the deeper struggle by
capital to achieve security in an increasingly decentred global economy.
However, while foreign policy is driven by geostrategy, it is also essential to
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consider the impact of domestic-political factors in capitalist geopolitics, for
while militarism entails risks, the prospect of open-ended, low-intensity mili-
tary engagement in Eurasia provides a pretext for silencing political dissent,
absorbing excess capacity, oﬀsetting deﬂationary pressures in the economy
and stabilizing the power of dominant capital in the ﬁnancial markets. Viewed
historically, geopolitical instability tends to increase at the peak of capitalist
power – as in the 1940s when (as now) the income share of the top 10 per cent
of American society approached 50 per cent of GDP. As the plutocratic
power of wealthy elites approached this level, there was little room left for
further enrichment of capitalist elites, who subsequently suﬀered a relative
loss of power under the New Deal (Nitzan & Bichler 2012: 42). Put diﬀer-
ently, systemic crisis and geopolitical instability coincide at a point where
capitalist power approaches its asymptotic limits, after which logically it can
only be sustained through increased violence until all wealth is appropriated
by ﬁnancial elites. In the transition from democracy to oligarchy, the US and
UK are characterized by levels of inequality not witnessed since the 1930s,
accelerating the impoverishment and proletarianization of the middle class
and the fracture of meritocracy (Piketty 2014).
As is apparent in Greece, where unemployment reached 27 per cent of the
working population in January 2013 (Papageorgiou 2013), a rapid deteriora-
tion of economic conditions cannot occur without major political consequences,
for the closer capitalist power approaches its limits, the more resistance it
creates: ‘the greater the resistance, the more diﬃcult it is for those who hold
power to increase it further; the more diﬃcult it is to increase power, the
greater the need for even more force and sabotage’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2012:
21). This sabotage assumes many forms, including recession/unemployment
and increased police repression; or governments can temporarily sustain the
illusion of prosperity by transferring negative inﬂationary eﬀects of excess
liquidity to developing economies. Alternatively, for militarily powerful states
like the US, economic crisis can be used to justify organized violence and war.
As Schmitt (1932) argued, violence is a constitutive dimension of modernity
rather than its prehistory (cf. Maleševic´ 2010), and perhaps the most danger-
ous consequence of systemic fear among capitalist elites is that it will lead to
an intensiﬁcation of politics: a catalyzing moment leading to a suspension of
rule of law and externalization of conﬂict through military adventurism
justiﬁed in the language of statecraft or liberal universalism.
How, therefore, should we explain the geopolitical strategy of the West
confronted by the prospect of declining economic power? The ﬁrst and most
important point is to demonstrate the limits of older geopolitical theories
based on geographical determinism. A key thinker in this tradition is Mack-
inder, whose seminal paper ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ (1904),
inﬂuenced a generation of strategists in Britain and Germany, as well as
Russia and the US. Mackinder’s Heartland thesis is an early illustration of
sweeping grand theory in the classical realist tradition which must be placed
in the context of its time. For Mackinder, ‘all political action occurs in a
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geographical context, and spatial relationships, keyed to the facts of relative
location, are almost invariably of signiﬁcance. In other words, political beha-
viour necessarily is geopolitical’ (Gray 2005: 27). The academic study of
geopolitics suﬀers from ‘guilt by association’ because it has been appropriated
by imperial geostrategists (Mahan, Haushofer, Spykman, Brzezinski, etc.)
since its inception, but for Gray this makes as little sense as condemning
medical research for its obsession with disease: ‘Because much of academe
hold to the liberal illusion that international relations can be transformed
benignly’, he observes, ‘it associates geopolitics and its generally realist
approach to statecraft, with conditions that need to be changed’ (ibid.: 28).
The authentic ethical question is the motivation for seeking geopolitical
knowledge in the ﬁrst place and the practical use made of it by strategists
acting either as cheerleaders for their respective governments (Ahrari 2011;
Brzezinski 2012; Mahnken 2012), or as objective researchers. Insights
obtained through the study of statecraft are morally questionable if and only
if they are used to justify or facilitate coercive diplomacy and war, not if they
are intended to theorize the actions of bellicose states that regularly engage in
coercive diplomacy and war. The real weakness of traditional geopolitics is its
lack of reﬂexivity and failure to calibrate its classical realist premises through
dialogue with other critical traditions. As noted in Chapter 2, however, this
theoretical limitation can be overcome once we abandon geographical deter-
minism and acknowledge that behind geopolitical actions and concerns
economic interests are generally present (Adamo 2001).
To illustrate this point it will be instructive to examine brieﬂy the uncritical
and unreﬂexive thinking of Western geopolitical theorists who continue to
call for assertive US leadership yet fail to consider the implications of global
economic convergence for the future of the West. From a geopolitical per-
spective, the US is the intrusive force in Eurasia – a ‘non-resident dominant
military power’ (Ehteshami 2007) – for it is assumed that unless the US con-
tinues to try to inﬂuence the outcome of diplomacy and conﬂicts over energy
in Eurasia, it will decline into geopolitical irrelevance – becoming the ‘EU of
the Western hemisphere’ (Walton 2007). In other words, the US cannot
simply allow regional developments to take their course because this would
undermine the agency of Western ﬁnancial capital in Europe and Asia.
Students of geopolitics are in this respect deeply inﬂuenced by the work of
Mackinder (1904), whose anxieties towards Russia as a potentially impreg-
nable Eurasian land power still resonate in the work of strategists who see it is
as imperative for the US that ‘no power or coalition attains hegemony in
eastern Eurasia, much less that an explicitly hostile state or coalition succeeds
in doing so’ (ibid.: 65). Although the US sustained its global power in the
post-war period by containing the Soviet Union and preventing Eurasian
powers from exerting inﬂuence over the Western European and South-East
Asian peripheral zones (a policy advocated by Spykman (1942) in his analysis
of the ‘Rimland’), Western strategists today continue to argue that unless the
US maintains a military presence in Eurasia and controls the pace of China’s
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internal balancing and economic modernization, the region will once again
become closed to Western inﬂuence. This, they insist, would deny Western
energy ﬁrms access to the rich oil and gas deposits of the Caucasus and
Central Asia, a transregional space that will eventually be integrated into a
Eurasian trade and security system led by China and Russia as the key
BRICS economies and principal signatories to the SCO (see below).
While Walton acknowledges that the US must ‘adapt its foreign policy to
emerging realities’ and abandon the illusion of unipolarity at the risk of
marginalizing itself among allies (Walton 2007: 9), other theorists advocate a
renovated ‘twenty-ﬁrst-century geopolitical strategy’ to consolidate Western
power through an ideological and strategic ‘projection of the West’ into Eur-
asia justiﬁed in accordance with Toynbee’s universalizing conceptualization of
the West as the ‘practical application of ideas based on reason and humanism
in response to Asiatic authoritarianism’ (Petersen 2011: 8). If Western policy
elites fail to evaluate the future geopolitically, argues Petersen – that is, to
understand the development of international relations in the present epoch in
terms of the geopolitical logic of Mackinder’s World Island theory, then the
‘pre-eminence and power of the West will diminish far more rapidly than
many might expect’ (ibid.: 9).
While this claim is not entirely false – historically the West has not hesi-
tated to use military power to advance its ﬁnancial and geopolitical goals in
Eurasia – to suggest that Western economies cannot expect to prosper with-
out a proactive policy of regional intervention is dubious. Petersen claims that
if the global economy is to prosper ‘as prescribed by the Smith-Ricardo free
trade model, then the West must be grown into Eurasia and its values and
institutions transplanted there’ (Petersen 2011: 103), yet simultaneously calls
for a proactive interventionist strategy to ensure that Eurasian economies do
not develop bilateral trade and investment ties that disfavour Western corpo-
rate interests. Though the hypocrisy of this argument is breathtaking, the real
issue here is the practical distinction between a ‘liberal globalist’ strategy
deﬁned with respect to international-legal norms and multilateral engage-
ment, and a ‘neoconservative’ strategy freed from the juridical constraints of
international law.
For some, this highlights the quintessential diﬀerence between European
and American approaches to international relations, reﬂecting the normative
commitment of EU states to legality and multilateralism and the unilateral
commitment of the Anglosphere to transnational ﬁnancial interests. For
others, however, it is a false distinction, not merely between the EU as an
‘enlightened force’ and the US as an imperial power, but between liberalism
and neoconservatism – ideological distinctions that collapse into irrelevance if
or when the transnationally constituted geopolitical interests of the core capi-
talist economies are compromised. To illustrate this point we need to examine
the geopolitical dilemma of the West with reference to the internal cleavages
and conﬂicts between leading fractions of capital within the Lockean heart-
land, before widening our investigation to explain how the increasing
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tendency of regional powers in Europe and Asia to check the power of Anglo-
American capital through strategic engagement and political commitment is
accelerating the transition to de facto multipolarity.
Smith (2014) argues that while the US is ‘selectively’ multilateralist and
China is ‘experimentally’ multilateralist, the EU is by default and of necessity
a multilateralist regional bloc which despite its internal divisions over foreign
policy tries to advocate a consensual approach to diplomacy. This is of course
an ideal-typical simpliﬁcation, for between the EU, US and China there is ‘a
mosaic of multilateral, quasi-multilateral and bilateral relationships that
reﬂect the diﬀerent approaches and experiences of the parties and which give
rise to the often uneasy relationships among the fragments of order to which
they give rise’ (Smith 2014: 11–12). While it is possible to measure the nature
of multilateral agency pursued by the three economic blocs by examining
forms of strategic engagement, political commitment and diplomatic interac-
tion, these too are ideal-typical caricatures of agency deployed to achieve
outcomes under variable conditions.
To understand the complex transnationally constituted geopolitical agency
of the West, it is essential to abandon the faulty diﬀerentiation between con-
ventional and normative power resources deployed by capitalist economies in
the transatlantic alliance to achieve their individual or collective goals. This
distinction gained traction as a result of the diplomatic row between the US/
UK and the Franco-German entente over Iraq in 2003 – a dispute in which
Germany ‘arguably prevented NATO from taking the role of compliant alli-
ance partner and doing what the United States wanted’ (Schmidt 2008: 57).
This dispute was instrumental in emancipating Germany from slavish adher-
ence to American foreign policy (weakening support for the Euro-Atlantic
orientation of the EU), but has less to do with paciﬁst multilateralism than
perceptions within the Franco-German axis of their mutual geopolitical
interests as the force behind ‘deep’ integration and the expansion of European
capital into Western Eurasia and MENA in conﬂict/cooperation with the
Anglosphere (Nazemroaya 2007).
As Therborn argues, the EU faces three possible futures. The ﬁrst is to
become the ‘new West Germany’, a powerful and competitive regional eco-
nomic bloc based on the power of German industrial and ﬁnancial capital
and the willingness of the German taxpayer to compensate for the poorer
economies of the southern eurozone. The second is to revert to being Amer-
ica’s ‘attack dog’, ‘helping to drive the prey into the guns of the Americans,
and taking care of the prey killed’ (Therborn 2007: 293). After the Iraq ﬁasco
this scenario was ruled out by most commentators, yet the eastward enlarge-
ment of the EU and the eurozone debt crisis have made it easier for the US
and UK to undermine the collective rationality of ‘Old Europe’ within the
EU and to relegitimize America’s leadership of NATO based on historic fears
of Russia.2 A ﬁnal option is to promote the EU as a model of economic eﬃ-
ciency, social security and environmentalism, which could establish the Union
as a kind of ‘global Scandinavia’, a normative force in world politics.
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The strategy favoured by German capital is the ﬁrst, but as the crisis in
Ukraine illustrates, Europe remains a geopolitical platform for American sea
power and the EU may be driven against its will towards conﬂict as the US
tries to force European elites to choose between East and West in an attempt
to prevent the forging of closer trade and security ties between the EU, Russia
and China that might undermine US inﬂuence in Eurasia via its bridgehead
in the NATO accession states of Eastern Europe.3 Integrating Ukraine into
NATO after the ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004–05 would have been a logical
extension of this policy for the US and the EU, weakening Russia’s geopoli-
tical position in Eurasia and extending the economic space of the ENP. As we
shall see, however, after the brief but decisive conﬂict in Georgia in 2008, this
policy was blocked by the CDU-SPD coalition in Germany which sought to
extend diplomatic engagement and security ties with Russia through the
Partnership for Peace (PFP) and mutual acceptance of the terms of the 1997
Founding Act4 as the optimal means for reducing tensions in Europe’s eastern
periphery – although Russia has always viewed the PFP purely as an inter-
national framework for security cooperation rather than defence integration
in order to guarantee its strategic autonomy (Simon 2008).
The political crisis in Ukraine presents EU states with an historic oppor-
tunity to develop transnational leadership in the transition to a multipolar
global order, building on their experience of dealing with non-traditional
security threats and promoting trust and conﬁdence building in other political
contexts (Reiterer 2014). Yet in practice the conditions for achieving collective
rationality in international relations are diﬃcult to sustain where individual
actors do not have full control over their acts – that is to say, where acts are
not options but the consequences of variables beyond the control of the agents in
question. This is not because collective rationality is impossible to achieve but
because rationality is feasible if and only if it is the product of acts that its
members fully and freely control (Weirich 2010). In the EU these precondi-
tions do not apply, for just as global corporate interests take precedence over
the national-democratic interests of the US, there is reluctance among Eur-
opean governments to embrace the geopolitical implications of post-
hegemonic regionalism because the costs of soft balancing against the US/
UK and the political constraints on collective rational decision making are
high. Rationality is a normative ideal, the achievement of which implies that
acts are justiﬁed and warranted within the constraints of imperfect informa-
tion. The geopolitical agency of the US/UK is precisely the antithesis of this,
namely, unjustiﬁed and unwarranted, oriented towards the creation of unpre-
dictability and risk through covert intervention in geopolitically catalytic
states.5 As the crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated, the transnationally con-
stituted geopolitical agency of the Anglosphere undermined the capacity of
the EU to act rationally as a emerging regional entity:
With 28 members of diverse language, culture, history and mentality, the
EU is unable to agree on any foreign policy other than the one
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Washington imposes. The extension of the EU to former eastern Eur-
opean satellites has totally broken whatever deep consensus might have
been possible among the countries of the original EEC: France, Ger-
many, Italy and the Benelux states. Poland and the Baltic States see EU
membership as useful, but their hearts are in America – where many of
their most inﬂuential leaders have been educated and trained. Washing-
ton is able to exploit the anti-communist, anti-Russian and even pro-Nazi
nostalgia of north-eastern Europe […] to obstruct the growing economic
partnership between the old EU, notably Germany, and Russia […]
Apparently abandoning Europe’s accumulated wisdom, drawn from its
wars and tragedies, and even oblivious to their own best interests, today’s
European leaders seem ready to follow their American protectors to
another D-Day.
(Johnstone 2014: 2)
The EU is an integral component of the Lockean heartland, and EU leaders
are aware that the purpose of CENTCOM is to block a transition in the
international system and enforce a division of the Eurasian landmass to per-
petuate US hegemony, which obliges corporate-state elites in the eurozone to
compromise speciﬁc EU interests for the sake of transatlantic relations.
Europe does not follow the US blindly or stupidly, argues Lagadec (2012: 18,
emphasis in original), ‘but because contrary to America itself, Europe cannot
comfortably live in a post-American world’. A similar point is suggested by
Baun (2014), who argues that it is precisely because of the opportunities and
risks posed by a changing world order that a new transatlantic ‘partnership’
must endure, for even as the EU consolidates trade and investment links with
Russia, China and the MENA region, the diplomatic and security incentives
for bandwagoning behind the US are still too powerful to resist in European
capitals. Confronted by instability in geopolitically catalytic states such as
Ukraine or Georgia, EU leaders are far too divided and pusillanimous to
resist US leadership, and are therefore unable to prevent the US from turning
political crises into an artiﬁcial choice between contradictory outcomes: on
the one hand, consolidation of trade and security ties between the EU and
Eurasia independent of US inﬂuence; on the other hand, the extension of
NATO into Eurasia (and therefore into Russia’s sphere of inﬂuence).
This, of course, is exactly what Brzezinksi (1997: 40) advocated in his
geostrategic policy prescription, namely that the US should ‘prevent collusion
and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries
pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together’. In
the conﬂict over Ukraine it has been useful for the Anglosphere to revisit the
rhetoric of the Cold War to undermine Russia’s attempt to take control over
its own sovereign brand in the quest to acquire ‘soft power’, though it is not
Russia which seeks to rebuild the ‘Iron Curtain’ but the Anglosphere, creating
a cordon sanitaire between Germany and Russia to limit integration between
Germany and the BRICS, which – while a concern for the US, would enable
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Germany to consolidate its capital base and industrial-technological power in
Eurasia while pursuing policy goals laid out in the ‘BRICS+G’ Sustainability
and Growth agenda (Escobar 2015; cf. Bachmann 2005).
To conclude, it might be argued that the real dilemma facing the West
concerns the tension between multilateralism and regionalism in the search
for Western economic and political security. Korybko (2014) suggests that the
Anglosphere is actively involved in frustrating major regional infrastructure
projects on a global level, using ‘segmented and patterned’ strategies to
weaken ‘resistant and deﬁant cores’ in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, East
and South-East Asia, and Latin America – the targets of which are, respec-
tively, Russia’s Eurasian Union, the Iran/Syria/Lebanon condominium,
China, and Brazil/Venezuela. There is little question that the US and UK
clearly favour a more aggressive approach to the Eurasian question, while
Germany is more cautious and reluctant to alienate Russia, in part for fear of
undermining the energy agreements that constitute a major component of
Russo-German relations. Although the US worked to ensure NAFTA would
become a regional/hemispheric FTA in which American corporate interests
would predominate, and seeks to extend the terms of NAFTA to transatlantic
trade with the EU through the TTIP, the US sees no value in regionalism in
itself (and, it should be added, sees little intrinsic value in multilateralism
unless it yields relative gains). Whereas the US has an interest in preventing
the consolidation of strong regionalism as an alternative to (i) the ‘Washington
consensus’, and (ii) the transatlantic security alliance, however, the EU is in
favour of post-Westphalian interregional engagement and trade, although EU
policy has so far failed to develop in a coherent or systematic way with regard
to Asia, Africa, Latin America and MENA (Hettne 2007). There is a temp-
tation prima facie, therefore, to believe the EU represents a civil alternative to
hard power, where interstate coercion is replaced by co-governance based on
the assumption that ‘what has worked in Europe may ultimately prove to
have wider relevance [for world order]’ (ibid.: 121). This point is made by
Simoni (2013), who from a constructivist perspective looks beyond shared
security interests, economic interests and cultural values to argue that a de
facto division of labour exists between the two sides of the transatlantic alli-
ance, where the US acts as military power of last resort, while the EU is
concerned with deﬁnitions of international justice. Yet this is also too sim-
plistic, for it ignores not only the divergence of interests between EU member
states that typically fail to reach consensus on external policy, but the capacity of
the US to limit European autonomy and retard systemic interregionalism in
favour of market-led globalization under Anglo-American leadership.6
Counterhegemonic regionalism
In December 2010 Paul Volcker argued that with US power in decline, the
‘growing question is whether the exceptional role of the dollar can be main-
tained’ (quoted in Lenzner 2010). The former chairman of the Federal
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Reserve followed up this missive by articulating grave doubts about the
coherence of the world economy, observing that it is ‘hard to call what’s going
on a ﬁnancial system […] Where can the leadership of the global ﬁnancial
system come from?’ (ibid., emphasis added).
For many observers, the answer is China, as the largest creditor and the
most powerful emerging economy, yet few economists would argue that China
is willing or able to assume a hegemonic role in the international ﬁnancial
system in the near future. In developmental terms, China is a post-revolutionary
society whose leadership emphasizes the importance of ‘reality and useful-
ness’ in the construction of social order, working in a Comtean sense towards
the ‘reorganization of human life in practical and scientiﬁc terms’ (Liu 2012:
61). Although Arrighi believes that the ‘social outcome of China’s titanic
modernization remains indeterminate’ (Arrighi 2007: 24), the cultural-political
reality of Chinese capitalism is the complete implosion of totalizing collecti-
vism and its replacement by the ‘irresistible force of narcissism’ driven by
material desire and egocentricity (Liu 2012). Eschewing its revolutionary past,
China does not seek a return to the chaos of Maoism, only a return to gen-
uine multipolarity (Pan & Chen 2012).7 Not only does China wish to avoid
antagonizing the West, but it is aware of the tensions in Sino-US relations
that could undermine its comprehensive national strategy (‘peaceful rise and
development’) of adapting to global capitalism and increasing its material
wealth and prestige as the pre-eminent economy in Asia without alarming its
neighbours.
Yet misunderstanding of China is at heart of the strategic dilemma of the
West, whose elites either misconstrue China as a geopolitical ‘threat’, or
denounce the rise of Chinese nationalism, failing to notice that not only must
China achieve modernization and internationalization at the same time
(Yiwei 2012), but that imposing artiﬁcial constraints on China’s growth and
development is to impose constraints on the sovereignty of capital, thereby
artiﬁcially restricting the future development of globalization in its transna-
tional and regional forms. As we have seen, the opening of Eurasia to capital
instantiated by globalization has problematized the international political
economy of Western power. As an historically insular civilization-state, China
is less of a security threat to the West than a powerful expression of the
emancipation of capital from its Lockean heartland to the ‘interstices’ of the
global economy (Westra 2010). This global economy incorporates diverse
economic regions into decentred networks of country clusters and commodity
chains, and is decoupled from territorial sovereignty. The economic moder-
nization of China is not just a result of ‘capitalism with Chinese character-
istics’, as Huang (2008) argues, but the pre-eminent example of capitalism in
its postliberal corporate form, as a result of which Chinese capital is poised to
exert increasing global power in partnership with developed and emerging
market economies, in contrast with the violence imposed by European trading
empires on economically ‘static’ regions of Africa and Asia. Though criticized
for its voracious pursuit of commodities in exchange for development
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cooperation, China now plays a major role in the modernization of resource-
dependent nations in the global South, and 40 African countries have signed
trade agreements with Beijing allowing price-sensitive economies access to
low-cost Chinese consumer goods (Bhattacharyya 2011: 101; cf. Marton &
Matura 2012; Carmody 2013).
The Western dilemma over China is articulated in the tension between a
policy of containment versus accommodation – the former based on strategic
engagement and alliance formation in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, the latter based
on the integration of China into the global economy. This dilemma pits neo-
conservatives against pragmatic realists, and both against ‘naïve’ globalists.
One of the main reasons for the incoherence of American economic and
strategic policy towards China in the Bush-Cheney period stems from the
contradiction between the Republicans’ loyalty to corporate interests and
reluctance to alienate lower-middle-class ‘backlash conservatives’ as the
White House struggled to ‘accommodate the inclination of US capital to
proﬁt from the Chinese economic expansion, and simultaneously pander to
the national-militarist dispositions of its electoral base’ (Arrighi 2007: 306).
Yet the fundamental issue for the West is not how to balance China’s military
modernization (by supporting Japanese, Taiwanese and or Indian regional
aspirations as counterweights to Chinese domination in Asia), but how to
resist China’s determination to challenge the dysfunctional position of the
dollar in the international monetary system. Unlike China’s military moder-
nization – which has been conducted with maximum secrecy to deﬂect atten-
tion from its application of dual-use technology imports to transform its
military capability and increase hard-power projection (Fisher 2008) – China
is open in its desire for monetary reset, calling for an orderly transition to a
multi-currency system where the dollar is traded alongside other currencies
(and gold) as a diversiﬁed asset for reserve holders (OMFIF 2013).
For China the instrumental goal is to widen the use of the renminbi as a
globally traded currency to increase China’s economic power; but while
China is prepared to cooperate with Western IFIs (and contributed to stabi-
lization of the global ﬁnancial system in 2009 in return for representation in
Western-led global institutions), its geoeconomic strategy is based on the
multilateral logic that ‘saving’ the West is simultaneously to save Chinese
economic modernization itself (cf. Vangeli 2013). China is keen to cooperate with
the West where this yields positive-sum results, but is proudly resistant to US
demands to reform its political system and is willing to use multilateral
engagement, soft balancing and military modernization to erode US leader-
ship (Ahrari 2011). Indeed, despite their characteristic cautiousness, China’s
leaders have in some instances failed to conceal their exasperation towards
the conduct of US ﬁscal and monetary policy, as revealed in an undiplomatic
statement released in October 2013 following the shutdown of the US Federal
government, when the Chinese state news agency announced that ‘such
alarming days when the destinies of others are in the hands of a hypocritical
nation have to be terminated’ (Xinhua, in Pento 2013b).
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China is also showing greater willingness to exploit bilateral and multi-
lateral ties with Eurasian states to realize its aims, particularly through the
SCO, and China’s deepening ties with the EU, Latin America, Africa and
MENA are a cause for concern for Western elites anxious to limit the rate at
which China’s economic footprint expands in coming decades. At stake for
China is the need for a stable international environment to support the mod-
ernization and internationalization of its economy which leads China to avoid
open hostilities. As Saunders argues, China needs ‘positive relationships with
current and potential great powers to facilitate the emergence of a multipolar
world order and to deny the United States the opportunity to construct a
coalition to contain China and prevent its continued rise’ (Saunders 2008:
128). At stake for the US, on the other hand, is not simply the growth of
power centres resistant to Western leadership, but the prospect of a premature
or involuntary loss of geopolitical control over the global commodity form of
ﬁat money as the primary means of payment in a global economy where
trade/investment ties with China are acquiring greater appeal for emerging
economies than dependence on the Anglo-American system of debt-based
ﬁnance.
This explains the signiﬁcance of the deal between China and Russia com-
pleted in November 2014, which signalled a transformation in Eurasian geo-
politics with implications for the petrodollar system. Although the scale of the
deal ($400 billion) is signiﬁcant in itself, turning China into Russia’s second
largest customer after Germany while ensuring Gazprom an Asian market for
25 years, for many Western commentators its geopolitical signiﬁcance lies in the
fact that bilateral trade deals of this type threaten the monetary foundations
of Western hegemony:
If Russia’s ‘pivot to Asia’ results in Moscow and Beijing trading oil
between them in a currency other than the dollar, that will represent a
major change in how the global economy operates and a marked loss of
power for the US and its allies. With the dollar as the world’s petro-
currency, it also remains the reserve currency of choice for central banks
globally. As such, the US is currently able to borrow with ‘exorbitant
privilege’ […] simply printing money to pay oﬀ foreign creditors. With
China now the world’s biggest oil importer and the US increasingly
stressing domestic production, the days of dollar-priced energy, and
therefore dollar-dominance, look numbered. Beijing has recently struck
numerous agreements with major trading partners such as Brazil that
bypass the dollar. Moscow and Beijing have also set up ruble-yuan swap
facilities that push the greenback out of the picture.
(Halligan 2014: 1)
The implications are clear: if global rebalancing continues on its present tra-
jectory and emerging economies abandon energy pricing in dollars, the dol-
lar’s reserve currency status ‘could unravel fast, seriously undermining the US
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Treasury market and causing a world of pain for the West’ (Halligan 2014: 1).
For China and Russia, however, the deal is a further step towards exiting the
petrodollar system and establishing greater independence from the Anglo-
American transnational capitalist class, although the petrodollar will survive
until Saudi Arabia itself decides to seek alternatives to US patronage. As the
collapse in the oil price in 2014 indicates, Saudi Arabia is the key petroleum
exporting power that can use its spare capacity to undermine the ﬁnancial
viability of other oil-producing powers and inﬂuence geopolitical develop-
ments in America’s favour – albeit at the price of undermining the proﬁt-
ability of US shale gas production. A similar interpretation can be applied to
the announcement in July 2014 of the formation of a $100 billion BRICS
development bank to be headquartered in Shanghai, which some Western
commentators were quick to dismiss as of ‘symbolic geopolitical importance’.
The BRICS bank’s real purpose, argues one journalist at the Financial Times,
‘is to act as a competitor to the US and European-led institutions […] and to
demonstrate that the BRICS nations are not hostage to these constructions of
a previous world order or indeed to anything run by the major western
powers’ (Leahy 2014: 1).
Yet the announcement comes after two years of negotiation between the
BRICS partners whose demand for more voting rights in Western-led IFIs
has been thwarted by US intransigence, and whose aim is to reduce depen-
dence on the Western-led ﬁnancial system and shield their emerging econo-
mies from the ﬁnancial turbulence emanating from the US as the Federal
Reserve vacillates over whether and how to scale down (‘taper’) quantitative
easing without triggering a collapse in equity markets – as witnessed in
October 2014 when even a mild tightening of monetary policy in the US led
to market falls (Evans-Pritchard 2014b, 2014c). It also coincides with the
launch of the BRICS(A) currency as a medium of conducting non-dollar
denominated trade, the new AIIB as a rival to the World Bank in Asia, and a
new international payment settlement system to rival SWIFT (Koenig 2014).
However, while some commentators insist this ‘economic sea change may
bring the empire to its knees, without spilling a drop of blood’ (ibid.), as
evolving ties between emerging markets erode the power of the West over
international ﬁnance, history suggests that geopolitical transitions of this
order of magnitude do not occur in a benign or orderly fashion. On the con-
trary, there are reasons to expect that monetary reset will lead to currency
warfare, political warfare and economic espionage, the consequences of which
are unpredictable.8 While an abrupt collapse of the dollar would be cata-
strophic for holders of US debt, the US has more to lose through reset –
although ‘loss’ is deﬁned by Western media in terms of global ﬁnancial
instability rather than a decline of Western power (Boyes 2014).
From a Western neoliberal perspective, China and Russia seek to dominate
the Eurasian landmass and exclude the West from open access to their energy
resources and mineral wealth, yet relations between these two Eurasian
powers are more complex than this allows, and Sino-Russian cooperation
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cannot be understood without reference to third-party relations with the US
(triangulation), the EU, Central Asia, India and the Middle East. Diplomatic
and commercial relations between sovereign territorial units or economic
blocs are typically based on strategizing behaviour – that is, where decisions
are taken on the basis of available information to engage with or reject
opportunities for cooperation, competition and counterbalancing with allies
and rivals. Of course, such ‘rational’ agency is determined closely by the per-
spectives of individual or collective agents for the ‘decision to participate in a
multilateral organization is not inherently a rational or predictable reaction
to an objective set of interests’ (Aris 2011: 11). On the contrary, argues Aris,
‘an actor’s behaviour is only explainable within the speciﬁc context of its per-
ceptions at any given moment in time, and these perceptions cannot be
predetermined’ (ibid.).
From this perspective, the historical context of rational decision making
can only be used to make weak predictions of future behaviour, for interna-
tional relations lack permanence and priorities and loyalties change rapidly.
In reference to the example above, it is clear that China’s paramount concern
is energy security – to ensure uninterrupted growth – which is in turn depen-
dent on supply, price stability and security of delivery (Ahrari 2011; cf. Mar-
ketos 2009). Russia’s paramount concern, on the other hand, is to leverage
the more restricted geoeconomic power of Russian corporations in a changing
multipolar environment by making optimal use of its key strategic resources
(energy/defence). Up to 2003–04, Russia was pliant in its dealings with the
US, which caused some concern in China, but as the balance of power shifted
in the wake of Iraq and Moscow sensed a failure to gain tangible beneﬁts
from its alignment with the West, Vladimir Putin tilted Russian foreign policy
back towards China to counterbalance the growing US military presence in
Central Asia (Swanström 2012; Stent 2014). Russia’s strategic position is
outlined in its 2009 ‘National Security Strategy’:
World development is following the path of globalization in all spheres
of international life, which in turn is characterised by a high degree of
dynamism and interdependence of events […] Values and models of
development have become the subject of global competition. The vulner-
ability of all members of the international community to new threats and
challenges has grown. As a result of the rise of new centres of economic
growth and political inﬂuence, a qualitatively new geopolitical situation is
unfolding. There is an increasing tendency to seek resolutions to existing
problems and regulate crisis situations on a regional basis, without the
participation of non-regional powers. The inadequacy of the current global
and regional architecture, oriented (particularly in the Euro-Atlantic
region) towards NATO, and likewise the imperfect nature of legal
instruments.
(National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020:
para. 8, emphasis added)
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Although Moscow is wary of becoming too dependent on China’s demand for
energy, Russia needs China to oﬀset resistance within the EU towards energy
dependence on its eastern neighbour, and – despite Russian fears of Chinese
mass immigration – requires Chinese investment to develop Siberia and the
far east. Russia must also compete for Chinese commercial ties with rival
energy exporters in Eurasia, including Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, and although it does not wish to be reduced to the role of a
subordinate provider of resources, it is unwilling to cooperate too closely with
the West for fear of alienating China and thus losing the opportunity to make
strategic gains through mutual Sino-Russian engagement with the US. For this
reason Russia is willing to cooperate with China in the SCO, an Asian
regional structure that excludes the West and unnerves Western policy elites
whose capacity to inﬂuence the direction of Russian foreign policy has
declined since the collapse of the ‘Obama reset’, and more recently following
US actions in Ukraine which have undermined Russia’s incentives to cooperate
with the West to contain China’s rise in Asia.
What, therefore, are the prospects for counterhegemonic regionalism in
Eurasia and what are its potential implications for the West? Western critics
claim that not only is the SCO a dysfunctional regional organization which
issues frequent and grandiose declarations on trade and security while failing
to make signiﬁcant policy decisions, but that Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation
is driven by negative integrating factors, mainly the ‘problematic relations
they have with the outside world’ (Swanström 2012: 11). Again, however, this
is hardly a straightforward question and Western assumptions of China’s irresis-
tible rise and Russia’s corresponding decline cannot fully explicate the dual
logic of cooperation and rivalry between the two Eurasian powers in their
dealings with the US and EU or their competing perceptions of security and
development in Central and East Asia.
The most important point, as Laruelle correctly observes, is that the ‘Sino-
Russian entente is based on a mutual rejection of the so-called unipolar world
under American domination, not on any substantive agreement’ (Laruelle
2012: 87). Historically, culturally and geopolitically there is no natural har-
mony of interests between China and Russia that could not be disrupted by
the emergence of (potentially unforeseeable) alternative geopolitical align-
ments: China is an Asian power that seeks to dominate East Asia in the
future – an area where Russia is no longer able to project power without great
eﬀort; Russia, on the other hand – despite its occupancy of the northern
Eurasian landmass – is still primarily a European entity with an historical
legacy of inﬂuence in Central Asia. There is no question China is the dominant
force in the entente, yet Russia continues to enjoy strategic preponderance in
the geostrategic heartland of Central Asia, particularly since the announce-
ment of the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the closure of the
last US airbase in Kyrgyzstan (Dzyubenko 2014). While it is the stronger
economy, China is willing to tolerate Russian military preponderance in this
closed region in preference to US military encirclement of its western borders,
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for even though the CSTO excludes China, it relieves Beijing of responsibility
for organizing regional security (ibid.: 81). Although the two states are com-
petitors in Central Asia (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2013), both cooperate with the
authoritarian secular regimes of the region to combat political Islamism and
reduce the risk of ‘colour revolutions’ of the type that occurred in Kyrgyzstan
in 2005. In addition, through the SCO, China and Russia coordinate collec-
tive action against terrorism, extremism and separatism – the so-called ‘three
evils’ that contribute to regional insecurity. In these respects, at least,
although bilateral relations are cordial rather than warm, there is clear
recognition of mutual interests, which is not entirely negative.
The US does not fear the CSTO as a serious rival to NATO, and while
Moscow has been blamed for inciting separatist violence in Georgia and
Ukraine better to control its weaker neighbours (actions that have caused
consternation in China), the US does not see Russia as a military threat
(except as a nuclear power whose capability has been eroded by the planned
development of a European ballistic missile defence treaty which Russia
initially showed interest in joining until it became clear that it could not
obtain the necessary guarantees that NATO missiles would not target the
Russian Federation itself).9
Russia’s military power aside, the focus of Western concerns is the emer-
gence of an informal alliance between Eurasian energy-exporting economies
that is partially replicated in the formal structure of the SCO and the infor-
mal structure of the BRICS, which poses a greater challenge to Western
hegemony (Chun 2013; cf. Mudunuru 2013). The correspondence between the
formal/informal dimensions of this counterhegemonic bloc is imprecise, but it
does not depend on shared commitment to an ideological vision of world
order. Still less does it limit the foreign policy of its adherents in any binding
sense beyond vague conceptions of ‘mutual trust and advantage’ in the char-
ter of the SCO (the ‘Shanghai spirit’), which is oriented more towards ‘Asian’
than ‘Western’ values. However, while this may evoke the Asian-African
Bandung communiqué of 1955, the priority is economic growth rather than a
common vision of development:
From the perspective of the Central Asian Republics, the framework of
the SCO, which contains their traditional economic sponsor, Russia, and
[…] China, is seen as an important source for economic investment to aid
their ailing domestic economies. Reciprocally, the Chinese leadership
considers the development of economic opportunities in Central Asia as
a primary aim, including gaining access to raw materials. As part of its
concentration on energy as an area of strategic importance during the
last decade, the Russian leadership considers maintaining its position as
the main economic trade partner of the former Soviet Republics and
ensuring it has an important stake in the direction of oil and gas pipelines
in the region as priorities.
(Aris 2011: 79)
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The reality is that the SCO is an expression of Eurasian multilateralism, and
is the only regional intergovernmental organization in Eurasia that Russia
does not dominate (Marketos 2009: 31). Unlike the CSTO and the new EEU,
which are recognizably Russian-led institutions reﬂecting Moscow’s security
and trade priorities in the post-Soviet space, the SCO has evolved as a more
legitimate intergovernmental structure, reﬂecting the interests of all its
member states rather than those of an aspiring hegemon, one which allows
Central Asian states to participate in ‘generating regional approaches to
cooperation and security on an equal basis with the larger powers […] an
opportunity that Central Asia has not had before in modern times’ (ibid.: 33).
Although some Western-sponsored international NGOs express concern
that the SCO exclusively comprises authoritarian postcommunist states with
little or no commitment to democratic norms (World Democracy Forum
2008; Ambrosio 2008), and although the SCO ultimately serves to stabilize
Sino-Russian hegemony in Eurasia, Marketos is doubtful whether this unify-
ing factor could overcome the disparity between Chinese and Russian policy
and the internal contradictions within the SCO as an organization that has
failed to evolve into a strong institutionalized alliance. As one Chinese scho-
lar argues, the reasons for this are clear: ‘Russia needs to assure its Central
Asian partners that it is “keeping an eye” on China’s intentions vis-à-vis the
region and stands by to provide Central Asian states with diplomatic backing
should they need it in relations with China’ (Guang, cited in Marketos 2009:
58). At the same time, he adds, Chinese eﬀorts to ‘endow SCO bodies with even
a restricted supranational mandate will meet with Russian resistance. Russia
will strive to preserve the SCO’s original design as an intergovernmental
forum’ (ibid.).
For Russia, the SCO provides a forum for pushing counterhegemonic
agendas vis-à-vis the West, and there is no desire for it to evolve into a poli-
tical or customs union dominated by China’s overwhelming economic power,
rendering Central Asia (and eventually Russia itself) helpless in trade nego-
tiations with Beijing. Hence the SCO is more likely to evolve as a ‘balancing
coalition’ with China as the leading power, Russia as an inﬂuential second-
tier power with control over vast energy resources, and the Central Asian
states as outliers, which is capable of using ‘military, economic, political and
normative levers against the United States and its interests in Asia’ (Sussex
2014: 74). Yet this countervailing potential cannot negate the diplomatic and
military inﬂuence of the US in Asia, which is built not just on American
‘imperialism’ but on the active complicity of East Asian states which prefer to
maintain a regional political order contingent on the ‘absent superpower’
rather than be forced to accept the strictures of a Sino-centric regional order
(Goh 2013). Neither can it create the necessary economic sovereignty to sup-
port the emergence of a truly autonomous Eurasian geopolitical bloc capable
of entirely resisting the ﬁnancial encroachment of transnational capital (cf.
Fotopoulos 2014).
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If therefore Eurasian political uniﬁcation is a non-existent prospect, the
practical issue confronting Western elites is the potential expansion of the SCO
and its possible correlation with the counterhegemonic agendas of the BRICS
economies, which have ‘unsettled conventional wisdom and cast doubt on the
US dollar’s future as the world’s leading reserve currency’ (Rickards 2014:
146). These two issues are closely correlated and must be dealt with in tandem
before analysing the growing tensions between the Anglosphere and the core
states of the eurozone. Of principal concern is the expansion of the SCO to
include Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia as full members, as well as the
accession of Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey to ‘dialogue partner status’. The
strategic importance of the SCO increased dramatically in September 2014
with the agreement in Dushanbe to expand the organization in Asia,
increasing its representative legitimacy while enabling the organization to
impact more eﬀectively on security developments in its core region (Tiezzi
2014). As scholars of European regionalism are aware, however, the expan-
sion of any intergovernmental organization is likely to create increased com-
plexity for existing members and dilute the capacity/willingness of the
organization to act in a uniﬁed, coherent fashion.
International observers believe neither Russia nor China yet wishes to grant
Iran member status because this would further complicate their already awk-
ward relations with the West due to the existence of sanctions, but talks on
Iran’s inclusion demonstrate the extent of realignment since the Iraq war and
the US ﬁnancial crisis. This reﬂects above all the role of Russia, which has
been driving the SCO’s enlargement as Eurasian economies increase their
gold reserves in anticipation of a faltering dollar. However, the inclusion of
Iran is in the interests of China, which has quietly increased its inﬂuence in
MENA through its patronage of Iran in deﬁance of Western eﬀorts to isolate
the Islamic Republic. As one observer argues:
China’s interest in absorbing the Middle East into her sphere of inﬂuence
is obvious, given her current and future energy requirements; but she will
also want to tap into the enormous wealth of the region. Her link into it
is through Iran […] to which she provided support during the Ahmadi-
nejad years. One can only speculate about the degree of Chinese inﬂuence
behind Iranian political developments, with Iran now aligning herself
with China’s view that trade matters more than belligerence with her
perceived enemies. However, if one acknowledges China’s strategic and
trade interests, there is a ready explanation behind Iran’s diplomatic
moves to heal the rift with Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council.
(Macleod 2013: 1)
This helps to explain the partial de-escalation of antagonistic rhetoric
between Iran and its Arab neighbours, which remain fearful of Iran’s nuclear
aspirations and inﬂuence in the Gulf, yet are aware that deepening ties with
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Iran would balance Saudi hegemony in the region, introducing a ‘second axis
to the GCC evolution and change its outlook from security to economic
growth and development’ (Al Mukhaini 2014). It is mistaken for the US to
view China or Russia as simply a threat to its commercial interests in the
Middle East because their primary interests are also commercial:
while China’s and Russia’s increasing involvements in the region
undoubtedly present a challenge to US and broader western hegemony,
some care needs to be taken in interpreting the nature of these rivalries.
Precisely because of the highly internationalized structure of the world
market, all major states – including China and Russia – are deeply
enmeshed in mutual trade and capital ﬂows, sharing a common interest
in the stability of global capitalism.
(Hanieh 2013: 44)
For China, in particular, the priority is to promote regional stability as the
US begins to disengage from conﬂicts in the region, although China’s hopes
for stability in Syria and Iraq have been undermined by spillover eﬀects from
the Syrian civil war and the violence of the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant) insurgency which has created opportunities for closer military ties
between Moscow and Baghdad,10 leading the US to return to Iraq to assist
the Iraqi government with airstrikes following accusations of pusillanimity by
Saudi leaders over America’s ‘lamentable’ handling of events in the region (Al
Faisal 2013), and fears over the emergence of an Iranian-dominated Shia
energy bloc with geopolitical ties to Russia and China (Weiler 2014; Minin
2013). The US, for its part, is keenly aware that the foundations of the US-
Saudi alliance that created and sustained the petrodollar cartel have been
eroded as the Saudis develop a leadership role in the GCC (in competition
with Qatar), while pursuing a more active role as a global and regional force
(cf. Gause 2011; Koch 2011). Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Syria have
indicated a growing desire to trade with China, leading some observers to
argue that the geopolitical chaos created by the fallout from the ‘Arab Spring’
has forced China to rethink its long-term strategy of forging a New Silk Road
linking the economies of Asia and the Middle East (Chaziza 2013).
Although Iran’s accession to the SCO is signiﬁcant, the inclusion of India
and Pakistan is a more logical geographical extension of the SCO into
Southern Asia where a range of security issues require the attention of the
international community. As Aris argues, there are huge potential beneﬁts for
increased cooperation between India and SCO members which would inten-
sify existing trade and security ties between Russia, China and India within a
new Eurasian ‘security triangle’, yet the inclusion of India as a democratic
state could shift the emphasis of the SCO away from its core concerns (regime
security) and alter the identity of the organization (Aris 2011: 160–8). The
alignment of India towards the Eurasian ‘strategic triangle’ is a consequence
of the election of the nationalist BJP Indian leader, Nerendra Modi, who has
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shown more willingness to enter into dialogue with China, as reﬂected in his
bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping before the BRICS summit in July 2014
where China’s president invited the Indian prime minister to resolve out-
standing ‘boundary issues’, deepen India’s engagement with the SCO, and
attend the leaders’ meeting of APEC states in Beijing in November 2014 – the
last of which, we noted in Chapter 6, is opposed by the US.
For the US, India’s accession is a diplomatic blow that could decisively tilt
the balance of power as well as the balance of world opinion among devel-
oping countries away from the West, while forcing India to make more com-
plex strategic calculations in decisions on foreign policy. From an Indian
perspective, India’s accession to the SCO brings it closer to the three countries
the US wants to ‘distance from its allies’ (Russia, China and Iran), which will
‘upset fence-sitters in the US establishment already unsure of the fruits of
courting India over the past decade’ (Kasturi 2014; cf. Rozin 2014). In addi-
tion to joining the SCO, India’s alignment with Russia and China in the
BRICS represents a powerful expression of countervailing power in a post-
hegemonic multipolar world, for it is this transregional economic bloc that
seeks to ‘reconﬁgure the world’, to bring about an end to dollar hegemony
and to challenge the predominance of Western values in global aﬀairs:
Two processes are exerting deﬁnitive inﬂuences over the current global
geopolitical dynamics. On the one hand, attempts are [being] made to
establish – regardless of the imminent human costs – a unipolar world order
propped up by ﬁnancial and military might […] On the other hand, the
contours of an alternative world order oﬀering greater fairness, rooted in
diﬀerent philosophies of individual existence, and based on its own eco-
nomic and social order are increasingly visible. Since individual countries
and national governments are defenceless at the face of the global ﬁnan-
cial centres, civilizations have to take over the leading role in the struggle
for the survival of mankind, and the advent of [the] BRICS, along with
its potential partner – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, reﬂects
one of the ﬁrst initiatives of the kind. Interestingly, due to profound geo-
political reasons the civilizations now moving to the front stage are
oriental and carry essentially non-Western values, moral norms, and
forms of social organization.
(Ivashov 2011: 1)
Although the tone of this analysis is polemical, the political and economic
implications of the challenge posed by the BRICS to Western economic
hegemony are understood perfectly clearly by Western commentators, includ-
ing Rickards, who notes that BRICS leaders are developing ‘radical new posi-
tions’ on ﬁve key issues confronting the world in a transitional period, namely
voting rights in the IMF, voting in the UN, multilateral assistance, interna-
tional development, and global reserve composition (Rickards 2014: 147). He
also notes that the BRICS mission statement calls for ‘nothing less than a
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rethinking or overturning of the post-Second World War arrangements made
at Bretton Woods and San Francisco that led to the original formation of the
IMF, World Bank and the United Nations’ (ibid.). In the absence of mean-
ingful reform, the ‘BRICS will take concrete steps to create their own insti-
tutions to perform their functions on a regional basis. The evolution of such
institutions would inevitably entail a diminution in the role of the institutions
they were meant to replace’ (ibid.).
This is a threat the Anglosphere cannot ignore, for while Western media
devote little coverage to BRICS announcements, while Russian and Chinese
intentions are often misrepresented, and while understanding of the BRICS is
limited in the West, alignment between the SCO and BRICS constitutes a
counterhegemonic challenge to Western leadership in IFIs and America’s
hold over the global monetary system, exempliﬁed by the decision by Russian
and Chinese banks to facilitate Iranian hard currency transactions in deﬁance
of Western sanctions on Iran and Iran’s forced exclusion from international
payments systems (Rickards 2014: 152). This example indicates the interrela-
tion between ﬁnancial and geopolitical power that underpins the transna-
tional commodity form of money capital and the vulnerability of the US
dollar as rival articulations of international monetary power compete for the
conﬁdence of investors and sovereign reserve holders. It also explains the
material determination of the US to retaliate against plans for a BRICS
reserve currency in the aftermath of its diplomatic retreat over intervention in
Syria, for at stake is nothing less than Western control over the petrodollar
system and America’s power to print the currency in which international
energy trades are denominated – without which the Anglo-American ﬁnancial
elite can no longer exert control over the future development of globalization.
As Eurasian economies add their weight to the Chinese-Russian alliance
against Anglo-American ﬁnancial hegemony, new combinations of ﬁnancial
and military action will inevitably be deployed to defend the status quo and
prevent a loss of US dominance in global energy markets and energy trans-
portation routes linking Europe, Asia and the Middle East (cf. Schortgen
2013). It is no longer possible to make sense of geopolitical developments in
Eurasia unless we are prepared to link seemingly unconnected events across
the region to the broader questions of energy and international monetary
power – in particular, the determination of non-western powers to prepare for
the contingencies of global monetary reset. After backing away from conﬂict
in Syria in September 2013 and accepting a Russian-led diplomatic solution
to the crisis, the US gained time to consider its options. Yet this rare display
of multilateralism conceded strategic gains to a counterhegemonic coalition
which has enabled Iran to reduce its diplomatic isolation by leveraging its
position as defender of Syrian sovereignty and patron of the Hezbollah militia
that turned the tide of the conﬂict in Syria in 2013. It is possible that the coup
d’état in Kiev in February 2014 was aimed at punishing Russia for its support
of Syria and for Iran’s rise as a regional force in the Middle East, ‘paving the
way for a renewed attempt to topple the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-
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Assad’ (Shaoul 2014). Syria matters, he adds, as it houses a major Russian
naval base and ‘occupies a strategically important position on the eastern
Mediterranean, linking it to Central Asia and the Far East’ (ibid.).
In reality, the actions of the US and its allies in Syria and Ukraine
demonstrate that even where NATO cannot intervene directly, the West will
attempt to force developments on the ground by using private security ﬁrms
or backing the most reactionary social elements against regional leaders who
ally with non-Western powers. In Syria the strategy of the West is to weaken
the Russian and Iranian-backed government by supporting moderate Sunni
rebels, while ‘allowing’ Saudi Arabia and Qatar to provide ﬁnancial support
for ISIL as a lever to pressure the Shi’ite governments of Iran, Iraq and Syria
(Blair 2014). In Ukraine, on the other hand, Western strategy is to draw
Russia into a land invasion of eastern Ukraine through acts of provocation –
which Russia has resisted, opting instead to provide aid to level the military
balance and accelerate peace talks between Kiev and pro-Russian separatists.
The conﬂicts in Syria and Ukraine raise questions about whether eﬀorts to
forge a security order in Eurasia independent of the US will be blocked by the
latter’s desire to remain geopolitically relevant. For some it is only a matter of
time before conﬂict erupts between NATO and Russia (Dugin 2014), while
China’s monetary ambitions could trigger a currency or trade war (Mirhaydari
2014). While enlightened observers in the US recognize that the West can no
longer aﬀord to think in Cold War terms (Hanson 1996), this type of progressive
thinking is hardly shared by Western security elites eager to counter the disin-
tegrative tendencies within NATO, to restrict Russian/Chinese political inﬂuence
in the Middle East, and to preserve Western geostrategic control over energy
transportation routes. The decision by the CIA to support the Euromaidan
protests in Ukraine indicates the oﬀensive intent of the Anglosphere confronted
by the international ﬁnancial proﬁle of the BRICS and Russia’s soft-power
rebranding.11 Not only did the US help facilitate a coup d’état against Yanuko-
vych by supporting neo-fascist forces, but it also reopened the question of Eur-
opean security, generating calls from NATO leaders for military spending to
meet the ‘Russian threat’, and sanctions to punish Russian leaders like Igor
Sechin who are planning a Eurasian energy trading system to break the mono-
poly of the petrodollar cartel in global energy markets (Durden 2014; Sandford
2014; Weiler 2014).
German Europe
A further – if somewhat less dramatic – challenge to the transnational lea-
dership of the Anglosphere stems from the unanticipated growth of German
political and economic power as the dominant state in the EU in the wake of
the eurozone crisis – a crisis that threatened in 2011–12 to push Italy and
Spain towards sovereign default and to undermine the supranational institu-
tions of the EU, allowing Eurosceptics in the UK to claim vindication for
their visceral opposition to the European single currency. Yet the stabilization
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of the eurozone under German leadership has created new opportunities for
supranational integration between member states through the introduction of
tighter ﬁscal rules to regulate the budgets of member states and reduce the
potential for debt to undermine the ﬁnancial stability of the Union. This has
increased Germany’s ﬁnancial authority within the EU to the chagrin of
France and the ‘Club Med’ economies, as the UK frets at the sidelines over
the deﬂationary risks posed by a commitment to austerity and the subtle
resurgence of German power in Europe. What is unclear, however, is the
likely impact of Germany’s increasing geoeconomic power and diplomatic
inﬂuence in the EU for the foreign and defence policy of the Federal Republic
as a member of the NATO alliance, a policy which some analysts argue is
entering a period of transition following Germany’s decision to oppose (in
solidarity with France) regime change in Iraq in 2003 and to abstain (in
opposition to France) over regime change in Libya in 2011 (Heymanns 2013).
Some 25 years after reuniﬁcation, German capital stands poised to reap the
beneﬁt of the shifting balance of power in the global economy, with new
opportunities for expansion into Eastern and Southern Europe, western
Russia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, as German corporate-state elites
cautiously begin to prepare the nation to assume a more proactive role in
international aﬀairs. Yet contrary to alarmist voices, it is wrong to assume
that stabilization of the euro has given Germany a ‘free hand’ in the EU, for the
political risks entailed in imposing austerity have been great, and Greece’s
threatened exit from the eurozone would be catastrophic for Berlin’s hard-won
reputation for sound moral-political judgement (Lang 2013).
It is not merely a question of German leadership of Europe but rather what
type of Europe Germany wishes to create as the US begins to disengage and
shift its attention to the Asia-Paciﬁc region – to the consternation of Ger-
many’s EU partners, which fear the possible consequences of a pan-European
political order with Germany as its hub (Navarro 2011). However, just as it is
mistaken to describe Germany as a ‘tamed power’ in Europe without a
meaningful foreign policy (Bulmer & Paterson 2010; cf. Katzenstein 1997), so
too is it simplistic to see Germany as a threat to its neighbours, even if his-
torical memories of assertive German leadership colour perceptions. As Beck
argues, ‘everyone knows it, yet to articulate it is to break a taboo: Europe has
become German. Nobody intended this but […] Germany’s economic power
has catapulted it into becoming the most important great power in Europe’
(Beck 2012: 7).
On this view, German reuniﬁcation and German leadership in the eurozone
crisis have increased the incentive for Germany to advance its national goals
by accepting a form of ‘institutional lock-in’ (where a dominant state asserts
its leadership by agreeing to engage with rules-based institutions while
retaining the prerogative to alter the terms of multilateral engagement if
necessary), as a result of which Thomas Mann’s vision of Europe has come a
step closer to realization, namely a Europeanized Germany as the hub of a
German Europe organized into a coherent federation. For many Europeans,
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of course, the optimism and subtlety of this argument are lost, as Berlin’s
leadership in the eurozone crisis has created serious divisions in the EU – not
merely between creditor and debtor states (particularly Greece and Italy
whose political sovereignty has been compromised), but between European
governments that support the emerging ‘Berlin consensus’ and European
voters across the EU (including Germany itself) who manifestly do not.
Yet Germany’s stabilization of the euro through the ECB has imposed
structural adjustments on southern eurozone states, designed to support a
return to growth across the currency area without resorting to the excessive
monetary expansion used by the US and UK as a means to disguise the hol-
lowness of economic ‘recovery’ after the global ﬁnancial crisis. So successful
has the stabilization of the euro been since 2012 that the currency area is
rapidly becoming a major destination for FDI from China and ASEAN
economies which consider the euro a safe alternative to the dollar, and Ber-
lin’s determination to preserve the single currency at all costs clearly demon-
strates that for Germany the survival of the euro has always been more than
simply a question of monetary policy, reﬂecting the essential character of the
EU as a political project to extend German ﬁscal and monetary practices to
the eurozone in its entirety (Bulmer & Paterson 2010).
Yet two basic questions remain, namely: (i) does this ‘German Europe’
represent a new form of counterhegemonic regionalism in potential conﬂict
with the transnationally constituted geopolitical and ﬁnancial power of the
Anglosphere; and (ii) is Germany pulling away from NATO in favour of
working towards a more autonomous foreign and defence policy – particu-
larly in the light of the NSA espionage scandal and the desire of the US to
impose sanctions on Germany’s key trading partner, Russia? Although a
complete answer to this question would require a separate study, evidence
suggests that while Germany has shown itself willing to challenge American
leadership by refusing to cooperate with NATO or by pursuing its own uni-
lateral priorities in speciﬁc conﬂict scenarios, despite pressure from NATO
allies like France, Italy and the UK, it is reluctant to assume a visible or
proactive leadership role in managing threats to European security which might
undermine its reputation for cooperative multilateralism and conditional
support for the EU as a security actor (cf. Biscop & Renard 2010).
Bulmer and Paterson are correct to argue that in response to its emerging
power in the EU and increasing geoeconomic might, Germany is moving
from a condition of ‘tamed power’ to ‘normalization’, expressed as the ‘will-
ingness to undertake unilateral demarches, the adoption of a discourse of
national interest in policy statements, and the use of power to keep certain
items oﬀ the agenda’ (Bulmer & Paterson 2010: 1059). Such a transition
involves diﬃcult choices, where the ‘“hard edges” of power are no longer
softened by the device of being able to present national interests as simulta-
neously European ones’, leading to a ‘rebalancing away from indirect institu-
tional power to the hard bargaining of agent power’ (ibid.: 1060). The
signiﬁcance of Germany’s institutional power can be seen in the adoption by
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the ECB of the Bundesbank’s mandate to maintain price stability and to impose
ﬁscal discipline on spendthrift politicians (Abdelal & Krotz 2014: 136). The
signiﬁcance of Germany’s new ‘agent power’, however, can also be seen in
the diplomatic standoﬀ between Berlin and London in June 2014 over the
appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as president-elect of the European
Commission – a decision that UK Prime Minister David Cameron wanted to
be taken by the European Council (an intergovernmental body) rather than
the European Parliament (a supranational body). Cameron issued a variety of
implied threats in order to force the issue, but German Chancellor Angela
Merkel dismissed British protests with a vague pledge to support UK reform
proposals for the EU. Operating outside the eurozone, however, the UK has
forfeited inﬂuence over the determination of policy and personnel, while
German power has increased in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis and
Berlin seems unwilling to return to its earlier habit of deference towards the
UK and France.
To understand the strategic priorities of the Federal Republic, however, we
must ﬁrst understand the importance of ‘exporting stability’ (Stabilitätsexport)
for Germany as the largest economy in Europe with vulnerable borders, and
the eﬀect of Germany’s rising geoeconomic power on geopolitical thinking in the
new Federal Chancellery and Foreign Oﬃce in Berlin.
After reuniﬁcation, German foreign policy was dominated by two key
developments, ﬁrst the eastward expansion of NATO (and subsequently the
EU), and second conﬂict in the western Balkans – security issues that con-
tinue to create instability in Europe’s eastern and south-eastern periphery. For
historic reasons strategic geopolitics in the tradition of Mackinder and
Haushofer are discredited in Germany, and the new Berlin Republic has dis-
sociated itself from the disastrous consequences of the radicalization of
German foreign policy after the fall of Bismarck in 1890 and the rise of
fascism in the 1930s.
This position is supported by a majority of Germans (61 per cent), who
reject involvement in NATO deployments driven by Realpolitik (Körber-Stiftung
2014), and domestic opinion is considered by Germany’s foreign and defence
elite to be the main constraint on increased cooperation with and participation in
NATO security operations. Even where Germany has agreed to participate in
out-of-area operations (in Kosovo and Afghanistan), it has oﬀered only limited
support in line with its Basic Law, which requires strict parliamentary oversight
of the activities of German armed forces abroad. This has created friction
between Berlin and Washington reminiscent of the antipathy that ﬂared between
France and the US in the 1960s when Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces
from NATO, and has led pro-US German observers to criticize the ‘friendly
disinterest’ of Germany’s elites towards military aﬀairs, and Germany’s unwill-
ingness to fulﬁl its role as ‘leader of the European pillar of the Alliance’ (Bunde
2013).
Others point out that if Germany wishes to beneﬁt from a global economy,
it must expect to invest in security to defend open borders – in addition to
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ratifying the TTIP – for America’s ‘involvement with the EU depends in large
part on its relations with Europe’s major countries including Germany, the
symbol of a once divided Europe and a benefactor of its success’ (Janes &
Nicholson 2014: 2). This can be read in many ways, but it clearly indicates the
anxiety felt towards the declining appeal of NATO, and is typical of rhetoric
used by US-funded NGOs which, since Germany’s abstention over interven-
tion in Libya, have targeted the German elite in an eﬀort to generate support
for the globalization of NATO as an alliance that is undermined by lack of
consensus and common purpose, and which must either secure a global
mandate to intervene ‘out of area’ or fade into geopolitical irrelevance (cf.
Kober 2009; Navarro 2011). From a US perspective, Germany is the ‘weak
link’ in the Atlantic security community, and every eﬀort is made through the
cultivation of pro-American opinion in the German media to deter the Berlin
corporate and political class from forging closer ties with Russia and China at
the expense of the transatlantic alliance (Ulfkotte 2014).
Although Germans view NATO as an ‘organization from the past’ (Sauer
2014), Washington’s tactic is to ‘shame’ Germany’s elites into aligning
domestic opinion away from paciﬁsm towards geopolitical engagement and
increased defence spending.12 This tactic has not been without eﬀect, as evi-
denced by the speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in January
2014 by Federal President Joachim Gauck, who stressed the need for Ger-
many to contribute to and participate in more enthusiastically the defence of
European and global security in an increasingly risk-prone international
environment (Müller 2014). Gauck caused controversy when he declared that
not only should Germans be ‘ready to do more’, but that ‘we are moving
towards a form of responsibility to which we are so far unaccustomed’
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2014).13
This change of tone in foreign and security policy is further evidenced by
the strident rhetoric of former Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière, who
impressed his NATO counterparts in 2013 with proposals for reform of the
military alliance that would see all member states develop and ﬁnance sover-
eign military capabilities collectively rather than individually – in country
clusters – allowing Germany greater inﬂuence over the smaller NATO
member states in its region (Heymanns 2013). Maizière has also supported
calls for parliamentary restrictions on the Bundeswehr (armed forces) to be
relaxed or abolished, beginning with German operations organized under the
auspices of the EU, for example, in Kosovo where Germany is the main EU
Investitionspartner, and where the breakaway Albanian-majority statelet is
part of a developing economic network linking Central Europe to the western
Balkans.14
Such changes in a country’s security and foreign policy do not happen
spontaneously; rather, they occur in periods of conﬂict and change when
geopolitical opportunities arise to assert greater inﬂuence – as Germany dis-
covered in 1999 following NATO’s bombing of Serbia and occupation of
Kosovo (a template for ‘humanitarian interventions’ in Iraq and Libya which
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Germany declined to support), or as a result of attempts by transnational
elites to undermine the political consensus within countries and manipulate
its evolution towards adoption of more hard-line positions. In the former
case, it is clear Germany used the opportunity of war in Kosovo to advance
its own geopolitical interests in the Balkans, where the EU has taken over
responsibility for security from the UN and where the BND is active in pro-
tecting German interests (Johnstone 2002; cf. Fitsanakis 2008). In the latter
case, it is clear transatlantic elites exploited the crisis in Ukraine not only to
reduce German scepticism towards military engagement but to challenge
Germany’s partnership with Russia and generate support for a revision of the
1997 Founding Act. Indeed, since the formation of anti-communist ‘stay-
behind armies’ in occupied Germany in the 1950s (Müller 1991), the US, UK
and France have shown a consistent willingness to appeal to the most reac-
tionary elements in the German establishment to advance Western ﬁnancial
and geopolitical interests, which in the present global confrontation are best
served by German support for the pro-US regime in Keiv and the creation of
a new cordon sanitaire from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
The litmus test of Germany’s evolving foreign and security policy in the
near periphery of the EU is the reaction of German corporate-state elites and
German voters to the crisis in Ukraine and the call for sanctions against
Russia. In contrast with the near-hysterical reaction of governments in
Romania and Poland, and the siren calls of the neoconservative anti-Russia
lobby in the US which has used the crisis to demonize Russia using tactics
reminiscent of the crisis in Georgia in 2008 (cf. Tsyganov 2009), Germany has
refused to engage in wild denunciations of Russian foreign and security policy
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and has been slow to agree to economic
sanctions which have adversely aﬀected the interests of German corporate
investors in Russia who do business in the US (Schepp & Schmergal 2014).
This reluctance has resulted in accusations that Germany is dominated by
Putin-Versteher (‘Putin sympathizers’) who underestimate the authoritarian
character of Putin’s government and the political risks of ‘appeasing’ Moscow
(Adomeit 2014).
This criticism is reminiscent of the negative publicity surrounding the €8.8
billion Nord Stream project between Gazprom and Ruhrgas (E.ON), which
led to the opening in September 2011 of a pipeline under the Baltic Sea,
bypassing the existing Eastern European transit route through Ukraine,
thereby enabling Germany to secure its gas supplies from Russia indepen-
dently of any disputes that may ﬂare up between Russia and Ukraine. Ger-
many’s desire to secure its own independent energy supplies may or may not
be read as evidence of counterhegemonic tendencies in its foreign policy, but
the evidence suggests that Berlin is concerned primarily with its own energy
interests rather than those of its eastern neighbours, and is prepared to act
unilaterally and geopolitically in defence of its energy interests – even at the
risk of being accused of promoting a ‘Berlin-Moscow axis’ at odds with
German membership of NATO.
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Hoﬀmann develops this point further in his analysis of German national
security policy, arguing that after a long period of dormancy the geopolitical
dimension of German energy policy has been ‘suddenly discovered’. In his
view, German foreign policy is deﬁned by cooperative multilateralism with
Western partners, commitment (Bindung) towards Russia for long-term
energy security, and regional diversiﬁcation of energy imports (Hoﬀmann
2012: 246). However, while Germany needs Russia, it seeks to avoid depen-
dence on Russian gas imports, a fact demonstrated by its participation in the
EU’s Central Asia Initiative. Despite Germany’s renewed desire to act in a
unilateral capacity, it remains committed to collective EU eﬀorts because it is
only via a ‘European framework that Germany’s geopolitical interests can be
realized’ (ibid.: 320). Putin-Versteher may be more voluble in Germany, but
the Berlin Republic remains closer than critics realize to US policy on
Ukraine, and Chancellor Merkel’s approach to the crisis has been driven by a
desire to promote EU investment in its near periphery through the ENP
without undermining Germany’s partnership with Russia, while simulta-
neously being seen to support US attempts to punish Russia over Crimea and
for daring to challenge the petrodollar cartel. However, if US foreign policy
‘were to change toward a more confrontationist or containment approach,
trouble in the transatlantic relationship would be brewing’ (Adomeit 2014: 2).
The accuracy of this prediction can be seen in the decision by Angela Merkel
and François Hollande to break ranks with the Anglosphere and negotiate a
second Minsk ceaseﬁre agreement for Ukraine in February 2015, rejecting the
belligerent threats of US leaders to arm the Ukrainian military.
Conclusion
Power transition theorists like to maintain that the threat of systemic war
escalates when a ‘single dissatisﬁed great power’s capabilities catch up to or
pass the capabilities of the traditional dominant power that is now in relative
decline. During this power transition, the challenger sees an opportunity to
defeat the dominant power and establish a new order’ (Rasler & Thompson
2012: 99). For US students of international security studies it is axiomatic
that China – like Germany a century ago – will seek to acquire the capability
to challenge the roaming power of the US in Asia, to exert control over its
‘near seas’, to promote Sino-centric regional economic integration, and to
defend and advance Chinese sovereignty claims while sustaining harmonious
relations with its Asian neighbours and avoiding conﬂict with America as the
latter increases its military presence in the Paciﬁc (Glaser 2014). However,
while China’s rise is already creating unease among its Asian neighbours –
whose ambivalence towards America’s military presence in the Asia-Paciﬁc is
tempered by anxiety about Chinese territorial aspirations – it is doubtful
whether China’s corporate-state elites will have the opportunity to emulate the
example of American hegemony. Even if Mearsheimer is right – that one
cannot predict the intentions of China’s leaders in the future – it is clear
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China is only one great power among many in an emerging complex multi-
polar system which (in contrast to the world the US inherited in 1945) will
materially constrain China’s ambitions (Moens 2012: 107).
Yet, as we have argued, the future of world order in a globally integrated
economy will be determined less by China’s capacity to grow peacefully than
by unwillingness in the West to accept a reset of the international monetary
system and a consequent diminution of its transnational ﬁnancial power. To
sustain this power in international politics, the US and its allies are accus-
tomed to acting unilaterally to suppress regional contenders and degrade
local sovereignties to maximize the mobility of ﬁnance capital concentrated in
North America, Japan and the EU. Western ﬁnancial power is supported by
the formal military alliance of NATO, but also by the informal interventionist
power of the US, UK, France, Israel and Australia as military actors in their
own right. It is further supported by the transnational signals intelligence
capacity of ‘ECHELON’ centred on the NSA and GCHQ (which continues
to deny Germany full membership and is a source of tension in transatlantic
relations).15 Although NATO is an institutional relic of the Cold War,
internally divided and unable to prevail in unconventional warfare, it remains
a symbol of Western power and is quick to assume the mantle of the ‘inter-
national community’, even if on closer inspection it is a ‘military club of rich-
world states and their satellites used to enforce western strategic and economic
interests’ (Milne 2014: 2).
America’s pivot towards Asia (locating 60 per cent of its military power in
the region) constitutes an attempt to remain geopolitically relevant by
emphasizing the threat posed by Chinese military modernization. Yet China
is not yet a direct threat to US interests in the eastern Paciﬁc because it can
only hope to increase the marginal costs of America’s presence in the region
rather than achieve naval parity (Monteiro 2014). Beyond its need for mone-
tary reset, China’s geostrategic priority is the security of its maritime trade
and energy imports, and it is precisely this vulnerability that the US may seek
to exploit to constrain China in a conﬂict scenario.16
The question remains, however, whether international society – to the
extent that such a collective entity exists as a pluralistic aggregation beyond
the liberal-universalist imaginary – is capable of managing the transition to a
multipolar global growth system and thus to address the geopolitical tensions
created by capitalism. Multilateralism is an institutional form of international
praxis based on ‘coordinating principles between three or more states in accor-
dance with certain principles’ (Ruggie 1993: 8), but the ‘real test of multi-
lateralism as an international practice is the extent to which it shapes institutions
and rules, frames international norms and values, and aﬀects behaviour,
especially of key actors’ (Smith 2014: 10). At present, argues Smith, the US
views itself as a ‘rule maker’ and regards China and Russia as ‘rule takers’ –
reluctant or otherwise; but if the Washington consensus gives way to
decentred globalism, the question will be how the US adjusts to its status as a
declining world power among great powers.
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As the permissive environment of the 1990s recedes, realists embrace a
return to multipolarity, yet a note of caution is advisable lest we succumb to
the idealism of those like Zakaria (2011) who predict a new era of multi-
lateralism in global politics; or Buzan who argues that there is no ‘need for
the US to see oﬀ challengers to its sole superpower status, ﬁrst because there
are none, and, second, because that status is anyway indefensible both socially
and materially’ (Buzan 2011: 21); or Ikenberry, who notes that all emerging
powers are capitalist and, though not ‘united by a common principled belief
in a postliberal world order […] are all very much inside the existing order
and integrated in various ways into existing governance institutions’ (Iken-
berry 2013: 96). Ikenberry in particular compares the US-centric order of the
late twentieth century to ownership of a privately owned corporation which as a
result of globalization is now ‘going public’. The goal for the West, he insists,
is to manage this historic transition while retaining a ‘seat on the board’,
though he fails to register how this transition is complicated by the decline of
the US dollar as the monetary basis of Western ﬁnancial power and the
material threat posed by reserve currency diversiﬁcation and non-dollar-
denominated trade for the transnational security and energy networks that
sustain this power.
This, of course, is hardly surprising, given the lack of attention paid by IR
to the determining role of capital which presupposes its own universality and
self-existence in the unfolding drama of globalization. Although complex
interdependence reduces the likelihood of great power war, it is uncertain
whether global convergence will lead to peaceful multilateralism in a multi-
polar global growth system structured by rival corporate power interests. On
the contrary, as it becomes apparent that Western corporate-state elites are
unwilling to hand over ‘seats on the board’ to ﬁnancial elites from emerging
economies and accept the verdict of history, the world is likely to witness a
relative intensiﬁcation of geopolitical rivalry as Eurasian and East Asian
economies recalibrate their ﬁnancial and monetary systems away from the
direct inﬂuence of Western-led IFIs.
While liberal realists seek evidence to support the transition from interna-
tional society to world society, forecasts of multilateral cooperation between
interdependent states must be balanced against the persistence of antagonistic
competition between regional and transregional capitalist blocs – located
principally in the West and Eurasia. There are few reasons to expect the US
to relinquish its embedded institutional power or to abandon unilateralism,
suggesting a continued or expanded occurrence of conﬂicts between the
declining hegemon and ‘recalcitrant’ regional powers which opt for ‘extreme
self-help’ or align themselves with revisionist great powers. Monteiro (2014)
suggests rightly that the potential for the declining hegemon to be drawn into
regional conﬂicts remains high as long as the incentive for ‘extreme self-help’
exists for regional powers, yet the premise of unipolarity itself is faulty and is
clearly contradicted by the capacity of ‘recalcitrant’ powers like Iran to
leverage their geopolitical security by aligning with great powers like Russia
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and China against the West’s attempts to isolate the Islamic Republic.
Although Israel retains the option of preventive war to delay Teheran’s bid
for military hegemony in the Gulf, Iran’s economic and political interests in
the greater Middle East have been successfully defended and advanced
through deft cooperation with Syria, Russia and China against US/Saudi
foreign policy, suggesting the growing irrelevance of America’s ‘unipolar
moment’ beyond the seminar rooms of Ivy League graduate schools.
Anglo-American IR scholars are correct to argue that emerging great
powers seek accommodation with the West, yet are correspondingly blind to
the refusal of the Anglosphere as a transnationally constituted geopolitical
force to accommodate itself to the realities of global economic convergence.
What is missing in many analyses is acknowledgment of the impact of relative
decline for the US in a global capitalist economy where the rapid (yet uneven)
development of emerging economies contrasts sharply with the US, where a
corporate oligarchy depends on direct ﬁnancial life support from the Federal
Reserve and the destabilization of regional economies that resist the penetration
of Western capital.
Above all, however, Western transnational foreign policy is driven by fears
that China and Russia are preparing for a major loss of international con-
ﬁdence in the dollar, exempliﬁed by the decision by BRICS economies to
develop alternatives to the Western-dominated global ﬁnancial and payments
system in deﬁance of the Anglo-American elite. However, while the Anglo-
sphere is opposed to monetary reset, given there is no way to resolve the ﬁscal
crisis of the US state without also generating hyperinﬂation, Western corpo-
rate-state elites may already have privately concluded that the short-term cost
of delaying dollar collapse by manipulating gold paper markets (allowing
China to acquire gold cheaply while continuing to hold US debt in return) are
less serious than the catastrophic risk of a disorderly default as investors
abandon US securities for alternative havens. China and Russia are preparing
for the remonetization of gold as an integral component of monetary reset,
and despite the eﬀect of quantitative easing and economic sanctions are rela-
tively less vulnerable to the ﬁnancial statecraft of Anglo-American capital.
Tacitly supported by China, Russia is pursuing a high-risk strategy in this
respect, namely to sell oil only for physical gold, thus re-opening the ‘gold
window’ through trade rather than through the currency markets without
Western permission. This strategy may succeed, argues Kalinichenko, regardless
of whether the West agrees to pay for energy in gold:
Since Russia has a constant ﬂow of dollars from the sale of oil and gas, it
will be able to convert these dollars to buy gold at current gold prices,
depressed by all means by the West […] Using the mechanism of active
withdrawal from the market of one ﬁnancial asset artiﬁcially lowered by
the West (gold) in exchange for another ﬁnancial asset artiﬁcially inﬂated
by the West (USD), Putin has thereby started the countdown to the end
of the world hegemony of petrodollar […] The West can spend as much
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of its eﬀorts and resources to artiﬁcially increase the purchasing power of
the dollar, lower oil prices and artiﬁcially lower the purchasing power of
gold. The problem of the West is that the stocks of physical gold in pos-
session of the West are not unlimited. Therefore, the more the West
devalues oil and gold against the US dollar, the faster it loses devaluing
Gold from its not inﬁnite reserves.
(Kalinichenko 2014: 1)
This strategy is intended to weaken the global hegemony of the petrodollar
and turn the US currency into an intermediate means of payment for an asset
with no counterparty liability – physical gold. Predictably, this has led to
retaliation in the form of US-Saudi cooperation to suppress the price of oil in
an attempt to undermine the Russian economy further, leading to a 41 per
cent decline in the value of the rouble in December 2014 and the replacement
of leading ﬁgures at the Central Bank of Russia (Fedorinova 2015).
Although Russia under Putin has successfully overcome the bitter legacy of
economic collapse, sovereign default and internal conﬂict, and has willingly
engaged with the West and adapted to new international institutional norms,
Moscow’s attempt to rebrand the country as a resurgent economic power with
vital geopolitical interests in Eurasia has failed in Western eyes because the
US cannot tolerate any challenge to the transnational geopolitical agency of
Western ﬁnancial and security interests. As Ishchenko (2015: 2) argues, ‘at any
given time Putin [has] engaged in precisely the level of confrontation with the
United States that Russia could handle. If Russia isn’t limiting the level of
confrontation now, it means Putin believes that, in the war of sanctions, the
war of nerves, the information war, the civil war in the Ukraine, and the
economic war, Russia can win.’ Washington, he adds, is not governed by
fools, and US actions in Ukraine reﬂect a realization in the West that as the
US declines Russia has become stronger, economically, militarily and diplo-
matically: ‘This process was natural and impossible to arrest,’ he argues, ‘and
we could have projected with a high degree of certainty that by 2020 to 2025,
without any confrontation, the period of US hegemony would have ended,
and the United States would then be best advised to think about not how to
rule the world, but how to stave oﬀ its own precipitous internal decline’
(ibid.). While Russia and China need peace to realize their long term goals,
therefore, the US needs perpetual conﬂict to push rising contenders oﬀ bal-
ance and delay a secular realignment of world order – even at the risk of
igniting full-scale war in Europe.
Underlying the long-term decline of the US and UK is an accumulation
crisis – a tendency towards overaccumulation that can ‘never be eliminated’
(Harvey 1989: 182). Overaccumulation, argues Harvey, is ‘an eternal problem
for any capitalist mode of production. The only question […] is how the
overaccumulation tendency can be expressed, contained, absorbed or mana-
ged in ways that do not threaten the capitalist social order’ (ibid.). As we saw
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the contradictory logic of overaccumulation is
212 Capitalist geopolitics
increasingly mediated through the state form of capital along multiple spatial
scales, and the intensiﬁed political management of transnational capital
reﬂects the speciﬁc capacity of the ﬁnancial circuit of states and IFIs to
reproduce the political conditions necessary for the valorization of value
through investment and speculation in established and emerging markets. Yet
declining proﬁtability and intercorporate rivalry are eroding the capacity of
all states – particularly the US and UK – to accumulate value proﬁtably, to
resist deﬂationary pressures, and to control the direction of capital ﬂows as
once self-sustaining ﬁnancial corporations demand increasing levels of struc-
tural support through state circuits of capital to sustain the accumulation of
derivative values that generate the illusion of wealth – directly contradicting the
neoliberal myth that society should be ordered through competitive ‘market-
based mechanisms rather than state intervention’ (Soederberg 2006: 111).
This, in turn, is undermining the ﬁscal integrity and stability of the US and
UK, which are increasingly unable to contain reserve currency diversiﬁcation
and the speculative orientation of transnational capital towards emerging
markets which oﬀer investors more opportunities for proﬁtable accumulation.
Sparked by the refusal or inability of Western corporate-state elites to engi-
neer structural reform of their banking systems, the accumulation crisis of
Western capital is pushing Western corporate-state elites to shift the cost of
devaluation elsewhere – onto emerging economies, workers and the poor. As
the ‘concentration and centralization of capital proceeds’, argues Smith, ‘the
overaccumulation and devaluation of capital necessarily tends to occur on an
ever more massive scale. Global turbulence and generalized economic inse-
curity increasingly become the normal state of aﬀairs’ (Smith 2003: 38).
Although realists continue to insist that in an international system structured
by anarchy states organize their security and prepare for war, making conﬂict
likely even if states do not seek it, it is increasingly clear that the underlying
structural cause of conﬂict in the international system is no longer geostrategic
rivalry as such, but ﬁnancial pressure to preserve the concentrated economic
power and above-average earnings of dominant capital, particularly ﬁnancia-
lized corporations that beneﬁt from the pro-liquidity policies and asset pur-
chases of central banks, whose primary function is to maintain the existence
of system-relevant institutions.
As liberal internationalism is gradually superseded, the old imperial illu-
sions of the West increasingly resemble relics of nineteenth-century capitalism
that no longer correspond to the complex realities of a multipolar global
growth system characterized by new forms of uneven and combined devel-
opment. Indeed, as Buck-Morss notes, for too many left-wing radical critics
the term US hegemony ‘stands in for all the evils of the world: economic,
cultural and political. But it needs to be emphasized that none of the pro-
blems that concern us […] would disappear even if the United States ceased to
exist altogether’ (Buck-Morss 2007: 440). While geopolitics has been deﬁned
historically by the logic of national security, capitalist geopolitics is ultimately
deﬁned by ‘ruling class security’ (Apeldoorn 2014), and even if organizations
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like the SCO or BRICS present a counterhegemonic challenge to the West, they
nevertheless exist in the ﬁrst instance to provide a forum for co-managing the
security of participating capitalist states whose domestic social and political
regimes are far from progressive. From this perspective, the material-ideological
structures of corporate capitalism are changing in form, but corporatism will not
‘end’ with the decline of the US from a world power to great power –
although reports indicate that corporate-state elites in the US itself are pre-
paring for an upsurge of violence as the economy deteriorates and envir-
onmentalist opposition to corporate energy policy escalates (Gaist 2014;
Ahmed 2013).
While transnational corporations headquartered in the West would prefer
to lead global markets through peaceful, rules-based trade, as Cooke
observes, ‘peaceful market domination has become more diﬃcult as the US
has declined economically in relation to emerging economies like China,
India, Brazil, etc.’ (Cooke 2013: 3). As the capacity of Western central banks
to delay structural adjustment is eroded, as the material-economic structures
of Western ﬁnancial power are placed in question, and as revisionist econo-
mies challenge Western leadership in international ﬁnancial institutions (or
develop IFIs of their own), military force and other forms of statecraft will be
called upon to undermine contenders, suppress local sovereignties and main-
tain access to resources necessary for the power of transnational capital. This
indicates the essential unity of capitalist sovereignty and state power articu-
lated in contemporary geopolitics – a transnational strategic practice that
mirrors predatory corporate rivalry for control over global markets and which
reproduces structural conditions for corporate oligarchy through the ﬁnancial
circuits of the national and transnational state form of capital.
Notes
1 An example of progressive interregionalism would be the developing ties between
the EU and ASEAN. The EU is the largest investor in South-East Asia, and the
EU is ASEAN’s second largest trading partner after China. See Blankert (2012),
who frames the relationship in positive terms as a ‘natural partnership’.
2 Some observers, e.g. O’Brennan (2014), suggest that after the eurozone crisis
external expansion of the EU is stalling – that is, the current project of integrating
the smaller states of the western Balkans (former Yugoslavia) is ﬂat-lining due to
‘enlargement fatigue’ on the part of EU member states, and a ‘deﬁcit of
implementation’ on the side of candidate states.
3 On the dual character of the European continent as a Euro-Atlantic/Euro-Asiatic
geopolitical space, see Sava 2004.
4 The text of the 1997 ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation’ can be found at www.nato.
int/cps/en/natolive/oﬃcial_texts_25468.htm.
5 On the normative deﬁcit of US foreign policy, see Aslam (2013), who argues from
an English School perspective that America fails to meet the criteria for great
power responsibility in international society: the norm of legality, the norm of
legitimacy, and the norm of prudence.
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6 For an alternative perspective on EU foreign and security policy, see Sjursen
(2012), who argues that the EU is capable of rising above mere inter-
governmentalism. See also the contributions in Telò & Ponjaert 2013.
7 Pan and Chen argue that China’s state elite is aware of the risks and opportunities of
multipolarity, yet sees the current shift in world order away from Western hegemony
as broadly positive because it has been conditioned by globalization and increasing
interdependence which hypothetically reduce the potential for war. The oﬃcial Chi-
nese strategy is to promote what Qin Yaqing somewhat pompously terms ‘relational
governance’, to manage international relations through a ‘deliberative political and
social arrangement in order to establish order, […] conduct mutually beneﬁcial coop-
eration, and build trust through the forming of common understanding of the social
norms and human morality’ (Pan & Chen 2012: 72). The principal components of
this strategy are ‘partnership bilateralism’ and ‘tailored multilateralism’.
8 Kennan (1948) deﬁned political warfare in a 1948 State Department memorandum
as ‘the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace […] the
employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its
national objectives’. For further details of current US thinking on the utility of
political warfare, see Boot et al. 2013.
9 On the development of missile defence since the Cold War, see Futter 2013.
Turnbull (2014) argues that the real focus of US ballistic missile defence operations
is Asia rather than Europe.
10 In September 2014 Iraq took delivery of new Russian Pantsyr-S1 mobile short-
range air defence systems. See www.janes.com/article/43893/30-09-2014.
11 On the historical evolution of Russia’s identity in international relations, see Taras
2013.
12 Deploying this tactic, Bunde argues: ‘While the strategic community in Germany is
mostly on the same page with international critics, Germany’s international partners
will have to target the political leadership – preferably along the lines suggested by
the [Stiftung Wissenschaft & Politik/German Marshall Fund] report and appeal to
those traditions of the German strategic culture that they want to see strengthened.
What they can thus do is to opt for a strategy of naming and shaming, basically
letting the German government know that the only way to keep NATO relevant is
to actually invest in and commit to its multilateral structures. This means more
pooling and sharing, more common funding, and the ensuing commitment that
these common resources can actually be used by NATO (or some of its allies) even if
one ally has objections against a certain mission’ (Bunde 2013: 3).
13 ‘Deutschland muss bereit sein, mehr zu tun […] Wir sind auf dem Weg zu einer
Form der Verantwortung, die wir noch nicht eingeübt haben.’
14 See the speech by Sigmar Gabriel, German Federal minister for economy and
energy, 28 August 2014, to assembled business leaders, www.bmwi.de/DE/Service/
veranstaltungen.
15 On the EU investigation into ECHELON, which provides vital economic intelligence
for Anglo-Saxon economies, see Schmid 2001 and Asser 2000; also see Bamford 2008.
16 Awareness of this vulnerability is driving Chinese investment in overland trade
routes from the Indian Ocean to western China and the creation of port facilities
in Asia (China’s ‘string of pearls’) to protect its expanding global economic foot-
print (see Joshua 2013). China’s acquisition of Gwadar port in Pakistan in Feb-
ruary 2013 against US wishes is a case in point. The port – which the US
previously sought for its own military purposes – provides China with a vital stra-
tegic asset in the Balochistan region of Pakistan, adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz,
and is being linked by road to Kashgar in China. The deal also has implications
for India, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (Mazhar et al. 2012; Sharma 2013).
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Abbreviations
ABF Asian Bond Fund Initiative
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BND Bundesnachtrichtendienst (German intelligence)
BRICS(A) Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CDU Christian Democrats
CEO chief executive oﬃcer
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
ECB European Central Bank
EEC European Economic Community
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EU European Union
FDI foreign direct investment
FIRE ﬁnance, insurance and real estate
FTA free trade agreement
G7 Group of Seven advanced economies
G20 Group of Twenty advanced and emerging economies
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters
GDP gross domestic product
IFI international ﬁnancial institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPE international political economy
IR international relations
ISDS investor-state dispute settlement
M&A merger and acquisition
MENA Middle East and North Africa region
MFN most favoured nation
MNC multinational corporation
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO nongovernmental organization
NSA National Security Agency
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFP Partnership for Peace
R&D research and development
RTA regional trade agreement
SAP structural adjustment programme
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDR special drawing right
SPD Social Democratic Party
TPP Transpaciﬁc Partnership
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN United Nations
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization
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